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Abstract 
Corporate governance has received considerable attention over the past few 
decades especially after several corporate scandals and global financial crises 
surfaced. It is a tool that ensures the wealth maximization interest of shareholders 
(Grove & Clouse, 2015; Gupta, 2015). Several studies on corporate governance 
have been made around the world, mostly in the context of developed nations. 
These have made significant contributions to the corporate governance literature and 
practice. However, there is scant research that addresses corporate governance 
issues in the context of emerging economies. In terms of applicability, it is important 
to view corporate governance not as a whole but in the context of specific fashion 
due to the economic, political, social and cultural differences among countries.  
In spite of the numerous studies in the subject and their contributions, a 
significant gap exists in our understanding of the relationship between corporate 
governance structure, process and board performances. Most of the prior studies 
focused on board structure giving much less emphasis to the board process- the 
missing link. By way of addressing the gap and providing a broader understanding of 
the relationship among the corporate governance variables, this study, among 
others, explored how board structure and board process influence the board 
performance in an emerging market economy context. Board performance has 
hardly been explored in this setting and this study tries to contribute to the existing 
literature by examining the antecedents of the boards‟ performance. The 
antecedents are positioned in the second order constructs that include the board 
structure and the board process. The antecedents with the board structure go 
beyond the usual variables of size, CEO duality and the outside/inside directors‟ 
ratio. 
A mixed method approach was used in the collection and analysis of the data. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from private and public banks‟ 
governing bodies and various groups of stakeholders. The quantitative data were 
mainly analyzed statistically using the Partial Least Square method of the Structural 
Equation Modeling. The qualitative data obtained from the survey and the interviews 
were thematically analyzed to identify important concerns. 
The findings from the quantitative data analysis showed that board structure 
has positive and significant influence on board process, board service and control 
v 
task performance. The findings also indicated a positive and significant relationship 
between board process and both board service and control task performance. 
Furthermore, the study revealed that board process mediates the relationships 
between board structure and both board service and control roles; it was also found 
that ownership type affects board performance but has no influence on company 
performance.   
The stakeholders‟ perceptions of various aspects of corporate governance 
practices, as beginners, were found out to be not bad. However, Ethiopia, like many 
emerging market economies, does not yet have a fully developed legal and 
regulatory system. Additionally, the enforcement capacities of the regulatory organ 
are at a nascent stage, and a private sector that is able to support effective corporate 
governance has yet to emerge. The nature of the Ethiopian banking corporate 
governance system can be characterized by a one tier system with a non-executive 
board of directors and ownership concentration. The boards of directors are also 
mainly control oriented rather than strategic or service oriented leaders. 
 
Key Terms: 
Corporate governance; Emerging economy; Board structure; Board process; Board 
performance; Firm performance; Second order; Ownership structure; Board of 
directors; Governing bodies; Stakeholders‟ perception. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction  
 Corporate governance has been one of the topical and most widely 
discussed issues in both the academic literature and the business press over the last 
two decades especially after the corporate scandals and financial crises of the recent 
times (Mallin, 2010). The scandals have eroded shareholders‟, stakeholders‟ and 
public‟s confidence in corporate governance mechanisms (Emmanouilides, 2007). 
Most of the scholarly research on the subject has focused on examining or linking 
corporate governance mechanisms or variables to accounting measures of 
performance, such as CEO duality, board size, CEO compensation with return on 
asset (ROA) as measures of performance (Zeitun & Tian, 2007; Zeitun, 2009; Fauzi 
& Locke, 2012). Most of the empirical findings have been mixed, inconclusive and 
inconsistent (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Minichillin, Zattono & Zona, 
2009). In their meta-analytic reviews of board structure and financial performance, 
Dalton et al. (1998) found little empirical evidence to support a definite relationship 
between governance structural variables and firm performance. They concluded that 
examination of these variables in relation to firm performance will provide only little 
information to academics or practitioners. 
From the perspective of this study, the inconsistent results of the previous 
studies should not come as a surprise as the studies did not include the missing link, 
which is corporate governance decision process, which has led to an incomplete 
picture emerging. Furthermore, firm performance is too remote to be used as an 
endogenous variable in any measure of the performance of boards of directors. This 
study, therefore, takes an alternative approach which addresses the missing link, 
analysis of board processes, neglected in previous studies. It also treats board 
performance as an endogenous variable rather than firm performance. This study 
adopts a broad and integrated approach by examining board structure, processes 
and performances to examine corporate governance from the standpoint of an 
emerging economy. The corporate governance constructs that are examined include 
board structure (board composition, board independence and board committee), 
board process (commitment, process conflict, cognitive conflict and boardroom 
activity) and board service and control performances (advisory role, networking role, 
strategic participation role, behavioral control role, output control role and strategic 
control role). These variables, to the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, have not 
2 
been examined empirically in an integrated way in previous studies. Furthermore, 
the study used primary data from the governing bodies (boards of directors) that are 
generally believed to be inaccessible to researchers or difficult to access. Besides 
the boards of directors, the research has also captured and described the 
perceptions of other groups of stakeholders on different dimensions of corporate 
governance. Above all, this study was conducted in the context of an emerging 
economy where research of the kind is scant. 
 
1.1 Corporate Governance: An Overview 
The concept of corporate governance can be traced back to the 18th century. 
Smith (1776) as quoted in Tricker (2009:8), for example, wrote that: “The directors of 
companies, being managers of other people‟s money than their own, it cannot well 
be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own”. Corporate 
governance emerged to be very important when many interested individuals and 
groups raised and merged their capital in order to finance huge enterprises. With the 
establishment of such enterprises comes the question of their management and 
control since the multiple owners cannot manage and control the business they own. 
This gap has to be filled by an appropriate organ that functions in the best interests 
of the owners, justifying the need for corporate governance (Said, Jaafar & Atan, 
2015; Tricker, 2009; Bainbridge, 2008; Garg, 2007; Wearing, 2005; Okeahalam & 
Akinboade, 2003; Blair, 1995).  
Corporate governance has become popular attracting the attention of 
investors, academics, and policy makers in the last two decades mainly after the 
Asian financial crises of the1990‟s, the collapse of Enron (2001) and WorldCom in 
2002 and the subsequent financial scandals of some companies in different 
countries (Mallin, 2010). The corporate scandals have eroded public confidence 
(Emmanouilides, 2007) in corporate governance structure and process as well as the 
ability of boards to direct and oversee management. The financial crises and related 
problems have led to a fresh demand for a sharp focus on corporate governance that 
relates to the role of boards, their appropriate structure and a board process capable 
of avoiding corporate failures occurring in the future (Gupta, 2015). It is not 
altogether surprising to see renewed government and public interest in corporate 
governance practices that guarantee that similar crises do not occur so that the 
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public‟s and more  particularly investors‟ confidence is not lost (Gupta, 2015; Said et 
al., 2015; Mallin, 2010; Grant, 2003). The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (2004) emphasizes that in the context of a globalized and 
fast changing environment, corporate governance is a key element not only in 
enhancing investor confidence, but also in improving both economic efficiency and 
growth. The OECD  (2004:11) further states that “[…] The presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an economy 
as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper 
functioning of a market economy‟‟.  
In spite of such growing interest in the subject of corporate governance (Tricker, 
2009), there is no universally agreed definition of the term though the various extant 
definitions reflect the same basic idea. The following definitions help to establish 
some common understanding of corporate governance. 
The United Kingdom (UK) Governance Code (2014:1) defines corporate 
governance broadly as “… the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. The system refers to the establishment of an appropriate governance 
structure and process through which shareholders appoint boards responsible for the 
governance of their companies. This body is meant to engage in setting strategic 
aims, supervising the management, and reporting to shareholders about its 
stewardship role with the overall objective of maximizing shareholders‟ value. 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate governance Council (2014:2) 
defines corporate governance as, “The framework of rules, relationships, systems 
and processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled within 
corporations. It encompasses the mechanisms by which companies, and those in 
control, are held to account”. This advocates for the appropriate governance 
arrangements in terms of structure, decision process, internal and external 
relationships and working mechanisms accompanied by accountability so as to 
introduce good corporate governance practices and promote investors‟ confidence. 
 The OECD (2004:11) understands corporate governance as an important 
instrument of holding together interests and relationships of various stakeholders, 
and defines it as:   
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company‟s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
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company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined”. 
In a more elaborate fashion, Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003:3) state that:  
“Corporate governance refers to the private and public institutions, including 
laws, regulations and accepted business practices, which in a market economy, 
govern the relationship between corporate managers and entrepreneurs 
("corporate insiders") on one hand, and those who invest resources in 
corporations, on the other‟‟.  
They further outline the elements of the totality of the subject: 
“[…] the processes, systems, practices and procedures as well as the formal 
and informal rules that govern institutions, the manner in which these rules and 
regulations are applied and followed, the relationships that these rules and 
regulations determine or create, and the nature of those relationships”. 
In a similar manner Donaldson (2012) defines corporate governance as the 
set of rules, policies, and institutions pertinent to the way a firm is controlled. On the 
bases of the above definitions, it could be argued that corporate governance, as a 
system, implies appropriate corporate structure and process capable of maximizing 
shareholders value (Gupta, 2015). The definition also implies that corporate 
governance is concerned with both internal and external aspects of corporate form of 
business (Mallin, Mulleneux & Wihlborg, 2005). As an internal aspect it refers to the 
boards‟ service task and control role; and external aspect to its relationship with the 
shareholders and stakeholders. In the definitions, corporate governance is seen as a 
means of setting and attaining organizational goals and also monitoring corporate 
performances. The need to maintain an appropriate relationship and, of course, 
balance between the shareholders and stakeholders (managers, employees, 
customers, creditors, suppliers, and investors) interests so as to ensure sustained 
success to all is well emphasized. Equally important in the definitions is the need for 
the legal and regulatory framework that governs the relationship among the various 
parties including individuals, corporations and society at large. In a nutshell, 
corporate governance provides the framework under which corporate entities are 
governed so as to promote the interests of shareholders and stakeholders (Tricker, 
2009).  
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 In addition to the above definitions, several other arguments have been made 
justifying the significance of corporate governance in modern society and economy. 
Mallin (2010:8) outlines the significance of corporate governance in greater detail. 
“[…] it helps to ensure an adequate and appropriate system of controls 
operates within company and hence assets may be safeguarded; it prevents 
any single individual having too powerful an influence; it is concerned with the 
relationship between a company‟s management, the board of directors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders; it aims to ensure that the company is 
managed in the best interest of the shareholders and other stakeholders; it tries 
to encourage both transparency and accountability, which investors are 
increasingly looking for in both corporate management and performance”. 
Good corporate governance, in addition to boosting investors‟ confidence, has 
an economic advantage for emerging economies in attracting potential foreign/local 
investors (Negash, 2008). The introduction of a code of best corporate governance 
practices by many countries demonstrates that corporate governance continues to 
receive due attention from governments and other interested groups. A synthesis of 
the existing literature (Institute of directors in South Africa, 2009; OECD, 2004; 
Cadbury report, 1992) shows that the code of best practices stresses the need for 
transparency, disclosure, accountability, internal control, board structure and 
composition, role of boards, performance based executive pay, shareholders and 
stakeholders right and the like.  
Among the several corporate governance mechanisms such as internal controls 
(policies, guidelines, and procedures), balancing power, compensation, and market 
forces, it is the board of directors system that is theoretically expected to alleviate the 
agency problem between the owners (principals/shareholders) and managers 
(agents). It is crystal clear that the burden of leadership in corporate organizations 
largely rests up on the upper echelon leaders especially the board of directors. 
Having a board, however, does not guarantee a company‟s success. A board may 
be a liability or an asset to an organization depending up on its structure, process, 
behavior, relationship with top management level, and the level of board members‟ 
commitment to represent and protect shareholders‟ interest. Irving Olds, former 
Chair of Bethlehem Steel Company, for example, stated that “Directors are like 
parsley on fish decorative but useless”. His ideas reflect the cursed side of boards. 
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This is mainly due to the low level of commitment that some boards have since they 
operate on part-time basis (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003). However, there are also boards 
that effectively lead, control and become major cause of organizational success. An 
effective board is essential to good corporate governance and investors‟ relations as 
it serves as a link between managers and investors (Mallin, 2010).   
In the discourse of corporate governance, emphasis is paid to the way 
corporate governance is structured and how it functions, because such issues have 
great impact on the performance and ultimately on the fate of any enterprise. That is, 
the way boards of directors are appointed, their diversity/similarity (demographic 
characteristics), how they work (board process) and their relationship with top 
management team are some of the key issues that have serious influence up on 
organizational performance.  
As discussed earlier, because of its apparent significance for the economic 
development and health of business organizations and society at large, corporate 
governance has received great attention from researchers, policy makers, the public 
and business entities (Roberston, 2009; Luo, 2007; Mallin, 2006 Basel Committee, 
1999). Corporate scandals and collapses (such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat) 
and the problems of business today are attributed mainly to a failure of corporate 
governance, which is another reason why governance gains importance. This 
condition has also led to the development of more regulation and codes (Gupta, 
2015; Said et al., 2015; Ahmed, 2015; ASX, 2014; Anderson, Melanson & Maly, 
2007; Garg, 2007). That is why corporate governance as a mechanism to influence 
organizational performance has gained increasing importance from management 
scholars.  
In spite of the demonstrated importance and emphasis, there are scant and 
equivocal empirical evidence about the relationship between the nature of corporate 
governance (board structure, process and its interactions with board roles) and its 
impact on organizational performance in general and in the context of emerging 
economies in particular. Researches in the past heavily focused on the agency 
theory that mainly deals with control functions of boards and the study of the 
relationship between the board composition and financial performance. Generally, 
there is little research on the board process and its impact on performance 
(Minichillin et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005; Ong & Wan, 2001). Furthermore, the 
research on the relationship between board structure and processes with the roles 
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that boards are entrusted with, whether ownership matters in board roles and firm 
performance, especially in the context of emerging economy, is limited. 
 
1.1.1  Corporate Governance in Africa 
There is little research on corporate governance in Africa (Negash, 2008; 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 2005; Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003). The 
limited studies are dominated by commission reports1, and hence, well grounded 
studies are scarce and this is especially true in regard to the Sub Saharan Africa 
context. In Africa, the numbers of listed companies are few and the majority of them 
are family or small private enterprises and state owned corporations that are 
characterized by weak regulatory and supervisory framework (Okeahalam & 
Akinboade, 2003; Armstrong, 2003; ECA, 2005). 
In spite of this deficiency, there is a developmental need in Africa that 
demands the participation of citizens geared towards wealth maximization in an 
environment where good corporate governance prevails. This initiative requires 
having a system in place to monitor and evaluate compliances with best practices of 
corporate governance. In order to ensure good corporate governance practices, 
there is also a need to establish and strengthen institutions responsible for enforcing 
it (Armstrong, 2003; Rossouw, 2005).  
Of course, the introduction of principles and standards of corporate 
governance contextualized in an African way is important (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2005). Some African countries have recently started to introduce reform 
measures with corporate governance that has led to the establishment of corporate 
governance codes in Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius and others. What is lacking according to Armstrong (2003), 
however, is the regulatory and institutional framework that will enforce these 
standards in the countries concerned. 
According to Africa‟s corporate governance survey conducted in 22 countries by 
Philip Armstrong in 2005, the implementation of corporate governance is at different 
stages of progress. South Africa is most advanced in this regard followed by 
Mauritius, Kenya, and Nigeria. Uganda and Zambia have shown good progress while 
Zimbabwe is regressing (ECA, 2005).  
                                                          
1
 Corporate governance in Africa: Economic research paper #66, 2001; Economic commission for 
Africa: Economic and Corporate Governance and Accountability, 2005 
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The majority of the private sector companies in Africa are non-listed small-to-
medium enterprises; however, the need for good corporate governance is high for 
listed, non-listed, and state owned enterprises (Rossouw, 2005). There are a number 
of factors that justify the need for corporate governance, which among others 
include: (i) high level of awareness on the contributions of corporate governance to 
economic success and sustainability of enterprises; (ii) the power to enhance 
corporate responsibility and goodwill which ultimately is believed to attract local and 
foreign investors and; (iii) the ability to serve as deterrent to Africa‟s corrupt and 
unethical business practices. In spite of such convictions, in the majority of African 
countries, there are obstacles to its development and implementation. With the 
exception of Francophone countries, Mauritius and South Africa, lack of effective 
regulatory and institutional framework for instituting standards of best practices is a 
major bottleneck (Ibid.).  
Rossouw (2005) states that privately owned companies are not inspired to get 
listed on the stock exchange due to lack of transparency, market discipline, sound 
regulatory environment and fear of disclosure demands as well as scrutiny of 
corporate activities, which are prerequisites for being listed, and which may be 
exploited by the state and competitors. Thus, this deters the practice and 
enforcement of standards of good corporate governance because privately owned 
companies are reluctant to join the domain of listed companies. 
 
1.1.2 Corporate Governance in Ethiopia 
Since the regime change from a Military Government to a Transitional 
Government in 1991, Ethiopia has launched a series of economic adjustment and 
reform programmes geared towards building a competitive private sector. This set of 
reforms has increased the size and role of the private sector. Even though the 
economy is dominated by smallholder agricultural activities, over the last two 
decades, the number of corporate forms of business firms has increased due to the 
liberalization of the economy. This development has increased the awareness and 
importance of corporate governance and drawn much attention to guarantee the 
protection of investors‟ interests and thereby encourage and boost investment 
(Roberston, 2009; Negash, 2008). 
Before attempting to assess and understand the status of corporate 
governance, it is important to first briefly scan the history and development of the 
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private sector as an important factor. According to Negash (2008), the history of the 
establishment of share companies in Ethiopia dates back to 1960 during the Imperial 
regime and became routine between 1960 and 1973. For the first time it was in 1960 
that the legal framework for corporate governance was laid when the two legal 
institutions, Commercial Code and Civil Code, were proclaimed. The Imperial 
regime, which for the first time recognized the role of the private sector in the 
economy, hardly created the necessary enabling environment. This even did not last 
long due to a regime change in 1974. The Imperial regime, which had feudo-
capitalist orientation, was replaced by a Military rule (socialist orientation) which 
brought an end to corporate practices. The Military rule nationalized and transferred 
all private enterprises and put them under state ownership. It set a capital ceiling that 
impeded the growth and expansion of private business. The nationalized enterprises 
fell under the central command economy and were run by government appointees. 
This brought to a halt the practice of corporate governance until a regime change in 
1991 that led to later revival. This had a far-reaching effect for the current weak 
status of private business in the country (Transparency Ethiopia, 2011). The 1991 
regime change brought a radical change in the economic orientation from a central 
command economy to a liberalized free market economy that led to privatization of 
some nationalized companies and appearance of new share companies.  
According to Negash (2008), the financial performances of the nationalized 
corporations which were clustered under different ministries were dismal justifying 
the privatization policy of the post Military regime. Also relevantly one of the intents 
of the structural adjustment program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1993-
1996) was to privatize the state owned enterprises that would pave the way for 
private sector development (African Development Bank, 2000: ii). But Armstrong 
(2003:19) argues that privatizing state owned enterprises in an environment where 
there was poor governance could mean extending the same problem to the private 
sector domain.  
As stated above, it was after a major policy change to liberalize the economy 
was in place that the formation of share companies governed and controlled by the 
board of directors came to the fore (Roberston, 2009; Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2004). The range of economic reforms introduced that includes: complete 
liberalization of domestic prices, devaluation of the local currency, privatization of 
state owned enterprises, more liberal investment climate, market based foreign 
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exchange and authorization of private banks represents a radical break with the 
past. This era marked the start of the practices of corporate governance helping to 
ensure sustained success for the newly formed companies. 
Ethiopia has no stock exchange markets but the recently established 
domestic private banks have been selling shares in the market, without having an 
institutional framework that safeguards the interest of the shareholders, which calls 
for the need for appropriate corporate governance. Private banks are expected to 
operate under the framework of corporate governance. There is however, lack of 
strong systems to ensure compliance with principles of corporate governance. 
Regarding state owned banks, a study conducted on the practices of 
corporate governance by the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral 
Associations (AACCSA) (2009:108) states that,  
“The state owned enterprises incorporated as share companies are expected 
to operate under formal corporate governance approaches. Currently such 
enterprises have boards of directors and separate managers. Even though 
the need for a corporate governance structure is not strong, introducing 
boards of directors, separating the owner (the state) from managers, is 
commendable”.  
However, the study poses a question whether these boards of directors have the 
proper training, experience, and expertise. It also questions the degree of 
independence of the boards from the interference of the government and the 
observation in this regard is not generally positive and this is not an exception to 
state owned banks (AACCSA, 2009). 
In line with this, Negash (2008) surmises the standards of corporate 
governance in Ethiopia as disappointing and specifically attributes it, among other 
things,  to, (i) the inadequacy of 1960 commercial code of Ethiopia to handle the 
legislative matters of the current complex issues of corporate governance, though a 
new corporate law is being drafted; (ii) lack of ratification or incorporation of 
international conventions and codes; (iii) ownership concentration and pyramids 
creating agency problem; (iv) inadequacy of laws protecting investors and creditors 
and also ineffectiveness of court systems in resolving investment disputes and; (v) 
lack of an organized share market and  quality issues in professional education. 
The general observation is that corporate governance is at its early stage of 
development in Ethiopia and is characterized by a very weak legal framework and 
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poor practices of corporate responsibility (Negash, 2008). However, since recently, 
there has been consensus among the business and sectoral associations in respect 
of the need for a strong corporate governance framework and national code of 
business practices (AACCSA: 2009). As a result, there are several initiatives towards 
improving the current weak status of corporate governance. The following are some 
of the most important measures towards improved corporate governance standards 
(PSD Hub/AACCSA, 2009) that include:  
 The revision of the 1960 Commercial Code, which is considered as pivotal 
part in upgrading corporate governance standards, 
  A joint move to standardize the accounting and auditing practices of 
corporate firms, 
 Modernizing and computerizing the Company Register, strengthening the 
organizations of the business community at the national and city levels to 
make important contributions to the institutional environment for supporting 
corporate governance, and  
 Increased awareness of the importance of corporate governance and 
commitment towards any effort to improve it by the business community and 
the state. 
Though corporate governance is at its early stage of development, the 
corporate governance model is based on a unitary (one tier) board of directors 
representing the shareholders in a more direct way with a view to optimally meeting 
shareholders‟ interest. The structure of the shareholding is also highly dispersed. 
 
1.2 Rationale of the Study   
 The researcher was personally interested in undertaking research on this specific 
topic for several reasons. First of all, the role and responsibility of upper echelon 
leaders is not well understood, and consequently the researcher realized that it 
deserves a critical assessment. Secondly, preliminary discussions with some board 
members of public enterprises and even private banks, regarding the roles and 
responsibilities that are assigned to them, revealed much below the researcher‟s 
expectations to the extent that some boards do not justify their existence. The third 
reason which was somehow similar to the above has to do with the complaints that 
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the researcher used to hear from CEOs of public enterprises and private banks. The 
complaints include: 
 the way board members are appointed, 
 the low level commitment of board members, 
 low attention to strategic issues but high involvement of board members in 
routines, 
 the high level of interference in petty issues emanating from self view or role 
perception as mere watchdogs rather than policy formulators and 
implementers, and  
 poor board process and relationship with top management team. 
Paradoxically, the majority of the enterprises with such problems still 
demonstrate good performances in terms of profitability. This has had a considerable 
effect on the researcher‟s decision to investigate whether “boards are like parsley on 
fish decorative but useless‟‟ as put by Irving Olds, former chair, Bethlehem Steel 
Company, in Gillies and Leblanc (2003) or whether they are the key drivers of 
organizational change and performance. Fourth, corporate governance is a topical 
issue beset with economic disturbances and corporate scandals. The corporate 
collapses (Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat) and the recent global financial crises 
have made corporate governance both an international and national issue attracting 
the attention of various stakeholders (Emmanouilides, 2007). 
Lastly, and more importantly as a propelling force for this research, much 
work has not been done on corporate governance in Ethiopia (Kiyota, Peitsch & 
Stern, 2008) since the issue is a recent phenomenon whilst the economy has been 
witnessing transformation over the last two decades. A study of corporate 
governance is important to Ethiopia mainly because: it is a key to developing a 
market economy and attracting foreign investment as desiderata for sustainable 
development; it ensures greater transparency and disclosure and thereby enhances 
investor confidence; it also ensures shareholder protection, to mention a few of the 
many more benefits that accrue. To date, the studies made on different aspects of 
corporate governance largely have focused more on developed economies than 
emerging economies (Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla & Smith, 2015; Ebrahim & 
Fattah, 2015; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). The study of the state of corporate governance is 
very important in emerging economies like Ethiopia because of the differences in the 
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social set up, cultural values and economic conditions compared to developed 
economies. In this connection Adegbite (2012), indicated that corporate governance 
model and corporate behavior are influenced by countries‟ institutional arrangements 
implying that corporate governance regulations should be considered from the 
context of any particular nation. In a similar manner, Bhasa, (2004) suggested that 
countries should develop corporate governance models unique to their needs by 
understanding their contextual situations. Thus, the empirical findings of studies 
made in developed economies might have limited application and meaning in 
emerging economies due to the differences in contextual settings that include 
organizational and environmental characteristics (Kumar & Zattoni, 2013). This study 
aims to fill the relevant gap in regard to Ethiopia by addressing the contextual 
situation.  
A review of the pertinent literature reveals that the focus of prior studies was 
largely on board structure and firm performance disregarding the board process as 
an important link. There is thus a gap in integrating the board process as a missing 
link in explaining performance. If board structure with different dimensions leads to 
company performance, it is equally important to understand and explain how the 
board process, which is a reflection of the board structure directly or indirectly 
influences performance. This study, therefore, is important in filling this research 
gap. Additionally, the focus of prior studies was on examining relationships with firm 
performance in financial terms as a proxy measure. This study, however, examines 
the relationships between structural, process and particularly board performance 
variables in a fully integrated model. Studies employing this approach are scant and 
fragmented, and this study aims to fill the gap by addressing explicitly the 
antecedents of the board performance but not firm performance. It also fills the gap 
in the literature by examining whether ownership structure influences board 
performances. 
In a nutshell, based on the identified limitations and gaps of the extant 
relevant literature, the researcher was motivated to investigate how boards are 
structured, function (board process), and execute their roles and responsibilities, and 
their impact on boards‟ and companies‟ performance in the Ethiopian emerging 
economy context. 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
Corporate governance is critical to the financial sector in general and the 
banking industry in particular. Poor corporate governance results in bankruptcy that 
has tremendous negative consequences on macroeconomic activities and public 
confidence in general and shareholders in particular. A sound corporate governance 
framework is also very imperative for emerging economies since it is one of the most 
important elements of an enabling environment for investors‟ confidence, which in 
turn fosters sustainable economic growth and development. Corporate governance 
has a short history in Ethiopia due to a central command economy that lasted about 
17 years (1974-1991). The post 1991 period in Ethiopia created fertile grounds for 
the revitalization of the practices of corporate governance due to a major policy 
change from a central command economy to a liberalized free market economy. This 
new era opened an opportunity for some nationalized companies to be privatized 
and new enterprises to flourish.  
In spite of the opportunities for the revitalization of corporate governance, 
there is a noticeable difference in the practices of corporate governance in the 
privately owned share companies and state owned enterprises in terms of election 
and composition of boards of directors. Privately owned share companies are 
structured and monitored by the board of directors that are elected by the 
shareholders; whereas state owned enterprises are governed by the board of 
directors composed of senior officials that are appointed by the government 
(Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003). The practice of election versus appointment 
(ownership structure) is expected to lead to a difference in the board demographics 
and thereby in the board process which calls up on the need to study the structural 
and process variables to see their implications up on the performances in the private 
and public enterprises. The ownership structure, which is in place, is mirrored in the 
corporate governance structure adopted in the two domains. The ownership 
structure is concentrated in the public enterprises which is in the hands of the 
government and relatively diffused in the private enterprises where there is a large 
number of shareholders. 
The banking industry, which has emerged as the most attractive venture for 
domestic investors, is among the few sectors that have benefited much from the new 
economic policy. Since 1994, 16 domestically owned private commercial banks have 
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been established2. Good corporate governance is fundamental in the financial 
sector, especially the banking industry, where banks serve as custodians of public 
money. The nature of banking services and activities demands high levels of 
integrity, transparency and accountability. Banks, as financial intermediaries, play a 
special role in the economy and are vulnerable and sensitive to bad corporate 
governance. Therefore, to enhance investor confidence, attract investment, and 
promote accountability, transparency, integrity and thereby national development; 
effective corporate governance in the banking industry is so essential. Having a 
stable financial system coupled with accepted corporate governance practices 
stands to boost trust and attract investment. In the Ethiopian context, some efforts 
are under way  to improve the framework for corporate governance that include 
revising  the  commercial code, developing standards for accounting and auditing 
practices, developing standards for capital markets, and competition policy projects  
( AACCSA: 2009).  
None of these efforts, however, have fundamentally focused on board 
structure, process, roles and codes as an important element of corporate 
governance in general and in the banking sector in particular. To ensure that boards 
engage in the right process, elements of board structure such as composition and 
professional background of members need to be accounted. Such accounting can 
produce better transparency, accountability, responsibility and pave the path for the 
introduction of good corporate governance practices. However, important issues 
such as whether boards are elected or appointed on merit basis with proper training, 
professional experience, and independence have not been a major reform concern 
so far. 
The need for the emergence and development of effective corporate 
governance in the banking sector is not rhetorically based. There are emerging 
concerns among the shareholders, stakeholders, and the regulatory bodies on the 
banks‟ corporate governance behaviors. A case in point was conflicts of interest, 
malpractices, divisions, hostilities among boards‟, interference of regulatory body, 
and also losses of trust of shareholders that were observed, in recent times3.   
                                                          
2
 www.nbe.gov.et 
3
 Angry Shareholders oust Abyssinia‟s Board Chairman, 2008; National Bank of Ethiopia Call Lion‟s 
Shareholder‟s meeting, 2010; Directors‟ Severe Pay Package Can Cost Banking Talent, 2011; Awash 
Bank Back in Controversy, 2011; NBE Orders Zemen Bank to Re-elect Board Directors.   
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Currently, the need for effective corporate governance practice and an 
institution responsible for it has become an important issue of discussion in Ethiopia.  
Globalization, the need to attract foreign and local investments so as to sustain 
development, the need to control corporate misbehaving and scandals are also 
some of the driving elements for an effective corporate governance to take place. 
Public concerns on the whole have started to focus on the effective protection of 
investors‟/public interests, the promotion of transparency of operations, 
accountability, and the need for banks to move towards standardized corporate 
governance practices.  
To this end, this research examines the practices and impacts of corporate 
governance systems in the Ethiopian banking sector in general and, board structure 
and process, in particular, up on corporate performances. Also, it specifically studies 
stakeholder perceptions of the corporate governance practices and outlines the 
unique features in the practices. On the bases of the problems stated above, the 
research answers the questions below.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 The main question that guides the research is: How do corporate governance 
structure and process, in an emerging economy setting, affect performances of 
boards in the Ethiopian banks? The sub questions formulated to operationalize the 
main research question include:   
1. What is the nature of the interplay between board governance structures, 
processes, and boards‟ service and control performances in banks? 
2. How does the board process mediate the relationship between boards‟ 
structure and boards‟ service and control performances? 
3. What is the impact of ownership structure on boards‟ service and control 
performances?  
4. Does the difference in ownership structure affect bank performances in 
accounting terms?  
5. What is the attitude of stakeholders toward corporate governance 
practices in the private and public banks?  
6. What are the unique features of the Ethiopian banking industry corporate 
governance environment? 
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1.5 Research Aim and Objectives of the Study  
The major aim of this study is investigating and analyzing the impact of 
corporate governance on performances of private and public banks. In doing so, the 
study explores, describes, critically examines, and analyses the board structures, 
board processes and their effects on board performances.  
Specifically, the study intended to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To explore the roles (service and control) that boards play and determine their 
association with governance structure and process.  
2. To determine if board process mediates the relationship between boards‟ 
structure and boards‟ service and control performances. 
3. To Investigate and understand the relationship between board structure, 
board process, and performance given differences in ownership structure. 
4. To assess the attitude of owners and stakeholders in the current corporate 
governance practices in light of the best practices of corporate governance 
and learn from their experiences.  
5. To identify any unique features of banking industry corporate governance in 
Ethiopia 
6. To analyze and synthesis the findings and contribute to the existing corporate 
governance literature. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The current research fills the gap by empirically resolving the controversial 
issue about whether “ boards are like parsley on fish decorative but useless” as put 
by Irving Olds, former chair, Bethlehem Steel Company, in Gillies and Leblanc 
(2003) or central to corporate performances. The study also examines the existing 
corporate governance practices in light of the standards of best practices and makes 
recommendations that improve the current practice. This would be of interest to 
scholars, policymakers, and practitioners, as well as private and public enterprises.  
Since 1994 with the liberalization of the economy, the private sector has been 
flourishing with many corporate sectors, particularly private banks emerging. Given 
the continuing growth in the corporate sector, currently, appropriate corporate 
governance is a necessity for the Ethiopian economy as it is an incentive to attract 
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investment, build investors‟ confidence, ensure transparency and disclosure, protect 
shareholders and stakeholders rights, and fight scandals, among others. 
Studies addressing Ethiopian corporate governance practices are sparse 
since the introduction of corporate governance is a recent phenomenon. Most of the 
international corporate governance studies generally focused on developed 
economies neglecting the relevant state of affairs in emerging economies like 
Ethiopia (Pamburai et al., 2015; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). As 
mentioned in the rationale of the study, the contextual setting of Ethiopia is different 
from that of developed economies and, therefore, a western may have limited 
appropriateness and utility to the corporate milieu of Ethiopia. As a result conducting 
a study embedded in the Ethiopian context would help to evaluate corporate 
governance practices and make recommendations that suit the local framework.  
 To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, this study is a pioneering project 
that focuses on the Ethiopian market from a corporate governance viewpoint. This 
research can also establish the necessary groundwork and serve as benchmark for 
similar researches in the future in the country of the study and in other similar 
economic contexts.  
 The subject of the study is hugely important calling for research into the 
interplay of several crucial factors in corporate governance, which is new to Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia as an emerging free market economy should put in place policies targeting 
best practices of corporate governance so as to attract and protect investors. In this 
regard, the study will fill the lacuna surrounding how corporate governance functions 
in the context of transitional economies. The findings will also help to shade light on 
the existing theories of corporate governance. Thus, the study will serve to deepen 
our understanding of the experiences of corporate governance in the Ethiopian 
context helping policy makers, boards, top management teams, and other 
stakeholders to have greater understanding of the factors that can positively affect 
performance. This study, therefore, will help in identifying the gaps in the current 
practices and forward recommendations for improving corporate governance 
practices as well as policy development on corporate structure, corporate processes 
and formulation of a code of best practices.   
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1.7 Scope of the Study 
Corporate governance is a broad concept that covers a wide array of sectors 
and institutions. This study, however, is limited to the banking industry that includes 
both publicly and privately owned banks whose primary objectives are profit making 
or wealth maximization. Compared to other sectors in the country, the banking 
industry is very much grown and experiencing much better consolidated corporate 
governance.  Hence, it is found to be suitable for this study. 
The unit of analysis for this study is the Ethiopian banks with different 
respondent groups that include boards of directors and stakeholders. Two empirical 
investigations are undertaken to achieve the objectives of the study. First, a survey 
of the upper echelon leaders is undertaken to see the relationships between 
governance structure and process with the board performances (roles), in general, 
and whether ownership matters in particular. Second, a survey of stakeholders‟ 
perceptions is carried out in order to scan the present status of corporate 
governance practices in the banking industry. In both empirical investigations, survey 
questionnaire was used. For the purpose of triangulating the results, interview was 
employed. In examining the relationship between corporate governance variables, 
the second generation regression model called the Smartpls accompanied by 
descriptive statistics of percentage and frequency analysis was used. The 
stakeholders‟ perception survey questionnaire which was used to assess the 
practices of corporate governance was evaluated using percentages and frequency 
distributions.  
An important mechanism to verify the effectiveness of corporate governance 
is the degree to which an organization achieves its objectives which can be 
expressed in terms of customer satisfaction, profitability, and maximizing 
shareholder‟s value. Though there might be a number of indicators to measure the 
impact of corporate governance on organizational performance, for the purpose of 
this study, Return on Asset (ROA) is used as measure of performance. 
Unfortunately, Tobin‟s Q (market value/ book value) ratio cannot be used due to the 
absence of a stock market where shares are traded freely. In measuring the 
performances, in accounting terms, secondary data obtained from the banks‟ annual 
reports are considered. 
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1.8 Limitations of the Study 
The study employed survey questionnaire, interviews, and desk review. Thus 
the limitations that are associated with these methods do also apply to this study. As 
stated in section 1.7 of this chapter, the study covers only the banking sector in 
Ethiopia because it is considered to have more consolidated corporate governance 
practices as it is closely supervised by the National Bank of Ethiopia which is  the 
regulatory organ in the country. Thus, the results obtained may not be used to make 
generalizations about other sectors. The OECD (2004) principle of corporate 
governance developed based on the experiences of developed economies has been 
used as a benchmark in scanning corporate governance practices in Ethiopia 
because Ethiopia has no standard codes of corporate governance against which 
corporate governance practices of companies can be assessed. Therefore, 
benchmarking corporate governance practices of the Ethiopian banks with the 
OECD may not exactly represent their status of governance practices.  
 
1.9 Organization of the study 
The remaining part of the thesis is organized into eight chapters as follows. 
Chapter Two deals with major corporate governance theories, codes of best 
practices and empirical studies. The chapter gives emphasis to the agency, 
stewardship, stakeholders, resource dependence and social capital views. It also 
reviews the empirical studies on corporate governance structure, process and board 
roles. 
Chapter Three presents a conceptual model on the basis of which the 
hypotheses are formulated. The corporate governance theories and the existing 
literature are used in developing and explaining the conceptual model, which also 
shows the link between the exogenous and endogenous latent variables. 
Chapter Four discusses the research methodology and tools used to 
operationalize the conceptual model and test empirically the hypotheses. 
Specifically, it discusses the philosophical foundations of the research, research 
design and strategy, sampling issues, approaches and steps followed in developing 
and testing survey instruments, the process of survey administration, the statistical 
approaches chosen to analyze and test the hypotheses. 
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Chapter Five deals with data examination and preparation to the next stage of 
instrument validation and measurement model evaluation. It evaluates the impact of 
missing data, identifies outliers, tests for non-respondent bias and takes appropriate 
actions as deemed necessary.  
Chapter Six addresses the reliability and validity of the measurement model 
as a prerequisite to the evaluation of the structural model, (testing hypotheses). The 
chapter discusses the two stages followed in purifying the measurement model, that 
is,  the  factorial dimensionality of the indicator variables using principal component 
analysis (PCA) and construct reliability and validity tests using partial least squares 
(PLS) measurement model evaluation. The chapter also presents the descriptive 
statistics of those manifest and latent variables that have passed the validation tests.  
It also carries out the bivariate correlation analysis as a preliminary test of the 
appropriateness of the structural model relationships that have been hypothesized.  
Chapter Seven examines the perceptions of both the governing bodies 
(Sample-1) and group of stakeholders (Sample-2), separately and in aggregate, 
towards the current corporate governance systems and practices in Ethiopia. The 
chapter further analyses the perceptions in terms of the OECD framework, 
remunerations, characteristics of boards, approach to promote corporate  
governance, strategic issues, board independence, board duty and other 
governance issues. Moreover, comments, issues raised and recommendations 
made by stakeholders to improve corporate governance practices are examined and 
analyzed so as to identify serious concerns. The chapter also analyses the 
qualitative in-depth interview for patterns in relation to specific corporate governance 
themes. 
Chapter Eight, which is initiated by the findings of the survey, provides a 
detailed discussion on structural model evaluation and the major findings of the 
study in association with the hypotheses established. The hypotheses are tested 
through PLS structural model evaluation techniques that examine relationships 
between the latent constructs. It, then, presents a summary of research questions, 
hypotheses, findings and discussion of the findings. In this chapter, the interview 
results are triangulated and integrated into the discussion of the findings.  
Finally, Chapter Nine presents a conclusion, lists its contribution to theory and 
practice and outlines its implications for future research.   
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Chapter 2 Unpacking Corporate Governance: A Review of Theoretical 
Foundations and Literatures   
Corporate governance (GC) issues emanate from the whole idea of 
responsibility,  fairness, accountability, transparency and independence  and these 
are of greater importance in a corporate form of organization where the ownership 
and management of businesses are separated (Jakarda & Inusa, 2014). In view of 
the above, the chapter reviews major corporate governance theories, codes of best 
practices, and empirical studies on corporate structure, process, and roles.  
2.1 The Role of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance (CG) occupies a central role in the modern economy, in 
both developed and emerging nations, as a large proportion of economic activity is 
undertaken by firms organized as corporations. The corporations are formed by 
interested citizens who demand protection. This is made possible through different 
mechanisms of corporate governance. The trust in corporate governance in this 
regard is due to the fact that it:  
 Helps to define and ensure an adequate and appropriate system of controls 
within company so that assets are safeguarded (OECD, 2004; Mallin, 2010);  
 Defines the roles and relationship between a company‟s management, the 
board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. It aims to ensure that 
the company is managed in the best interest of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders (OECD, 2004; Mallin, 2010);  
 Tries to encourage both transparency and accountability, which investors are 
increasingly looking for in both corporate management and performance 
(Mallin, 2010); 
 Has an economic advantage for emerging economies in attracting potential 
foreign/local investors (Negash, 2008). 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
 Corporate governance mechanisms are  a set of instruments that are 
instituted to control and reduce inefficiencies and malpractices in corporate forms of 
organizations (Afolabi & Dare, 2015). Common corporate governance mechanisms 
include: board of directors, internal controls (policies, guidelines, and procedures), 
balancing power, market forces, and compensation (Dalwai, 2015). Boards of 
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directors are, voted in by shareholders, used in order to ensure wealth maximization 
and other interests of the owners (Grove & Clouse, 2015). Board of directors as 
internal governance mechanisms have the responsibility to shape the governance of 
an organization given their direct access to management and shareholders (Said et 
al., 2015). Moreover, the burden of leadership rests up on boards of directors and 
they are central to corporate forms of business where ownership and management 
are separated. The shareholders use them to bridge the gap between themselves 
and the management. This group is considered to be a major driving force of 
governance in a corporation (Tricker, 2009).   
 The second corporate governance mechanism is internal controls in the form 
of instituting policies, procedures, and guidelines that are used to manage activities 
and behaviors of the corporation. The third corporate governance mechanism is 
balancing power. This is a common practice of corporate governance mechanisms 
as it deals with demarcating and defining duties between the board and the 
management and between different levels management. It ensures the balance of 
power in the organization so that no one individual person has the capacity to 
overuse resources beyond the limit set. A market force for corporate control is the 
fourth type of control mechanism that influences the executive body to pursue 
shareholders‟ interests instead of theirs‟. This could mean that if managers ignore 
shareholders‟ interest and pursue only their personal interests, stock prices may fall 
which makes the company a target for takeover and consequently losses of jobs for 
managers. In order to avoid the possibility of a takeover, the management would 
work in the best interest of the shareholders. It is therefore the market forces that 
force the executives to think in that line (Tricker, 2009; Dalwai, 2015).  
 According to Dalwai (2015), the fifth mechanism refers to compensation which 
is a performance-based type of management structure. Compensation as a 
corporate governance mechanism ties managerial compensation to firm 
performance so as to align the interests of management and shareholders. This aims 
at improving performance by motivating managers and individuals to work hard and 
reap the benefit from it.  
2.3 Requirements for Effective Corporate Governance 
There is no one model of corporate governance and every country has its own 
distinctive type of corporate governance that reflects the political, economic, and 
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regulatory set ups, enforcement capacity, the legal system, and different ownership 
structure and business situations. According to Gregory and Simms(1999),  effective 
corporate governance tends to assume the prevalence of at least the following 
situations: well-developed and well-regulated securities markets; laws that recognize 
shareholders rights and the equitable treatment of minority and foreign shareholders; 
transparency and disclosure requirements; enforcement mechanisms on the basis of 
which shareholders and stakeholders rights are safeguarded; anti-corruption laws to 
prevent bribery and protections against fraud targeting investors; strong and 
independent courts and regulators; well developed private sector institutions such 
as, strong accounting and auditing sector, professional associations, rating agencies, 
strong financial press and capable securities analysts. 
2.4 Need for and Roles of Board of Directors  
Boards of directors come into play to fill the gap between ownership and 
control and for the purpose of controlling and maintaining an effective organization 
where ownership and management are separated (Garg, 2007). This is one of the 
roles that boards are expected to play in addition to other roles stated by Goodstein, 
Gautam and Boeker (1994) as cited in Ghosh (2006:435), i.e.,  
“Corporate boards fulfill three roles […]. First, boards play an institutional role: 
providing a link between the organization and its environment. Second, boards 
discharge a governance role: monitoring and disciplining of inefficient 
management. The third role of the board is strategic: chartering the future 
growth path of the firm in a competitive setup”.  
The roles that are expected of boards are mainly linked with the major theses 
outlined by different theories viz. the agency, stewardship, stakeholders, resource 
dependence and social capital theories. These theories, which are briefly discussed 
in the subsequent sections, have greatly influenced the nature and development of 
corporate governance (Mallin, 2010; Tricker, 2009).  
2.4.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory deals with the challenge on how to ensure that the agent 
(managers) acts in the interest of the principal (shareholders) (Mallin, 2010; Tricker, 
2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problem occurs in situations where 
owners are not in a position to manage/control the organization they own, that is, 
when there is separation of ownership and control (Bhasa, 2004). It also deals with 
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the agency problem, which is the likelihood of conflicting goals, abuse of power, and 
information asymmetry and provides the framework for handling such situations 
between the principal and agents (Fama, 1980). The problem lies in the self interest 
that the agent demonstrates which may not favor the interests of the principals (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Fama & Jense, 1983; Ramos & Olalla, 2014). According to Tricker 
(2009:219), “[T]he agency theory looks at corporate governance practices and 
behavior through the lenses of the agency dilemma‟‟, which arises whenever a 
principal enters into a contract with an agent to manage a property. Tricker 
(2009:217) explains the situation by quoting Smith (1776) that, “The directors of 
companies, being managers of other people‟s money, cannot be expected to watch 
over it with the same vigilance with which they watch over their own”. Thus, to align 
the interests of the agent with the shareholders, agency costs that include monitoring 
costs are incurred (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Marnet, 2004). 
Agency theory is based on a narrow theoretical scope (Tricker, 2009) and the 
assumption that humans are utility maximizers, self-seeking and opportunistic. 
Therefore, the main issue is the extent to which mangers, as agents, act in the 
interest of shareholders. Corporate governance is thought to be one of the 
mechanisms to constrain the opportunistic behavior of the agent that requires the 
establishment of a board of directors that oversees the activities of the agent (Mallin, 
2010). The theory views the board of directors as a means of control through 
monitoring (Mallin, 2010; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Mueller &Barker III, 1997; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980). One can deduce 
from the previous discussion that boards as governance mechanisms monitor the 
management and through their control on the selection of directors, proposed by its 
nomination committee composed of non-executive directors, can improve the overall 
performance of management. As a governance mechanism, the key role of boards 
would be to reduce the agency costs and maximize shareholders wealth. It is for 
these reasons that boards have become one of the essential governance institutions 
in corporate organizations.  
In a nutshell, the theory views a board of directors as an important 
governance mechanism which provides important services and executes control 
functions. Mallin (2010:15) further elaborates that, “In the context of corporations and 
issues of corporate control, agency theory views corporate governance mechanism, 
especially the board of directors, as being an essential monitoring device to try to 
26 
ensure that any problems that may be brought about by the principal-agent 
relationship, are minimized.” 
The agency theory, though the mainstay of research for the past three 
decades, is criticized for studying the complex nature of corporate governance using 
a relatively narrow theoretical lens of contract relationships that involves principals 
and agents. As a simplistic model it is also easily challenged by posing the question 
„who is the agent for whom‟ in a situation where there is a chain of investments. As 
Tricker (2009:222) puts it: “… the ultimate beneficial owner invested through a 
pension fund, which invests in a hedge fund, which invests in a private equity 
company, which places funds in the hands of financial institutions, which invests in 
the shares of listed company but lends them as collateral for another transaction, 
who is agent for whom …”. The agency theory is also criticized for its moral 
assumption about human behavior that people maximize their personal utility or that 
people are self-interested not altruistic. 
2.4.2  Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory argues against the assumption imbedded in the 
agency theory of opportunistic and self-interest human behavior. The stewardship 
theory states that there is no conflict of interest between owners (shareholders) and 
agents (managers) if there is an appropriate structure that allows coordination to be 
achieved most effectively (Dulwicz & Herbert, 2004). Thus, managers are trustworthy 
and good stewards of organizational resources rather than self serving individuals 
exploiting for private ends due to their position and information asymmetry (Ramos 
and Olalla, 2014).  
The stewardship theory is constructed based on the belief of unification of 
command at the head of an organization. That is, unifying (combining) the CEO and 
chairman‟s role can be beneficiary to shareholders since this results in greater unity 
of direction and strong command and control. On the other hand, the agency theory 
does not believe in the CEO duality (combining the two roles in one person) because 
doing so results in concentration of power in one person with consequences of 
agency cost and lower return to shareholders (Mallin, 2010; Anderson & Baker, 
2010). 
Furthermore, Muth and Donaldson (1998) as cited in Dulwicz and Herbert 
(2004:263) indicated that “Stewardship Theory, in contrast to Agency Theory, 
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recognizes a range of non-financial motives of managers found in the occupational 
psychology literature, for example need for advancement and recognition, intrinsic 
job satisfaction, respect for authority and the work ethic”. So, the theory claims that 
managers are motivated by non financial motivators that include the factors listed 
above.  
The stewardship theory is based on a positive view of human attitude that 
argues that people are not inclined to opportunism, and managers do like to pursue 
shareholders‟ interests; and board members with different experiences, 
competences and viewpoints, as a valuable resource to corporate boards, provide 
counsel and service to management to enhance their decision making process and 
impact corporate performance (Clark, 2004; Tricker, 2009; Anderson & Baker, 2010). 
In describing the stewardship nature of boards and demonstrating the 
relationship between boards and stakeholders, Tricker (2009:224) stated that, 
 “… each company is incorporated as a separate legal entity. The share holding 
members of the company nominate and appoint the directors, who then act as 
stewards for their interest. …. Ownership is the basis of power over the 
corporation. Directors have a fiduciary duty to act as stewards of the 
shareholders‟ interest. Inherent in the concept of the company is the belief that 
directors can be trusted.”  
Tricker (2009: 224) plainly puts that the theory is based on a classical idea of 
corporate governance that “Directors‟ legal duty is to their shareholder not to 
themselves, or to other interest groups. Contrary to agency theory, stewardship 
theory believes that directors do not always act in a way that maximizes their own 
personal interests: they can and do act responsibly with independence and integrity”. 
Opponents of the stewardship theory recognize that the current corporate 
situation differs from the 19th century realities. They argue that the concept of 
appointing directors by shareholders owning a single company is naïve in modern 
circumstances where shareholders are remote and do not nominate the directors. In 
complex organizations, there is lack of transparency, accountability, and commitment 
seriously challenging the stewardship role of boards. Moreover, though the theory 
serves as a legal foundation for company legislation, the late 20th and 21st century 
corporate collapses have eroded trustworthiness of boards owed under the 
stewardship model (Tricker, 2009).  
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2.4.3 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory considers a wider group of constituents instead of 
focusing only on shareholders‟ interests. According to Freeman (1984:46), “A 
stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization‟s objectives”. Stakeholder 
groups include: employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, government, and local 
community (Tricker, 2009; Mallin, 2010; Anderson & Baker, 2010). This theory 
propounds, “… the growing recognition by boards of the need to take account of the 
wider interests of society” (Gay, 2002 as cited in Dulwicz & Herbert, 2004:263).  This 
implies that, corporations have many relationships with stakeholders (constituent 
groups) and the action of one has implications for the other. Therefore, the 
stakeholder theory is concerned with such relationships based on which the 
corporation takes into account the interest of the stakeholders in its processes and 
outcomes. Stakeholders play various roles in corporate governance and some of 
them including customers, creditors and employees are considered to be important 
components for its survival as they provide essential resources to the corporation. As 
a result, a stakeholder theory argues that the interests and concerns of stakeholders 
should get full attention in the process of directing and controlling a corporation 
(Spitzeck & Hansen, 2010).  
 
2.4.4 Resource Dependence and Social Capital Theories 
The resource dependence theory asserts that the effectiveness of a firm can 
be influenced by the ability of key organizational members to act as boundary 
spanners so that carefully selected outside board members can extract important 
resources from the environment that might not be available in the firm (Tricker, 2009; 
Daily & Dalton, 1993). One way to influence the external organizations on which 
firms depend on resources is to have outsiders on the board of directors that serve 
as a link between the two. The resources could include links to markets, access to 
capital and other sources of finance, provision of know-how and technology, 
relationship with business, political, and other societal networks and elites (Tricker, 
2009). Therefore, to have access to these resources, the corporate structure of the 
board should match environmental demands. This is consistent with the 
organizational theory of systems approach that the organization is an open system 
that interacts with its environment and depends on it for its resources. This is also 
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propounded by the social capital theorists who argue that the networking board of 
directors with the external organizations has the potential to bring more resources to 
the firm due to the linkages established.  
Despite differences in their areas of emphasis with regard to the roles of the 
board of directors, theories of agency, stewardship, resource dependence, and 
social capital suggest that board structure (composition) may affect corporate 
performance. Therefore the theories evince that board structure has significant 
impact up on organizational performance. The social capital and the resource 
dependence perspectives see outside board members as a link to external 
resources that can be used as a means to improve performance. Specifically, they 
facilitate access to capital, skills, and other type of resources (Mueller & Barker III, 
1997), whereas the view of the agency theory is that, outsiders would control and 
limit self-serving and opportunistic behavior demonstrated by management. 
Empirical evidence associated with bankrupt organizations demonstrate that firms 
that have higher levels of inside control tend to experience bankruptcy, showing the 
value of outside board members. And the value of a board as a monitoring and 
control organ is affected by its composition (Mueller & Barker III, 1997).      
Previous discussions revealed that the need for corporate governance and 
the dynamics of board of directors can easily be captured by none of the theories. 
The theories complement rather than contradict each other and none of them 
question the importance of board governance in corporate organizations.  
Corporate board structure and processes, as mechanisms of corporate 
governance, have received considerable attention from researchers, academicians 
and policy makers (Ghosh, 2006). These two important components of corporate 
governance are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
2.5 Board Structure  
Board structure refers to the design and style of governance that matches the 
intended functions of a corporation. It is usually determined by the needs of the 
organization (Mallin, 2010; Tricker, 2009). Focusing on board structure and 
processes, this study considers the aspects of structure that include unitary and dual 
structure, composition, size, CEO duality, and board committees. 
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2.5.1 Unitary and Dual Boards 
Unitary board and dual board structures are the two types of board model that 
are discussed as two different approaches in corporate governance between 
countries (OECD, 2004; Gillette, Noe & Rebello, 2008). A unitary board of directors, 
prevalent in the majority of EU member states and the USA, is composed of both 
executive and non-executive directors. This form of structure is characterized by a 
single board where the shareholders elect members in their annual general 
meetings. The board has the overall responsibility for the corporate affairs and works 
towards achieving the same goal (Mallin, 2010). According to Tricker (2009), the 
unitary board model has four possible structures: (1) a board composed of only 
executive directors, (2) a board consisting of a majority of executive directors, (3) a 
board with a majority of non-executive directors, and (4) a board with only non-
executive directors. The common feature of these structures, in contrast with the 
dual board structure, is that there is a single governing body known as a unitary 
board.     
The dual board system is a two-tier board (model of governance) structure: 
the upper supervisory board and the lower management board. The supervisory and 
the management boards are composed entirely of non-executive (outside) and 
executive directors, respectively (Gillette et al., 2008). In this governance model, 
there is a clear distinction between the two in their roles and responsibilities. The 
supervisory board, elected by shareholders, oversees the direction of the business 
and assesses the managerial performance with the power to appoint and remove 
members of the executive board of management. The executive board of 
management on the other hand has the responsibility to formulate and present 
strategies, management plans, and budgets to the supervisory body for discussion 
and approval (Mallin, 2010; Tricker, 2009). 
The common feature between the  one-tier and the two-tier models of 
corporate systems is that the boards in both cases appoint the members of the 
management body (executives) and have the responsibility to ensure that the 
financial reporting and control systems are functional and in conformity with the law 
(Mallin, 2010). 
Advocates of the unitary board structure argue that such a system enhances 
close working relationship, better communication, and information flow between the 
executive and non-executive directors as they belong to the same board. This in turn 
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allows fast decision making process and efficient information flow. In contrast, the 
two tier-board system is characterized by poorer information flow, slower decision 
making and higher cost of board. This is due to the distinct separation of the non-
executive and executive directors. In spite of this,  the two-tier system  has the 
advantage of being objective and independent in the process of assessment of 
executives and compensation policy (Mallin, 2010).  
 
2.5.2 Board Composition   
As a mechanism to alleviate the agency problem and thereby enhance 
company performance, many authors consider the composition of board members 
as a crucial issue (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Fauzi & Locke, 2012). The way a board 
is structured has implication for task performance- be it positive or negative. In line 
with this, there has been an on-going debate in the literature on board composition 
and performance; and the board‟s effectiveness in fulfilling its governance role. The 
outcomes of the debate are yet ambiguous. Previous empirical studies evince mixed 
results. For example, Sheridan and Milgate (2005) and Kang, Cheng and Gray 
(2007) found a positive correlation between board composition and firm financial 
performance. Nyamongo and Temesgen (2013) found that the existence of an 
independent board of directors tends to enhance the performance of the commercial 
banks in Kenya. Pamburai et al. (2015), Ghosh‟s (2006) and Coles, McWilliams and 
Sen‟s (2001) empirical evidence uncovered a positive association between the 
number of non-executive directors and firm performance judged in terms of 
accounting measures (Return on Asset) and this is consistent with the growing 
volume of research literature. This is also in line with the suggestions made by 
Weisbach (1988) and Wyatt and Rosenstein (1990) who stated that outside directors 
play an important role in monitoring management. They explicitly stated that 
performance measures are highly correlated with CEO turnover when a firm is 
dominated by outside members of boards of directors rather than insiders. Outsider 
dominated boards tend to add value to a firm‟s performance by initiating change in 
the CEO when preceded by poor performance. Herbert and Dulewicz (2004) have 
empirically shown the association between the greater number of executives and the 
experiences of non-executive directors and better firm performance. By the same 
token, the Cadbury Committee (1992) in the UK and the Combined Code (2000) 
note the need for a balance in the representation between executive and non-
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executive directors (independent boards) on the boards of firms. The role that 
independent boards play in alleviating the agency problem and improving board 
effectiveness is paramount. Anderson, Melanson and Maly (2007) believe that 
changes in board structure that increases the board independence from 
management improves board effectiveness. In agreement with the above, a study 
made by Semenova and Savchenko (2015) who used the 2010 bank-level data from 
112 countries showed that a high proportion of executive directors on the board 
would reduce a bank‟s profitability. 
It is interesting to note that Hermaline and Weisbach (1991) and Andres, 
Azofra and Lopez (2005) found no relationship between board composition and 
performance as the former admitted that the results could be due to insufficiency of 
tests employed. In contrast to the above, Garg (2007) found that board composition 
is inversely related to the value of the firm. Empirically, research did not come up 
with consistent support though balance is inclined towards having more outside 
board members in order to ensure board independence. Board reform critics suggest 
more representation of outside directors for better protection of shareholder interests 
(Daily and Dalton, 1993) as the effectiveness of inside directors is compromised by 
their ties to the CEO putting them at a difficult position to aggressively monitor and 
evaluate CEO actions, resulting perhaps in a poor firm performance (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990).   
 
2.5.3 Board Size, does it really matter? 
Board size, which refers to the total number of directors serving on the board, 
is another important factor in the discussion of corporate performance. Different 
authors have different views in this regard. Some advocate that boards should be 
small, while others favor the idea of a large size. Fauzi and Locke (2012) discussed 
how large a board should be from the perspective of the corporate governance 
theories. They stated that from the perspective of the agency and resource 
dependence theories, it is preferable to have larger boards in order to minimize the 
agency problem by monitoring management through a greater number of members 
and also bring opportunities for more networking and access to resources. The ideal 
number of directors representing shareholders is still a subject of discussion. But 
there seems to be a semblance of a consensus that a size between 12 and 15 would 
work well for most organizations. Many have the feeling that fewer numbers (<12) 
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may allow the group to control and manipulate the board while more directors (>15) 
may be difficult to manage (Colley, Doyle, Logan, Stettinius, & Virgina, 2003). 
Many studies have been undertaken to find out whether board size really 
matters in terms of influencing a firm‟s performance and whether there is as such an 
optimum number of board members on a board that may result in higher 
performance. The literature is still inconclusive about the relationship between board 
size and performance. The existing empirical evidence show mixed results. For 
example, the studies conducted by Ramos and Olalla (2014), Bokpin (2013), Fauzi 
and Locke (2012), Saibaba and Ansari (2012), and Provan (1980) show association 
between larger board size and higher performance whereas the findings of Yermack 
(1996) and Guest (2009) indicate that a smaller number of board of directors is more 
effective and increases firm value. Whereas the findings of Nyamongo and 
Temesgen (2013) show that a large board size tends to impact performance 
negatively. Similarly Garg (2007) found that smaller boards are more efficient than 
larger ones.  
Many similar empirical evidence are consistent with the above showing an 
inverse association between board size and firm performance (Pamburai et al., 
2015; Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour & Gunasekarage, 2008; Ghosh, 2006; Andres et 
al., 2005; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998). Andres and Vallelado (2008) found 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank performance and board size where 
performance diminishes reaching an optimum size of 19 board of directors. A recent 
study by Arif and Syed (2015) revealed that board size has significant impact on 
Return on Assets. The studies of Arouri (2011) and Zahra and Stanton (1988), 
however, showed no association.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that determination of the appropriate 
board size should be viewed from the stand point of resource dependence 
suggesting that the greater the reliance on the external environment, the larger the 
board of directors.  Therefore, preferences for particular board sizes might be based 
on two things: resource dependence as one factor, and size and complexity of the 
organization as another.  
 
2.5.4 CEO Duality 
Another structural variable worth considering is CEO duality and its influence 
on board structure and company performance. In the CEO duality, the CEO serves 
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as a chair of the board of directors (Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015) where there will be a 
unified chain of command for board members and the top management team. In 
such a system, corporate leadership is consolidated under one person as compared 
to an independent leadership structure where a separate board chair oversees top 
management‟s decisions. What does this mean to the CEO, the board members and 
top management team (TMT)?  
The duality structure is common in the Fortune 500 firms of the U.S.A. despite 
the alleged superiority of the non-duality structure and persistent criticism of the dual 
role of CEO as board chairperson. This structure represents concentration of power 
and authority in the hands of the CEO which might signal a potential danger for 
abuse of power. Rechner and Dalton (1989) argued that the dual structure 
represents a prima facie case of conflict of interests- agency problem. According to 
them, one of the tasks of boards is to monitor the performance of management and 
question that how, a person who plays two roles, can reflect independence of 
judgment for self-evaluation. Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) 
criticized the combined structure as inappropriate design that allowed the CEO to 
have concentrated power and use it to their own self-interest. They argued that the 
combined structure increases the agency cost as it may hamper the board‟s role of 
monitoring management. These authors believed that separating the roles of the 
CEO and the board‟s chair will lead to improve firm performance. Thus, according to 
the agency theory separating the roles of CEO and chairman of the board can 
minimize the agency costs (Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011). Consolidating 
the two into one position is also considered as a potential threat to the independence 
of boards (Adegbite, 2015). For example, the Cadbury Code of Best Practice 
(Cadbury Report, 1992) and the OECD (2004) recommend for the separation 
between the positions of chair of boards and the CEO in order to have more 
independent boards. 
Despite the above arguments, others have counterpoints to the above such 
as Stoeberl and Sherony (1985) and Anderson and Anthony (1986) who said that 
CEO must not be subordinate to anyone. This assumes that the final responsibility 
for the performance of a corporation rest with the CEO and this has to be 
accompanied by full authority (not divided authority). They further argued that 
combined leadership results in a crystal clear leadership in strategy formulation and 
implementation which will lead to better firm performance. They also believed that 
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separating the roles may entail information sharing costs, inefficiency and conflicts 
between CEO and non-CEO chairperson, less efficient decision making process and 
implementation and blurred accountability for bad firm performance. However, the 
agency theory is not in favor of the CEO duality (Fama & Jensen,1983) as it is 
detrimental to companies because CEO duality could  mean just like the same 
person marking his/her “own examination papers” (Ong & Wan, 2001). The agency 
theory argues that in order to avoid the agency problem and exercise effective 
monitoring, then there has to be the separation of duties between the CEO and 
board chairperson.  
Empirical studies that examine the relationship between duality and firm 
performance are few and their findings are mixed. Rechner and Dalton (1989), 
conducted a study on the Fortune 500 groups with the objective of providing 
multiple-year comparisons of shareholder returns (from 1978 to 1983) for those 
companies with CEO duality versus those with independent positions. The results 
demonstrate that there are no significant differences reflected over the entire six-
year period and even no such differences evident in any given year. Therefore, for 
the Fortune 500, according to them, a role (being dual or not) does not impact 
shareholders returns. In the same vein, Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) reported that 
no evidence that changes from duality to non-duality or vice versa has any 
measurable impact on performance of the affected firms in the period up to 2 years 
after the change has occurred.   
Yi and Chen (2008) empirical study also shows no significant relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance nor improvement in firm performance 
after changes in leadership structure from dual to non-dual. Furthermore, Daily and 
Dalton (1997) study of the dual CEO and non-dual CEO firms show no significant 
differences in performance between the firms. The studies made by Abdullah (2004) 
and Arouri et al. (2011) on the Malaysian listed companies and Arab Gulf countries, 
respectively, also show that CEO duality is not related to firm performance. A study 
made by Nyamongo and Temesgen (2013) found no evidence that CEO duality or 
otherwise has impact on the performance of the Kenyan commercial banks. Dahya 
(2005) documented that separating the leadership roles of the CEO and board 
chairperson among the U.K companies is not related with performance improvement.  
Rechner and Dalton (1991), however, have come with different findings for 
the Fortune 500 companies showing that firms opting for independent leadership 
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consistently outperformed, in terms of higher accounting returns, than those relying 
upon CEO duality. Grove et al. (2011) and Pi and Timme (1993) found that in the 
banking industry, CEO duality and accounting performance measures are negatively 
related. Another interesting study by Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) reveals lack 
of evidence of the association between unitary leadership structure and inferior 
accounting and market returns. They argued that CEO duality is efficient and 
consistent with shareholders' interests for the U.S. large companies and the 
legislative efforts to separate the titles are misguided. Sridharan and Marsinko 
(1997) investigated the impact of CEO duality on market value of the firms by 
examining Paper and Forest Products industry and their results demonstrate the 
superior performance of firms with a dual CEO. The studies by Ramos and Olalla 
(2014), Coles et al. (2001) and Dahya and Travlos (2000) reveal a positive 
association between CEO duality and firm performance in accounting terms. Guillet, 
Seo, Kucukusta and Lee (2013) who also studied the CEO duality and firm 
performance in the U.S. restaurants suggest that CEO duality contributes to financial 
performance. However, a more recent study made by Semenova and Savchenko 
(2015) who used the 2010 bank-level data from 112 countries shows that combining 
CEO and chair of the board of directors‟ positions reduces banks‟ profitability. 
The  above discussion of findings convey that which governance structure 
benefits firm performance remains equivocal that requires further study before 
definitive conclusions can be reached. 
 
2.5.5 Board Committees 
It is customary for a board of directors to establish different standing 
committees since it is difficult for the entire board members to sit together and deal 
with every issue that seeks its attention. Establishing committees would allow the 
board to have the division of work and there by maximum use of the board‟s 
expertise. This would presuppose that each committee should have a clear task and 
reporting obligation at the appropriate board meetings (Tricker, 2009; Colley et al., 
2003; Klein, 1998). Though boards delegate tasks to committees, the ultimate 
responsibility for the areas rests on the board covered by the committee (Mallin, 
2010; Klein, 1998). Most boards have audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees as principal standing committees. Moreover, depending up on corporate 
constitutions, other committees such as executive committee, risk management 
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committee, and governance committee could be formed as need be to meet specific 
corporate demands (Tricker, 2009). Locke and Fauzi‟s (2012) study revealed that 
board committees have a positive and significant impact on firm performance. 
Audit Committee 
The audit committee is the most important sub-committees that play a crucial 
role in ensuring the protection of shareholders interests in matters pertaining to 
financial reporting and internal control (Mallin, 2010; Klein, 1998). Colley et al. (2003) 
argued that the audit committee should be composed of independent directors who 
should not have been in management or part of management in the last five years, 
nor is anyone who is a close family or has business ties to management. In line with 
the above, Klein (1998) in examining the firm performance and board committee 
structure found the predominance of outsiders on the boards‟ audit committee. 
Adegbite (2015) emphasizes the independence of the board audit committee as an 
essential element of good corporate governance and identified moral uprightness 
and individual integrity as major instruments to ensure independence beyond 
regulations. A recent investigation by Arif and Syed (2015) on the impact of 
corporate governance on the performance of financial institutions demonstrates that 
audit committee independence has significant impact on return on assets. 
The audit committee serves as a bridge between the board and both internal 
and external auditors and ensures that the board gets all relevant audit information 
(Mallin, 2010; Tricker, 2009). The committee works closely with an external auditing 
firm and has the responsibility to ensure the accuracy of the financial statements and 
report properly to outsiders. Its functions include oversight of financial control using 
internal control and overseeing processes that monitor compliance with laws, 
regulations, and the corporate code of conduct. It also undertakes risk management 
tasks by assessing the system and understanding all the risks that the company 
faces and how they can be managed (Mallin, 2010; Tricker, 2009; Colley et al., 
2003). Klein (1998) sees the audit committee as vital in alleviating the agency 
problem by facilitating a timely release of unbiased financial information by 
management to shareholders and other stakeholders. The unbiased and timely 
release of information helps to reduce the information asymmetry between 
management and all outsiders. 
Tricker (2009) affirms that, currently, all codes of corporate governance 
practices and stock exchange requirements demand listed companies to have audit 
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committees entirely composed of independent non-executive directors. In spite of 
this, Tricker (2009) stated that there are some criticisms and concerns about the 
audit committee that it can get involved in management affairs and interfere in 
management‟s legitimate responsibilities. Tricker further stated that apart from 
exercising sound commercial judgment, there is a concern that the audit committee 
can possibly be bureaucratic and process driven.  
Remuneration Committee   
It is the sub-committee of the main board that deals with compensation and 
benefits of board members and executives, possibly, members of senior 
management. The committee is composed wholly or mainly of outside directors 
(Klein, 1998; Colley et al., 2003; Tricker, 2009; Mallin, 2010).  
 Directors‟ remuneration has been a subject of discussion for long as noted by 
Tricker (2009: 70) that “… investigative media and institutional investors in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom have been challenging the apparently high 
levels of directors‟ remuneration. High rewards in companies with poor corporate 
performance were particularly suspect”.  In 1995, a Greenbury Report, which has 
now been integrated with the UK Combined Code of conduct, looked into the board 
pay level. The report proposes the formation of a remuneration committee composed 
of independent non-executive directors with the role to make recommendations to 
the main board on the compensation package that includes salary, fees, pension 
arrangements and other benefits that comprise travel costs, housing costs, school 
fees etc. of executive directors and, sometimes, other senior executives. 
 Mallin (2010) stated that the formation of the remuneration committee 
precludes executive boards from determining their compensation packages and the 
committee should also provide a transparent procedure for setting executive pay 
levels that includes setting appropriate targets for performance related pay schemes. 
According to Klein (1998), the remuneration committee‟s primary job is to determine 
and review the nature and amount of all compensation for the top management 
group of the company. By doing so the committee helps to reduce the agency 
problem by designing and implementing compensation packages that better align the 
interest between top management and owners (shareholders). 
Nomination Committee 
The nomination committee is a sub-committee of the main board, consisting 
of wholly or mainly outside directors, charged with the responsibility of identifying 
39 
and recommending new members to the board or proposing on replacements to the 
board. Tricker (2009) noted the time when boards were composed of people known 
to each other, with similar values and backgrounds that looked like a cosy club 
where the incumbent members appointed people on same wavelength to join them. 
The nominating committee serves as a means to prevent the board from becoming a 
cosy club and serve as a check and balance tool to minimize the possibility of 
nomination of the dominant boards‟ potential candidate. The nomination committee 
is expected to heavily engage in search for the best candidates in order to ensure a 
balanced board composition in terms of executive and non-executive directors, 
knowledge, skills, qualities, and experience (Mallin, 2010).   
The strength of a board depends up on the aggregate capabilities of the 
members with individual capabilities. Thus, strength of the individual member will 
have a significant impact up on the strength of the board in general. Therefore, the 
stronger the individual members in a board, it is highly likely that the board will be the 
reflection of it. Furthermore, in addition to the individual attributes, members must 
develop team spirit and be capable of playing active role and reflect different views 
for the good of the company. In selecting a member it is important to be cautious and 
every member has to be selected in light of his/her experience, integrity, and also 
demonstrated performance in areas related to the company‟s activities (Colley et al., 
2003). This major job is accomplished by a nomination committee. 
 
2.6 The Board Process 
The board process refers to how the board executes its expected functions 
(decision making process, commitment, meetings, and critical debate). In promoting 
better corporate governance, among other things, board structure and process are 
pivotal. But most of the talks and empirical studies have focused on the board 
structure than board process (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005; 
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Lablanc & Gillies, 2003). 
The theoretical and empirical discussion on board process, until recently, was 
sparse and insufficient and one possible reason could be inaccessibility of boards.  
Now there is a shift in emphasis on studying board process because the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance is consistently inconclusive and 
mixed (Wan & Ong, 2005). These authors attribute the lack of relationship between 
the two variables to the insufficient understanding of the board process. Of course, 
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board process greatly depends up on the board structure because it is the way the 
board is structured that affects the quality of the process.  
By board process, it is meant the way boards function and make decisions. 
Gillies and Lablanc (2003) argue that board process is the most important factor in 
bringing about better governance. These scholars link board process with a firm‟s 
financial performance. They say (2003:1), “Improving process will not only improve 
board governance but will improve that there really is a link between a board of 
directors and a firm‟s financial performance”. Similarly, Huse (2005) identified board 
decision making as the foremost predictor of board performance and indicated 
commitment, creativity, and criticality as the main variables that define a boardroom 
decision making culture. Wan and Ong (2005) also concur on the impact of board 
process on board performance but differ in regard to whether board structure is 
related to board performance while they agree that board structure does not 
influence board performance. 
Understanding board process is not an easy task and Finkelstein and Mooney 
(2003) proposed that if someone wants to understand the board process and 
effectiveness, someone has to talk to and ask the people who sit on boards about 
their board experiences and what really makes boards work or not work. In the early 
years of this century, corporate scandals such as auditing lapses, the hiding of 
losses or loans, inflating revenue, and insider trading led to the losses of the 
Fortunes and eroded faiths of investors in many institutions. Relatively little is known 
about how the past corporate failures occurred. Many generally attribute the 
disasters to poor corporate governance practices (Ahmed, 2015). Though one of the 
tasks of boards is to monitor management and corporate stewardship, one may 
attribute that at least one of the causes of corporate failure may be boards‟ inability 
to function effectively, that is, a failure of the board process. The way how boards 
make decisions may be critical factor in determining the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. Therefore, it should not be only the board structure that must be given 
due attention to determine board effectiveness but also effectiveness of the board in 
the decision making process to determine corporate performance.  
It makes much more sense to consider the board process as a missing 
element in determining the effectiveness of corporate governance than only the 
structure since how boards are selected, how they actually work, how they make 
decisions, their capacity to make appropriate decision, or how they interact with each 
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other are the inner workings of the board that must be analyzed to determine 
corporate performance. 
Therefore, for a board to effectively accomplish its task, it has to have the 
right structure with the right board membership involved in the right board process. 
Hence, to bring about effectiveness and good performance, board process should be 
taken as an important component in corporate governance.  
 
2.7 Roles, Duties and Responsibilities of Boards 
The cause of corporate failure, be it accounting fraud, auditing lapses, 
concealment of losses, or excessive executive remuneration, all are linked to lack of 
effective corporate governance (Ahmed, 2015; Monks & Minov, 2011; Mallin, 2010). 
Thus, there is strong need for good corporate governance in order to prevent 
corporate failure and restore investor confidence. According to King III (2009: 55), 
“Good corporate governance is essentially about effective and responsible 
leadership, which calls for integrity, transparency and accountability. Leaders need 
to define strategy, provide direction and establish the ethics and values that will 
influence, and guide practices and behavior to achieve sustainable performance”. 
The board of directors is one of the key players responsible for bringing and 
ensuring sound corporate governance in a company (Tricker, 2009). Of course, a 
failure in a company is also attributed to a failure in corporate governance. Ayogu 
(2001:5) substantiates this by stating that “a crisis of governance is basically a crisis 
of board of directors”. Colley et al. (2003) support the above view point and state that 
the collective problems of business today are seen in many instances as a failure of 
corporate governance which in turn is caused by failures of a board of directors to 
effectively execute their duties and responsibilities, both collectively and individually. 
The collapse of Enron, WorldCom and others demonstrates the overriding 
need for integrity, honesty, and transparency in boards of directors which has also 
raised concern for increased demand on their effectiveness (Mallin, 2010). A board 
of directors needs to be transparent, show a high level of integrity at all times, and be 
responsible and accountable for their actions in order to restore confidence and 
achieve the desired results. 
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2.7.1 Roles of the Board 
Boards play a crucial role in bringing about good governance if there is a 
system that enables them to carry out their pivotal role of directing, governing, and 
controlling activities of a company. Boards play important role of linking between 
managers and investors which at the same time is fundamental to good corporate 
governance and owners‟ relation (Millan, 2010; Monks & Minow, 2011). Boards are 
thus, “the overlap between the small, powerful group that runs the company and a 
huge, diffuse, and relatively powerless group that simply wishes to see the company 
run well” (Monks & Minow, 2011: 252).   
Boards play strategic roles in crafting vision for a company that guides and 
sets the pace for its future development, formulating and reviewing strategy, and 
shape the direction in collaboration with management; and establish corporate 
values to be promoted. They also play the monitoring and control roles to ensure 
corporate survival and protect shareholder‟ interests (Ahmed, 2015). This includes 
hiring, evaluating and firing of CEO; monitoring and evaluating management; 
reporting to, and communicating with shareholders; evaluating board performance 
and planning board succession; ensuring compliance with statutory and other 
regulations; and reviewing social responsibilities.  
Furthermore, boards take part in providing services in the form of advice and 
counseling and connecting it with the environment. In executing this role, boards 
provide support and counsel to CEO, assist in obtaining scarce resources, and 
participate in relationships with outside bodies (Millan, 2010; Ticker, 2009). 
 
2.7.2 Duties of the Board 
The roles of directors can be defined in terms of a set of duties that are 
charged to them, which include: the fiduciary duty (duty of trust), the duty of loyalty 
and the duty of fair dealing, the duty of care, the duty not to entrench, and the duty of 
supervision. 
The Fiduciary Duty 
The fiduciary role of the board of directors is a duty to act honestly, in good 
faith and in the best interest of those whom the directors represent (shareholders). 
Ahmed (2015), Monks and Minow (2011), Tricker (2009), and Colley  et al. (2003) 
argued that fiduciary duty is the primary responsibility of directors as they are 
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required to act honestly by providing sufficient and accurate information on issues 
that affect the interests of the shareholders. This duty includes elements of integrity, 
honesty, and competence that begin with understanding of objectives of the 
corporation (Colley et al., 2003). According to Tricker (2009), one of the primary 
responsibilities of directors is integrity as they are steward of the interests of the 
shareholders. Members should act in the company‟s interest and resist the 
temptation to make personal gain at the expense of shareholders.  
The Duty of Loyalty and the Duty of Fair Dealing 
This is the duty to be faithful when a corporate director assumes office by 
acknowledging that the interest of the corporation and the shareholders precede any 
director‟s interest and avoid conflicts of interest in fulfilling their duty. The underlying 
principle is that directors should not make use of their office to profit out of it or take 
personal advantages (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). Monks and Minow 
(2011:268) illustrate the issue stating that, “… if a director sat on the boards of two 
companies with conflicting interests ..., he would be forced to resign from one board 
because clearly he could not demonstrate loyalty to the shareholders of both 
companies at the same time”. The duty of fair dealing can be considered as a 
subsidiary to the above demanding that corporate transactions be executed in a 
direct and transparent manner; fair to the interest of the shareholders (Colley et al., 
2003).  
The Duty of Care 
This calls up on directors to act carefully, reasonably, and exercise 
independent judgment and skill in carrying out their duty (Johnson et al., 1996). 
Monks and Minow (2011), Tricker (2009), and Colley  et al. ( 2003) state that due 
diligence be given in making a decision by discovering as much information as 
possible and considering all alternative courses of action. And the duty of care has to 
be relevant to the skill, experience and knowledge of the board member. Failure to 
exercise such care amounts to negligence in common law countries. Courts asses 
the duty of care within the context of the “business judgment rule” (when conflicts of 
interest are absent), which provides directors with the benefit of the doubt when 
things go wrong. That is, if directors show that they acted responsibly and with due 
care then courts will defer to their business judgment. 
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The Duty not to Entrench 
The duty not to entrench is based on objective evaluation of corporate 
situation and board‟s willingness to take appropriate action when a corporation is not 
performing well. That is, if management does not perform well, change should be 
made and this has to be applied to the board if it does not perform well. Resistance 
to change as shown in the formation of a coalition between management and board 
is called entrenchment.  Colley et al. (2003: 24), elucidate entrenchment by stating 
that “There are many […] companies with poor performance where the board and 
management continue in place without successfully addressing the issue-in effect, 
they become entrenched. It emerges as an issue when the board attempts to block a 
change- of- control transaction …” 
The Duty of Supervision 
This is an element of duty of care that oversees the operations of 
management, how they should control it, and what should be done when a problem 
manifests. In executing this duty, the board sets policies of ethics and disclosure 
against which the behaviors of directors and senior executives are measured. 
Furthermore, this requires the establishment of internal controls so that accurate 
reporting of what is going on in the corporation is ensured. This function is usually 
performed by the Audit committee of the board (Colley et al., 2003). 
 
2.7.3 Responsibilities of the Board 
The overall responsibility of a board of directors is to strategically guide, 
govern and control a corporation.  A set of board responsibility, applicable to both 
unitary and dual structure, is put in the OECD principles of corporate governance 
(2004: 58) as follows,  
“ Together with guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly responsible for 
monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for 
shareholders, while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing 
demands on the corporation. In order for boards to effectively fulfill their 
responsibilities they must be able to exercise objective and independent 
judgment‟‟.  
Moreover, the board has the responsibility to oversee organizational systems that 
conform to applicable legislation that includes tax, competition, labour, 
environmental, equal opportunity, health, and safety laws. It further states that 
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boards have the responsibility to act in the best interest of shareholders and also 
held accountable to the same and the company. Their responsibility is not limited to 
the shareholders; in fact they are required to account for other stakeholder interests 
that include employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities. 
According to OECD principles of corporate governance (2004: 24-25), boards 
have the responsibility to perform key functions that include the following: 
 Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, annual 
budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance. 
 Monitoring the effectiveness of the company‟s governance practices. 
 Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning. 
 Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests 
of the company and its shareholders. 
 Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. 
 Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board 
members and shareholders. 
 Ensuring the integrity of the corporation‟s accounting and financial reporting 
systems. 
 Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
Moreover, the board has the responsibility of ensuring that an appropriate structure 
(with sufficient number of non-executive board) is in place so that boards can 
exercise objective and independent judgment on corporate affairs. 
 
2.8 Codes of Corporate Governance Best Practices 
The critical role that corporate forms of business organizations play in a 
country‟s economy is beyond doubt. A country‟s competitiveness and capital 
accumulation is also a reflection of the competitive nature of its corporations. As a 
result, the issue of good corporate governance has drawn global attention. Good 
corporate governance has a vital role in enhancing investors‟ confidence and 
attracting new capital inflow. Good corporate governance should be incorporated as 
a key component of a firm‟s strategy but not simply to fulfill the formality for the 
requirements of best practices (Grove & Clouse, 2015; Jakada & Inusa, 2014).  
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Good corporate governance can be ensured when companies have codes of 
best practices that address the roles of boards, composition, fairness, transparency 
and disclosure, accountability and responsibility issues, to mention a few.  Corporate 
governance codes are voluntary set of principles, standards and best practices that 
govern business with the objective of maximization of shareholders value (Cadbury, 
1992; OECD, 2004). There is no doubt that countries that have standards of 
corporate governance attract more capital, build better trust and bear more positive 
impact on their companies than those that are short of it.  
Because of the crucial role that codes of best practices play in improving 
corporate governance, below are presented the Cadbury report, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision of codes of best practices for the financial 
institutions, the OECD global framework of good corporate governance principles 
and the King III code of corporate governance principles of South Africa. The former 
three are based on a developed economy context and a western orientation and the 
last one is based on a developing economy context and with an African touch. 
According to Jakada and Inusa (2014), the codes are general guidelines for 
implementing corporate governance principles based on a country‟s prevalent 
situation as there can be no universally prescribed specific solution to structural 
problems, in view of differing contexts, which implies that the regulations and rules 
do not have to be the same for different countries.  
 
2.8.1 The Cadbury Report 
The Cadbury Report, published in 1992, is one of the reports of codes of best 
practices developed by the United Kingdom Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury. The purpose of development 
of the code was to promote good corporate governance. The recommendations of 
the Cadbury Report not only contributed to the development of corporate 
governance to the United Kingdom but also to other countries. The code is a 
voluntary code based on „comply or explain‟ approach of implementation. That is, 
listed companies in the London Stock Exchange are required to state whether they 
are complying with the code or explain for their non-compliance. The report covers 
such key governance elements such as (Cadbury report, 1992):  
 The board should meet regularly, retain full and effective control over the 
company and monitor the executive management. 
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 The role of the board chair, who is responsible to run the board functions, and 
the chief executive officer, who is responsible to run the operation, should be 
separated;  
 The necessity of establishment of board committees which will be 
accountable to the board. The committees include audit committee composed 
of non-executive directors; remuneration committee for recommendation of 
directors‟ remuneration; nomination committee for the purpose of instituting 
formal and transparent  procedure for the nomination and selection of new 
directors to the board;  
 The board should be composed with majority non-executive directors of 
sufficient caliber so that their views will bear significant influence in the 
boards‟ decision.  
 Non-executive directors should bring an independent judgment to bear on 
issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments, and 
standards of conduct. 
 Directors‟ service contracts should not exceed three years without 
shareholders‟ approval. 
 Executive directors‟ pay should be subject to the recommendations of a 
remuneration committee made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors. 
 It is the board‟s duty to present balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company‟s position. 
 
2.8.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established with the view to 
enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking 
supervision in the globe (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Basel Committee, 1999). The 
committee was composed of banking supervisory authorities from different countries 
with the objective of formulating guidelines and standards in different areas that 
concern the best practices of banking supervision. The committee issued reports of 
principles and regulations as deemed necessary to ensure and enhance corporate 
governance practices in banks. The Committee reports are in line with OECD 
principles and reinforce the importance of them for banks (Basel Committee, 1999). 
The Basel Committee believes that to ensure sound financial system, increase 
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monitoring efficiency and thereby a country‟s economic development, then, the role 
of corporate governance is paramount (Ahmed, 2105; Andres & Vallelado, 2008; 
Basel Committee, 1999). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reports 
incorporates the following basic issues (Basel Committee, 1999 and 2006), 
 The need for corporate values, codes of conduct; 
 A well articulated corporate strategy against which overall success of 
enterprise and contribution of  individuals can be measured; 
  A clear assignment of responsibility and decision making authority with a 
clear picture of the hierarchy of approval steps for individuals up to the board 
of directors; 
  Establishment of mechanisms for the interaction and cooperation among the 
boards, top management  and auditors;  
 Establishment of mechanisms for strong internal control system that include 
internal and external audit functions; 
 Monitoring of risk exposures especially when conflict of interest are likely to 
happen; 
 Appropriate information flow internally and to the public 
The Basel Committee reports also include the following specific practices. 
 Board members should be qualified, have a clear understanding of their roles 
and  be able to exercise independent and sound judgment in governing the  
affairs of the bank;  
 The board and top management should understand the bank‟s operational 
structure; 
 The board should approve and oversee the bank‟s strategic objectives and 
corporate values;  
 The board should set and enforce clear lines of responsibility, authority and 
accountability in the bank; 
 The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior 
management consistent with board policy; and 
 The bank should ensure transparency in the governance process. 
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2.8.3 The OECD Principles 
The OECD is an international body formed by 34 developed countries to produce 
a set of globally accepted principles of corporate governance. In publishing the 
elements of good corporate governance, the OECD has considered the views of the 
member counties on what constitutes sound corporate governance. The OECD 
principles provide a framework for developing and establishing a corporate 
governance system and practice of a country in line with its own political, economic, 
institutional, legal and regulatory environments (OECD, 2004). It also serves as a 
framework for assessing a country‟s corporate governance. The following are some 
of the key elements of the OECD‟s (2004) good corporate governance principles. 
 The rights of shareholders 
  Equitable treatment of shareholders 
 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
 Transparency and  disclosure of information  
 The responsibility of the boards 
The Rights of Shareholders 
This is one of the basic rights that states that the corporate governance 
framework should protect and aid the exercise of shareholders‟ rights. Shareholders 
have the right to vote, thus, corporate governance should ensure that there is one 
vote for one share. It ensures that shareholders have the right to vote in absentia if 
they cannot be present physically; should have the right for authorization of 
additional shares and should have the right to ask questions. Furthermore, this 
principle seeks ensuring that shareholders obtain relevant and material information 
on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. It encourages shareholders to 
participate in general shareholder meetings; elect and remove members of the 
board; and share in the profits of the corporation. Shareholders also have the 
obligation to use their voting rights as mechanism of ensuring sound corporate 
governance. 
Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
A corporate governance framework should ensure equitable treatment of all 
shareholders in the same series of classes· It should ensure the same voting rights 
and equal treatment of shareholders within the same class of shares.  
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The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
A corporate governance framework should acknowledge the key place that 
stakeholders have in promoting good governance. Corporate governance should 
acknowledge the rights of stakeholders that are protected by law and ensure that 
these rights are respected. It should acknowledge that relationship with stakeholders 
is important for building sustainable enterprises and mutual development by fostering 
teamwork. Therefore, corporations should recognize the contributions of 
stakeholders for the long term success of the corporation and should always take 
into account their interests in taking decisions and actions 
Transparency and Disclosure of Information 
The corporate governance framework ensures transparency and disclosure of 
material information on a timely and accurate basis concerning the financial 
situation, operating performance, annual audit, and governance structure and policy, 
board and management members, and objectives of the company 
The Responsibilities of the Board  
This principle aims at ensuring the strategic guidance of the corporation, the 
efficient monitoring of management, and accountability of the board to its corporation 
and the shareholders. The principle specifically states that boards have the 
responsibility to act on informed basis, in good faith, with due care and in the best 
interests of the company and the shareholders. The board has also the responsibility 
to take into account the interests of stakeholders in its decisions and actions. In 
general board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to the 
responsibilities entrusted to them. 
 
2.8.4 The King Code of Corporate Governance Principles of South Africa 
(King III) 
As repeatedly noted in this document, corporate governance is about 
establishing systems, structures, processes, along with appropriate control 
mechanisms so as to enable upper echelon leaders to effectively discharge their 
responsibilities. To this effect, King Code and Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa, usually referred to as King III was developed and became effective on 
March 1, 2010. King III is the third report on corporate governance that replaces the 
previous King I and II reports.  King III is based on the idea that governance issues 
that had been legislated have to be accepted as a minimum baseline. In line with 
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this, Institute of directors in South Africa (2009:7) states that “Good governance is 
not something that exists separate from the law and it is inappropriate to unhinge 
governance from the law.” 
King III is in line with the global corporate governance principles, such as 
OECD, which includes major corporate governance components in its guidelines.  
The code applies to all entities incorporated in South Africa regardless of their size or 
nature of their business. King III is based on „apply or explain‟ self regulation basis in 
the sense that companies are required to explain how the codes  were applied, or if 
not applied, explain the reasons for not applying them. South Africa has the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) market with listing requirements as an 
enforcing mechanism and those listed are bound to adopt King III. King III code and 
recommendations, among other things, cover the following corporate governance 
elements: Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, roles and responsibilities of 
boards and executives, composition of boards, board committee, governing 
stakeholder relationships, integrated reporting and disclosure, and compliance with 
laws, rules, codes and standards (Institute of directors in South Africa, 2009). 
 
2.9  Summary 
In this chapter empirical and theoretical assessments were made on 
corporate governance literature relevant to the thesis. In particular, emphasis was 
given to the agency, stewardship, stakeholders, resource dependence and social 
capital views. Further the empirical studies on corporate governance structure, 
process and roles were reviewed 
The first, second and third sections of the chapter focused on the role, 
mechanisms and requirements of effective corporate governance. This part 
discussed the role corporate governance plays in the modern economy, the common 
mechanisms to ensure sound corporate governance and requirements to institute 
effective corporate governance. The fourth section reviewed the role of the board of 
directors in light of the agency, stewardship, stakeholders, resource dependence and 
social capital perspectives. The fifth and the sixth sections of the chapter assessed 
the board structure and process. The assessment revealed that the relationship 
between the different aspects of the board structure and performance are 
inconsistent and inconclusive. Research on the board process is spares and this 
may be due to inaccessibility of the board of directors. One of the reasons for the 
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inconsistent results of the relationship between the different aspects of the board 
structure and performance may be due to lack of understanding of the board process 
as a missing link. The seventh and the eighth sections reviewed the duties and 
responsibilities of boards and codes of corporate governance that included the 
Cadbury Report, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the OECD Principles 
and the King Code of corporate governance principles of South Africa.  
In the next chapter, a conceptual model is developed based on relevant 
corporate governance theories and prior research works. In line with Chapter Two, 
the next chapter also reviews additional empirical studies in developing the 
framework and generating testable hypotheses. The testable hypotheses are 
developed based on the conceptual framework. In explaining the framework and the 
hypotheses, earlier empirical studies and corporate governance theories are 
considered.   
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Chapter 3  Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development 
3.1  Introduction 
The analytical model in this chapter builds on the gaps identified in the 
literature (chapter two) and the relevant theoretical frameworks that provide insight to 
answer the research questions. To answer the research questions and meet the 
objectives, the study is steered by the theoretical frameworks and earlier empirical 
studies. The analytical framework also serves as the basis to generate and 
empirically test the hypotheses. In addition to the literature review made in chapter 
two, extensive review has also been made in this chapter in the development of the 
hypotheses. 
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework of Corporate Governance 
Previous theoretical discussions have revealed that corporate performance is 
affected by three interlinked variables (see Figure 3.1), which include: 
1. The board structure that refers to board composition, director 
independence, and board committee. The board structure has influence on 
the board process i.e., the decision making activities of the board. 
2. The board process refers, among other things; to the way decisions are 
made involving board member commitment, critical debate (process and 
cognitive conflicts) in board meetings, and board room behavior/activity. 
The board structure and process in turn have implications for the board 
roles or task performances.   
3. The board role includes the service and control tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999; Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009). 
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Figure 3. 1: Analytical framework of corporate governance 
Source: Adapted from Forbes and Milliken (1999), Lablance and Gillies (2003), 
Huse (2005) and Minichilli, Zattoni, and Zona (2009). 
 
In general, the framework adopted assumes that board performance (roles/tasks) 
has a direct relationship with board structure and board process. It also displays that 
effective corporate governance is a function of appropriate board structure and 
process, on which effective board performance depends. These corporate 
governance variables are interlinked in the sense that boards engage in right 
process when structural issues such as composition, independence and committee 
work are well addressed. The structural variables are believed to have an influence 
on the working of the board (process), as the decision making activity of the board 
benefits from boards with a mix of different backgrounds, composition, and 
independence (Wan & Ong, 2005). This will also have an impact on boards‟ 
performance, i.e., to diligently execute their roles and responsibilities. All these in 
turn impact on corporate performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
The corporate governance theories discussed in Chapter Two are in one way or 
another linked with the three factors that affect the functioning of corporate 
governance from which the study benefits to have different lenses of examining the 
issue under discussion. The theories also shade light on the roles played by boards. 
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According to Minichilli et al. (2009), Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand (1996), boards are expected to provide board services in the form of 
advice and counselling and networking with the environment. A board‟s role in this 
regard has to do with the resource dependence, stewardship, and social capital 
theories, which argue that board of directors perform service task by bringing in 
different types of resources to an organization due to their diversity (co-opting 
outside directors) and the connections (linkage) they have with the environment. The 
service tasks are in the form of advice and counseling (advisory task), which is 
mentoring and supporting management; and strategic participation that includes 
initiating, formulating, evaluating, selecting, implementing strategic alternatives, and 
improving the quality of strategic decisions of the top management. 
Boards of directors also perform control tasks (Minichilli et al., 2009; Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Johnson et al., 1996; Fama & Jensen, 1983), which is associated 
with the agency theory or role. Advocates of the agency theory believe that boards of 
directors play the control role by safeguarding the interests of shareholders from 
unhealthy management behavior. According to Minichilli et al. (2009), Johnson et al. 
(1996), Zahra and Pearce (1989), a set of related activities is performed in 
accomplishing the board control role that includes controlling the firm‟s performance, 
monitoring essential activities of the firm, and monitoring internal behavior 
particularly the CEO‟s behavior. 
In line with the behavioral control task, boards also perform output control 
tasks. An output control task, according to Minichilli et al. (2009), is basically based 
on both agency and stakeholder theory with an external focus, which is performed 
through monitoring corporate financial performance. The third control task performed 
by boards refers to strategic control, which is based on the agency theory having a 
strategic focus. This is primarily concerned with evaluating and monitoring strategic 
decision making. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
3.3.1 Board Structure and Board Service and Control Task Performances 
The need for corporate governance becomes evident in corporate forms of 
organizations where ownership and control are separate giving rise to the agency 
problem, which for the first time was identified by Berle and Means (1932) as 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control.  
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The agency problem occurs because of dispersal of shareholding ownership 
in corporate forms of organizations, in which a typical shareholder may not show 
interest in the day-to-day affairs of a company. Likewise the thousands of 
shareholders that make up the majority of owners may demonstrate the same 
behavior as the typical shareholder, resulting in agency cost. The agency cost 
results when those who are directly interested in day-to-day affairs, the 
management, have the ability to manage the resources of companies to their own 
advantage without effective shareholder control (Berle & Means, 1932). This 
situation is explained in terms of the key theoretical lens of the agency theory, which 
is a dominant theory in corporate governance studies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Grant, 2007; Anderson, 
Melanson & Maly, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009; Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012). The agency 
problem makes both accountability and governance assume a greater significance 
and have emphasis in corporate organizations.  It is this context that brought boards 
into play as one major internal governance mechanism to overcome the agency 
problem and thereby maintain effective organization (Fama & Jensen, 1983). These 
authors also view the board of directors as the top most important internal decision 
control system of firms. Furthermore, the resource dependence theory views outside 
board of directors as key board members that link the firm with the environment and 
help bring important resources which may not be available in the firm. They also 
provide services in the form of advice and counsel based on their experience and 
exposure. Their networking with the environment, in addition to resource generation, 
enhances corporate image and reputation (Daily & Danton, 1993). 
 As stated above, one of the internal governance mechanisms is to have an 
appropriate board structure that is explained in terms of composition, independence 
and committee functioning (Fauzi & Locke, 2012). Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005), 
underline the importance of board committee as one factor that potentially affects the 
way boards operate by explaining their impacts on firm performance if they are 
omitted. The debate on corporate governance largely centers on the board 
characteristics, especially size and CEO duality in the context of developed 
economies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Daily & Dalton, 1993; Dulewicz & Herbert, 
2004; Andres et al., 2005). The research focusing on developing economies is scant; 
particularly the study on the relationship between board composition, board 
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independence, and board committee, the individual association of which with board 
performance, is not well established (Fauzi & Locke, 2012). It is clear that the system 
of corporate governance has to be context-specific, which should be based on a 
particular country‟s economic, legal, institutional framework, and cultural factors 
(Weimer & Papa, 1999; OECD, 2004). Garg (2007) also stated that board structure 
might have different relationship with firm performance in transition economies as 
opposed to western economies as there are differences in institutional contexts. 
Therefore, in helping to overcome the agency problem, the make-up of boards 
and institutional contexts vary considerably from country to country, which might 
result in different relationships between structure and performance. For example, the 
recommendation by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) about the composition of 
boards is totally in favour of a non-executive (outside) board of directors (Ethiopia 
Proclamation no. 592/2008, 2008) unlike the King Committee (2009), the OECD 
(2004) and the Cadbury Report (1992), all of which advocate for both executive and 
non-executive directors but with a majority of non-executive board of directors. Thus, 
this study limits itself to examining whether proper board structure (composition, 
independence, and committee) influences board performance. Emphasis is given to 
the above structural components as there are no CEO duality and executive (insider) 
directors in the Ethiopian banking context. The researcher recognizes other aspects 
of structural variables like CEO duality, size, and insider/outsider boards that have 
been examined extensively though the findings between these structural variables 
and firm performance have equivocal results (Minichilli et al., 2009; Dalton & Daily, 
1999; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). It is, therefore, hypothesized 
that, 
H1a: A board with proper structure is positively and significantly related to 
board service task performance; and  
H1b: A board with proper structure is positively and significantly related to 
control task performance.  
 
3.3.2 Board Structure, Board Process and Board performances 
The model in section 3.2 illustrates that the board process encompasses three 
constructs: board commitment, critical debate and board room behavior/activity. 
According to Minichilli et al. (2009:60), the board members‟ commitment implies, 
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 “… preparation before meetings and the involvement during meetings. The board 
members‟ preparation refers to their willingness and ability to participate in board 
meeting with a deep knowledge of the topic to be discussed in order to actively 
contribute to the decision making process … The board members‟ involvement 
during meetings refers to the effort they devote during discussions and in the 
follow up of the decisions taken during the board meetings.” 
The second construct in the board process is board members‟ critical debate that 
relates to the task-related disagreements resulting from differences in opinions. 
Critical debate reflects the exchange of ideas, information and the examination of 
issues from different perspectives. This exercise can improve the strategic decision 
making process and the quality of the decision (Minichilli et al., 2009). The board 
room behavior, the third set of variables in the model, is expressed in terms of the 
board room‟s internal atmosphere at board meetings, the length of board meetings to 
attend to relevant issues, equal opportunity for board members to discus and ask 
questions and the chair‟s ability to lead meetings well with a clear focus on the major 
issues. Minichilli et al.‟s (2009) empirical study shows that process variables such as 
commitment and critical debate have positive influence on board service and control 
task performances. Following these results, two hypotheses are established. 
H2a: Board process has positive and significant relationship with board service 
task performance; 
H2b: Board process has positive and significant relationship with board control 
task performance. 
The model also takes board process as an intervening/moderator variable 
between structure and performance following the arguments by Wan and Ong 
(2005), Forbes and Milliken (1999), and Johnson et al. (1996). Previous researches 
studying corporate governance focused on board structure more than board 
processes, and this could be due to the inaccessibility of board members as they are 
extremely busy. The strong need to study board process emanates from the fact that 
process is a reflection of the structure. The way boards operate, their commitment, 
and decision process would highly depend on structural variables such as 
composition, independence and committee functioning. To know what is going on in 
the board room, it is very important to get first hand information of the board process 
and this is possible only by accessing the board of directors who play a major role in 
directing, governing, and monitoring a company‟s affairs. Beyond board structure, to 
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better understand board performance, about which the empirical literature has been 
inconclusive, governance scholars advise that the black box be uncovered to see its 
relationship with performance. In line with this, Buchanan and Huczynski (2010) in 
their organizational behavior book, argue that performance should be approached as 
a function of structure and process. Accordingly three hypotheses are formulated in 
this regard:  
H3: A properly structured board has positive and significant relationship with   
board process;  
H4a: The board process mediates the relationship between board structure and 
board service task performance; 
H4b: The board process mediates the relationship between board structure and 
board control task performance. 
 
3.3.3  Ownership Type and Board Performance  
Chapter one section 1.4 which presented the problem statement emphasized 
the noticeable differences observed in corporate governance practices of the private 
and state owned banks in terms of election and composition of board of directors.  
That is, privately owned banks are structured and monitored by the board of 
directors elected by the shareholders; whereas state owned banks are governed by 
a board of directors composed of senior officials that are appointed by the 
government (Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003). The current practice of election versus 
appointment (ownership structure) is expected to bring variation in board 
demographics, board process and ultimately board service and control task 
performances. In line with this argument, the study attempts to investigate whether 
ownership type has a moderating effect on board service and control task 
performances due to the difference in structure. Thus the following hypotheses are 
formulated:  
H5a:  Type of ownership does not moderate board service task performances. 
H5b:  Type of ownership does not moderate board control task performances. 
 
3.3.4  Ownership Structure and Firm Performance  
 Financial performance is one of the measures of firm performance, which in 
effect, is the measurement of the outcomes of a firm‟s policies and operations. To 
evaluate the financial performance of a firm, one should look into the income 
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statement and balance sheet. These reports demonstrate the status of financial 
operations and net worth of a firm, respectively. The impact of ownership structure 
on firm performance has become the center of attention in the corporate governance 
literature (Rahman & Reja, 2015; Ongore & Kusa, 2013; Bokpin, 2013; Fauzi & 
Locke, 2012; Ongore, 2011; Arouri, Hossain & Muttakin, 2011; Cornett, Gou, 
Khaksari & Tehranian, 2010; Zeitun, 2009; Zeitun & Tian, 2007; Bhaumik & Dimova, 
2004; Sun, Tong & Tong, 2002; Morck et al., 2000; Sarkar & Sarkar, 1998). 
However, the empirical studies on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance have resulted in mixed and inconclusive outcomes. For example, 
Ongore (2011) concludes that ownership concentration and government ownership 
have significant negative relationships with firm performance while diffuse ownership 
has significant positive relationship with firm performance. Mule and Mukras (2015) 
and Arouri et al. (2011) findings are also consistent with Ongore‟s with regard to 
ownership concentration. Zeintun and Tian (2007) and Bhabra (2007) found that 
ownership structure has significant effects on a firm‟s financial performance. The 
empirical evidence of Kapopoulos and Lazaretous (2007) suggests that a more 
concentrated ownership structure positively relates to higher firm profitability where 
as Demsetz and Villalonnga (2001), and Demestz and Lehn (1985) found no 
significant relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Aburime‟s (2008) study of Nigerian banks also shows that ownership structure has 
no significant impact on profitability. 
Several attempts have also been made to study financial performances in 
light of public and private forms of ownership. Empirical studies (Kapur & Gualu, 
2012; Micco, Panizza & Yanez, 2007; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 
2002) show that private banks that operate specially in developing economies have 
higher profitability compared to public (state-owned) banks. Berger, Clarke, Cull, 
Klapper and Udell‟s study (2005) of Argentinean banks found strong evidence 
indicating that state-owned banks have poor long-term performances. An 
international comparison of performances of privately-owned versus state-owned 
banks by Cornett et al. (2010) demonstrated that state-owned banks operated less 
profitably than privately-owned banks prior to 2001. The study of Lannota, Nocera 
and Sironi (2007) also confirmed that government owned banks are less profitable 
compared to privately owned banks. A more recent study by Rahman and Reja 
(2015) on the ownership structure of banks shows that government ownership is 
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significant to return on asset (ROA), that is, a high level of government ownership 
decreases performance. On the contrary, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel‟s (2005) study 
of transition countries shows that government-owned banks‟ performances are better 
than the domestic private bank‟s while Najid and Rahman (2011) found a positive 
relationship between government ownership and performance.  
Kapur and Gualu (2012) have specifically studied the impact of ownership 
structure on the performance of eight Ethiopian commercial banks from 2001 to 2008 
period. They used parametric and nonparametric tests of the differences of financial 
performances between private and public banks. The results showed that the 
profitability of private banks is better than their public counterparts. Kiyota et al., 
(2008) also analysed the performances of state-owned vis-a-vis privately owned 
banks and found that state owned banks were less efficient. In line with the above, 
Zeitun and Tian (2007) and Zeitun (2009) examined whether ownership affects a 
firm‟s performance in accounting terms and found that government ownership is 
significantly and negatively related to a firm‟s accounting performances. But, Sumon 
and Dimova (2003) argue that in a proper market where firms are subject to 
competition, firms can operate efficiently regardless of being private or public 
holdings, that is, ownership is no longer a significant determinant of performance. 
Given the diverse results of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, this study will empirically examine whether profitability of banks differ 
due to the difference in ownership structure, in an emerging economy setting, by 
establishing the following hypothesis. 
H6: There is no significant difference in the return on average asset (ROA) between 
private and public banks due to the difference in ownership structure. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter presented the conceptual framework on the basis of which the 
hypotheses were developed.  The conceptual framework was developed based on 
existing major corporate governance theories that include the agency, stewardship, 
stakeholder, resource dependence, and social capital theories. Furthermore, the 
literature and frameworks of Forbes and Milliken (1999), Lablance and Gillies (2003), 
Huse (2005), and Minichilli et al. (2009) were considered in developing the 
conceptual model. The chapter explained how the conceptual model was developed 
and the link to the exogenous and endogenous latent variables by formulating a total 
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of eight hypotheses. The hypotheses developed are empirically tested in Chapter 
Eight. The next chapter discusses the research methodology and tools used to 
operationalize the conceptual model before testing the hypotheses empirically.   
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Chapter 4  Research Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter deals with methodological issues that, among others, include   
philosophical foundations of the research, approach (design) to the study and the 
specific research methods chosen. It also includes research strategy, time horizon, 
techniques and procedures and justifications for their appropriateness. In order to 
show the links that these research components have in the research process, the 
research-process onion developed by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009:108) is 
adopted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1: The research – process ‘onion’  
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2009). 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy  
According to Saunders et al. (2009) and Creswell (2009), before delving in to 
design and choice of methods, researchers need to focus on the importance of 
understanding and defining the research philosophy (basic beliefs/world view) that 
steers the study. Research philosophy refers to “the development of knowledge and 
the nature of that knowledge” (Saunders et al., 2009: 107). They further explain that 
the research philosophy adopted for a certain study contains fundamental 
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assumptions about how the researcher views the world. The assumptions about the 
world view support the research strategy and method chosen for the study (Hall, 
2003; Gray, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009; Creswell, 2009).   
Accordingly, the philosophical choice for this study is both positivism and 
interpretivism as the research questions fall into the two philosophical domains.  As 
these ontological stances influence the research process, the mixed methods, both 
quantitative and qualitative, are highly appropriate for the study because the 
research questions do not clearly fall only into one of the research philosophies 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, the ontological positions for the research are both 
objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism assumes that social entities exist in reality 
external to the social actors vis-a-vis the subjectivism stance that states that social 
phenomena are created from the perception and actions of the social actors. This 
study has taken the two positions for the following reasons: 
 The Ontological position for this study is dominantly objectivism because the 
board of directors, as an organogram, in a corporate form of organizations is a 
reality separate from the members that live in that reality. Board of directors is 
a reality that exists in corporate forms of organizations (be it public or private) 
where ownership and control are separated. To fill the gap, there is always a 
need for a board of directors with proper structure, process, roles and 
responsibilities regardless of changes in members. The structure is a reality to 
be discovered that is separate from the members that perceive that reality. 
 It is partly subjectivism because it is important to study and understand the 
perceptions, feelings, and individual meanings that boards, owners and 
stakeholders attach to their roles and the way the board members and owners 
think how boards should be structured, engage in the board process, and 
execute their roles. 
 
4.3 Research Approach/Design 
The main aim of this study is to investigate and analyze the impact of 
corporate governance on the performances of private and public banks. In doing so, 
the study will explore, describe, and critically examine the board structures, board 
processes and responsibilities, and ultimately their impacts on board tasks and firm 
performances.  
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As the research questions and objectives are mainly descriptive and 
exploratory, the research involves describing and exploring the system of corporate 
governance in the context of the different ownership structures – public and private. 
It is a descriptive study because it will depict corporate governance 
practices/situation and gives meanings and draws conclusion from the data that are 
described. It is exploratory as it will find out what has happened and is happening 
and assess corporate governance practices in light of standards, shareholders, 
boards and stakeholders views in the different ownership structures. 
The research, as stated above, draws up on the positivist and interpretvist 
paradigms and it is based on deductive reasoning to explore and analyze what the 
various data sources will reveal. This study is, therefore, motivated towards using a 
mixed method to triangulate information from various data sources and have an in-
depth understanding of the subject of inquiry.  As Saunders et al. (2009) argue, the 
mixed method also gives room to evaluate the extent to which findings of the 
research and inferences made can be trusted as the two of them complement each 
other. 
The quantitative method, which expresses the assumption of the positivist 
paradigm, will be used to examine and measure the relationships between corporate 
governance variables (see details in section 4.4.5). The qualitative method, which 
reflects the phenomenological paradigm, will also be used in order to provide 
sufficient details about the study situation (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Creswell (2009) 
states that in qualitative research there is no necessarily single truth to be 
discovered, rather there might be numerous views reflected by different participants 
having equal truth. Therefore, the qualitative approach is employed to explore, 
describe and understand corporate governance practices from the participants‟ 
viewpoints.  
 Advocates of the mixed method argue that in order to capture the complexity 
of phenomena and give sense to meanings, a more complex research design is 
important (Creswell, 2009; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Thus using the mixed 
method approach has the advantage of maximizing the benefits from both. That is 
why this approach is selected to study corporate governance practices of the 
Ethiopian banks.  
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4.4 Research Strategy 
The study of corporate governance involves examination and analysis of 
complex structures, processes, dynamic relationships between multiple 
stakeholders, and ultimately the impacts on the performance of corporate firms. 
Research that deals with such a complex subject needs to find out in-depth 
information that uncovers detailed characteristics of the issues so that dynamic and 
complex phenomenon can be captured.  A research strategy capable of handling 
such a complex issue is the case study method. 
Case study, as a strategy, is an empirical method of inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Robson, 2002); thus, it is an 
essential method that is capable of capturing a dynamic and complex phenomenon. 
Case study is an ideal method when “how”, “why”, and “what” questions are being 
posed, and when a holistic and in-depth investigation is needed (Yin, 2003; 
Saunders et al., 2009).  Case method is most appropriate when the research aims to 
cover not only the phenomenon of study, but also the contextual conditions from the 
view points of participants (Yin, 2003; Bartex & Jack, 2008; Leedy & Ormord, 2010).   
Case study gives special attention to completeness in observation, 
reconstruction, and analysis of the cases by incorporating the views of the actors in 
the case under study (Tellis, 1997a). Thus, it enables multi-perspectival analysis that 
considers relevant groups of actors and their interactions. Moreover, case study 
promotes triangulated research through the adoption of multiple data collection 
techniques (questionnaire, interview, document analysis and observation) to seek 
information from multiple sources (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997b; Saunders et al., 2009). 
Hamel et al.(1993) and Yin (1994) as cited in Tellis (1997a) argue that a study that 
focuses on exploring, describing, understanding, and explaining relationships 
between phenomena/actors and the results thereof can best be achieved  through  a 
case study. This argument is further strengthened by other authors that recommend 
that case study as a research strategy can be used for descriptive and exploratory 
purposes (Yin, 2003). Therefore this research strategy is appropriate for this study 
as it aims at making context specific analysis, conclusions, and recommendations.  
The banks covered by this study operate in the public and private domain. In 
recent times, malpractices, conflicts of interest, divisions, hostilities among boards‟, 
interference of regulatory body, and also losses of trust of shareholders have 
become common to observe. The research aims to uncover the how and why of 
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such occurrences. Moreover, the current practice of setting boards by appointment 
and election in the public and private banks, respectively, is expected to affect the 
board‟s composition, diversity, role, integrity, transparency, accountability, process, 
and thereby performances. Thus, the research adopted a comparative case study 
method to capture the whole dynamic processes and relationships in the context of 
public and private banks. According to Tellis (1997a: 4), “case study evaluation can 
cover both process and outcomes, because they can include both quantitative and 
qualitative data”. Thus, in this study, the structure, processes and performances will 
be explained through quantitative statistical results and contexts are to be explained 
through qualitative data.  
Case study can be designed for a single or multiple cases. In this research, 
17 banks are selected and thus, a multiple comparative case study design is 
adopted. The cases however, are grouped into two; public and private banks. 
Multiple comparative case studies are preferred to a single case study since 
evidence from multiple cases are often considered more compelling (Yin, 2003).  
Furthermore, a multiple comparative case study  enables to make comparisons in 
order to explore similarities and differences within and between cases that will 
enable  to make generalization about the analysis based on corporate governance 
theories (analytical generalization) but not the population (Yin, 2003; Baxter & Jack, 
2008). 
Case studies are selected based on certain criteria. Corporate firms prevail in 
different sectors of the economy and the banking sector is selected for this study. 
This sector, composed of limited liability companies, is selected for various reasons, 
which among others, include:  
(1)   It is in this sector that ownership and control are well separated,  
(2)  It involves diversified ownership (public vs. private) and board structure 
(appointed vs. elected), 
(3)  The sector, compared to other sectors, has longer years of accumulated 
experience of corporate governance.  
(4)  Banks, as financial intermediaries, are vulnerable and sensitive to bad 
corporate governance practices. Thus, the agency, stewardship, 
stakeholders, resource dependence and social capital theories can better be 
applied.   
(5)  Preliminary survey by the researcher about the corporate firms in the country 
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revealed that, as compared to other sectors, the banking sector has relatively 
sufficient and organized data as well as better levels of awareness about 
corporate governance. 
 
4.5  Time Horizon and Sampling Procedures 
 4.5.1 Time Horizon 
In this study, the potential respondents were boards of directors, board 
secretaries, CEO and groups of stakeholders of both private and public banks. 
These are high profile, busy and hardly accessible people with a tight time schedule. 
This makes a longitudinal survey design undesirable but the cross-sectional survey 
desirable for the study.  
The study, therefore, is a cross-sectional one because the information was 
collected using questionnaire and interview and then analyzed over a relatively short 
period of time, with the intention of determining possible relationships but not to test 
causality relationships. 
4.5.2 Sampling Procedures  
There are different sampling techniques which can be classified into two 
broad categories as probability/representative and non-probability/judgmental 
sampling. This research adopted non-probability sampling techniques, which are 
most appropriate for exploratory research especially when the research questions 
require an in-depth study (Saunders et al., 2009). Non-probability sampling is a 
technique applicable in a situation in which the chance of each case being chosen 
from the population is not known. Therefore, selection is based on subjective 
judgment and this makes it difficult to make statistical inference about the population 
from a non-random sample. 
From among the non-probability sampling techniques, this research selected 
the purposive sampling type since it enables the researcher to use his judgment to 
select sampling units that would best enable to answer research questions and meet 
objectives. It is best applied in a case study research with a relatively small sample 
of informative cases (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 As has been stated in chapter one section 1.7, this study has two parts, main 
study (hypothesis testing) and exploratory (descriptive) study. For these studies, the 
unit of analysis is banks in Ethiopia and the target population is board of directors of 
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banks and stakeholders that include shareholders, members of parliament (MP), 
employees and regulatory agencies. Accordingly, two groups of samples, for the 
main and exploratory studies, were considered in the survey. The first group 
(Sample-1) consists of the boards of directors of private and public banks, board 
secretaries and presidents (CEO) of the Ethiopian banks. The choice to have these 
respondents as key informants in the study is that these people are considered 
knowledgeable about corporate governance issues as they are the key drivers of 
corporate forms of organizations. Especially CEOs are in a better position to report 
about boards of directors (Minichilli et al., 2009). The second group of samples 
(Sample-2) involves stakeholders that include shareholders4, parliamentarians, 
private and public bank employees, regulatory and supervisory bodies. 
The study involves both private and public banks, in which ownership is used 
as a basis for stratification. The total number of public banks is only three; as a 
result, all of them are considered and constitute one group while the private banks 
constitute the other group. The private banks are further stratified on the basis of 
years of service in operation. In the interest of encompassing one term of board 
tenure as well as data availability, at least three years of service was taken as a 
minimum requirement for inclusion in the study. Thus, private banks that have been 
operating for less than three years were excluded from the study. The total number 
of private banks is sixteen out of which fourteen banks, which have been in operation 
for at least three years, were selected purposely. The purpose of the selection was 
guided by experience, availability of data, and willingness to provide information. 
 
4.5.3 Data Type, Sources, and Instrument Design 
4.5.3.1 Data Type and Sources 
As stated earlier, this study adopted a mixed research approach and a case 
study method which enable the use of multiple data collection techniques from 
multiple primary and secondary sources. It is believed that using both qualitative and 
quantitative data collection techniques help to obtain sufficient information, 
strengthen the validity and quality of data and ultimately the research findings. 
Both primary and secondary data sources of information are vital in a multiple-
case study in order to have a wider perspective and make an in-depth analysis of the 
                                                          
4
 Annual general meetings (AGM) are usually conducted over the months of October and November 
and the researcher exploited this opportunity to collect data from the shareholders during their AGM.  
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corporate governance practices in its context. Accordingly, primary and secondary 
data were collected both from the primary and secondary sources in order to arrive 
at a sound conclusion about the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and performance in public and private banks in Ethiopia. 
 
4.5.3.1.1 Primary Data Sources and Structure of Survey Instrument 
Current and former board members and CEOs, shareholders, MPs, employees 
and supervisory and regulatory agencies were important primary data sources in this 
study. Primary data collection tools include survey questionnaire and interview. 
Saunders et al. (2009) state that using multiple data collection techniques in the 
same research has advantages in obtaining sufficient and triangulated information.  
Questionnaires 
Though questionnaires as data collection instruments are commonly used within 
the survey strategy, case study research can also use them. Questionnaires can be 
used for descriptive research such as attitude and opinion surveys. Questionnaires 
as data collection tools fall in the domain of quantitative study (Saunders et al., 
2009). 
In this study „delivery and collection of questionnaires‟ (Saunders et al., 
2009:363) was employed as another main technique. Accordingly, survey 
questionnaire was prepared and distributed to board members, board secretaries 
and presidents/CEOs of the banks under study. In order to measure the attitude and 
degree of confidence of shareholders and MPs about the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance system, another set of questionnaires was developed for the 
sampled shareholders and MPs. Similar questionnaires were also used for 
employees of sampled banks and regulatory agencies to triangulate the perceptions 
of professionals and other stakeholders (See Appendices 4.2a, 4.2b and 4.2c). 
Delivery, follow-up, and collection were done by the researcher in order to increase 
the response rate. Details are given in Chapter Seven section 7.3.  
The questionnaires that were developed and distributed to the board of directors, 
secretaries and CEOs consisted two sets of questions: the first part focused on the 
background information, which included questions on the profiles of the respondent 
and the bank. The second part concentrated on the main issues of the board 
structure, board process and board performance variables. In the structural variables 
of the second set of the questionnaire, questions regarding board composition, board 
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independence, and board committees are addressed. The board process part of the 
questionnaire is composed of three sets of questions focusing on commitment, 
critical debate and boardroom activities. The questionnaire that contained questions 
on the role of boards was divided into two sections that addressed service and 
control roles respectively. The service and control roles are measured each through 
three sets of variables: advisory, networking, and strategic participation; and the 
control role using behavioral, output, and strategic control variables. 
Furthermore, there are measurement questions on the responsibility of boards 
and their leadership. Questions on disclosure of information, board independence, 
shareholders‟ rights, and role of stakeholders are included. To capture the views of 
stakeholders on the corporate governance system, a survey questionnaire that 
focused on shareholders‟ rights, corporate performance, strategic issues, board 
independence, and role of stakeholders was prepared and distributed to the key 
stakeholders. 
Interview 
Interview as a data collection instrument may be employed in both quantitative 
and qualitative studies. There are different types of interview as used in quantitative 
and qualitative studies. These include; structured interviews, semi- structured 
interviews, and unstructured interviews (Saunders et al., 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 
2010). This study used semi-structured interview as the main research categories 
are descriptive and exploratory in nature. The semi-structured interviews help to 
reveal and understand the „what‟ and the „how‟ but also to place emphasis on 
exploring the „why‟ (Saunders et al., 2009:321). The semi-structured interview will 
also provide an opportunity to the interviewee to discuss issues of interest which 
might be significant for the researcher‟s understanding and which may at the same 
time be helpful to address the research questions. Furthermore, using interviews as 
an instrument in this mixed method research may be helpful in validating findings 
from the questionnaire. In collecting the relevant data, the researcher employed an 
interview guide format. 
Accordingly, in this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
different groups of key informants, which included: board members, board 
secretaries and presidents/CEOs of sampled banks. Such varied groups of 
interviews were designed with the objective of preventing heavy dependency on a 
single informant and triangulating the information from different sources, which 
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enhances validity. The researcher did not obtain the consent of the respondents to 
audio tape the interview; as a result, there was total reliance on note taking with 
noted attendant risks of losing the flow of conversation and some points. The 
interview questions mainly focused on seeking information on board members‟ 
commitment to good corporate governance practices, their role in assurance of 
sound stewardship, board structure, functioning of the board of directors and issues 
on transparency and disclosure (see Appendix 4.2d). Details are given in Chapter 
Seven section 7.6. 
 
4.5.3.1.2 Secondary Data Sources  
Secondary data are both quantitative and qualitative as used in descriptive 
research. As Saunders et al. (2009:258) state, in „business and management 
research such data are used most frequently as part of a case study or survey 
research strategies, including archival research …‟  
In this study, secondary sources such as statistical reports, annual reports, 
journal articles, books, official reports of regulatory agencies, news papers, and 
periodicals were collected and analyzed through desk review. In spite of the attempts 
made to review other documents that are relevant to the study (such as minutes of 
board of directors and management, reports of shareholders, letters, memoranda, 
administrative reports), the researcher did not get the chance to access anyone of 
them due lack of permission by the banks. In regard to those documents that have 
been collected, attempt was made, as much as possible, to evaluate the accuracy 
and consistency of the documents and records before using them.  
 
4.5.3.2  Instrument Design/ Development 
Instrument development is an important process in research methodology in 
order to operationalize the constructs of the conceptual model (Chapter 3) in a 
measurable and quantifiable way. The choice of design depends on what is to be 
answered and the depth one needs to probe (Adams, Khan, Raeside & White, 
2007). The importance of this process is also emphasized by Greener (2009) that 
well designed questionnaires are the skeleton of any good research study. Leedy 
and Ormrod (2010:91) further explain its importance by stating that, “Measurement 
instruments provide a basis on which the entire research effort rests. Just as a 
building with a questionable foundation is unlikely to be safe for habitation, so, too, 
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will research efforts employing faulty measurement tool provide little of value in 
solving the problem under investigation.” Therefore, a measurement instrument 
should be reliable to yield consistent results in comparable situations and be valid in 
a way that the instrument measures what it actually intends to measure (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2010). 
Based on Adams et al. (2007), Greener (2008) and Churchill (1978), a 
procedure for developing better instrument, among others, includes specifying the 
constructs based on literature search, generating a sample of items to operationalize 
the constructs, and pre-test them using a panel of experts‟ (POE) comments in order 
to purify the measure before using the instrument for actual data collection. This 
process of instrument design helps to enhance content validity by minimizing the 
possibility of measurement errors of the instrument. Below, the activities carried out 
and measures taken to purify the survey instrument before the actual data collection 
are detailed. 
 
4.5.3.2.1 Survey Instrument Development, Pilot Testing and Fine-tuning of 
Instrument 
The study has two parts: the main study which focused on the upper echelon 
leaders largely composed of the board of directors, and a sideline study that 
examined corporate governance practices and perception of stakeholders. 
The main study examines the relationships among three major constructs: 
board structure, board process and board performance. These constructs involve 
eleven latent variables. The board process and performance latent variables items 
are customized from prior studies and board structure latent variables largely 
formulated based on theoretical foundations. Based on Minichilli et al. (2009) and 
Wan and Ong‟s (2005) prior studies, commitment, critical debate, board performance 
items were retained and two new items added to strategic participation to enhance 
its measuring power/ dimension. Reliability and validity tests were performed at both 
item and construct level in the measurement model of section 6.2. 
The following are some of the items adapted and their sources.  Composition 
items which have not been validated in prior research were obtained from the World 
Bank (2011); OECD (2004), King III, Board Evaluation Questionnaire and 
Proclamation number 592/2008.  Board independence items are adapted from World 
Bank (2011) and OECD (2004). Board committee related items are adapted from 
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Nam and Nam (2004), OECD (2004) and Proclamation number 592/2008.  Board 
composition, independence, and committee consist of a total of 19 items; of which  
11 items measure board composition, three items independence and five items 
committee, on a five point likert scale, using a “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” 
format. Both board independence and committee variables were not validated in 
prior research. Board process and board role variables, which are rated on a five 
point Likert scale anchored from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” were adapted 
from and validated in the works of Minichilli et al. (2009) and Wan and Ong (2005). 
Appendix 4.1 provides further details of the main constructs, variable‟s name, 
operationalization/ measurement items adapted and their sources.  
 To ensure content validity, the measurement scales were tested on different 
groups with the expertise and experience on corporate governance. The group 
involved five scholars who work at Addis Ababa University and one experienced 
practitioner and consultant. Three members of this group have served as board 
members in public and private banks. One member of this group is also a statistician 
and researcher.  
 The group of experts commented in writing on each questionnaire item and 
gave their overall assessment on the instrument‟s clarity, understandability and 
relevance to the research context. Up on the initiatives of the experts, meetings were 
also held with each of them for further clarifications and understanding of the 
instrument. Each discussion took an average of one hour and three of the meetings 
were held in the researcher‟s office and the other three in the offices of the experts. 
 Overall, the general impression of the group was that the tool is usable with 
minor refinements. Minor improvements such as rewording, rearrangement of items, 
and clarification of technical words were made based on the pre-test feedback from 
the panel of experts. Following the panel of experts‟ pre-test and subsequent 
refinements, the instrument was pilot tested with a board of directors and board 
secretaries. 
The pilot runs were carried out with four boards of directors and one board 
secretary. The survey instrument was hand delivered by the researcher. Two weeks 
later, scheduled face -to- face meetings were held with each of them to discuss the 
wording of the survey questionnaire, its clarity, understandability and relevance to 
the research setting. The meetings with each of them took roughly one hour and 
thirty minutes. Overall, the above validation process (pre-tests and pilot runs) 
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resulted in minor amendments that included shortening of items, explanation of 
technical words, and rewording and sequencing of items in the questionnaires. 
(Appendices 4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.2c provide the final research instruments made ready 
for the survey). 
 
4.5.3.4 Data Collection Techniques 
Data were collected from boards of directors, board secretaries, CEOs and 
stakeholders (Shareholders, MPs, and employees, supervisory and regulatory 
bodies) using survey questionnaire methods. Semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted with different groups of key informants, which included: board 
chairpersons/members, secretaries and Presidents/CEOs and shareholders of 
sampled banks. 
A total of 556 questionnaires were distributed by the researcher to Sample-1 
and Sample-2 concurrently. The sampled respondents were heterogeneous, and 
covered all categories, in order to have a representative view. Of the 556 
questionnaires, 154 were distributed to Sample-1 and 402 to Sample-2. In Sample-1, 
members of the senior corporate leadership that included all members of the board 
of directors, board secretaries and the Presidents/CEOs of the public and sampled 
private banks were subjects of the study. In order to have a clear picture of the 
governance process during their tenure, attempt was also made to include former 
board members from the public and private banks. The distribution of the 
questionnaire to the board members was done through the board chairpersons, 
board secretaries, and the researcher as convenient. A letter of support from the 
College of Business and Economics of the Addis Ababa University, where the 
researchers works, was attached in order to get the necessary support from all 
concerned during all steps of the questionnaire distribution and collection (see 
sample letter of support in Appendices 4.3a and 4.3b). The table below shows the 
number of questionnaires distributed to board members and Presidents/CEOs by 
ownership type. 
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Table 4.1: Number of questionnaires distributed to Sample-1 
 
 
Bank’s name   
Type of ownership and number 
of questionnaires distributed 
to  BOD , board secretaries and 
CEOs 
Private Bank     Public Bank 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia  ( CBE)  11 
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE)  10 
Construction and Business Bank (CBB)  9 
Awash International Bank (AIB) 12  
Dashen Bank 8  
Bank of Abyssinia 10  
Wegagen Bank 9  
United Bank 10  
Nib International Bank (NIB) 12  
Cooperative Bank of Oromia (CBO) 8  
Lion International Bank  (LIB) 12  
Zemen Bank 10  
Oromia International Bank OIB 9  
Bunna International Bank 6  
Berhane International Bank 6  
Abay Bank S.C. 5  
Addis International Bank S.C 7  
                                 Total                    154 
 
In Sample-2, 402 survey respondents that included shareholders, members of 
the parliament (MPs), employees of the case banks, and Regulatory and 
Supervisory Agencies were purposively selected as important stakeholders from the 
respective domains of banks for their views about corporate governance. 51 (≈10% 
of 547 members) questionnaires were distributed to Members of Parliament (MPs) 
as representatives of public interest. The MPs include members of the Public 
Accounting Affaires Standing Committee (20), Budget and Finance Affairs Standing 
Committee (20), Justice and Administration Affairs Standing Committee (6) and 
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Human Resources Development Affairs Standing Committee (5). Five 
questionnaires each were also distributed to Regulatory and Supervisory bodies at 
the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and Public Financial Enterprises Agency 
(PFEA), respectively. In addition, 75 questionnaires were distributed to public bank 
employees. In regard to the private bank domain, 120 and 146 questionnaires were 
distributed to shareholders and employees, respectively.  
Administration of the questionnaire to the shareholders was made by the 
researcher during a shareholders‟ annual general meeting based on their 
willingness, recognition of their knowledge, and information about corporate 
governance in their banks as well as their  accessibility whereas the distribution to 
public and private employees was done by the concerned offices of the banks. The 
following table details the categories of stakeholder respondents to whom the 
questionnaires were distributed. 
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Table 4. 2: Number of questionnaires distributed to Sample-2 
 
 
Bank’s name  
Type of ownership,   categories of respondents & 
number of questionnaires distributed 
Private Bank     Public Bank 
Shareholders Employees MPs Employees 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia      
51 
25 
Development Bank of Ethiopia    25 
Construction and Business Bank    25 
Awash International Bank  15 10   
Dashen Bank 15 10   
Bank of Abyssinia 15 10   
Wegagen Bank 20 15   
United Bank 20 10   
 Nib International Bank  15 15   
Cooperative Bank of Oromia   7   
Lion International Bank   20 15   
Zemen Bank  10   
Oromia International Bank   10   
Bunna International Bank  10   
Berhane International Bank  7   
Abay Bank S.C.  7   
Addis International Bank S.C  10   
Total 120 146 51 75 
NBE 5 
PFEA            5 
                                 Grand Total 402 
 
In the survey method, different studies have resulted in different response 
rates due to, among other things, type of the respondent, clarity of questions, style 
and length of questionnaire, and respondents‟ fatigue. Due to these reasons, the 
return rates are usually low (Adams et al., 2007 and Babbie, 2007). According to 
Minichilli et al., (2009), Zona and Zattoni (2007)  and Pittigrew (1992), the response 
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rate of boards of directors has usually been as low as less than 25% as board of 
directors are typically busy and often refrain from revealing information about their 
organization. In corporate governance related surveys, for example, Zona and 
Zattoni (2007) and Minichilli et al., (2009) each found 15% response rates. However, 
in this study, the following activities were accomplished to raise the response rate 
and thereby to decrease non response rate (Adams et al., 2007).  
(i) Care was taken in the design of the questionnaire 
(ii) A pre-test was conducted to fine-tune the questionnaire 
(iii) A cover letter was attached stressing the importance of the study so as 
to elevate the respondents interest in the topic 
(iv) Repeated personal reminders were made to increase the response 
rate. 
With all these strategic efforts and without any incentives to respondents, 
monetary or otherwise, a total of 419 questionnaires were collected, the overall 
response rate being a high 75%. After adjusting for incomplete questionnaires, the 
response rate was the same 75%, which is significant considering response rates in 
similar surveys in corporate governance studies reported in the literature. When we 
consider the response rate breakdown for Sample-1 and Sample-2, it is shown that 
given the leadership position for Sample-1 suggesting a lesser completion only 106 
responses out of 154 were returned, representing a response rate of 69%. For 
Sample-2, the response rate was 77.9%. The table below represents a summary of 
the above and Appendix 4.4 gives a summary together with questionnaire (case) 
identification numbers. 
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Table 4.3: Questionnaires distributed and returned by category of respondents  
 
Banks 
Respondents Category 
BOD and President MP/Shareholders Employees Remark 
Distributed  Returned Distributed  Returned Distributed  Returned  
CBE 11 8  
51 
 
51 
25 16  
CBB 9 6 25 22  
DBE 10 7 25 22  
Awash 12 9 15 8 10 7  
Dashen 8 5 15 7 10 8  
Abyssinia 10 8 15 9 10 5  
Wegagen 9 8 20 16 15 15* *1 not properly filled (Case 312) 
United 10 8 20 12 10 8  
NIB 12 7 15 11* 15 14 *1 not properly filled (Case 80) 
CBO 8 4   7 6  
LIB 12 10 20 16 15 14  
Zemen  10 7   10 6  
OIB 9 6   10 5  
Bunna  6 3   10 8  
Berhane  6 2   7 5  
Abay  5 3   7 6  
Addis  7 5   10 8  
NBE     5 5  
PFEA     5 3  
Total 154 106 (69%) 171** 130*** 231 183  
Grand 
Total  
Distributed 556 Stakeholders  
( Shareholders, 
MPs, 
employees, 
NBE, PFEA) 
Distributed 402 
Returned 419 (75%) Returned 313 (78%) 
171** = 120 shareholders and 51 MPs; 130*** = 79 shareholders and 51 MPs
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4.5.4 Ethical Clearance 
 The study was conducted in line with Unisa‟s policy on research ethics. The 
researcher was granted research ethics clearance certificate on 12 December 2013 
to conduct the study in Ethiopian banks (see Appendix 4.5). 
 
4.5.5 Corporate Governance Variables and Data Analysis Techniques 
The corporate governance framework in private and public banks was studied 
to have a clear picture and understanding of the governance system. The research 
assessed the relationship between corporate structure, process and board 
performances. Board performance (service and control tasks) was treated as a 
dependent variable and corporate structure (board composition, board independence 
and board committee) and corporate processes (commitment, critical debate, and 
boardroom dynamics) as independent variables. These structural and process 
variables were measured against boards service and control task performance to 
establish relationships. Board performances as dependent variables were examined 
in light of service tasks (advisory, networking, and strategic participation variables) 
and control tasks (behavioral, output, and strategic control variables). The structural, 
process and board performance variables were measured using a 5-point Likert 
scale with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  Accordingly, 
in the analysis, a higher average score could mean higher level of achievements in 
corporate governance variables. 
The research used both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis 
because the integration enhances the validity and quality of the data analysis as 
reflected in the research outcome. Quantitative data were analyzed mainly using the 
Partial Least Squares Method (PLS) to determine relationships and SPSS was used 
to calculate t-statistics, averages and deviation on the variables and qualitative data 
obtained from primary and secondary sources were transcribed, summarized and 
analyzed for important themes through narrations and descriptions. 
 As mentioned above, the research mainly used the Structural equation 
modeling (SEM), which is a family of statistical models that attempts to explain the 
proposed relationships among multiple variables in a model. SEM examines 
construct validity and theoretical interrelationships among constructs expressed in a 
series of equations, similar to a series of multiple regression equations (Hair, Hult, 
Ringle & Sarstedt, 2014b). Before analysis was made, the data was prepared using 
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SPSS Version 20 and then data analysis was performed using partial least squares 
technique (PLS), which is the second generation regression analysis technique. PLS 
is used for outer model evaluation to handle reliability and validity tests. It is further 
employed for the inner model evaluations to formally test the hypothesis generated 
in chapter three. The specific software used to perform the analysis (both for outer 
model tests of reliability and validity and inner model tests of hypotheses 
evaluations) was Smart PLS 2.0, developed by Ringle, Wende and Will (2005). This 
software program was chosen for the following reasons: (1) it is assumption free 
(does not require the normality and independence assumptions (Vinzi, Chin, 
Henseler & Wang, 2010; Chin and Newsted, 1999), (2) it is open source, (3) it is 
appropriate to handle SEM (Structural Equation Modelling) and (4) it can be used 
with small samples ( Bart & Bontis, 2003) (5) removes the problem of multicolinearity 
in a regression model (Mateos, 2011). 
For the main study, the data set has a few items with a relatively small sample 
size (106). Given this characteristic of the data set and other restrictive data 
assumptions (normality, large sample, multicollinarity), PLS is arguably a suitable 
tool and, therefore, used for analysis. The data analyses were conducted in two 
stages. First, the measurement model was estimated using confirmatory factor 
analysis (Hair et al., 2014b) and in the second stage, the hypotheses were tested 
with the structural modeling technique of PLS. The sub-section below introduces 
PLS.  
 
4.5.5.1 Overview of the Partial Least Squares 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) is a family of structural equation modeling (SEM) 
which is a statistical approach employed for modeling complex multivariable 
relationships among observed and latent variables. As a Structural Equation Model, 
PLS estimates the measurement of relationship of latent variables by means of a 
number of observable indicators. This approach of structural equation modeling is 
called Partial Least Square-Path Modeling (PLS-PM) (Vinzi et al., 2010; Mateos, 
2011; Sanchez, 2013; Hair et al., 2014b). This method allows combining multiple 
observed measures of a latent variable and then modeling the causal relationships 
amongst the latent variables, instead of single observed variables which are merely 
manifests of the latent constructs. 
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PLS-PM as a second generation multivariate analysis model is a correlation, 
component-based approach and more prediction-oriented method mainly 
recommended for predictive research models (Mateos, 2011). When the model is 
reflective, PLS-PM primarily goal is to estimate the variance of endogeneous 
constructs and in turn their respective manifest variables (Vinzi et al., 2010).  It is a 
„soft modeling’ technique with the ability of greater flexibility of handling hard 
assumptions of multivariate analysis of data distributions (assumption of normality) 
and sample size (large sample) (Vinzi et al., 2010; Mateos, 2011). PLS-PM enables 
to work with observable variables and latent variables (constructs) by estimating the 
latent variables as linear combinations of the observable (manifest) variables.  The 
following are some of the characteristics of PLS (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004; Vinzi et 
al., 2010; Mateos, 2011; Bobe, 2012, Hair et al., 2014b). 
 PLS is a powerful analytical tool that can handle multifaceted structural 
models. 
 It removes the problem of multicolinearity in a regression model. 
 It is more appropriate for predictive research model. 
 It does not require data with normal or known distributions. 
 It works with relatively small sample size (minimum sample size of 10 times 
the largest number of structural paths directed at a particular construct in the 
structural model (Hair et al., 2014b).  
 It uses a more complex, two-step estimation process to estimate latent 
variable scores (weight relations) directly using cross products of multi-item 
measures.  
The figure below depicts a PLS-PM output of the current main study using SmartPLS 
2.0 software. Details of the PLS-PM output are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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Figure 4. 2: Partial view of PLS-PM output of the current main study 
 
4.6  Summary 
This chapter described the research methodology, in general, and the specific 
methods used in the entire research process, in particular. It discussed the relevant 
methodological literature, the ontological position of the research, the research 
design and strategy, sampling issues, approaches and steps followed in developing 
and testing survey instruments, the process of survey administration, and the 
statistical approaches chosen to analyze and test the hypotheses. 
The research largely draws up on the positivist and interpretivist paradigms. It 
used a mixed-method research approach mainly composed of a quantitative survey 
to measure corporate governance variables. The quantitative section is followed by a 
qualitative study of corporate governance practices, which triangulates the results of 
the quantitative analysis. To address the research questions using suitable 
methodologies, the research adopted a case survey strategy by taking both the 
private and public banks. The unit of analysis, therefore, is banks with different 
categories of respondents that include board members, and secretaries, as well as 
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bank presidents and stakeholders. Subsequently, these are the primary sources of 
information, which is obtainable using questionnaire and interview. Annual reports of 
banks, statistical reports, journal articles, books, proclamations and directives of the 
regulatory body were secondary sources of information. The tasks carried out in 
instrument design, pilot testing and fine tuning of the instrument are described in this 
chapter. Particularly, the steps followed in the survey instrument development that 
include specifying the domain of the constructs,  sources of the measurement items, 
and validation of the content of the survey instrument are addressed.  
 Finally, the exogenous and endogenous corporate governance variables 
were specified together with data analysis techniques to be used. Both SPSS and 
SmartPLS were used for empirical analysis. The former was employed for 
assessment of the unidimensionality of scales, reliability tests, descriptive and 
bivariate correlation analysis whereas the later was used for validity tests through 
outer model evaluation and hypotheses testing through inner model evaluation. As 
outlined above, the next chapter will examine and prepare the data for the next stage 
of instrument validation and measurement model evaluation.  
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Chapter 5  Data Examination and Preparation 
5.1 Introduction 
 Data examination and preparation are the crucial first steps in any statistical 
analysis especially in multivariate procedures such as SEM/PLS (Hair, Black, Babin 
& Anderson, 2014a). The initial steps help the researcher to perform a number of 
tasks such as: evaluating the impact of missing data, identifying outliers, and testing 
the assumptions underlying most multivariate techniques (Straub, Boudreau & 
Gefen, 2004; Hair et al., 2014a).   
 This chapter discusses the steps followed in examining the data and actions 
taken in regard to irregularities and paving the way for statistical analysis. More 
specifically, the current chapter, which contains six sections, discusses the data 
preparation process, identifies missing data and reports actions taken, spots outliers 
and outlines decision taken to retain them or otherwise, and conducts tests for non-
respondent bias.  
5.2 Data Screening and Entry 
  Bajpai (2011) states that the data preparation process must start from 
preliminary questionnaire screening followed by data editing and coding. 
Subsequently data are entered into spread sheet and data analysis strategies 
initiated. 
 The data for this study were collected from Ethiopian private and public bank 
boards of directors, board secretaries, CEOs and stakeholders (shareholders, MPs, 
employees, regulatory agencies) using a paper-based survey questionnaire (see 
Appendices 4.2a, 4.2b and 4.2c). To conduct the main study 154 questionnaires 
were distributed to board members, board secretaries and CEOs. To assess 
corporate governance practices and stakeholders‟ perceptions, 402 questionnaires 
were distributed to different groups of stakeholders. Since the physical distribution of 
questionnaires was done by the researcher, it was accomplished in two stages. In 
the fourth week of October, 2013 where annual shareholders‟ general meetings of 
private banks commence, distribution of questionnaires to the shareholders was 
made on the dates of the meetings whilst distribution to the private board members 
and CEOs was made prior to the meetings. Concurrently, questionnaires for public 
banks‟ board members, MPs, both private and public bank employees, and 
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supervisory and regulatory bodies were also distributed during the annual 
shareholders‟ meetings.  
 After several efforts were made in the form of repeated personal visits and 
phone reminders for almost five months, 419 questionnaires were collected, which 
constitutes a 75% return rate. Preliminary questionnaire screening was made that 
included re-checking for missing pages, irrational consistency in the answers, pattern 
of similar answers to different questions and possibility of substantial missing data. 
After the preliminary data screening was done, the next step was to prepare the data 
for analysis (Bajpai, 2011) which was done by means of data coding. This is 
considered as an important and crucial step in data analysis (ibid.). Taking into 
account the importance of coding, the researcher coded the data in a way 
convenient for data entry and thereafter for importing and exporting to other software 
applications.  
 During preliminary screening of the 419 questionnaires, 2 incomplete cases 
with too much missing data were identified and removed, leaving 417 cases for use 
in the analysis. The data were entered into SPSS version 20 by the researcher, and 
every necessary care was taken to avoid data entry error. After the data entry, data 
cleaning was conducted to identify problems associated with inconsistent or illogical 
data entry and handling of missing data (ibid.). To minimize the risk of common 
method bias, multiple respondents were used to evaluate the system of corporate 
governance but not their individual performances. Therefore, the problematic issue 
of common method bias is not the worry of this study. 
 
5.3 Handling Missing Values  
 Missing values arise due to lack of responses to one or more questions in a 
survey, which creates difficulties in statistical analysis as it reduces statistical power 
and results in biased estimates calculated from incomplete data set (Hair et al., 
2014a & b; Babbie, 2013; Bajpai, 2011; Wang, Henseler, Chin & Vinzi, 2010). 
 In order to solve the problem of missing data, some techniques or data 
imputation algorithms for transforming the incomplete data to a complete data set 
have been proposed. One of the estimation methods which is mostly used in this 
regard is the Mean Imputation (Mean) method. This method uses the available 
observations and fills the missing values with a calculated mean of those 
observations (Hair et al., 2014a & b; Wang et al., 2010). 
88 
 All the missing data in this study is due to non-response by the respondents 
but does not exceed the permissible limit of 10% per observation (Hair et al., 2014a; 
Bajpai, 2011) and therefore can be ignored. Hair et al. (2014b) propose that when 
using PLS-SEM, an observation should be removed whenever the missing data 
exceeds 15% and the mean replacement for missing data be considered when the 
percentage of missing data is less than 5% of values per indicator. On the basis of 
the recommendation of Hair et al. (2014b), the mean imputation method was used to 
replace the missing values as the missing data per indicator is less than 5% and also 
missing data per observation does not exceed 15%. Table 5.1 presents a summary 
of the pattern of the figures of missing data by case and variable for the metric data. 
 Table 5.1: Pattern of missing data by case and variable for metric data 
# of 
missing 
data 
# of cases 
with missing 
data 
%age of 
case with 
missing data 
Subtotal of 
missing data 
by cases 
# of variables 
with missing 
data 
%age of 
variables 
with missing 
data 
Subtotal of 
missing 
data by 
variables 
0 81 76% 0 54 68% 0 
1 19 18% 19 14 18% 14 
2 2 2% 4 8 10% 16 
3 0 0 0 1 1% 3 
4 2 2% 8 1 1% 4 
5 1 1% 5 2 2% 10 
7 1 1% 7 0 0 0 
Total 106 100% 43 80 100% 47 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of cases with missing data  
Cases Missing data Cases Missing data 
Number 
missing  
Percentage 
missing 
Number 
missing  
Percentage 
missing 
12 1 1.3 86 1 1.3 
55 1 1.3 65 2 2.5 
61 1 1.3 102 1 1.3 
66 1 1.3 84 2 2.5 
68 1 1.3 106 1 1.3 
91 1 1.3 73 1 1.3 
93 1 1.3 101 1 1.3 
98 1 1.3 49 1 1.3 
75 1 1.3 82 4 5.0 
76 1 1.3 96 5 6.3 
77 1 1.3 88 4 5.0 
83 1 1.3 97 7 8.8 
85 1 1.3    
There are no cases with 10% or more missing values. 
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Table 5.3: Summary of variables with missing data  
Variables Missing data Variables 
 
Missing data Variables 
 
Missing data 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
SComp_3 3 2.8 PrCd_1 1 .9 SerSp_3 1 .9 
SComp_4 2 1.9 PrCd_4 1 .9 SerSp_5 1 .9 
SComp_6 1 .9 SerAd_2 1 .9 SerSp_8 2 1.9 
SComp_9 4 3.8 SerAd_6 1 .9 BCont_1 1 .9 
SComp_10 2 1.9 SerAd_7 5 4.7 BCont_2 1 .9 
SBInd_1 1 .9 SerNw_3 2 1.9 BCont_7 2 1.9 
SBInd_2 1 .9 SerNw_4 2 1.9 OCont_1 1 .9 
SBInd_3 2 1.9 SerNw_5 1 .9 OCont_6 5 4.7 
SComm_2 1 .9 SerNw_7 2 1.9    
There are no variables with 5% or more missing values. 
 More precisely, Appendices 5.1 and 5.2 show that there are 8480 data values 
(80 metric manifest variables times 106 cases), of which 43 (0.5%) are missing. 
None of the observations has more than 10% missing values and none of the 
manifest variables has more than 5% missing values.  In fact, the highest figures of 
missing values per observation and per variable are 7(8.8%) and 5(4.7%), 
respectively. There is only one observation with 7 missing values and only two 
variables with the highest number of 5 missing values each. Thus, all observations 
and metric variables have a low level of missing values that is acceptable and that 
does not affect the results of the study. Therefore, all the 106 cases can be 
analysed. Furthermore, the SmartPLS-SEM software recommends the mean 
replacement option for missing value treatment. Thus, for further analysis the data 
was made complete by inputting the mean values.  
 
5.4 Examination of Outliers 
 Outliers refer to extreme responses or observations with a unique 
combination of characteristics that are different from other observations or cases in 
the data set. Outliers may have the potential to influence the outcome of any 
statistical analysis and must be handled properly to avoid distortion and meet 
research objectives (Hair et al., 2014a & b). 
 Several methods can be used to detect and assess the impact of outliers that 
include univariate, bivariate, or multivariate tests. Detection of outliers for this study 
is performed based on a multivariate perspective as the study involves more than 
two variables. The issue of detection of multivariate outliers for each observation 
across a set of variables is addressed by the Mahalanobis D2 measure (Hair et al., 
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2014a). This method measures each case‟s or observation‟s distance from the mean 
of all observations, providing a single value for each case regardless of the number 
of variables that are involved in each case. That means higher D2 values 
observations are distanced from the center of all observations on a set of variables 
implying that these observations are dissimilar and will be removed from further 
analysis.  
 According to Hair et al. (2014a), observations with a D2/df value that exceeds 
2.5 in small samples of less than 200 and 3 or 4 in large samples of at least 200 can 
be considered as outliers.  Thus, on the basis of the recommendations of Hair et al. 
(2014a), a Mahalanobis D2 diagnostic measure was considered to examine the data 
set, consisting of 106 cases with 80 metric variables, to detect multivariate outliers 
(see for details Appendix 5.3). The analysis in Appendix 5.3 shows that there are no 
cases that have a value (D2/df) exceeding 2.5, indicating the values are below 1.0 
implying there is no observation detected as a multivariate outlier. To further confirm 
the absence of outliers, a partial view of SPSS analysis is produced and presented in 
Table 5.4 below. 
 Table 5. 4:   Partial output of Residuals Statisticsa for examination of outliers 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Predicted Value -6.855 110.6844 53.500 27.43437 106 
Mahalanobis  Distance (D
2) 50.874 96.402 79.245 9.513 106 
a. Dependent Variable: IDNo 
 The critical χ
2 value for degrees of freedom equaling the number of metric 
variables (80) at the 0.05 level is 101.88. From Table 5.4 it can be observed that the 
maximum score for Mahalonobis distance is 96.40, which is less than the critical 
value of 101.88 implying that there are no outliers surrounding any observation.  
Hence, all the 106 cases from sample one are used in this study as there are no 
cases as outliers.  
5.5 Estimating Non-response Bias  
 In survey sampling, individuals chosen for the sample may be unwilling or 
unable to participate in the survey. This may result in non-response bias. This is a 
kind of bias that results from a difference between those respondents who volunteer 
to participate in the survey and those who do not. Non-response is often considered 
a bigger problem with mail survey (which often results in very low response rates) 
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than other forms (Churchill, 2010). A proxy method of measurement used to test for 
non-response error is simply to compare the mean responses of early period 
respondents with those of late respondents during data collection periods. The 
literature does not point to any established norm or procedure to determine the 
numbers of responses and time period to be included in the test. As mentioned in 
chapter four section 4.5.3.3, due to the precautionary measures taken in the design 
of the questionnaire and collection stages to decrease the non-response rate, 106 
completed questionnaires were received with an overall response rate of 69%. To 
differentiate between early and late arrivals, the questionnaires were numbered with 
dates of return.  
 To check for non-respondent bias, an independent samples t-test was run to 
help verify if differences existed between respondents and non-respondents 
regarding board structure, board process, and board performance variables. As 
stated above, non-response bias was tested based on comparison of early and late 
respondents in reference to the specified constructs. The means (composite 
indexes) of the constructs were taken for analysis. To perform the test, the first 30% 
(32 responses) and the last 30% (32 responses) responses were taken as response 
and non-respondent samples. There were 80 Likert scale questions grouped under 
the four main constructs and all were included in the test. Next, the means of the two 
groups were compared using SPSS version 20 independent samples t-test. The 
analysis revealed that no significant difference existed between the mean values of 
answers of the early and late respondents at the 5% significant level for all latent 
variables. The non-response bias for the entire first order latent variables is given in 
Appendix 5.4. Table 5.5 presents a summary of independent sample t-test for non-
response bias. 
Table 5.5: Summary of independent samples t-test for non-response bias. 
Second order latent variables t-test for Equality of Means 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Composite Index (mean) of 
Latent Variables 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Early  Late Mean 
Difference 
Board structure- BStruct .55 56 .59 3.875 3.810 .065 .119 
BProcess- Board process 1.379 62 .173 3.831 3.662 .169 .122 
 Board service role-BServrole -.596 57 .571 3.749 3.839 -.090 .152 
Board control role-BControle .442 56 .671 3.779 3.722 .057 .134 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter examined and prepared the survey questionnaire for the 
instrument validation and measurement evaluation of the research process. It first 
made a preliminary visual assessment of the questionnaire for incomplete cases 
before proceeding to the next data examination statistical approaches. There were 
only two questionnaires with too much missing data and these were automatically 
discarded as unusable. Then, the data was carefully coded and entered into SPSS 
version 20 in order to examine and handle any missing values, outliers and non-
response bias. As discussed in the above sections, the data went through the data 
cleaning process and it was ascertained that the data did not suffer from any one of 
the anomalies mentioned above. Consequently, based on the results of the analysis, 
the data was made ready for the next stage of the research process, i.e. ensuring 
instrument reliability and validation of the measurement model.    
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Chapter 6 Instrument Validation, Measurement Model, Descriptive 
Study and Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
6.1 Introduction  
To maintain internal validity, triangulated sources and evidence were used. 
Moreover, the research design chosen for this study is based up on the research 
questions which ensure that the findings that are expected would reflect the reality. 
As Saunders et al. (2009) state, a proper research design guided by research 
questions, objectives, and philosophical underpinnings reduces the possibility of 
getting wrong findings, which this study strives to achieve. To ensure the validity of 
the research instrument, a questionnaire was pilot tested involving at least 5% of 
sampling units and professional colleagues to see how the items adequately 
measure the variables under the major constructs. Furthermore, to measure internal 
consistency reliability, Cronbach‟s alpha reliability coefficient was calculated for 
items measuring the variables. Therefore, it is by taking the intentions above that this 
research was conducted to ensure the internal validity and consistency of the 
research process. 
To avoid potential problems of inferences, pattern-matching techniques were 
used against theoretical perspectives. Generalizations beyond the cases were not 
made but only analytical generalizations5 about the cases (Yin, 1984), so the study 
would not suffer from external validity problems. According to Tellis (1997a), a case 
study achieves its reliability through the development of a study protocol that 
includes case study issues, objectives, and questions, as undertaken in this study. 
 
6.2 Assessment of Unidimensionality of Scales (using EFA and CFA) 
 This is a follow up to Chapter Five, which is done in two processes to ensure 
unidimensionality of items. Unidimensionality means that each actual scale item on 
an instrument measures (reflects) a single construct, which also means that one 
single construct explains a set of measured variables (items) (Hair et al., 2014a; 
Gefen & Straub, 2005). First, construct (latent) variables with multi-items that have 
been formulated based on theoretical grounds and that have not been empirically 
validated in prior research were evaluated using the principal component analysis 
                                                          
5
 This is when a previously developed theory is used as template against which the empirical results 
of the case study are compared. 
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(PCA) extraction with Varimax with Kaiser Normalization rotation (Mande, Ishak & 
Idris, 2013). Then, the items that were retained after PCA analysis, were subjected 
to reliability and validity tests (CFA) using a PLS measurement (outer) model (ibid.). 
PCA is an important tool that extracts an appropriate number of components that 
account for a maximal amount of total variance in the observed variables (Hair et al., 
2014a). PCA extracts factors assuming uncorrelated (orthogonal) linear 
combinations of the measurement items. The loading pattern is rotated to simplify 
the interpretation of the results. The rotation is a Varimax rotation which creates 
orthogonal factors with minimized high loadings of the measurement items on other 
factors (Hair et al., 2014a; Gefen & Straub, 2005).The PCA is performed using SPSS 
version 20. According to Hair et al. (2014a), the following rule of thumb is followed in 
assessing the unidimensionality of manifest variables. Factor loadings (a factor 
loading represents the correlation between an original variable and its factor) in the 
range of 0.30 to 0.40 are considered sufficient to meet the minimal level of 
acceptance for interpretation of the structure and loadings of at least 0.50 are 
considered practically significant.   
In this study, to ensure the robustness of the scale and consider the practical 
significance, a factor loading of at least 0.50 was used. Those items with a factor 
loading of at most 0.49 were dropped from the next stage of confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) of the PLS. After this process, the new components brought about by 
the PCA and those constructs adopted from prior studies were further evaluated 
using PLS to establish their reliability and validity. Items that did not meet the 
requirements of reliability and validity were excluded from further analysis.  
 For this study EFA was run for those constructs not empirically validated in 
prior studies and those validated but slightly modified to meet the objectives of the 
study. The ones not validated include the following constructs: board composition, 
board independence and board committee, and boardroom atmosphere. Those 
validated but slightly modified include board process, service role and control role 
variables. Although EFA often tests unrestricted factor models, it can also be run in a 
restricted model to determine a set of items measuring each theoretical construct 
(Kassahun, 2012). Straub, Boudreau and Gefen (2004:25), state that “When PCA is 
used, […] as exploratory factor analysis technique, researchers can simply test the 
group of variables separately.” On the basis of the recommendations that EFA be 
run separately for each set of items that reflect a given theoretical construct, this 
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study run five separate EFA models for those constructs that were not validated 
through prior studies and also those that are empirically supported. PCA has been 
used with the following rules to extract the factors (Hair et al., 2014a; Gefen & 
Straub, 2005):  
• Minimum factor loading of 0.5 used to allocate an item to a factor,  
• Number of factors retained is based on eigenvalues greater than 1.0,  
• Enough factors that meet about 60% of total variance explained, 
• Varimax rotation method used for factor rotation to clearly load items to factors 
and gain better interpretation,  
• One item or two items factors were dropped (Hair et al., 2014a) and 
• Items with cross loadings on more than one-factor were dropped.  
Below are the different EFA models.  
 
Table 6.1:  Board composition:  Initial factor solution Rotated Component Matrixa 
  
Manifest 
variables 
Component Action 
1 2 3  
SComp_1 .785 -.094 .064  
SComp_2 .697 -.310 .136  
SComp_3 -.127 .666 -.248 Removed (only two items under component 2) 
SComp_4 .543 .424 -.101  
SComp_5 .590 .204 .198  
SComp_6 -.002 .706 .392 Removed (only two items under component 2) 
SComp_7 .261 .327 .561 Removed (only two items under component 3) 
SComp_8 .251 .296 -.013 Removed due to low factor loading (<0.50). 
SComp_9 -.112 -.149 .765 Removed (only two items under component 3) 
SComp_10 .545 .083 .040  
SComp_11 .115 -.028 .443 Removed due to low factor loading (<0.50). 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.  
 
 Table 6.1 provides an EFA model for composition construct producing a three 
component solution with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and explaining 58 percent of 
the variance. At this stage, a total of six items were removed due to either low factor 
loadings (less than 0.50) or low number of less than three items under one factor. In 
deciding the number of items representing a factor, the recommendation of Hair et 
al. (2014a: 608) that  “… good practice dictates a minimum of three items per factor, 
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preferably four, not only to provide minimum coverage of the construct‟s theoretical 
domain, but also to provide adequate identification for the construct …‟‟ was 
followed. The point of the recommendation is that, it is difficult to assess the 
construct validity of a single item dimension as its adequacy to reliably represent a 
construct is suspect. As a result, only one factor was retained and named as „board 
composition‟ based on the overall nature of the items in the construct (see Table 
6.1). The labeling of a latent variable is based on items with higher loadings. These 
items with high loadings are considered more important as they have significant 
influence on the name selected to represent a factor (Hair et al., 2014a). 
 
Table 6.2: Board committee and independence: Rotated Component Matrixa 
Manifest 
variables 
Component Action 
1 2 3 
SBInd_1 .442 .654 .055  
SBInd_2 .114 .831 .084  
SBInd_3 -.005 .841 .101  
SComm_1 .582 .242 -.126  
SComm_2 .907 .075 .098  
SComm_3 .834 .035 .186  
SComm_4 .653 .124 .412  
SComm_5 -.108 .086 .870 Removed (only one item factor) 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.  
 
 Regarding board independence and committee of the structural construct, 
eight items were assessed for dimensionality and 3 items loaded onto component 2 
(labeled as board independence) and four items onto component 1 (labeled as board 
committee) with eigenvalues of  greater than 1.0, accounting for 68 percent of total 
variance explained. One item was dropped as it solely loaded only on factor 3.  
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Table 6.3: Board process: Rotated Component Matrixa 
Manifest 
variables 
Component Action 
1 2 3 4 
PrBrm_1 .475 .194 .389 .043 Removed due to low factor loading (<0.50). 
PrBrm_2 .112 .254 .661 .249  
PrBrm_3 .405 .392 .583 .156  
PrBrm_4 .274 .368 .097 .413 Removed due to low factor loading (<0.50). 
PrBrm_5 .424 .590 .427 .174  
PrBrm_6 .620 .264 .259 .278 Can‟t be assigned in a meaningful way 
PrBrm_7 .439 .234 .395 .113 Removed due to low factor loading (<0.50). 
PrBrm_8 .207 .258 .756 .015  
PrBrm_9 .238 .288 .561 .448  
PrCd_1 .038 .066 -.207 -.788  
PrCd_2 -.052 -.012 -.202 -.860  
PrCd_3 -.231 -.256 .121 -.669  
PrCd_4 .281 .660 .260 .211  
PrCd_5 .211 .844 .223 .056  
PrCd_6 .186 .832 .301 -.035  
PrCd_7 .404 .636 .171 .122  
PrC_1 .681 .064 .405 .186  
PrC_2 .618 .305 .393 .108  
PrC_3 .559 .351 .151 -.149  
PrC_4 .817 .214 .066 .061  
PrC_5 .613 .478 .115 .274  
PrC_6 .211 .097 .715 .047 Can‟t be assigned in a meaningful way 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.  
  
The EFA for the board process construct also extracted a four-factor solution, 
explaining 63 per cent of the total variance with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Based 
on the items with the highest loadings and the overall nature of the items in the 
factor, four components were identified and named as, „board commitment‟, 
„cognitive conflict‟, „process/procedural conflict‟ and „boardroom atmosphere‟. 
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Table 6.4: Board Service role: Rotated Component Matrixa 
Manifest 
variables 
Component Action 
1 2 3 4 
SerAd_1 .188 .317 .674 .185  
SerAd_2 .302 .365 .599 .208  
SerAd_3 .490 .015 .590 -.054  
SerAd_4 .299 .070 .723 .146  
SerAd_5 .401 .186 .697 .098  
SerAd_6 .717 .169 .192 .180  
SerAd_7 .440 .659 -.163 .005  
SerNw_1 .147 .804 .215 .082  
SerNw_2 .127 .731 .330 .333  
SerNw_3 .232 .774 .171 .189  
SerNw_4 .190 .666 .254 .285  
SerNw_5 .195 .290 .097 .699  
SerNw_6 .256 .182 .129 .689  
SerNw_7 .149 .086 .114 .835  
SerSp_1 .749 .192 .285 .166  
SerSp_2 .825 .080 .174 .134  
SerSp_3 .719 .338 .295 .211  
SerSp_4 .793 .206 .205 .321  
SerSp_5 .725 .341 .261 .251  
SerSp_6 .627 .172 .244 .431  
SerSp_7 .741 .289 .222 .091  
SerSp_8 .543 .158 .344 .119  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.  
  
With reference to the board service role construct, the EFA resulted in a four 
factor solution with eigenvalues of at least 1.0 and explaining 67 percent of total 
variance. Based on the item with the highest loadings and the overall nature of the 
items in the factor, four factors were identified and labeled as, „advisory role‟, 
„networking-resource dependency‟, networking-image building‟ and „ strategic 
participation‟. 
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Table 6.5: Board control role: Rotated Component Matrixa 
Manifest 
variables 
  Component Action 
1 2 3 
BCont_1 .716 .205 .078  
BCont_2 .714 .072 .464  
BCont_3 .742 .086 .152  
BCont_4 .612 .483 .243  
BCont_5 .624 .279 .250  
BCont_6 .178 .163 .757  
BCont_7 .037 .362 .629  
OCont_1 .311 .095 .695  
OCont_2 .422 .017 .555  
OCont_3 .139 .227 .728  
OCont_4 .489 -.127 .549  
OCont_5 .542 -.059 .626 Removed due to cross loading 
OCont_6 -.029 -.143 .071 Removed due to low factor loading (<0.50).  
SCont_1 .331 .760 -.056  
SCont_2 .473  .721 -.151  
SCont_3 .072 .272 .690  
SCont_4 .462 .502 -.088  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.  
 Board control role was the last construct evaluated using EFA and the result 
was a three factor solution with eigenvalues of greater than 1.0 and explanatory 
power of 62% of total variance. Two items were dropped due to cross loadings and 
low factor loadings (of less than 0.5). Based on the item with the highest loadings 
and the overall nature of the items in the factor, three components were identified 
and labeled respectively as, „behavioral control‟, „output control‟ and „strategic 
control‟. 
 The following table gives a summary of the EFA output for the above 
construct models that include items dropped and factor (construct) names and 
revised codes.  In all, out of the total of 80 items, EFA led to the removal of 14 items 
that failed to meet any of the component extraction criteria stated above. Of the 66 
items filtered out, 48 (73%) demonstrated significant factor loading of more than 
0.60. Furthermore the EFA procedure grouped the 66 items into 14 factors. This 
factorial validity process represents an initial requirement/specification of the 
measurement model which lays the ground for the confirmatory factor analysis 
performed using the PLS-PM.   
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Table 6.6: Summary output of EFA 
Construct No. of items 
before EFA 
No. of items 
removed 
Items 
removed 
Criterion 
for removal 
No. of 
components 
Component name  No. of items after 
EFA 
Board 
structure 
19 7 SComp_3, 
SComp_6, 
SComp_7, 
SComp_8, 
SComp_9, 
SComp_11, 
SComm_5 
Two item factor 
Two item factor 
Two item factor 
Factor loading<.5 
Two item factor 
Factor loading<.5 
One item factor 
3 Board composition 12 
Board 
Independence  
Board committee  
Board 
process 
22 5 PrBrm_1, 
PrBrm_4,  
PrBrm_6 
PrBrm_7 
PrC_6 
Factor loading<.5 
Factor loading<.5 
Not meaningful 
Factor loading<.5 
Not meaningful 
 
4 Commitment 17 
Cognitive conflict 
Process/procedural 
conflict 
Boardroom 
atmosphere 
Board 
service  
role 
22    4 Advisory role  22 
Networking- 
resource 
dependency 
Networking- image 
building 
Strategic 
participation 
Board 
control 
role 
17 2 OCont_5 
OCont_6 
Cross-loading 
Factor loading<.5 
 
3 Behavioral control  15 
Output control 
Strategic control 
Total 80 14   14  66 
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Table 6.7: Summary of main constructs, latent variables, initial and revised 
codes obtained through EFA 
Construct Latent variable 
label 
Initial code Factor 
loadings 
Revised code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Structure 
Board composition SComp_1 .785 SComp_1 
SComp_2 .697 SComp_2 
SComp_4 .543 SComp_3 
SComp_5 .590 SComp_4 
 SComp_10 .545   SComp_5 
Board Independence SBInd_1 .654 SBInd_1 
SBInd_2 .831 SBInd_2 
SBInd_3 .841 SBInd_3 
Board committee SComm_1 .582 SComm_1 
SComm_2 .907 SComm_2 
SComm_3 .834 SComm_3 
SComm_4 .653 SComm_4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Process 
Commitment  PrC_1 .681 PrCom_1 
PrC_2 .618 PrCom_2 
PrC_3 .559 PrCom_3 
PrC_4 .817 PrCom_4 
PrC_5 .613 PrCom_5 
Process conflict PrCd_1 .788 PrCon_1 
PrCd_2 .860 PrCon_2 
PrCd_3 .669 PrCon_3 
Cognitive conflict PrCd_4 .660 PrCog_1 
PrCd_5 .844 PrCog_2 
PrCd_6 .832 PrCog_3 
PrCd_7 .636 PrCog_4 
PrBrm_5 .590 PrCog_5 
Boardroom 
atmosphere 
PrBrm_2 .661 PrBrA_1 
PrBrm_3 .583 PrBrA_2 
PrBrm_8 .756 PrBrA_3 
PrBrm_9 .561 PrBrA_4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Service role 
Advisory role SerAd_1 .674 SerAd_1 
SerAd_2 .599 SerAd_2 
SerAd_3 .590 SerAd_3 
SerAd_4 .723 SerAd_4 
SerAd_5 .697 SerAd_5 
Networking- 
resource 
dependency role 
SerNw_1 .804 SerNwR_1 
SerNw_2 .731 SerNwR_2 
SerNw_3 .774 SerNwR_3 
SerNw_4 .666 SerNwR_4 
  SerAd_7 .659 SerNwR_5 
Networking- image 
building role 
SerNw_5 .699 SerNwI_1 
SerNw_6 .689 SerNwI_2 
SerNw_7 .835 SerNwI_3 
Strategic 
participation role 
SerSp_1 .749 SerSp_1 
SerSp_2 .825 SerSp_2 
SerSp_3 .719 SerSp_3 
SerSp_4 .793 SerSp_4 
SerSp_5 .725 SerSp_5 
SerSp_6 .627 SerSp_6 
SerSp_7 .741 SerSp_7 
SerSp_8 .543 SerSp_8 
SerAd_6 .717   SerSp_9 
 
 
 
Control role 
Behavioral control  
 
BCont_1 .716 BCont_1 
BCont_2 .714 BCont_2 
BCont_3 .742 BCont_3 
BCont_4 .612 BCont_4 
BCont_5 .624 BCont_5 
Output control 
 
OCont_1 .695 OCont_1 
OCont_2 .555 OCont_2 
OCont_3 .728 OCont_3 
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OCont_4 .549 OCont_4 
BCont_6 .757 OCont_5 
BCont_7 .629 OCont_6 
SCont_3 .690 OCont_7 
Strategic control SCont_1 .760 SCont_1 
SCont_2 .721 SCont_2 
 SCont_4 .502  SCont_3 
  
The analysis from this point onwards is based on the new factor groupings 
and revised codes of the retained indicator variables obtained after the PCA process. 
In the following section further assessment of the scales, construct validity and 
reliability, is performed through the CFA of the PLS-PM.  
 
6.3 Reliability and Validity Assessments (CFA) through PLS Outer Model 
Evaluation  
 In the previous section, assessment of factorial validity was undertaken 
through EFA to determine the factor structure of each of the theoretical constructs. 
Once this was done, the next step was to conduct an outer model evaluation that 
provides evidence of reliability and construct validity. These evaluations are 
performed through the CFA of the partial least squares path modeling (PLS-PM) 
approach. This assessment precedes the assessment of the structural model and 
the test of the research hypothesis (Hair et al., 2014a & b, Mande et al., 2013).  This 
section, therefore, addresses the assessment of the indicator (manifest variable) 
reliability, construct reliability and validity (i.e., convergent validity and discriminant 
validity). These tests are performed using a partial least squares (PLS) 
measurement model evaluation approach. The important point in CFA is to confirm 
how well the model fits the data. In other words, the CFA assesses the contribution 
of each manifest variable in representing its associated construct and measures how 
well the group of manifest variables represents a construct. Once the constructs 
meet the required measurement standards, the relationships between constructs are 
assessed (Hair et al., 2014b). The following gives a brief account of the principles 
and concepts applied in the evaluation of the measurement model (reliability and 
validity). However, the following sample size requirement should be fulfilled to have a 
robust model when employing PLS-PM. 
 The minimum sample size requirement for an analysis using PLS-PM is 
based up on the 10 times rule of thumb, which requires  that  the minimum sample 
size should be at least 10 times larger than the largest number of structural paths 
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directed at a particular construct in the structural model. In other words, the minimum 
sample size should not be less than 10 times the maximum number of structural path 
arrowheads heading to a latent variable anywhere in the PLS path model (Hair et al., 
2014b; Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics, 2009). On the basis of this rule of thumb and 
taking the first order level into account, the maximum number of paths that could 
have been directed into any target latent variable would be seven. Since the second 
order level is considered for hypothesis testing, the maximum number of paths was 
reduced to two. However, as the first level is simply embedded in the second level, 
the first level is taken as a basis to determine the minimum threshold value for the 
sample size. Accordingly, the minimum sample size for this study should be 10*7 = 
70. Previous empirical studies proposed a sample size of 100 to 200 as a good 
starting point for studies based on path modeling (Wong, 2013). In the current 
research, the main study is carried out with a sample size of 106, which satisfies the 
10 times rule of thumb as well as the prior research suggestion of 100 to 200 sample 
size (ibid.).   
 As stated elsewhere PLS is a structural equation modeling (SEM) statistical 
approach that models multivariable relationships among observed and unobserved 
variables. PLS-SEM is described by two sub models: the outer model (measurement 
model) and the inner model (structural model). The outer model relates a block of 
observed variables (manifest variables or indicators or measures) to their respective 
unobserved variables (latent variables or constructs). This method allows the 
estimation of a causal theoretical network of relationships linking latent variables, 
each measured by means of a number of observable variables. The inner model 
relates some endogenous latent variables to other latent variables on the basis of 
hypotheses established by a researcher (Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin & Lauro, 2005; 
Vinzi et al., 2010).  
 The PLS path model examines a number of issues in a two-stage process: (1) 
the assessment of the measurement model, and (2) the assessment of the structural 
model (Mande et al., 2013). The analysis has to be conducted in this order because 
it is necessary to check, first, that what is being measured is what is intended to be 
measured, before any conclusion about the relationships among the latent variables 
can be drawn (Sanchez, 2013). The PLS measurement model assesses the 
reliability of the manifest variables with respect to their latent variables. This section 
focuses on the measurement model; and the structural model analysis results will be 
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treated in Chapter Eight. For the purpose of assessing the quality of the 
measurement model, issues such as individual item (indicator) reliability (outer 
model loading), construct reliability, convergent and discriminant validity are 
addressed for the reflective constructs. These evaluations are performed by carrying 
out a series of PLS algorithm calculations using the SmartPLS computer program 
that produces several reports. The following steps are followed in the evaluation of 
the measurement model (Hair et al., 2014b:97). 
 Step 1.  Assess Indicator reliability  
 Step 2.  Internal consistency (composite reliability)   
 Step 3. Convergent validity (average variance extracted) 
 Step 4. Discriminant validity 
 
6.3.1 Assessment of Reliability  
 Reliability is about estimating the consistency of the measurement or the 
degree to which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used under 
the same conditions with the same subjects. In other words, reliability of a measure 
is an indication of the stability and consistency with which the instrument measures 
construct. Hence, reliability ensures consistent measurement across time and across 
the various items in the instrument. That means, if we measure something many 
times and the result is always the same, then we can say that our measuring 
instrument is reliable. When the outcome of the measuring process is reproducible, 
while it does not indicate that it is valid; it simply means that the measurement 
instrument does not produce erratic and unpredictable results (Adams et al., 2007). 
The sub-section below presents and examines the two parts of reliability called 
individual indicator reliability and internal consistency reliability (the reliabilities for 
each construct‟s composite of measures). 
 
6.3.1.1 Indicator and Internal consistency reliability (construct reliability) 
 Indicator reliability is a variable (individual) level reliability that measures the 
extent to which a measurement item is measuring what it intends to measure. The 
factor loading (correlations) value of the outer model is used to measure individual 
item (indicator) reliability. Loadings are correlations between a latent variable and its 
indicators. Indicator reliability is considered adequate when an indicator has a factor 
loading of greater than 0.70 regarding a particular construct, which in other words, 
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means that more than 50% of the variance in the indicator variable is captured or 
explained by the construct. The amount of variance explained by a latent variable is 
called communalities and these are just squared loadings (Hair et al., 2014; 
Sanchez, 2013; Vinzi et al., 2010; Bart & Bontis, 2003; Hulland, 1999). For 
exploratory research of this kind, 0.40 or higher is acceptable (Hulland, 1999). 
 The second aspect of a reliability test is internal consistency reliability 
(construct reliability), which is indicative of the homogeneity of the items in 
measuring or reflecting their construct. In other words, it is the reliability of a set of 
indicators for their consistency in measuring their constructs jointly (Mande et al., 
2013). The two commonly applied methods to evaluate internal consistency reliability 
for reflective measures are composite reliability and Cronbach‟s alpha (Hair et al., 
2012). 
 Cronbach Alpha is a measure of squared correlations between observed 
scores and true scores. It is measured in terms of the ratio of true score variance to 
observed score variance. The Cronbach's alpha is a ratio used to evaluate how well 
a block of indicators measures their corresponding latent construct. It is an average 
of inter-variable correlation between indicators of a reflective construct. Cronbach‟s 
alpha is limited by the assumption that all indicators are equally reliable (tau-
equivalence) or it uses equal weighting (each manifest variable is assumed to be 
equally important in defining the latent variable). If a block of manifest variables is 
unidimensional, they have to be highly correlated, and consequently will have a high 
average inter-variable correlation. On the other hand, a low alpha value implies 
multidimensional structure of data. A common threshold value of Cronbach‟s alpha is 
0.6 (Vinzi et al., 2010) though other scholars consider a value greater than 0.7 
acceptable (Sanchez, 2013).  
 The other measure of internal consistency which is similar to Cronbach„s 
alpha is composite reliability. Composite reliability evaluates how well a construct is 
measured by its assigned indicators (Vinzi et al., 2010). In contrast to Cronbach‟s 
alpha, composite reliability does not assume tau-equivalence (parallelity) of the 
manifest variables, rather it uses actual factor loadings (Vinzi et al., 2010), making it 
more suitable for PLS-SEM, which prioritizes indicators according to their individual 
reliability (factor loadings) (Hair et al., 2012; Hair et al., 2014b). Because of this, the 
index is considered to be a better indicator than the Cronbach's alpha as it takes into 
account to what extent the latent variable explains its block of indicators. The 
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composite reliability can vary between 0 and 1 and values larger than 0.6 are 
frequently judged as acceptable in exploratory research (Vinzi et al., 2010; Hair et 
al., 2014b). Other scholars suggest a threshold of at least 0.70 (Hair et al., 2012). 
Composite reliability is considered as the best alternative to Cronbach‟s alpha as it is 
usually calculated in conjunction with structural equation modeling (Hair et al., 2012; 
Hair et al., 2014b). 
 Assessment of reflective outer models involves determining indicator reliability 
(squared standardized outer loadings), internal consistency reliability (composite 
reliability), Cronbach‟s alpha, convergent validity (average variance extracted, AVE), 
and discriminant validity (Fornell-Larcker criterion, cross-loadings). The assessment 
is done in two phases. In phase one the indicator variables with their latent variables 
are screened with their outer loadings and a report is produced containing AVE, 
composite reliability and Cronbach„s alpha. The assessment is done through a visual 
examination as well as the reading of the outputs obtained from the PLS algorithm.  
Furthermore, the evaluations are based on the acceptable thresholds stated above. 
In the second phase, the model is revised with the indicators that meet the 
evaluation criteria at step one, and the PLS algorithm computation is iterated once 
again and made ready for validity tests.  
In phase one, the 66 indicators, which were retained after PCA analysis, were 
assigned to their respective latent variables in the PLS-PM. Then, the SmartPLS was 
run to generate the pictorial and calculation results of outer loadings, AVE, 
composite reliability, Cronbach‟s alpha for the first order measurement model. The 
results of this process are reported in Table 6.8 below.   
Table 6.8: Phase one of PLS first order outer (measurement)   model analysis 
 Loadings  AVE Composite  
Reliability 
Cronbach’s  
Alpha 
R Square Action 
Board composition 
(SComp) 
 0.45 0.80 0.69 0.71  
SComp_1 0.80      
SComp_2 0.70      
SComp_3 0.59     Drop 
SComp_4 0.70      
SComp_5 0.59     Drop 
Board Independence 
(SBInd) 
  
0.65 0.85 0.73 0.55  
SBInd_1 0.83      
SBInd_2 0.80       
SBInd_3 0.77      
Committee function 
(SComm) 
 0.56 0.83 0.72 0.62  
SComm_1 0.59     Drop 
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SComm_2 0.89      
SComm_3 0.84      
SComm_4 0.70      
 Board Process – 
Commitment 
(PrCom) 
 0.61 0.89 0.84 0.78  
PrCom_1 0.73      
PrCom_2 0.83      
PrCom_3 0.70      
PrCom_4 0.83      
PrCom_5 0.81      
Board Process – 
Conflict ( PrCon) 
 0.67 0.86 0.75 0.21  
PrCon_1 0.78      
PrCon_2 0.89      
PrCon_3 0.78      
Board Process – 
Cognitive Conflict 
(PrCog) 
 0.70 0.92 0.89 0.81  
PrCog_1 0.81      
PrCog_2 0.88      
PrCog_3 0.88      
PrCog_4 0.78      
PrCog_5 0.85      
Process- Boardroom 
atmosphere  
( PrBrA) 
 0.67 0.89 0.84 0.76  
PrBrA_1 0.82      
PrBrA_2 0.86      
PrBrA_3 0.77      
PrBrA_4 0.83      
Board Service role- 
Advising (SerAd) 
 0.57 0.87 0.81 0.71  
SerAd_1 0.76      
SerAd_2 0.76      
SerAd_3 0.67      
SerAd_4 0.75      
SerAd_5 0.82      
Board Service role- 
Networking -
resource 
dependency 
(SerNwR) 
 0.63 0.90 0.85 0.62  
SerNwR_1 0.80      
SerNwR_2 0.84      
SerNwR_3 0.85      
SerNwR_4 0.81      
SerNwR_5 0.68      
Board Service role- 
Networking- image 
building (SerNwI) 
 0.66 0.85 0.75 0.44  
SerNwI_1 0.81      
SerNwI_2 0.83      
SerNwI_3 0.80      
Board Service role- 
Strategic 
participation (SerSp) 
 
0.66 0.95 0.94 0.89  
SerSp_1 0.83      
SerSp_2 0.82      
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SerSp_3 0.86      
SerSp_4 0.90      
SerSp_5 0.85      
SerSp_6 0.78      
SerSp_7 0.83      
SerSp_8 0.70      
SerSp_9 0.77      
Board control role 
(BCont) 
 0.62 0.89 0.84 0.87  
BCont_1 0.79      
BCont_2 0.82      
BCont_3 0.76      
BCont_4 0.77      
BCont_5 0.80      
Output control role 
(OCont) 
 0.43 0.83 0.76 0.81  
OCont_1 0.70      
OCont_2 0.74      
OCont_3 0.75       
OCont_4 0.78      
OCont_5 0.48     Drop 
OCont_6 0.40      Drop 
OCont_7 0.57     Drop 
Strategic control role 
(SCont) 
 
0.84 0.94 0.90 0.76  
SCont_1 0.91      
SCont_2 0.92      
SCont_3 0.92      
 
 Phase one of this process displays that a total of six items (SComp_3, 
SComp_5, SComm_1, OCont_5, OCont_6, OCont_7)  that fell short of meeting the 
criteria of a factor loading of at least 0.70 were considered not reliable and removed. 
All the remaining 60 items out of the total of 66 items have factor loadings of at least 
0.70, the lowest being 0.70 and the highest 0.92. This implies that the individual item 
reliability is adequate, which also means that more than 50 percent of the variance in 
the observed variable is shared with the respective latent variables. Even though 
Hulland (1999) proposed acceptable indicator reliability of 0.40 or higher for 
exploratory research, this study considered a threshold of 0.50 recently proposed by 
other scholars, as noted above, to enhance even further its construct validity. 
 From the table it can be observed that the two latent variables (Board 
composition and Output control role) out of the fourteen, produced lower values of 
0.45 and 0.43 of AVEs respectively, which are below the threshold value of 0.50. For 
the remaining 12 latent variables, the lowest AVE is 0.56 and the highest 0.84. 
These values represent the average variance shared between a latent variable and 
its associated indicator variables. With regard to internal consistency reliability or 
construct validity, all the fourteen latent variables showed composite reliability values 
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of at least 0.80, the lowest being 0.80 and the highest 0.95. Cronbach‟s alpha values 
for the latent variables ranged from 0.70 to 0.94, which are above the modest level of 
reliability. 
 To move to validity tests, the above process has to be reiterated in order to 
improve the AVE values for the two latent variables namely: Board composition 
(Scomp) and Output control role (Ocont). Accordingly, five observed variables, in the 
constructs, with factor loadings of less than 0.70 were removed. These were: 
Scomp_2, Scomp_5, Ocont_5, Ocont_6 and Ocont_7. This resulted in improving the 
AVEs values above the threshold of 0.50. Furthermore, one variable (Scomm_1) 
under the Board committee (SComm) construct, which had a low factor loading of 
0.59, was also removed. The details of phase two of the outer model evaluation 
process are given in Table 6.9 below. 
Table 6.9: Phase two of PLS first order outer (measurement) model analysis 
LVs and indicators Loadings  AVE Composite  
Reliability 
Cronbach’s  
Alpha 
R Square Action 
Board composition 
(SComp) 
 0.59 0.81 0.65 0.61  
SComp_1 0.85      
SComp_2 0.76      
SComp_4 0.70      
Board Independence 
(SBInd) 
  
0.65 0.85 0.73 0.58  
SBInd_1 0.82      
SBInd_2 0.81      
SBInd_3 0.78      
Committee function 
(SComm) 
 
0.68 0.86 0.75 0.61  
SComm_2 0.89      
SComm_3 0.89      
SComm_4 0.70      
 Board Process – 
Commitment (PrCom) 
 0.61 0.89 0.84 0.78  
PrCom_1 0.73      
PrCom_2 0.83      
PrCom_3 0.70      
PrCom_4 0.83      
PrCom_5 0.81      
Board Process – Conflict 
( PrCon) 
 0.67 0.86 0.75 0.21  
PrCon_1 0.78      
PrCon_2 0.89      
PrCon_3 0.78      
Board Process – 
Cognitive Conflict 
(PrCog) 
 0.70 0.92 0.89 0.81  
PrCog_1 0.81      
PrCog_2 0.88      
PrCog_3 0.88      
PrCog_4 0.78      
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PrCog_5 0.85      
Process- Boardroom 
atmosphere ( PrBrA) 
 0.67 0.89 0.84 0.76  
PrBrA_1 0.82      
PrBrA_2 0.86      
PrBrA_3 0.77      
PrBrA_4 0.83      
Board Service role- 
Advising (SerAd) 
 0.57 0.87 0.81 0.70  
SerAd_1 0.76      
SerAd_2 0.76      
SerAd_3 0.67      
SerAd_4 0.75      
SerAd_5 0.82      
Board Service role- 
Networking -resource 
dependency (SerNwR) 
 0.63 0.90 0.85 0.62  
SerNwR_1 0.80      
SerNwR_2 0.84      
SerNwR_3 0.85      
SerNwR_4 0.81      
SerNwR_5 0.68      
Board Service role- 
Networking- image 
building (SerNwI) 
 0.66 0.85 0.75 0.44  
SerNwI_1 0.81      
SerNwI_2 0.83      
SerNwI_3 0.80      
Board Service role- 
Strategic participation 
(SerSp) 
 
0.66 0.95 0.94 0.89  
SerSp_1 0.83      
SerSp_2 0.82      
SerSp_3 0.86      
SerSp_4 0.90      
SerSp_5 0.85      
SerSp_6 0.78      
SerSp_7 0.83      
SerSp_8 0.70      
SerSp_9 0.77      
Board control role 
(BCont) 
 0.62 0.89 0.84 0.86  
BCont_1 0.79      
BCont_2 0.82      
BCont_3 0.76      
BCont_4 0.77      
BCont_5 0.80      
Output control role 
(OCont) 
 
0.61 0.86 0.79 0.77  
OCont_1 0.74      
OCont_2 0.82      
OCont_3 0.78      
OCont_4 0.78      
Strategic control role 
(SCont) 
 
0.84 0.94 0.90 0.78  
SCont_1 0.91      
SCont_2 0.92      
SCont_3 0.92      
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 On the basis of the outcome of phase one which eliminated 6 indictors, phase 
two of the PLS algorithm was carried out on the remaining 60 items. As can be seen 
from Table 6.9, the PLS computational process on the 60 manifest variables showed 
that each of them has a factor loading of at least 0.70, all latent variables resulted in 
AVEs of above 0.57 and a composite reliability of greater than 0.81. The above 
results of the measurement model are significant; therefore, the measurement model 
is adequate. In other words, the measurement model has passed the tests of 
indicator reliability (factor loadings of 0.70 or more) and internal consistency 
(construct) reliability (composite reliability value of at least 0.70) and is ready for 
validity tests as described in the following sub-section. The following table 
summarizes the number of manifest (observed) variables removed and retained in 
phases one and two of measurement model evaluation of the reliability tests. 
Table 6.10: Summary of phases one and two of the CFA 
Latent variables No. of 
items 
Pre- 
EFA 
Items 
removed 
by EFA 
No. of item 
post EFA 
(PCA) 
Phase 1 of CFA Phase 2 of 
CFA 
No. of 
items 
removed 
No. of 
items 
retained 
No. of 
items 
retained 
Board 
composition 
11 6 5 2 3 3 
Board 
Independence 
3  3  3 3 
Board committee  5 1 4 1 3 3 
Commitment 6 1 5  5 5 
Process conflict 3  3  3 3 
Cognitive conflict 4  5
i    5 5 
Boardroom 
atmosphere 
9 4 4
ii 
  4 4 
Advisory role 7  5
 iii
  5 5 
Networking- 
resource 
dependency role 
4  5
iv
  5 5 
Networking- 
image building 
role 
3  3  3 3 
Strategic 
participation role 
8  9
v
  9 9 
Behavioral control  7  5
 vi   5 5 
Output control 6 2 7
vii 
 3 4 5 
Strategic control 4  3
viii   3 3 
Total 80 14 66 6 60 60 
i =More by one item due to PCA; ii = Less by one item due to PCA; iii = Less by two items due to 
PCA; iv =More by one item due to PCA; v= More by one item due to PCA; vi =Less by two items due 
to PCA; vii= More by two  items due to PCA, viii = Less by one item due to PCA 
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6.3.2 Assessment of Construct Validity of First Order Model through CFA 
Validity refers to the degree to which an instrument measures what it intends 
to measure, and the degree to which the measured item or construct has meaning. 
In other words, it is the extent to which the research is accurate (Hair et al., 2014a) 
or the degree of accuracy of measurement. Once indictor and construct reliability 
assessment of the measurement model is performed, the next step is to establish 
content and constructs validity. Content validity is indicator validity that shows the 
extent to which the variables in a measurement model belong to the domain of the 
construct (Vinzi et al., 2010). The indicator validity in this study was determined 
using the principal component analysis, which examined the indicators‟ 
unidimensionality of scales (see section 6.2.1 for details).   
 The other type of validity that was assessed using CFA/SEM is construct 
validity. Construct validity is used to test constructs with multiple indicators. 
According to Hair et al. (2014a: 618), “Construct validity is the extent to which a set 
of measured items actually reflects the theoretical latent construct those items are 
designed to measure.” They further state that “…evidence of construct validity 
provides confidence that item measures taken from a sample represent the actual 
true score that exists in the population (ibid.)”. Construct validity has two main 
components: Convergent validity and discriminant validity. Both are subtypes of 
construct validity and they work together. In other words, if the process can 
demonstrate evidence for both, it means there is evidence for construct validity. 
Convergent validity is assured when multiple measures of the same construct hang 
together or operate in similar ways or when multiple indicators of a specific construct 
converge or share a high proportion of variance in common (Hair et al., 2014a). In 
simple terms, convergent validity applies when multiple indicators converge or are 
associated with one another as opposed to discriminant validity which measures the 
extent to which a construct is truly distinct from other constructs (Hair et al., 2014a). 
This means that the indicators of one construct hang together or converge, but also 
diverge from other constructs. Thus, high discriminant validity means that a construct 
is unique and captures some phenomena in relation to other constructs. The 
convergent and discriminant validity (construct validity) results of the measurement 
model are shown below. 
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6.3.2.1 Convergent Validity 
 Factor loadings and AVE (Average Variance Extracted) are two of the several 
methods that are used to test convergent validity among measurement items. The 
size of the factor loadings is one important consideration as high loadings on a factor 
would indicate that they converge on the latent construct. As a good rule of thumb, a 
factor loading of 0.7 or higher for each of the items is considered significant and this 
can be understood in the context of an item‟s communality, the proportion of 
variation in the item that is explained by the latent variable (factor) (Hair et al., 
2014a).  But the most common measure of convergent validity is AVE (Average 
Variance Extracted) which is the average of the squared factor loadings of the items 
that reflect a construct (Vinzi et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2014a). AVE explains the 
proportion of the variance of its indicators captured by the construct, relative to the 
total amount of variance. The minimum required level for AVE is 0.5, implying that 
the construct explains 50% of the variance of its reflective indicators and, therefore, 
has adequate convergence (Chin, 2010). In evaluating a measurement model, AVE 
measure has to be obtained for each latent variable. For this study, AVEs have been 
calculated for the measurement model as shown in Table 6.9 above. As can be seen 
from the table, all the fourteen latent variables have a measurement of at least 0.5 
AVEs, actually the lowest being 0.57 and the highest 0.84. These measurements 
demonstrate that the convergent validity of all the latent variables is acceptable. 
 
 6.3.2.2  Discriminant Validity 
 The other measure of construct validity is discriminant validity, which refers to 
the degree to which a dimension is demonstrably different from other constructs 
(Hair et al., 2014). According to Hair et al. (2014: 218), “…, high discriminant validity 
provides evidence that a construct is unique and captures some phenomena other 
measures do not”. Similarly Hulland (1999) says that one condition for discriminant 
validity is that a latent variable should share greater variance with its indicators than 
the variance shared with other latent variables. In regard to relevant tests, there are 
two ways to evaluate discriminant validity:  The Fornell-Larcker criterion and cross-
loadings comparison. Fornell-Larcker criterion uses AVEs to assess discriminant 
validity. In order to demonstrate the evidence of discriminant validity, AVEs of each 
latent variable should be greater than the latent variable‟s highest squared 
correlations with any other latent variable in the model (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). This 
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is simply to compare the square root of the AVEs with correlations between the 
latent variables. The latent variables correlation values are found under quality 
criterion of Smart PLS Default report. These values are exported and then the 
correlation value between the same latent variables, which is 1, is replaced by the 
square root of AVEs of the reflective latent variables. The square root of the latent 
variables AVEs are on the diagonal position and the correlations between the 
constructs are in the lower left triangle. To pass the discriminant validity test, the 
square root of AVE should be greater than all the correlation values in the row and 
column of the latent variable (ibid). This process is presented in Table 6.11. 
Table 6. 11: Discriminant Validity Assessment: Fornell- Larcker Criterion 
Note:  diagonal values (bold) are the square root of the variance shared between the LVs and their indicators 
(AVEs) and the off-diagonal elements are the correlations among the LVs. For discriminant validity, diagonal 
elements shoulder be greater than off-diagonal elements. 
 
 As can be observed from the above table, the diagonal values (square root of 
AVEs) exceed their corresponding off-diagonal values (correlation of the latent 
variables with other latent variables in the model), providing good evidence of 
discriminant validity.  
As stated above, the other alternative approach to evaluate discriminant 
validity is to examine the cross-loadings of the indicator (manifest) variables. 
Sufficient discriminant validity is established when an indicator‟s loading (correlation) 
on a latent variable is greater than all of its cross-loadings with other latent variables. 
Table 6.12 shows the loadings and cross-loadings of indicators, suggesting 
adequate discriminant validity. 
 LV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
BCont(1) 0.79                           
OCont(2) 0.72 0.78                         
Pr Cog(3) 0.63 0.58 0.84                       
PrBrA(4) 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.82                     
PrCom(5) 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.66 0.78                   
PrCon(6) -0.22 -0.35 -0.29 -0.39 -0.30 0.82                 
SBInd(7) 0.53 0.60 0.49 0.49 0.55 -0.31 0.81               
SComm(8) 0.50 0.45 0.52 0.55 0.42 -0.17 0.36 0.82             
SComp(9) 0.56 0.52 0.46 0.51 0.47 -0.31 0.41 0.43 0.77           
SCont(10) 0.71 0.71 0.61 0.69 0.60 -0.38 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.92         
SerAd(11) 0.66 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.53 -0.12 0.38 0.42 0.55 0.59 0.75       
SerNwI(12) 0.57 0.32 0.41 0.46 0.47 -0.03 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.45 0.81     
SerNwR(13) 0.54 0.52 0.35 0.45 0.43 -0.04 0.24 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.56 0.52 0.80   
SerSp(14) 0.77 0.71 0.70 0.77 0.63 -0.31 0.57 0.49 0.57 0.77 0.73 0.53 0.61 0.81 
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Table 6.12: Cross- lodgings/Correlations of Individual Items to Constructs/ Discriminant validity Report 
Items/LV  BCont OCont PrCog PrBrA PrCom PrCon SBInd SComm SComp SCont SerAd SerNwI SerNwR SerSp 
BCont_1 0.79 0.58 0.43 0.52 0.50 -0.29 0.38 0.37 0.53 0.61 0.52 0.27 0.42 0.57 
BCont_2 0.82 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.56 -0.09 0.40 0.33 0.41 0.51 0.60 0.60 0.45 0.62 
BCont_3 0.76 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.60 -0.22 0.43 0.53 0.42 0.58 0.50 0.45 0.39 0.59 
BCont_4 0.76 0.63 0.46 0.50 0.43 -0.16 0.41 0.36 0.49 0.58 0.52 0.43 0.51 0.65 
BCont_5 0.79 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.48 -0.09 0.48 0.37 0.34 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.36 0.62 
OCont_1 0.53 0.74 0.33 0.43 0.46 -0.14 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.28 0.53 0.47 
OCont_2 0.53 0.82 0.41 0.51 0.53 -0.29 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.18 0.37 0.55 
OCont_3 0.64 0.78 0.49 0.57 0.60 -0.34 0.48 0.29 0.35 0.63 0.40 0.36 0.42 0.58 
OCont_4 0.53 0.78 0.57 0.53 0.48 -0.30 0.55 0.42 0.41 0.59 0.41 0.17 0.31 0.62 
PrBrA_1 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.82 0.42 -0.29 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.55 0.47 0.32 0.28 0.57 
PrBrA_2 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.86 0.67 -0.29 0.50 0.49 0.39 0.62 0.53 0.35 0.38 0.72 
PrBrA_3 0.54 0.49 0.55 0.77 0.51 -0.21 0.29 0.48 0.42 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.61 
PrBrA_4 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.83 0.54 -0.47 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.57 0.45 0.37 0.40 0.62 
PrCog_1 0.43 0.54 0.80 0.54 0.59 -0.31 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.21 0.23 0.52 
PrCog_2 0.52 0.49 0.88 0.54 0.58 -0.22 0.39 0.40 0.35 0.49 0.45 0.26 0.23 0.55 
PrCog_3 0.55 0.48 0.88 0.54 0.55 -0.14 0.30 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.38 0.35 0.59 
PrCog_4 0.53 0.37 0.78 0.54 0.58 -0.24 0.43 0.43 0.32 0.52 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.55 
PrCog_5 0.60 0.54 0.85 0.69 0.69 -0.28 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.59 0.56 0.50 0.41 0.72 
PrCom_1 0.56 0.57 0.49 0.56 0.73 -0.28 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.46 0.36 0.35 0.54 
PrCom_2 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.62 0.83 -0.24 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.32 0.49 
PrCom_3 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.70 -0.05 0.36 0.17 0.18 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.33 0.42 
PrCom_4 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.44 0.83 -0.21 0.49 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.44 
PrCom_5 0.58 0.54 0.67 0.54 0.81 -0.35 0.42 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.46 0.39 0.39 0.56 
PrCon_1 -0.08 -0.19 -0.14 -0.28 -0.15 0.78 -0.21 -0.07 -0.13 -0.19 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 -0.17 
PrCon_2 -0.19 -0.33 -0.23 -0.39 -0.25 0.89 -0.32 -0.14 -0.24 -0.32 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 -0.32 
PrCon_3 -0.24 -0.30 -0.31 -0.28 -0.30 0.78 -0.23 -0.18 -0.34 -0.37 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.24 
SBInd_1 0.52 0.63 0.45 0.55 0.54 -0.29 0.82 0.41 0.43 0.58 0.41 0.26 0.37 0.60 
SBInd_2 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.30 0.40 -0.25 0.81 0.24 0.27 0.38 0.24 0.10 0.04 0.34 
SBInd_3 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.29 0.35 -0.21 0.78 0.17 0.27 0.37 0.24 0.13 0.11 0.38 
SComm_2 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.36 -0.14 0.32 0.89 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.16 0.36 0.35 
SComm_3 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.33 -0.16 0.28 0.89 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.42 
SComm_4 0.50 0.34 0.44 0.56 0.34 -0.10 0.28 0.70 0.31 0.44 0.34 0.31 0.21 0.46 
SComp_1 0.53 0.57 0.36 0.40 0.45 -0.28 0.44 0.34 0.85 0.49 0.49 0.17 0.35 0.50 
SComp_2 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.33 -0.24 0.21 0.29 0.76 0.34 0.43 0.19 0.18 0.34 
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SComp_4 0.43 0.31 0.37 0.44 0.28 -0.18 0.27 0.36 0.70 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.53 0.46 
SCont_1 0.68 0.63 0.60 0.67 0.65 -0.30 0.57 0.49 0.49 0.91 0.54 0.35 0.40 0.72 
SCont_2 0.66 0.69 0.53 0.62 0.52 -0.38 0.49 0.45 0.55 0.92 0.52 0.27 0.41 0.69 
SCont_3 0.62 0.63 0.54 0.61 0.49 -0.36 0.49 0.37 0.43 0.92 0.56 0.26 0.46 0.71 
SerAd_1 0.57 0.39 0.48 0.45 0.43 -0.06 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.50 0.76 0.37 0.50 0.52 
SerAd_2 0.56 0.42 0.40 0.44 0.39 -0.09 0.30 0.20 0.48 0.42 0.75 0.51 0.53 0.54 
SerAd_3 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.51 0.41 -0.14 0.34 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.67 0.17 0.28 0.56 
SerAd_4 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.39 -0.08 0.29 0.23 0.33 0.40 0.75 0.28 0.35 0.52 
SerAd_5 0.51 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.39 -0.08 0.27 0.36 0.51 0.42 0.82 0.32 0.44 0.61 
SerNwI_1 0.51 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.00 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.38 0.81 0.47 0.45 
SerNwI_2 0.47 0.23 0.36 0.43 0.38 -0.08 0.08 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.82 0.43 0.46 
SerNwI_3 0.40 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.01 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.26 0.31 0.80 0.36 0.39 
SerNwR_1 0.43 0.38 0.21 0.31 0.33 0.02 0.12 0.29 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.31 0.79 0.44 
SerNwR_2 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.37 0.44 0.00 0.23 0.29 0.38 0.41 0.52 0.50 0.84 0.51 
SerNwR_3 0.51 0.54 0.35 0.44 0.44 -0.15 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.85 0.51 
SerNwR_4 0.38 0.35 0.28 0.38 0.30 0.00 0.14 0.36 0.27 0.26 0.48 0.49 0.80 0.48 
SerNwR_5 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.16 -0.03 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.70 0.47 
SerSp_1 0.60 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.51 -0.25 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.58 0.63 0.40 0.47 0.83 
SerSp_2 0.59 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.50 -0.27 0.55 0.30 0.31 0.60 0.54 0.34 0.38 0.82 
SerSp_3 0.62 0.51 0.57 0.64 0.49 -0.24 0.40 0.34 0.48 0.59 0.69 0.49 0.61 0.86 
SerSp_4 0.69 0.65 0.75 0.72 0.64 -0.28 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.90 
SerSp_5 0.69 0.61 0.57 0.69 0.60 -0.22 0.45 0.41 0.54 0.64 0.63 0.54 0.60 0.85 
SerSp_6 0.64 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.51 -0.14 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.78 
SerSp_7 0.67 0.69 0.49 0.58 0.52 -0.31 0.48 0.40 0.56 0.71 0.56 0.31 0.50 0.83 
SerSp_8 0.56 0.65 0.46 0.59 0.42 -0.32 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.57 0.52 0.33 0.41 0.69 
SerSp_9 0.60 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.41 -0.25 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.59 0.58 0.41 0.44 0.77 
Note: Factor loadings of the indicators (bold) are larger than any other factor loading values, thus, qualifying for discriminant validity. 
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 Table 6.12 shows that the factor loadings of the indicators and their respective 
latent variables, highlighted in bold, are higher than any other factor loading values 
of the indicators of the other construct variables. Thus, the model has passed the 
test of discriminant validity. The two tests have yielded similar results demonstrating 
the discriminant validity of the first order model.  
  As can be noted from the conceptual model and the first order model of PLS 
evaluation, the research hypotheses of the main study were established at a second-
order (second level constructs). Thus second-order CFA is needed in order to test 
the validity of the second order measurement model. Before employing CFA to test 
the validity of the higher level constructs, an overview of second order factor model 
is presented below followed by the validation process. 
 
6.3.3 Second Order Factor Model and Construct Validity 
 Whenever researchers examine complex abstracts of higher level, they 
usually consider higher-order models or hierarchical component models (HCM) that 
involve second-order structures which are of two layers of constructs (Hair et al., 
2014b). These types of models are special cases of the first order because they 
contain latent variables of higher order that have embedded the lower order model in 
them (Sanchez, 2013; Hair et al., 2014b). Hair et al. (2014b) state that one of  the 
reasons for considering the HCM is that, HCM simplifies  the model set up by using a 
single construct ( dimension) that represents all lower order constructs. That is, HCM 
can be used to reduce the number of relationships in the structural model reducing 
the complexity of the analysis and making the relationship easy to grasp. As a result, 
the PLS path model becomes parsimonious and easy to analyse. Furthermore, 
higher order constructs mediate the relationship between the lower order constructs 
and their associated targeted endogenous constructs in the PLS-PM. 
Taking into account the complexity of the relationships of first order latent 
variables and the nature of the hypotheses, this study was based on the second-
order model PLS-PM. To perform the second order outer model assessment, the first 
order outer model measurement has to be validated using the CFA which this study 
has taken care of. Then, as in the first order outer (measurement) model evaluation 
(CFA), a second order outer model has to be estimated using CFA before the 
second order inner model is assessed to test the hypotheses.    
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 Phase one of the PLS outer model evaluation as done in section 6.2.2 
illustrated that the first order measurement model was adequately valid satisfying 
both the requirements of the convergent and discriminant validity. As mentioned 
above, the indicators of the first order constructs form the second level constructs. 
What this simply means is that the lower level model is embedded in the higher level 
model. Thus, the validity of the second order measurement model is logically 
expected to be satisfactory if the first order outer model proves to be valid. The 
problem of collinearity for the current second order constructs cannot be a critical 
issue as the first order measurement model has established the discriminant validity 
of all the first order constructs. Further to the above justification regarding the validity 
of the second order model on the basis of the results of the first order measurement 
model (CFA), a second order CFA was carried out for each higher level construct. 
The second-order model has four second order constructs namely; Board structure 
(BStruct), Board process (BProcess), Board service role (BServrole) and Board 
control role (BControle). The table below reports the assessment of tests of the 
construct validity of the four main constructs at a second order level. 
Table 6.13: PLS second order outer (measurement) model analysis 
Second order 
constructs  
First order 
constructs 
Outer 
loadings 
AVE Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Board Structure 
(BStruct) 
  0.53 0.85  0.79 
 Scomp 0.78     
SBInd 0.76 
SComm 0.78 
Board Process  
(Bprocess) 
  0.55 0.90 0.53 0.86 
 PrCom 0.88     
PrCon -0.46 
PrCog 0.90 
PrBrA 0.87 
Board Service 
Role (BServrole) 
  0.65 0.95 0.61 0.94 
 SerAd 0.84 
   
 
SerNwI 0.67 
SerNwR 0.78 
SerSp 0.94 
Board Control 
Role (BControle) 
  0.57 0.94 0.70 0.93 
 Bcont 0.93     
Ocont 0.88 
Scont 0.88 
 
 As can be seen from Table 6.13, 12 out of the 14 latent variables have an 
outer loading well above the minimum requirement of 0.70. Of the rest two, SerNwI 
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latent variable has an outer loading of 0.67, which is only slightly below the 
requirement and PrCon has a much lower value of 0.46. However, these latent 
variables are retained in the measurement model since they have met the criteria for 
reliability and convergent validity. Particularly, when the composite reliabilities and 
AVEs (average variance extracted) of their respective higher order constructs are 
examined, they are well above the critical values of 0.70 (Bprocess 0.90, BServrole 
0.95) and 0.50 (Bproces 0.55, BServrole 0.65), respectively. In sum, all the second 
order constructs‟ composite reliabilities are well above the minimum value of 0.70, 
the lowest being 0.85 and the highest 0.95, providing sufficient evidence of internal 
consistency reliability. The second order constructs‟ AVEs are all above the critical 
value of 0.50, ranging from 0.53 to 0.65, providing evidence of convergent validity. 
With regard to the relationships between the second order constructs and their 
respective first order latent variables, all have strong and positive relationship except 
for PrCon, which does not. Hence, the second order constructs have the potential to 
explain more than 50% of the variances of their respective first order latent variables. 
Likewise, the R2s of the target endogenous variables (board service and board 
control role) show that both the board structure and the board process exogenous 
latent variables moderately explain 61% and 70% of the variances in the board 
service and board control roles, respectively. According to guidelines, R2 values of 
0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 represent weak, moderate, and substantial explanatory power, 
respectively (Hair et al., 2014b; Wong, 2013).  
Table 6.14: Discriminant Validity assessment of second order constructs: 
Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
Constructs  BStruct Bprocess BServrole (BControle) 
BStruct 0.73    
Bprocess 0.71 0.74   
BServrole 0.68 0.70 0.81  
(BControle) 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.76 
 
 Table 6.14 shows that the diagonal values (square root of AVEs) exceed their 
corresponding off-diagonal values (correlation between the constructs), providing 
good evidence of discriminant validity. 
 In SmartPLS, the algorithm to make the estimations stops in two conditions; 
one, when the stop criterion of the algorithm is reached or secondly, when the 
maximum number of specified iterations has been reached. If the algorithm 
converges in fewer numbers of iterations than the maximum specified, then this is a 
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good sign of consistent and valid data (Wong, 2013). For the present measurement 
model, the algorithm has converged only after 7 iterations (instead of reaching the 
maximum specified 300 iterations), indicating that the estimation is very good. Below 
is a summary of the assessment of the measurement model for quick reference. 
Table 6.15: Summary of measurement model evaluation (issue of reliability)  
Reliability 
Latent variable Indicators Outer 
loadings 
Indicator  reliability 
(Squared loadings) > 0.4* 
acceptable, preferred level  >.50 
Internal 
consistency 
reliability 
> 0.60** 
Reliable? 
SComp  (Board 
composition) 
SComp_1 0.85 0.72 0.81  
Yes SComp_2 0.76 0.58 
SComp_4 0.70 0.49 
SBInd  (Board 
Independence) 
SBInd_1 0.82 0.67 0.85  
Yes SBInd_2 0.81 0.66 
SBInd_3 0.78 0.61 
Committee 
function (SComm) 
SComm_2 0.89 0.79 0.86 Yes 
SComm_3 0.89 0.79 
SComm_4 0.70 0.49 
Board Process – 
Commitment 
(PrCom) 
PrCom_1 0.73 0.53 0.89 Yes 
PrCom_2 0.83 0.69 
PrCom_3 0.70 0.49 
PrCom_4 0.83 0.69 
PrCom_5 0.81 0.66 
Board Process – 
Conflict ( PrCon) 
PrCon_1 0.78 0.61 0.86 Yes 
PrCon_2 0.89 0.79 
PrCon_3 0.78 0.61 
Board Process – 
Cognitive Conflict 
(PrCog) 
PrCog_1 0.81 0.66 0.92 Yes 
PrCog_2 0.88 0.77 
PrCog_3 0.88 0.77 
PrCog_4 0.78 0.61 
PrCog_5 0.85 0.72 
Process- 
Boardroom 
atmosphere ( 
PrBrA) 
PrBrA_1 0.82 0.67 0.89 Yes 
PrBrA_2 0.86 0.74 
PrBrA_3 0.77 0.59 
PrBrA_4 0.83 0.69 
Board Service 
role- Advising 
(SerAd) 
SerAd_1 0.76 0.58 0.87 Yes 
SerAd_2 0.76 0.58 
SerAd_3 0.67 0.45 
SerAd_4 0.75 0.56 
SerAd_5 0.82 0.67 
Board Service 
role- Networking -
resource 
dependency 
(SerNwR) 
SerNwR_1 0.80 0.64 0.90 Yes 
SerNwR_2 0.84 0.71 
SerNwR_3 0.85 0.72 
SerNwR_4 0.81 0.66 
SerNwR_5 0.68 0.46 
Board Service 
role- Networking- 
image building 
(SerNwI) 
SerNwI_1 0.81 0.66 0.85 Yes 
SerNwI_2 0.83 0.69 
SerNwI_3 0.80 0.64 
Board Service 
role- Strategic 
participation 
(SerSp) 
SerSp_1 0.83 0.69 0.95 Yes 
SerSp_2 0.82 0.67 
SerSp_3 0.86 0.74 
SerSp_4 0.90 0.81 
SerSp_5 0.85 0.72 
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SerSp_6 0.78 0.61 
SerSp_7 0.83 0.69 
SerSp_8 0.70 0.49 
SerSp_9 0.77 0.59 
Board control role 
(BCont) 
BCont_1 0.79 0.62 0.89 Yes 
BCont_2 0.82 0.67 
BCont_3 0.76 0.58 
BCont_4 0.77 0.59 
BCont_5 0.80 0.64 
Output control 
role (OCont) 
OCont_1 0.74 0.55 0.86 Yes 
OCont_2 0.82 0.67 
OCont_3 0.78 0.61 
OCont_4 0.78 0.61 
Strategic control 
role (SCont) 
SCont_1 0.91 0.83 0.94 Yes 
SCont_2 0.92 0.85 
SCont_3 0.92 0.85 
*If the research is exploratory, 0.40 or higher is acceptable (Hulland, 1999); **in exploratory 
research, 0.60 or higher is considered acceptable (Hair et al., 2014b) 
 
All the indicators have individual indicator reliabilities larger than the minimum 
acceptable level of 0.40. Composite reliability values are much larger than 0.60 
demonstrating a high level of internal consistency among the indicators of the 
reflective latent variables. 
Table 6.16: Summary of measurement model evaluation (issue of validity) 
Validity 
Latent variable Convergent 
validity 
AVE 0.50 or 
higher 
Discriminant validity Valid? 
Is square root of AVE of 
each LV greater than 
correlations among LVs 
(Fornell Larcker criterion)? 
 
Is an indicator's outer 
loadings on a 
construct higher than 
all its cross loadings 
with other indicators 
constructs? See 
Table 20 
SComp  (Board 
composition) 0.59 
0.77 
 Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
SBInd  (Board 
Independence) 0.65 0.81 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Committee function 
(SComm) 0.68 0.83 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Board Process – 
Commitment (PrCom) 0.61 0.78 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Board Process – 
Conflict ( PrCon) 0.67 0.82 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Board Process – 
Cognitive Conflict 
(PrCog) 
0.70 
0.84 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Process- Boardroom 
atmosphere ( PrBrA) 0.67 0.82 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Board Service role- 
Advising (SerAd) 0.57 0.76 
 Valid 
Board Service role- 
Networking -resource 
dependency (SerNwR) 
0.63 
0.79 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Board Service role- 
Networking- image 
building (SerNwI) 
0.66 
0.81 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
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Board Service role- 
Strategic participation 
(SerSp) 
0.66 
0.81 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Board control role 
(BCont) 
0.62 
0.79 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Output control role 
(OCont) 0.61 0.78 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
Strategic control role 
(SCont) 0.84 0.92 
Yes,   all indicators. Valid 
 
 From the above summary table, it can be observed that both the convergent 
and discriminant validity are confirmed. All of the AVEs values are much larger than 
the minimum acceptable level of 0.50. The discriminant validity, which is also 
established as square roots of AVEs, is larger than the corresponding row and 
column correlation values. Also, all indicators‟ outer loadings on a construct are 
higher than all cross loadings with constructs of other indicators. Thus in general, the 
reliability and validity of the measurement model was assured through the above 
tests and procedures. 
 The next step after the reflective measurement model validation, in the 
structural equation modeling is evaluation of the structural (outer) model to estimate 
the strength and direction of the relationship among the latent variables (LV). Before 
presenting the structural model evaluation, the following section reports 
characteristics of sample 1 respondents and descriptive statistics of the manifest and 
latent variables of the main study. Sample 2 respondent (Stakeholders) 
characteristics and descriptive statistics of stakeholders‟ attitude towards corporate 
governance practice are presented in Chapter Seven sections 7.3. 
 
6.4  Descriptive Statistics of the Manifest and Latent Variables of the 
Conceptual Model 
This section describes the main study (sample 1). Firstly, it presents the 
descriptive statistics on the profiles of the respondents and type of ownership of the 
banks and secondly, a description of both the observed and unobserved latent 
variables. In regard to the later, it considers those items that have passed the 
validation requirements as demonstrated in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of this chapter. 
To examine corporate governance systems and practices, both samples 1 and 2 are 
considered and the descriptive statistics for sample 2 is given in Chapter Seven 
section 7.3.  
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Profile of Respondents (Sample 1) 
This part analyses ownership type and presents profile of respondents in terms of 
demographic data, professional background and work experience. As stated in the 
methodological section, the sample frame for the main study was restricted to banks 
(private and public) in Ethiopia. The respondents were those stated below. The 
respondents provided their answers through questionnaires, a summary of which is 
given in Table 6.17. 
The collected data shows that 80 % (85) of participants serve private banks and 
20% (21) public banks. Of the 106 participants in the study, 10 % (11) are board 
chairmen, 64% (68) non-executive board members, 7% (7) former board members, 
8% (8) board secretaries, and 11% (12) bank presidents. Demographic information 
related to the sample group used in the main study would show that:  
 approximately 90 % (95) of the participants are males; 
 about  69 % (73) of the participants are above 50 years old and 31% (33) are 
in the range of 30 and 49 years old; 
 82 % of the participant have served for at least 3 years as a board member; 
  about 96% have more than10 years of work experience other than board 
membership, and 
 more than two-thirds (69%) hold either a master‟s or doctoral degree in areas 
such as business, economics, finance,  law, accounting, agriculture and 
science related areas to mention few. 
Table 6.17: Ownership type and profile of respondents 
Ownership type & 
demographic Variables 
Category Count n=106 
% 
Valid 
 % 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Ownership type 
Private 85 80.2 80.2 80.2 
 
Public 21 19.8 19.8 100 
 
Total 106 100.0 100.0  
Position  
Board chairman 11 10.4 10.4 10.4 
 
Non-executive 
board 
68 64.2 64.2 74.5 
 
Former board 7 6.6 6.6 81.1 
 
Board secretary 8 7.5 7.5 88.7 
 
Bank President 12 11.3 11.3 100.0 
 
Total 106 100.0 100.0  
Gender 
Female 11 10.4 10.4 10.4 
 
Male 95 89.6 89.6 100.0 
 
Total 106 100.0 100.0  
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Age  
30-39 9 8.5 8.5 8.5 
 
40-49 24 22.6 22.6 31.1 
 
50-59 42 39.6 39.6 70.8 
 
>60 31 29.2 29.2 100.0 
 
Total 106 100.0 100.0  
Year of service as a 
board member 
     
 
1-3 39 37 43 43 
 
4-6 40 38 43 86 
 
>6 12 11 14 100 
 
Total 91 86 100.0  
 
Missing  15 14 
 
 
 
Total 106 100.0 
 
 
Work experience other 
than board 6-10 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 
 
11-15 6 5.7 5.8 9.6 
 
16-20 18 17.0 17.3 26.9 
 
>20 76 71.7 73.1 100.0 
 
Total 104 98.1 100.0 
 
 
Missing 2 1.9 
  
 
Total 106 100.0 
  
Level of education 
Diploma 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
 
Bachelor's  
Degree 
31 29.2 29.5 31.4 
 
Master's Degree 58 54.7 55.2 86.7 
 
Doctoral Degree 14 13.2 13.3 100.0 
 
Total 105 99.1 100.0 
 
 
Missing 1 .9 
  
 
Total 106 100.0 
  
Professional 
background 
Business and 
economics 
related 
66 62.0 70.2 70.2 
 Law 12 11.3 12.8 83.0 
 Development 
studies 
4 3.8 4.3 87.3 
 Engineering 2 1.9 2.0 89.3 
 PSIR, social 
anthropology, IT 
4 3.8 4.3 93.6 
 Pure sciences 6 5.7 6.4 100.0 
 Total 94 88.7 100.0  
 Missing 12 11.3   
 Total 106 100.0   
 
 Referring to the above table, the questionnaires that examine the role of 
boards were filled by those persons that directly or indirectly play an active role in 
corporate leadership. Of the 106 that have properly filled the questionnaire, 93% 
(Boards and Presidents) were involved in making corporate decisions and, therefore, 
have sufficient understanding of corporate practices. Thus, the respondents‟ 
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responses are representative of corporate governance data that enables to answer 
the research questions. From the same table, it is observed that there is no 
respondent who serves as executive and at the same time sits on the board. This is 
because the National Bank of Ethiopia‟s Directive No. SBB/49/2011 strictly prohibits 
that no employee of a bank, whether permanent or contractual, can sit on the board 
of any bank. The board is, therefore, exclusively drawn from non-executive directors 
making the composition different from that of other emerging economies. By the 
same directive, there is no issue of CEO duality as the CEO cannot be a member of 
the board of directors. 
 The sample was gender biased, with males accounting for 90% (95). The 
majority of the respondents have enough experience as non-executive board 
members and in other areas of practice. This characteristic of the respondents is 
believed to provide a good opportunity to examine issues from various perspectives 
and prove useful in the questionnaire completion process, which may result in valid 
and reliable research results. It is also noted that the majority of experienced 
respondents are predominantly older persons with more than 50 years of age, 
constituting 69%. In the sample it can also be noted that 98 % hold a minimum of a 
bachelor‟s degree. An analysis of the professional background of the respondents 
indicates that more than 70% are business and economics related professionals. 
This ensures that respondents‟ level of understanding of governance issues can be 
high enabling them to easily comprehend questionnaire items. A response obtained 
from such groups is expected to be reliable and valid. 
Furthermore, the National Bank of Ethiopia‟s Directive No. SBB/54/2012, 
under the title „Requirements for Persons with Significant Influence in a Bank‟, 
stipulates requirements with regard to the required knowledge, experience and age 
of non-executive board of directors. According to the directive, at least seventy five 
percent of a bank‟s board members should hold a minimum of a basic degree or its 
equivalent and the remaining members should be completers of general secondary 
school or its equivalent. Furthermore, board members are required to have adequate 
experience in business management or should take adequate training after holding a 
seat on the board and their age should also be at least 30 years (Directive No. 
SBB/54/2012).  Hence, on the basis of the above table and the description given, all 
the board members surveyed comply with requirements set out by the NBE. 
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Descriptive Statistics- Board Structure 
 A Board‟s effectiveness is influenced by its structure, which includes 
composition, independence and committee functioning. The board structure should 
be clear and transparent, defining the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the 
board and management in unambiguous terms. The board has to have a sufficient 
number of members with the right blend of skills, experience, and appropriate degree 
of diversity relevant to the board‟s tasks as well as the company‟s operation to be 
able to make effective strategic decision and evaluate managements‟ performance 
objectively. For the board to be independent, the majority of its members should be 
external (non-executive) (OECD, 2004). Having a non-executive board member in 
addition to helping maintain independence has an added advantage as non-
executive board members bring with them important resources and serve as a link 
with the external environment. One aspect of board structure is working with board 
committees as some board functions are performed better with committee members 
having specialized knowledge. It is a common practice for boards to accomplish their 
work through committees (Adams et al., 2010). It is believed that working with 
specific committees is useful as this would allow maximum use of the board‟s 
expertise and knowledge. Decision making by the board is also facilitated by 
establishing a specific committee as it is sometimes difficult to make effective 
decisions in the context of a larger board. 
 Regarding the board structure, respondents were asked to rate the extent to 
which boards have the proper composition, independence, and operate with 
committees. A five-point Likert scale was used to rate the extent to which they agree 
or disagree with item statements falling under the latent variables. On the basis of 
the assessment of scales using both EFA and CFA (Chapter Six), the original 80 
items were reduced to 60 items falling into 14 dimensions (factors). Three of the 
dimensions (board composition, board independence and board committeee)  were 
used to measure the main construct, namely, board structure. The following 
descriptive statistics, therefore, applies only to those items that have passed the 
validation process. Presented below in Tables 6.18 and 6.19 are descriptions of the 
items under each latent variable and results of descriptive statistics, respectively. 
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Table 6.18: Description of items of board structure construct 
Item code Description 
SComp_1 
There is a transparent and clear structure between the board, the President,  and executive 
directors 
SComp_2 
The board consists of a workable number of board members to function effectively and 
efficiently 
SComp_4 
Non executive board members bring with them important resources (expertise, link to the 
market, knowhow, technology...) and serve as a link with the external environment 
SBInd_1 The  board of directors are independent from the President of the bank 
SBInd_2 
Board members are independent from the board chairperson as the chairperson  will not 
influence the extension or termination of the directorship 
SBInd_3 The board of directors are independent from the controlling (large) shareholders 
SComm_2 
Working with committees is useful as this would allow maximum use of board‟s expertise and 
knowledge 
SComm_3 
Committee assignments reflect  the interests, experience, and skills of individual board 
members 
SComm_4 Standing and ad hoc committees report regularly to the full board 
 
Table 6.19: Descriptive statistics: Board structure 
Latent Variable 
(LV) 
Item code N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
 
Board 
Composition 
SComp_1 106 1.00 5.00 4.28 .83 
SComp_2 106 1.00 5.00 4.14 .94 
SComp_4 106 1.00 5.00 3.97 .95 
Average value of composition 
4.13 
 
0.69 
 
Board 
independence 
SBInd_1 105 1.00 5.00 4.23 .91 
SBInd_2 105 2.00 5.00 4.09 .89 
SBInd_3 104 1.00 5.00 3.69 1.17 
Average value of Independence 
4.00           
 
0.80 
 
 
Board 
committee 
SComm_2 105 1.00 5.00 4.46 .64 
SComm_3 106 1.00 5.00 4.17 .80 
SComm_4 106 2.00 5.00 4.20 .71 
Average value of committee 4.28 
 
0.59 
Board structure Overall average score 4.14  
 From the above table, it can be seen that the mean differences are not 
significant but working with committees is the best rated and most well developed 
practice of structural element with a mean of 4.28 out of 5, followed by board 
composition (4.13). In regard to the individual items, SComm_2, which relates to the 
advantage of working with committees, has received the highest rating (4.46). This 
goes in line with the literature and empirical evidence (OCED, 2004, Millan, 2010; 
Fauzi & Locke, 2012). SComp_1 is the item with the second highest mean value 
(4.28) confirming the existence of a transparent and clear board structure with a 
plain definition of roles, responsibilities and relationships. With a mean of 3.69 out of 
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5 the lowest rated item is SBInd_3. This item examines whether the board of 
directors are independent from the controlling (large) shareholders, and the obtained 
value signifies that the board of directors is not totally free from the influence of the 
controlling shareholders as larger shareholders have influence on the selection of 
board members and thus their composition. The item analysis shows that all items 
have individually received more than 3 points out of the maximum 5. Looking into the 
standard deviation of the overall construct items, the variability is relatively small 
denoting general homogeneity or less diverse responses. The overall average score 
for the board structure is 4.14 (83%), which is significant. 
Descriptive Statistics-Board Process 
 The board of directors is expected to be engaged in making strategic 
decisions and providing strategic guidance to the management of corporate forms of 
organizations. To this end, the objective of boards is primarily to maximize 
shareholders‟ values as well as protect the shareholders‟ interests. To ensure 
attainment of these objectives, board members need to demonstrate a high level of 
commitment, be critical in decision making and maintain healthy discussions and 
good boardroom atmosphere. In this regard, respondents were asked to rate the 
extent to which they think board members fare on these standards. This analysis 
refers to these four dimensions (Board commitment, process conflict, cognitive 
conflict and board room atmosphere) all of which reflect the main construct, board 
process. The analysis is based on the 17 items that were retained after the validation 
phase. Table 6.20 below presents descriptions of the items under each latent 
variable and results of descriptive statistics, respectively. 
Table 6.20: Description of items of the board process construct 
Item code Description 
PrCom_1 Board members regularly attend board meetings and make informed decisions. 
PrCom_2 
Board members come to the meeting well prepared for the agenda and are actively 
involved in discussions. 
PrCom_3 
Board members are very active in finding their own information in addition to reports  
supplied by the President 
PrCom_4 Board members devote sufficient time needed and are available to fulfill board activities. 
PrCom_5 
Board members effectively use their knowledge, skill, and experience and contribute 
meaningfully to board discussions. 
PrCon_1 There are conflicts and disagreements on the decisions to be taken during meetings 
PrCon_2 There are conflicts and disagreements on the board‟s working style 
PrCon_3 
Differences of opinion in board decisions are more often settled by vote than by more 
discussions 
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PrCog_1 The Board exerts efforts to build consensus and manage conflict constructively 
PrCog_2 Board members ask critical questions of proposals initiated by the management team. 
PrCog_3 Board members critically assess information presented by the management team 
PrCog_4 Board members raise critical points during meetings and do not serve as rubber stamp 
Prcog_5 
The board conducts its deliberations in a thoughtful, objective manner, and considers 
viewpoints of members before making decisions. 
PrBrm_1 The board focuses much of its attention on long-term strategy and policy issues 
PrBrm_2 
The board chair leads meetings well with a clear focus on the big issues and allows 
open discussion before decisions. 
PrBrm_3 
Board members accept and support a decision that has been made, regardless of the 
way they voted on the issue. 
PrBrm_4 There is always a very good internal atmosphere at board  meetings 
Table 6.21: Descriptive statistics: Board Process 
LV Item code N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
 
 
 
Commitment 
PrCom_1 106 2.00 5.00 4.15 .60 
PrCom_2 106 1.00 5.00 3.65 .93 
PrCom_3 106 1.00 5.00 3.47 .95 
PrCom_4 106 1.00 5.00 3.71 .89 
PrCom_5 106 2.00 5.00 4.01 .72 
Overall commitment 
3.80 
 
0.64 
 
 
Process conflict 
PrCon_1 105 1.00 5.00 3.12 1.13 
PrCon_2 106 1.00 5.00 2.62 1.03 
PrCon_3 106 1.00 5.00 2.33 1.08 
Overall process conflict 
2.69 
 
0.89 
 
 
 
Cognitive conflict 
PrCog_1 105 1.00 5.00 4.17 .80 
PrCog_2 106 1.00 5.00 4.13 .76 
PrCog_3 106 1.00 5.00 4.02 .84 
PrCog_4 106 1.00 6.00 4.14 .82 
Prcog_5 106 1.00 5.00 4.19 .79 
Overall cognitive conflict 
4.13 
 
0.67 
 
 
Boardroom 
atmosphere 
PrBrm_1 106 1.00 5.00 3.56 1.02 
PrBrm_2 106 1.00 5.00 4.12 .91 
PrBrm_3 106 1.00 5.00 4.04 .94 
PrBrm_4 106 1.00 5.00 3.93 1.05 
Overall boardroom atmosphere 
3.91 
 
0.81 
Board process                          Overall average score  3.73  
  
 The descriptive analysis of the board process shows diverse results with the 
highest overall mean value associated with cognitive conflict (4.13) and the lowest 
mean value representing process conflict (2.69). Except for two process conflict 
items, no item has a score of less than 3 out of 5. The items forming the cognitive 
conflict construct scored high across the board denoting that the decision making 
process is based on a synthesis of important ideas, issues, principles and critical 
questions. Before decisions are made, deliberations are conducted in a thoughtful, 
discerning and objective manner, paying heed to the viewpoints of the members. On 
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the other hand, the process conflict latent variable has received the lowest points, 
implying that there are barely conflicts and disagreements in the decision process, 
and differences of opinions in board decisions are settled by votes than more 
discussions. Referring to board commitment construct, it can be observed from the 
scores that board members regularly attend meetings with the necessary 
preparation, making informed decisions, actively participating in discussions using 
their knowledge and experience, and devoting sufficient time to perform board 
activities. Scores of the board room environment also show that the board chair 
leads meetings well with a clear focus on the big issues and allows open discussion 
before decisions. Board members also accept and support a decision that has been 
made, regardless of the way they voted on the issue. In the boardroom, there is a 
good internal atmosphere and the board, somehow, focuses much of its attention on 
long-term strategy and policy issues. The standard deviation of the main construct, 
except for the process conflict latent variable, is not significant, showing a pattern of 
similar responses. The overall average achievement score for the board process is 
3.73 (75%), which is above average. 
Descriptive Study: Board Service and Control Roles 
 It has been mentioned several times that board of directors as a governing 
bodies is imperative in corporate forms of organizations where ownership and 
management are separated. That is, due to their large number, it is not possible for 
the owners to manage their firms. This introduces the need for a corporate body, 
boards that act on behalf of the multiple owners. Boards are entrusted with the 
responsibility of governing and controlling corporate forms of organizations. They are 
charged with the responsibility, among others, executing two distinct major tasks: 
service and control tasks (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009). These roles are mainly 
rooted in the resource dependency, agency and stewardship theories. These 
broader roles are further classified into six specific roles. The service related role that 
includes the advisory, networking, and strategic participation functions; and the 
control related roles that include behavioral, output, and strategic control (Minichilli et 
al., 2009).   
 The service roles involve a set of related activities. For example, boards serve 
as a source of advice by providing suggestions in setting corporate policies and 
strategic decision making. Boards also play a networking role and help in obtaining 
scarce resources and building external legitimacy and reputation. Likewise, the 
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control role consists of a set of related activities that include for example: monitoring 
performances and behaviors of self and top management; and evaluating and 
monitoring strategic decision-making. 
 In reference to the service and control roles, respondents were asked to rate 
the extent to which they think boards actively play the service and control roles. The 
service and control main constructs are broken down into seven dimensions on the 
basis of EFA. EFA categorized the networking role into two factors (resource 
generation and image building) while keeping the other five factors as they were. As 
a result, the analysis is based on seven latent variables (advisory, resource 
dependency, image building, behavioral control, output control and strategic control 
roles) that reflect the main construct. The analysis is based on the 34 items that 
resulted from the validation procedure. Table 6.22 below presents descriptions of the 
items under each latent variable and results of descriptive statistics, respectively. 
Table 6.22: Description of items in the board service and control roles constructs 
Item code Description of service role 
SerAd_1 
Board members take initiatives to  give advice based on personal knowledge, ideas, and 
points of view 
SerAd_2 The board provides support and counsel to senior executive body up on request 
SerAd_3 
The board has significant influence on major management issues (such as bank‟s structure, 
strategy…) 
SerAd_4 The board contributes to technical issues (new technology, new product…) 
SerAd_5 
The board contributes to market issues (new market or consumer behavior) and legal issues 
affecting the bank 
SerNwR_1 The board creates linkages with important external stakeholders 
SerNwR_2 The board assists the bank in obtaining scarce resources 
SerNwR_3 The board provides the bank with external legitimacy and reputation 
SerNwR_4 
The board represents the bank in the political, economic, and social arena influencing the 
decision-making process. 
SerNwR_5 Non executive directors provide alternative viewpoints 
SerNwI_1 Board members are chosen on their merit and  influence in community 
SerNwI_2 The board seeks information and advice from leaders of similar organization 
SerNwI_3 
The board invites former members to convey the bank‟s history and values to new members 
and share their experience 
SerSp_1 The board understands the organization‟s operational and environmental contexts 
SerSp_2 
The board is actively involved in long-term strategic planning process and goals to align with 
changes in the environment 
SerSp_3 
The board identifies actions to seize opportunities that will contribute to the bank‟s strategic 
priorities 
SerSp_4 
The board applies a strategic approach to decision making: considers facts, perspectives, 
objectives and criteria in discussions 
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SerSp_5 The board demonstrates awareness of emerging trends and reflect them in decision-making 
SerSp_6 The board benchmarks strategic plan with best performing banking industry data 
SerSp_7 The board identifies annual strategic direction within the framework of the long range planning 
SerSp_8 The board receives plan for strategy implementation from the President 
SerSp_9 The board gives proper advice and directions on how to achieve goals by setting policies 
 Description of control role 
BCont_1 
The board is actively involved in monitoring that all internal behaviors are adequately 
controlled 
BCont_2 
The board is actively involved in defining behavioral guidelines for itself and top level 
managers 
BCont_3 
The board is actively involved in controlling/preventing occurrence of conflicts of interest 
among itself 
BCont_4 The board is actively involved in supervising and evaluating the performance of  the President 
BCont_5 The board actively oversees the activities of its standing committees 
OCont_1 The board controls that the activities are well organized 
OCont_2 The board evaluates performance according to plans and budgets 
OCont_3 The board has internal mechanisms to effectively monitor key performance areas  yearly 
OCont_4 The board is regularly kept informed on the financial position of the bank 
SCont_1 
The board actively monitors and evaluates implementation of strategic decisions and main 
goals 
SCont_2 The board critically reviews performance against strategic plan 
SCont_3 
Management regularly reports to the board on key outcomes and targets that flow directly 
from the strategy 
 
Table 6. 23: Descriptive statistics: Board service and control roles 
LV Item code N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
 
 
 
Advisory role 
SerAd_1 106 2.00 5.00 4.05 .75 
SerAd_2 105 1.00 5.00 3.90 .87 
SerAd_3 106 2.00 5.00 4.29 .68 
SerAd_4 106 2.00 5.00 3.69 .82 
SerAd_5 106 2.00 5.00 3.81 .81 
 Overall advisory 
role 
   3.95 0.59 
 
 
Networking- resource 
dependency role 
SerNwR_1 106 1.00 5.00 3.62 .96 
SerNwR_2 106 1.00 5.00 3.64 .85 
SerNwR_3 104 2.00 5.00 3.88 .76 
SerNwR_4 104 1.00 5.00 3.59 1.02 
SerNwR_5 101 1.00 7.00 3.71 .92 
 Overall resource dependency role  3.69 0.72 
 
Networking- Image 
building role 
SerNwI_1 105 1.00 5.00 3.45 1.10 
SerNwI_2 106 1.00 5.00 3.28 1.00 
SerNwI_3 104 1.00 5.00 2.88 1.10 
 Overall image building role  3.20 0.87 
 
 
Strategic participation 
role 
SerSp_1 106 2.00 5.00 4.12 .69 
SerSp_2 106 1.00 5.00 4.10 .83 
SerSp_3 105 1.00 5.00 3.91 .87 
SerSp_4 106 1.00 5.00 4.09 .74 
SerSp_5 105 1.00 5.00 3.91 .83 
SerSp_6 106 1.00 5.00 3.74 .94 
133 
SerSp_7 106 2.00 5.00 4.11 .79 
SerSp_8 104 2.00 5.00 4.10 .82 
SerSp_9 105 1.00 6.00 4.11 .83 
 Overall strategic participation role  4.02 0.67 
Board service role  Overall average score 3.81  
 
 
Behavioral control 
role 
BCont_1 105 1.00 5.00 3.54 .92 
BCont_2 105 1.00 5.00 3.51 .90 
BCont_3 106 1.00 5.00 3.79 .84 
BCont_4 106 1.00 5.00 3.89 .87 
BCont_5 106 2.00 5.00 3.99 .66 
 Overall behavioral control role  3.74 0.65 
 
 
 
Output control role 
OCont_1 105 2.00 5.00 3.80 .77 
OCont_2 106 2.00 5.00 4.15 .70 
OCont_3 106 2.00 5.00 3.87 .73 
OCont_4 106 3.00 5.00 4.45 .52 
 Overall output control role  4.07 0.53 
 
Strategic control role 
SCont_1 106 1.00 5.00 3.97 .83 
SCont_2 106 1.00 6.00 4.10 .86 
SCont_3 106 2.00 5.00 4.29 .69 
 Overall strategic control role  4.12 0.73 
Board control role Overall average score 3.98  
 
 The overall results of the service role main construct‟s latent variables with the 
highest mean value of 4.02 for the strategic participation role and the lowest mean 
value of 3.20 for the networking- image building role are shown above. The highest 
mean value shows that more emphasis is give to the strategic participation task, 
which agrees with the literature that recommends that boards should devote more 
time to strategic issues than operational ones. The networking-image building role 
has the lowest achievement with a relatively larger standard deviation of diverse 
responses. 
 looking into the control role main construct‟s latent variables, both the output 
control and strategic control latent variables demonstrate the highest overall mean 
values suggesting that boards do make follow ups on key performances, financial 
position and outcomes that flow directly from the strategy. All in all, except the image 
building variables, none of the observed variables have a mean value of less than 
3.5 out of 5. The standard deviations are relatively small suggesting homogeneity of 
responses.  
 The examination of individual items under each latent variable shows that, 
SerAd_1 and SerAd_3 have a mean rating of 4.05 and 4.29, respectively, confirming 
that board members take initiatives to give advice based on personal knowledge and 
that they have significant influence on major management issues such as structure 
and strategy. The networking-resource dependency latent variable has 5 observable 
variables with the highest mean value of 3.88 (SerNwR_3), lowest mean value of 
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3.59 (SerNwR_4), and overall mean value of 3.69. The values represent that boards 
as external resources provide the bank with external legitimacy and reputation; make 
available alternative view points and help in securing access to scarce resources. 
With regard to image building items, the mean values range between 2.88 and 3.45 
with a standard deviation of between 1.00 and 1.10. The achievements are relatively 
small implying that boards as image building inputs, are not chosen exclusively on 
merit basis and influence in the community. This further indicates that active boards 
do not necessarily invite former boards to share their experience and relate the 
bank‟s history and pass on values to new members. This latent variable has a 
diverse response set compared to others with relatively higher standard deviations.  
 Regarding the strategic participation latent variable, the result shows an 
overall average mean of 4.02 demonstrating board involvement in strategic issues. 
In this latent variable, SerSp_1 has the highest mean value (4.12) followed by 
SerSp_7 (4.11) and lowest mean value (3.74) of item SerSp_6. The standard 
deviations range between 0.69 and 0.94 representing less diverse responses for 
each item.  All in all, the items‟ mean values of more than 4 for the latent variable 
imply the following: the board understands the organization‟s operational and 
environmental contexts in long-term strategic planning process, and applies a 
strategic approach to decision making by considering facts, perspectives, and 
objectives. The board identifies an annual strategic direction within the framework of 
the long range planning and gives proper advice and directions on how to achieve 
goals by setting policies. The overall average score for the bard service role is 3.81 
(76%), which is higher than the average. 
 The other main construct, control role, has three dimensions: behavioral, 
output and strategic control. Regarding the items under behavioral control latent 
variable, it is observed that BCont_5, which states that the board actively oversees 
the activities of its standing committees, was the highest rated item with a mean 
value of 3.99 followed by Bcont_4 (The board is actively involved in supervising and 
evaluating the performance of the President) with a mean value of 3.89. On the other 
hand, BCont_2, that states the board is actively involved in defining behavioral 
guidelines for itself and top level managers, has the lowest mean achievement of 
3.51. The overall mean value of the behavioral control dimension was 3.74 denoting 
the extent of strength of the boards‟ role in controlling corporate behavior. The 
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standard deviation ranges from 0.66 to 0.92 denoting less variability of responses 
from the means.   
 The output control latent variable‟s overall mean was 4.07, the highest rated 
item being OCont_4 (mean 4.45) followed by OCont_2 (mean 4.15) and the lowest 
rated item OCont_1 (mean 3.8) (description of items given in Table 6.22 above). The 
overall mean value of 4.07 means, among others, the board is regularly kept 
informed on the financial position of the bank and evaluates performance according 
to plans and budgets. The standard deviation ranges from 0.52 to 0.77 representing 
less diverse responses. 
 The strategic control latent variable has an overall mean of 4.12. Item 
SCont_3 has the highest mean achievement of 4.29 while item SCont_1 has the 
lowest mean value of 3.97 in the category. The lowest standard deviation is 0.69 and 
the highest 0.86 having less varied responses. The results suggest that 
management regularly reports to the board on key outcomes and targets that flow 
directly from the strategy; and the board critically reviews performance against 
strategic plan and it actively monitors and evaluates implementation of strategic 
decisions and main goals. The board control role construct has an overall mean 
achievement of 3.98 (78%), which is much higher than the average. 
Table 6. 24: Descriptive statistics of second order constructs (Board 
structure, Board process, Board service role and Board Control role) 
 
Main constructs N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BStruct 104 2.22 5.00 4.14 .52 
BProcess 104 2.00 4.76 3.73 .48 
BServrole 105 1.82 5.00 3.81 .58 
BControle 105 1.92 5.00 3.98 .57 
 
 Table 6.24 presents the overall mean performance of the main (second order) 
constructs on the basis of which the hypotheses are established. The results are 
above their average values with relatively smaller standard deviations denoting less 
diverse and dispersed responses. Following description of the first order and second 
order latent variables, below is presented an empirical assessment of the 
relationships between the latent variables as part of a preliminary investigation of the 
hypotheses of the research. 
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6.5 Bivariate Correlation Analysis of Latent Variables and Principal (Higher 
 Order) Constructs 
 Bivariate analysis as statistical analysis assesses the empirical relationship 
between two variables. It is helpful in preliminary tests of hypothesis of associations. 
In this regard, bivariate correlation was conducted between the latent variables 
considering their composite index (mean) calculated using SPSS version 20. SPSS 
was also used to examine the relationships between the latent variables. The 
associations of the principal constructs were also examined taking into account the 
composite indexes of the latent variables forming each principal construct. The latter 
was used for the preliminary tests of the hypotheses before formally testing them 
using the PLS-PM. Bivariate analysis of the latent variables and principal (higher 
order) constructs are displayed in Tables 6.25, 6.26 and 6.27, respectively. 
Table 6.25 of Pearson‟s correlation for the 14 latent variables, used in the 
measurement model of PLS, demonstrates that 86 out of the 91 (95%) correlations 
are significant, of which 80 are positively correlated and 6 negatively. The 
preliminary diagnostic process gives support to the hypothetical model. With regard 
to the bivariate analysis of the principal constructs that form the inner model, Table 
6.26 shows that all the six correlations are significantly and positively correlated. This 
result agrees with the five hypotheses established in the research. The preliminary 
support of the bivariate correlation results is briefly presented below taking into 
account the hypothetical model developed in Chapter Three. The model assumes 
that the board structure as a principal (higher level) construct with three latent 
variables, namely, board composition, board independence, and board committees 
will directly influence the board process, board service and control roles; with the 
board process, board service role and control roles standing as principal constructs, 
each with its reflective latent variables. The model also shows that there is a 
relationship between the board process and board service and control roles. The 
tables below show the correlation coefficients of the latent variables of the 
conceptual model and the correlations between the principal latent constructs. 
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**,*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
 SComp SBInd SComm PrCom PrCon PrCog PrBrA SerAd SerNwR SerNwI SerSp BCont OCont SCont 
SComp 
(LV1) 
Pearson Correlation 1              
Sig. (2-tailed)               
N 106              
SBInd 
Pearson Correlation .374
**
 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .000             
N 104 104             
SComm 
Pearson Correlation .340
**
 .298
**
 1            
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002            
N 106 104 106            
PrCom 
Pearson Correlation .428
**
 .515
**
 .435
**
 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000           
N 106 104 106 106           
PrCon 
Pearson Correlation -.284
**
 -.296
**
 .061 -.263
**
 1          
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .002 .534 .007          
N 105 103 105 105 105          
PrCog 
Pearson Correlation .457
**
 .476
**
 .502
**
 .704
**
 -.269
**
 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .006         
N 105 103 105 105 104 105         
PrBrA 
Pearson Correlation .519
**
 .456
**
 .465
**
 .632
**
 -.384
**
 .670
**
 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000        
N 106 104 106 106 105 105 106        
SerAd 
Pearson Correlation .538
**
 .371
**
 .398
**
 .519
**
 -.116 .562
**
 .584
**
 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .239 .000 .000       
N 105 103 105 105 104 104 105 105       
SerNwR 
Pearson Correlation .460
**
 .206
*
 .339
**
 .398
**
 -.007 .334
**
 .443
**
 .556
**
 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .040 .001 .000 .945 .001 .000 .000      
N 101 100 101 101 100 100 101 100 101      
SerNwI 
Pearson Correlation .264
**
 .194
*
 .503
**
 .461
**
 -.004 .401
**
 .446
**
 .433
**
 .502
**
 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .049 .000 .000 .964 .000 .000 .000 .000     
N 104 103 104 104 103 103 104 103 100 104     
SerSp 
Pearson Correlation .559
**
 .550
**
 .491
**
 .611
**
 -.286
**
 .690
**
 .763
**
 .734
**
 .602
**
 .549
**
 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000    
N 103 102 103 103 102 102 103 102 99 102 103    
BCont 
Pearson Correlation .547
**
 .507
**
 .532
**
 .635
**
 -.192 .624
**
 .663
**
 .672
**
 .535
**
 .559
**
 .777
**
 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
N 105 104 105 105 104 104 105 104 101 104 103 105   
OCont 
Pearson Correlation .489
**
 .557
**
 .337
**
 .654
**
 -.310
**
 .556
**
 .634
**
 .586
**
 .524
**
 .314
**
 .701
**
 .711
**
 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000  
N 105 104 105 105 104 104 105 104 101 104 103 105 105  
SCont 
Pearson Correlation .529
**
 .539
**
 .366
**
 .591
**
 -.361
**
 .605
**
 .688
**
 .588
**
 .442
**
 .322
**
 .775
**
 .712
**
 .694
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
N 106 104 106 106 105 105 106 105 101 104 103 105 105 106 
Table 6. 25: Pearson Correlations among the latent variables 
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Table 6. 26: Pearson Correlations among the principal constructs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 6. 27: Pearson correlation coefficients of structural and process latent 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**,*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level (2-tailed), respectively 
 
As shown in Table 6.27 above, the board structure‟s latent variables (Scomp, 
SBInd and Scomm) are significantly correlated with board process‟s latent variables 
(PrCom, PrCon, PrCog, and PrBrA) except for SComm and PrCon. The structural 
latent variables are positively correlated with commitment, cognitive conflict and 
boardroom activity latent variables; and negatively correlated with the process 
conflict latent variable. These values give preliminary evidence of the relationship 
between board structure and board process latent variables. The results show that 
board structure affects board process. That is, a properly structured board in terms 
of composition, independence, and active committee might also be active in the 
board process expressed in terms of commitment, critical debate, and good sprit in 
the boardroom. 
 
 
 
 
 BStruct BProcess BServrole BControle 
BStruct 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
     
N 104    
BProcess 
Pearson Correlation .679
**
 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
N 102 104   
BServrole 
Pearson Correlation .679
**
 .740
**
 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
N 96 95 97  
BControle 
Pearson Correlation .737
**
 .746
**
 .819
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 104 103 97 105 
Principal Construct                       Board process 
 
Board structure 
LV PrCom PrCon PrCog PrBrA 
SComp .428
**
 -.284
*
 .457
**
 519
**
 
SBInd .515
**
 -.296
**
 .476
**
 .456
**
 
SComm .435
**
 .061 .502
**
 .465
**
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Table 6. 28: Pearson’s correlation coefficients of structural, service & control 
roles latent variables 
Principal Construct                       Board service role Board control role 
 
Board structure 
LV SerAd SerNwR SerNwI SerSp BCont OCont Scont 
SComp .538
**
 .460
**
 .264
**
 559
**
 .547
**
 .489
**
 .529
**
 
SBInd .371
**
 .206
*
 .503
**
 .550
**
 .507
**
 .557
**
 .539
**
 
SComm .398
**
 .339
**
 .503
**
 .491
**
 .532
**
 .337
**
 .366
**
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The table above shows the extent of relationship between board structural 
latent variables and board service and control role latent variables. The correlation 
coefficients provide preliminary support of the significant and positive association 
between each of the structural latent variables (Scomp, SBInd and Scomm) and 
each of the service (SerAd, SerNwR, SerNwI and SerSp) and control role (BCont, 
OCont and SCont) latent variables. The significant positive correlation of the 
structural latent variables and the service and control latent variables may not be 
surprising as properly structured boards are expected to accomplish all service and 
control tasks effectively.  
  Table 6. 29: Pearson’s correlation coefficients of process, service & control 
roles latent variable 
Principal Construct                       Board service role Board control role 
 
Board Process 
LV SerAd SerNwR SerNwI SerSp BCont OCont Scont 
PrCom .519
**
 .398
**
 .461
**
 .611
**
 .635
**
 .654
**
 .591
**
 
PrCon -.116 -.007 -.004 -.286
**
 .624
**
 -.310
**
 -.361
**
 
PrCog .562
**
 .334
**
  .401
**
 .690
**
 .624
**
 .556
**
 .605
**
 
PrBrA .584
**
 .443
**
 .446
**
 .763
**
 .663
**
 .634
**
 .688
**
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 (2-tailed) 
Table 6.29 shows the relationship between the board process and board 
service and control roles. Except for the process conflict (PrCon) variable and three 
service role variables (SerAd, SerNwR & SeRNwI), the remaining variables show 
significant correlations. PrCon is significantly but negatively correlated with SerSp, 
OCont, and Scont but positively related with BCont. These associations seem logical 
because when the intensity of process conflict gets higher, it negatively affects (is 
detrimental to) the strategic participation, output and strategic control roles while 
positively influencing the behavioral control role. The remainders of the board 
process latent variables (PrCom, Prcog and PrBrA) are positively and significantly 
related to the service and control role latent variables, at the 0.01 significance level. 
This means that high level of commitment; cognitive conflict and good boardroom 
spirit probably allow boards to execute their service and control roles more 
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effectively, in terms of advice provision, resource generation, image building, 
strategic participation, behavioral , output, and strategic control.  
Turning to the principal (higher level) constructs, the same results have been 
obtained as above but in their aggregate forms. The summary table of the bivariate 
correlation between the constructs is presented below. 
 
Table 6. 30: Pearson’s correlation coefficients of board structure, board 
process, board service & control roles main constructs 
Principal 
construct 
Board Process 
(Bprocess) 
Board service 
role (BServrole) 
Board control 
role (BControle) 
Board Structure 
(BStruct) 
.679
**
 .679
**
 .737
**
 
Board Process 
(Bprocess) 
1 .740
**
 .746
**
 
Board service 
role (BServrole) 
.740
**
 1 .819
**
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 The correlation coefficients between the latent constructs are high, significant 
and positive, as expected, providing preliminary evidence for the hypothesized 
relationships. Examining the relationship from the table above, it is noted that board 
structure is positively and significantly related to board process, board service role 
and board control role. This result is consistent with the results given in Tables 6.27 
and 6.28 above showing that a properly structured board can positively influence the 
board process, board service role and board control role. In turn, the board process 
with high coefficients is positively and significantly related to the board service role 
and control roles. That is, a board that is in the right board process is expected to 
accomplish both the board service and control roles rightfully. The correlation 
coefficient between board service and control roles is the highest value recorded in 
this study (.819**) demonstrating that a board that is active in performing the service 
tasks can also be active in performing all the control tasks. 
 Once the quality of the measurement model is assured and preliminary test of 
relationships performed, the next step of analysis would be estimation of the 
specified structural model and formal tests of the hypotheses using Smart PLS-PM. 
This is discussed in Chapter Eight. 
6.6 Summary 
 This chapter presented the evaluation of the reliability and validity of the 
measurement model as a prerequisite to the assessment of the structural model, 
(testing hypotheses). That is, if the measurement model cannot pass tests of 
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reliability and validity, it is not possible to assess the structural model or perform 
hypothesis testing. The measurement purification was done in two stages. Firstly, 
the factorial dimensionality of the indicator variables with respect to their latent 
variables was carried out through exploratory factor analysis using principal 
component analysis (PCA). Secondly, construct reliability and validity tests were 
performed using PLS outer (measurement) model evaluation on those items retained 
after EFA. The two processes led to the removal of a total of 20 items (14 items 
through EFA and 6 items by CFA). The PCA regrouped the indictor variables into 
several constructs. The processes ensured the reliability and validity of the 
measurement model, which serves as a basis for the measurement of the structural 
model presented in Chapter Eight. The profile of sample-1 respondents and 
descriptive statistics of those manifest and latent variables that passed the validation 
tests are also presented in this chapter. Before the structural model evaluation that 
tests the hypotheses established in Chapter Three, bivariate correlation analysis was 
carried out as a preliminary test of the appropriateness of the structural model 
relationships hypothesized.  
Before presenting the structural model evaluation, the next chapter will 
examine the perceptions of both the governing bodies (Sample-1) and group of 
stakeholders (Sample-2), separately and in aggregate terms, regarding the current 
corporate governance systems and practices in Ethiopia. The analysis is believed to 
complement the structural model results. 
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Chapter 7 Perception Survey of Corporate Governance Practices: 
Analysis,  Findings and Discussions 
7.1 Introduction 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the previous chapter assessed the mean achievement 
of corporate governance constructs and their relationships as a preliminary test of 
the hypothesis established in Chapter Three. The results for almost all first and 
second order latent variables were above their average values, denoting quite 
adequate performance for the latent variables. As a preliminary evidence for the 
hypothesized relationships, the bivariate correlation analysis also reported high, 
significant and positive relationship between the constructs. The formal tests of the 
hypotheses are performed and presented in Chapter Eight.  
Before presenting the structural model evaluation, this chapter examined how 
the governing bodies (Sample-1) and group of stakeholders (Sample-2) perceive 
corporate governance practices in Ethiopia. To the best of the researcher‟s 
knowledge, little or none is known about the opinions of boards and stakeholders in 
relation to the principles of good corporate governance, strategies and approaches 
to promote good governance, characteristics of the Ethiopian boards, key corporate 
governance issues and the like in the Ethiopian emerging market economy context. 
Two separate analyses were made deliberately, and finally aggregated, to give 
emphasis to the perceptions of the governing bodies and the stakeholders and 
empirically compare differences and address research questions five and six set in 
Chapter One section 1.5.     
This chapter, therefore, empirically analyses the respondents‟ perceptions of 
the current practices of corporate governance. The analysis is conducted in relation 
to, among other things, the OECD framework, remunerations, characteristics of 
boards, approaches to promote corporate governance, strategic issues, board 
independence, board duty and governance issues. Moreover, comments, issues 
raised and recommendations made by stakeholders to improve corporate 
governance practices are examined and analyzed so as to identify any serious 
concerns. Finally, in order to enhance the results of the quantitative analysis and/or 
inform each other, the qualitative in-depth interview is analyzed for patterns in 
reference to specific corporate governance themes. 
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7.2 Survey of Governing bodies’ (Sample-1) Perception of Corporate 
Governance Practices 
It is believed that every country has its own distinctive type of corporate 
governance that reflects its political, economic and regulatory setups. Regardless of 
the distinction, corporate governance principles have at their center stage something 
in common that deal with a system by which corporate forms of organizations are 
directed and controlled (OECD, 2004). This specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the different actors in corporate forms of business that 
include, the shareholders, boards, employees, other stakeholders like creditors and 
the society at large. Corporate governance sets out rules, procedures and systems 
on the basis of which corporate affairs are handled fairly. Corporate governance 
spells out the structure through which company objectives are set, the means of 
achieving them, and monitoring their performances (ibid). 
A corporation with good corporate governance is expected to demonstrate, 
among other things, protected shareholders‟ rights, equitable treatment of 
shareholders, appreciation of stakeholders‟ role, disclosure and transparency (Grove 
and Clouse, 2015), alignment of company and shareholders‟ interests. Good 
corporate governance could mean ensuring fairness to all parties, maintaining 
transparency, planting accountability, instituting shareholder confidence, sustaining 
wealth maximization for owners and building good image for a company. It is for 
these benefits that corporate governance has received increased importance since 
the last decades especially after corporate scandals of big companies such as Enron 
and the financial crises of the recent times.   
To this end, this study attempts to scan corporate governance practices in the 
emerging Ethiopian economy settings. OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) is taken as a benchmark for assessment in this 
study because, so far, Ethiopia has no standardized code of corporate governance 
nor an institution responsible for crafting and enforcing the same.  
To assess corporate governance practices, the five pillars of OECD principles 
of corporate governance are mainly taken into account. The OECD is an 
international body formed by 34 developed countries to produce a set of globally 
accepted principles of corporate governance. The OECD principles provide a 
framework for developing and establishing corporate governance systems and 
practices of a country in line with its own political, economic, institutional, legal and 
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regulatory environment. It also serves as a framework for assessing a country‟s 
corporate governance practices. Some of the key elements of OECD‟s good 
corporate governance principles focus on the rights of shareholders, the equitable 
treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, 
disclosure and transparency and the responsibilities of the board (OECD, 2004). To 
address the first two issues, Sample One respondents of only the private domain (85 
respondents out of 106) were particularly asked to provide data on the corporate 
governance practices that specifically address the ownership and control structure of 
their banks, shareholders‟ rights and treatment of shareholders. These questions 
were specifically addressed to them because the questions do not apply to the public 
banks as they are fully owned and controlled by the government with high 
concentration of ownership.  
Ownership and Control Structure of Private Banks 
Corporate governance is affected by the relationships among the major actors 
in the governance system. These include controlling shareholders, management, 
creditors, employees, the government and other stakeholders (OECD, 2004). 
Ownership and control structure are among the variables that affect corporate 
governance behavior. Agency problem or corporate misbehavior is more manifested 
in a dispersed ownership structure. On the other hand, when ownership is highly 
concentrated, there is a danger of asset expropriation by controlling shareholders. In 
this regard, both ownership dispersion and concentration can become a concern for 
corporate forms of organizations (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Though corporate governance is at its earliest stage of development in 
Ethiopia, the problems of ownership dispersion and concentration cannot be an 
exception to it. Regarding this issue, participants were requested to describe the 
ownership and control structure of the banks in which they serve. The frequency 
distribution shows that 47(54%) believe that the largest shareholders (each up to 5% 
of holdings) collectively and effectively control the bank with significant voting rights, 
whereas 37 (44%) believe that ownership is fairly diffused (see Appendix 7.1). The 
data indicates the presence of controlling shareholders and ownership concentration, 
allowing controlling shareholders to have more freedom and power to influence 
decisions to be along the lines of their interests. 
However, the concentration of ownership is limited due to Banking and 
Insurance Proclamation No. 592/2008 of the Federal Government of Ethiopia that 
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defines ownership of banks. The proclamation specifies limitation on the acquisition 
of shares stating that except the government of Ethiopia no party can hold more than 
5% of a bank‟s total shares on its own or jointly. The purpose of this directive is to 
ensure fairness to all shareholders and safeguard the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Furthermore, concentration of ownership could mean giving few 
shareholders the ability to control the bank activities, which might jeopardize minority 
shareholders‟ rights,  and result in loss of shareholders‟ confidence, lose of 
confidence in investors, and above all negative impact on compliance to best 
practices corporate governance.  
The Rights and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Shareholders are the principal owners of corporate forms of organizations. 
Due to their large number, as owners, shareholders do not have the opportunity to 
manage and control the firms that they own. So, they hire management to run the 
firm with the objective to maximize shareholders‟ interests. This demonstrates that, 
for a large number of owners, management and control are distanced, resulting in 
the need for a board of directors, as an internal corporate mechanism with 
appropriate governance codes to protect shareholders‟ rights and ensure their 
equitable treatment.  
The OECD (2004) states several characteristics of shareholders‟ rights and 
obligations as discussed earlier in Chapter Two section 2.8.2 and listed in Table 7.1 
below. Respondents were asked to indicate the presence or absence of these 
features in practice. Table 7.1 gives a summary of responses from private bank 
respondents in relation to shareholders‟ rights and equitable treatment.  
 
Table 7.1: The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders 
Characteristics  Yes No 
# % # % 
Deviation  from one-share one-vote rule  2 2 83 98 
Voting by mail allowed 1 1 84 99 
Voting by proxy allowed 70 82 15 18 
Adequate time given for questions at shareholders meetings 73 86 12 14 
Shareholders' priority subscription rights protected 82 97 2 2 
Equitable treatment of shareholders practiced 66 78 19* 23 
Candidates disclosed before shareholders‟ meetings 13 15 70 82 
Large shareholders nominate candidates at the shareholders‟ 
meetings 
54 64 29 34 
*Not fully 
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It is noted from the above table that the principles of the rights and equitable 
treatment of shareholders appear to be in place as most of the respondents 
indicated the presence of most of the features such as shareholders‟ right to vote, 
participate and ask questions at AGM (Annual General Meeting), priority subscription 
right to additional share and equitable treatment of all shareholders. Specifically, the 
voting system in almost all private banks is based on one-share one vote rule (98%) 
which is in line with the Commercial Code of Ethiopia (Article number 407, 2, 1960). 
The 1960 Commercial Code of Ethiopia is still active and allows different rights to 
different classes of share such as the preferred right of subscription in the event of 
future issues, or rights of priority over profits, or assets or both. But, it states that all 
shares of the same class have the same par value and the same rights in proportion 
to the amount of capital represented and prohibits the issue of share with a 
preference as to voting rights (Articles 335 and 336). The recent Proclamation No. 
592/2008 article number 10(1) of the Federal government of Ethiopia proclaims that 
banks shall issue only one class of shares which are of ordinary shares of the same 
value. Thus, there are no preferential shares with preferential rights to voting during 
the AGM.  
One of the OECD principles of basic rights of shareholders is participating and 
voting at AGM either in person, by mail or by proxy. Of those surveyed, almost all 
confirmed that voting by mail has never been allowed and used by anyone of them 
(99%). A high percentage (82%) of those surveyed also stated that voting by proxy is 
allowed and practiced by shareholders. The Commercial Code article 398 (1960) 
allows shareholders to nominate one proxy (who produces a supporting legal 
document) to represent them in the AGM. In addition to participation and voting, 
shareholders‟ rights include asking questions in an AGM. Thus, 86% of the 
respondents mentioned that there is a participation opportunity and that adequate 
time is given for asking questions during AGM. Based on the above table, almost all 
(97%) stated that shareholders' priority subscription rights in the issuance of 
additional shares are well protected. 
The OECD code of corporate governance emphasizes the equitable treatment 
of all shareholders and 78% of the respondents admitted that equitable treatment 
does exist across the board, including the minority shareholders. Disclosure of 
candidates before shareholder meetings is not a common practice according to 82% 
of the respondents. A good proportion of the respondents (64%) also stated that big 
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shareholders are given the chance to nominate candidates at the shareholders‟ 
meetings.   
Shareholders have not only rights but also obligations that are quite important 
for successful corporate governance practices. These obligations revolve around 
knowing, demanding and exercise their rights. Below the summary of responses 
(see Table 7.2) shows that 18% and 53% of the respondents believe that  all know 
and the majority of the shareholders know their rights and obligations, respectively, 
while 29%% of the respondents believe that only few of the shareholders know their 
rights and obligations. This implies that further effort is needed to clearly establish, 
among the shareholders, that their interests could be protected and enhanced not 
only through the board of directors but also through their own active participation. In 
terms of the degree of exercise of their rights, 84% of the respondents are convinced 
that shareholders who know their rights do freely exercise them in AGM and other 
situations.   
 
 Table 7.2: Shareholders’ rights and obligations 
Characteristics  Yes Majority 
know 
Only few 
know 
# %  % # % 
Shareholders know their rights and obligations  15 18 45 53 25 29 
 
Those who know their rights freely exercise them 
in AGM in matters such as voting and  profit 
sharing 
Yes No Sometimes 
# %  % # % 
71 84 3 3 11 13 
 
In a nutshell, the above analysis appears to indicate that there is a sound 
governance practice considering the reported presence of some features and the 
scores on some of corporate governance parameters such as: the shareholders‟ 
rights to vote, participate and ask questions at AGM, priority subscription right to 
additional shares and equitable treatment of all shareholders. 
Disclosure and Transparency 
Transparency in information disclosure applies both to the private and public 
sector banks as disclosure and transparency in information enables stakeholders to 
have a good understanding of a company and helps in developing trust and good 
image. Disclosure and transparency in information is critical in corporate governance 
as it serves as a tool to disseminate information to all stakeholders concerning the 
148 
company at large. OECD (2004) and the Cadbury report (1992) recognize disclosure 
and transparency as an important component of any corporate governance system.  
The OECD (2004) principles on disclosure and transparency urge 
corporations to disclose material information on a timely and accurate basis. These 
include the financial situation, operating performance, annual audit, and governance 
structure and policy of the company. Banking Business Proclamation No. 592/2008 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian also requires all commercial banks 
to disclose material information on issues mentioned above. With regard to this, 
respondents were asked whether they believe their banks are transparent and 
disclose material information on the issues listed in the table below. 
Table 7. 3: Disclosure and transparency of private and public banks 
Characteristics  Yes No 
# % # % 
Governance structures 98 93 8 7 
Explicit corporate governance rules 78 74 27 26 
Vision, missions, and values 105 99 1 1 
Financial performances       106 100   
Audited annual reports 106 100   
Resume or background of directors 70 66 36 34 
Members of board sub-committees 66 62 40 38 
 
  Table 7.3 above summarizes the responses to survey questions regarding the 
type of information that they disclose and the means of disclosing them. Accordingly, 
almost 100% of the respondents confirmed that the banks they govern comply with 
the transparency of information disclosure principles and comply with the Banking 
Business Proclamation No. 592/2008 on matters related to financial performance, 
audited annual reports, vision mission, values and corporate structures. More than 
two thirds of respondents also stated that they disclose information on corporate 
governance rules and background of directors.  
Table 7.4 below reveals that the vast majority of the respondents (95%) 
confirm that their banks employ both annual reports and reports to regulatory 
agencies, to disseminate material facts.  
Table 7. 4:  Disclosure of material information 
Means of disclosure # % 
Annual reports  101 95 
Reports to regulatory agency  103 97 
Web pages 40 38 
Brochures 35 33 
Meetings  42 40 
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Annual reports to shareholders and regulatory agencies are mandatory 
requirements by law. Thus, the efforts of banks in promoting transparency and 
disclosure of material information should be judged by the additional voluntary efforts 
they exert such as provision of information on web pages, through brochures and 
during meetings. The responses of the respondents in this regard do not paint a 
positive picture as only 38% of the respondents stated that their banks post relevant 
material information on their web pages while, 33% and 40% of the respondents 
revealed that their banks employ brochures and meetings , respectively, to 
disseminate material facts. 
Role of Stakeholders 
OECD (2004:45) recognizes the importance of stakeholders and emphasizes 
that any governance framework should acknowledge “… the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active cooperation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises”. It further states that stakeholders‟ 
relationships that include employees, creditors, suppliers and investors are important 
for building sustainable enterprises and bringing about mutual development by 
fostering teamwork.   
Therefore, corporations should recognize the contributions of stakeholders in 
promoting good governance for the long term success of the corporation and always 
take into account their interests in taking decisions and actions. Such interests of the 
corporation are served by recognizing the interests of stakeholders and the society 
at large. Of course, sound corporate governance is the outcome of the combined 
efforts of various interest groups and stakeholders. In Ethiopia, different stakeholders 
have been engaged in various activities such as revising commercial codes, 
enacting rules, monitoring and enforcing directives and regulations (AACCSA, 2009) 
to promote sound corporate governance. For the purpose of understanding their 
perceptions, respondents were requested to rank the relative importance of 
stakeholders in improving corporate governance in Ethiopia, in general, and the 
banking sector in particular. Table 7.5 summarizes the responses. 
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Table 7. 5: Summary of perception of relative importance of stakeholders’ role 
in improving corporate governance 
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # 
Media 9 8 10 9 11 10 18 17 25 24 19 18 14 
Chamber of commerce 2 2 6 6 15 15 24 23 26 25 20 19 13 
Professional society 7 7 17 16 34 32 19 18 11 10 9 9 8 
Financial supervisory 
agencies 
68 64 22 21 9 9 - - 1 1 2 2 4 
The judiciary 7 7 15 14 17 16 14 13 1 11 27 26 12 
Non executive board of 
directors 
18 17 23 22 9 9 10 9 11 10 23 22 12 
Others, Bankers 
association 
4 4            
 
Except the financial supervisory agency, which is rated as relatively most 
important (level 1) by 64 % of the respondents, the rest of the stakeholders scored 
less than 20%. The majority of the respondents believe that the financial regulatory 
and supervisory agencies, as the most important stakeholders, can play a key role in 
promoting and improving corporate governance in the country, particularly, in the 
banking industry. It is not surprising to observe the importance attached as the 
financial supervisory agencies are the only institutions that are endowed with the 
power to monitor, regulate and supervise the financial institutions in the country. An 
empirical study by Mullineux (2006) and Arun and Turner (2004) on the corporate 
governance of banks suggests that there needs to be a prudent regulatory system 
for banks in order to enhance good corporate governance. On the basis of the 
perception survey, it is observed that the other entities, which are outside(non-
executive) board of directors, professional societies, chamber of commerce, the 
media and the judiciary were rated 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th in terms of their importance in 
improving corporate governance practices. The non-executive board of directors is 
second in importance, which agrees with the literature which recommends the 
significant presence of non-executive boards (OECD, 2004) as internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to minimize the agency costs. The judiciary and the media 
are believed to promote good governance. However, the respondents rated them as 
least important in this regard. This might indicate that the respondents do not have 
much confidence in the capacity of these institutions in promoting good corporate 
governance practices in Ethiopia. 
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Controlling the undue influence of the largest shareholders is another 
important role of stakeholders. In this regard, respondents were asked to rank the 
relative importance of the different stakeholders in controlling the abusive behavior of 
controlling owners in the Ethiopian context. A summary of the respondents‟ views is 
given below.   
Table 7.6: Summary of perceived relative importance of stakeholders’ role in 
preventing influence of controlling owners  
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Missin
g 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # 
minority shareholders  7 7 10 9 19 18 22 21 25 24 8 8 15 
Institutional investors 11 10 11 10 19 18 28 26 16 15 8 8 13 
Outside (non-executive) 
board of directors 
12 11 18 17 25 24 18 17 14 13 8 8 11 
Financial supervisory 
agencies 
52 49 31 29 7 7 2 2 1 1 4 4 9 
Labor unions or 
employees 
2 2 9 9 5 5 19 18 52 49 1 1 18 
The legal system 25 24 23 22 13 12 15 14 11 10 8 8 11 
 
Table 7.6 presents respondents‟ rating of the relative importance of six 
categories of stakeholders in thwarting the undue powers of controlling/large owners 
to pursue their private interests. Financial supervisory agencies are rated as the 
most important stakeholders in this regard. This  perceived importance is not  due to 
extra efforts exerted by the regulatory and supervisory agencies but on account of  
the legal power vested in them (by the Licensing and Supervision of Banking 
Business proclamation number 84/1994). Corporate governance is relatively new to 
the country and at a nascent stage and the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) is the 
only enforcing institution that oversees how well good governance is practiced. 
According to the Table the legal system, non-executive board of directors and 
institutional investors, which received scores of 22% (level 2), 24% (level 3) and 26% 
(level 4), respectively, are also considered important entities in preventing the 
influence of controlling owners, while minority shareholders‟ and the labor unions‟ 
roles are indicated least important by the respondents. The roles of institutional 
investors, minority shareholders and the labor unions need further enhancement for 
them to be considered as key players in this regard.  
Respondents were also requested to indicate whether they think institutional 
shareholders are in a stronger position to influence the board than other types of 
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shareholders (minority and controlling shareholders), to act in the best interests of 
the owners. The majority (54, 51%) do and quite a substantial number (45, 43%) do 
not feel that institutional shareholders have the power to act more influentially in this 
manner. 
Better corporate governance can be achieved by different strategies that may 
include, among others, having active shareholders, enacting specific rules, and 
introducing standards and codes. However, their relative contribution in bringing 
about better corporate governance would depend upon the specific environment in 
which they operate. The relative effectiveness of the tasks in promoting better 
corporate governance in Ethiopia is an issue to be addressed. To this effect, 
respondents were asked to rank the relative effectiveness of the seven tasks listed 
below in bringing better corporate governance in Ethiopia, in general, and the 
banking sector in particular. A summary of the analysis is presented below. 
Table 7.7: Summary of relative effectiveness of tasks for better corporate 
governance 
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # %  % # 
Internal CG mechanism 
for better CG 
45 43 17 16 15 14 5 5 6 6 3 3 7 7 8 
external CG 
mechanism for better 
CG  
16 15 19 18 15 14 21 20 11 10 8 8 6 6 10 
Enhancing the 
standards of 
accounting, audit and 
disclosure 
10 9 17 16 21 19 22 21 12 11 5 5 10 9 10 
Introducing code of 
corporate governance 
29 28 24 23 23 22 8 8 7 7 5 5 1 1 9 
Conducting and 
publicizing corporate 
governance ratings of 
banks 
5 5 8 8 10 9 13 12 24 23 16 15 19 18 11 
Tightly controlling some 
types of related-party 
transactions 
2 2 10 9 11 10 8 8 21 20 28 26 13 12 13 
Reducing ownership 
concentration 
8 8 11 10 4 4 10 10 18 17 18 17 22 21 15 
 
From Table 7.7, it can be observed that the task or approach of „making 
internal corporate governance mechanisms work better, such as ensuring active 
shareholder participation and enhancing the role of the boards in executing their 
roles properly‟, is perceived to be a very effective approach to bring better corporate 
governance as indicated by 43% of the respondents. The „introduction of a code of 
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corporate governance‟ stood second in importance as a strategy for better 
governance receiving support from 28% the respondents. Similarly, „making the 
external governance mechanism work effectively‟ is rated as the third effective 
approach in achieving better corporate governance. „Enhancing standards of 
accounting, audit and disclosure‟ are also considered as effective mechanisms for 
better corporate governance while the rest of the approaches are not well considered 
important by the respondents as effective approaches for better corporate 
governance.  
Responsibilities of Boards 
The fifth pillar of the OECD principles of corporate governance addresses the 
issue of board responsibilities that include assurance of strategic guidance of the 
company, effective monitoring of management and accountability to the company 
and the shareholders. It specifically states that boards have the responsibility to act 
on informed basis, in good faith, with due care and in the best interest of the 
company and the shareholders. The board has also the responsibility to take into 
account the interests of stakeholders in its decisions and actions. More generally 
board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to the 
responsibilities entrusted to them.  
Board members of private and public banks were requested to rate the extent 
to which they carry out the responsibilities entrusted to them in light of the principles 
outlined above. The interrogative item was rated on a five point agree/disagree 
scale. A summary of responses is given below. 
Table 7. 8: Board members’ self-assessment of role performance  
Board responsibilities  At  least 
agree* 
% Mean 
As a member of the board of directors, I was adequately informed and 
knowledgeable about my functions and responsibilities (BrdR_1). 
86 89 4.2 
As a member of the board of directors, I used to feel responsible and 
devote sufficient time to carry out my responsibilities (BrdR_2). 
93 96 4.3 
As a member of the board of directors, I consider fiduciary and 
stewardship responsibilities in discussions and decision-making (BrdR_3). 
89 92 4.3 
As a member of the board of directors, I was responsible and take into 
account stakeholder interests in decisions and actions (BrdR_4). 
89 92 4.4 
As a member of the board, I was willing to be accountable and responsible 
for situations that may cost me to the extent of relinquishing my position 
(BrdR_5). 
91 94 4.5 
Over all  93 4.3 
*Note:  Measured on likert scale; strongly agree and agree aggregated as at least agree 
 
154 
The mean value (4.3 out of 5) of board members‟ self assessment of their 
performance in carrying out their responsibilities in the effort of ensuring sound 
corporate governance is remarkable as shown in Table 7.8. On average 93% of the 
respondents agreed that they carry out their responsibilities properly. This set of 
responses was triangulated using assessments from the various stakeholders who 
agreed that boards play their active role in ensuring effective corporate governance 
practices as extensively discussed in Chapter Seven, section 7.3 on the board 
duties. 
An independent samples t-test was also performed which showed that there 
were no significant differences between the private and public bank boards in 
carrying out their respective responsibilities at the 1% significance level except for 
variable BrdR_1 which revealed that private bank board members are not 
adequately informed and knowledgeable about their functions and responsibilities 
compared to their public bank counter parts (see Table 7.10). 
 
Table 7.9: Mean scores of private and public boards self-assessment of the 
performance of their responsibilities  
Board 
responsibilities  
Ownership N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 
BrdR_1 
Private 78 4.0641 .58863 .06665 
Public 19 4.5263 .51299 .11769 
 
BrdR_2 
Private 78 4.2692 .55063 .06235 
Public 19 4.5263 .51299 .11769 
 
BrdR_3 
Private 78 4.2564 .69199 .07835 
Public 19 4.5789 .60698 .13925 
 
BrdR_4 
Private 78 4.3718 .68583 .07765 
Public 19 4.5263 .61178 .14035 
 
BrdR_5 
Private 78 4.4359 .61559 .06970 
Public 19 4.6316 .59726 .13702 
 
 
Table 7.10: Independent samples test for the difference between private and 
public board responsibilities 
 Board 
responsibilities  
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
BrdR_1 1.26 .27 -3.14 95 .002 -.462 .147 
BrdR_2 .21 .65 -1.85 95 .068 -.257 .139 
BrdR_3 .05 .83 -1.86 95 .066 -.323 .173 
BrdR_4 .34 .56 -.90 95 .371 -.155 .172 
BrdR_5 .88 .35 -1.25 95 .215 -.196 .156 
 Equal variances assumed 
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Boards’ Power, Access to Information, and Remunerations 
Boards of directors are vested with the power to hire CEO and remove a 
poorly performing CEO. The Ethiopian Commercial Code of 1960 proclaims that 
board of directors may be removed at any time but by a general meeting. 
Proclamation No. 592/2008 article number 14 specifies that both removal and 
appointment of directors by the general meeting need the approval of the National 
Bank of Ethiopia.  Boards also need to have access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information so that they can make informed decisions and fulfill their responsibilities 
accordingly (OECD, 2004). Regarding remunerations, Article 353 of the 1960 
Commercial Code of Ethiopia stipulates that directors may receive a fixed annual 
remuneration that is determined by shareholders general meeting. However, the 
amount of the share in the net profits may not exceed 10%. Proclamation No. 
592/2008 article number 14(e) empowers the National Bank of Ethiopia to fix the 
remuneration of Directors. Thus Directive No. SBB/49/2011 of the Bank has decreed 
that a board of director‟s annual compensation shall not exceed 50, 000 birr. It has 
also decreed that no employee of the bank may sit on the board of any bank 
effective January 15, 2011. Regarding the above issues board members in the study 
were requested to reflect their views. A summary of the responses is presented in 
Appendix 7.2 and discussed below. 
One of the principles of OECD (2004) relates to a formal and transparent 
board nomination and election process which requires an active role of shareholders 
in the nomination and election processes.  In this regard the board is expected to 
play a key role in ensuring that the nominations and election process are done in a 
transparent manner and in accordance with proper criteria under Directive No. 
SBB/54/2012 of the National Bank of Ethiopia. Since ownership is highly dispersed, 
boards and controlling owners may have influence on the selection and removal of 
boards and a poorly performing CEO/ President.  
In this regard, respondents were given the chance to identify the parties that 
have the strongest influence in the process. The majority of the respondents (54% 
each) stated that the boards of directors and the controlling owners with some input 
from the board have the strongest influence in the selection and removal of non-
executive boards while 21% of the respondents believe that the NBE has equally 
strong influence. They were also asked to identify the documents that they strictly 
observe or adhere to in the appointment of boards and almost all (103, 97%) replied 
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that they consult the directives issued by the National Bank of Ethiopia (for more 
details see Appendix 7.3). 
 In reference to power in the removal of a poorly performing bank president 
and selection of a new one, 91% and 26% of the respondents, respectively, believe 
that the boards of directors and controlling owners with some inputs from the board 
are the most decisive. Given the powers of the boards and their key role in 
identifying potential value adding board members and presidents with the 
appropriate knowledge, ability and experience, the responses of the study subjects 
are not at all surprising. 
Attempt was also made to obtain views from the respondents in regard to 
whether boards have access to information from diverse sources to help them make 
informed and value adding decisions. As shown in Appendix 7.2, 37% and 46% % 
respectively of the respondents agree that they often and sometimes obtain 
information through meetings with manager of the company. Only 15% of 
respondents stated that access to business records and books of accounts is 
somehow limited and while the majority (77%) said there are no restrictions at all to 
these documents. 
As stated above, remuneration of the board of directors is fixed to a maximum 
of 50,000 Birr per individual member per year, regardless of the level of profitability 
of the bank, by Directive No. SBB/49/2011. Remuneration of boards and executives 
must be aligned with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. 
Shareholders do not have the right to determine the remuneration of the boards due 
the above stated directives though the Commercial Code of Ethiopia Art. 353 (1) 
(1960:76) plainly puts it as “Directors may receive a fixed annual remuneration, the 
amount of which shall be determined by a general meeting and charged against 
general expenses.” On this issue, board members were asked whether the current 
fixed rate is sufficient to attract, retain and motivate board members; and quite a 
large number 94 (89%) replied in the negative. The same group was also asked 
about current remuneration for the senior management and the majority 69 (65%) 
replied that the remuneration is enough. Slightly more than half- 55 (52%) believe 
that the remuneration is not linked to their performances. 
General Corporate Governance Practices 
The following section examines the current corporate governance practices 
prevailing in the banks in light of board members, board meetings, attendance rate, 
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board size, board committees, and characteristics of Ethiopian boards and 
governance approach fit to the Ethiopian situation (see Appendix 7.3 for summary 
table). Evaluation of the current practice of corporate governance is essential in 
order to know its status and take appropriate action. In this respect, it is important to 
know how the governing bodies of the banks perceive the current status of corporate 
governance practices prevailing in their banks. Thus, the private and public banks 
top leadership respondents were asked to rate the status of their banks corporate 
governance compared with other banks in Ethiopia. The majority, 38 (36%) and 30 
(28%) rated their governance as „much better „and „slightly better‟ than that of other 
banks, respectively. The majority of the respondents, that is, 50 (54%) and 35 (33%) 
also said compared to the previous years their corporate governance practice was 
„very good‟ and „good‟, respectively. Evaluation of board members, in light of 
individual and group experience, effectiveness and approach to run the bank, was 
also carried out and the vast majority 87 (83%) rated it as at least good. 
Board meetings are important for board functioning since they serve as key 
platforms for the directors as well as senior management groups to exchange 
relevant information on companywide issues such as performance, strategies, plans, 
and policies.  Though it is difficult to determine an optimal frequency of board 
meetings as this depends on the specific situation of companies, it is nonetheless 
essential for boards to meet at a specific time interval to accomplish their board 
function.  Frequent meetings may allow for boards to do their jobs on time and may 
also result in better follow up and communication between management and boards. 
However, this might also distract the board from concentrating on strategic issues 
and the management from its day to day operations. Therefore, it is important to take 
in to account the advantages, disadvantages and a bank‟s situation in determining 
the frequency of board meetings.   
Boards of directors constitute a strategic decision organ that directs and 
controls corporate forms of organizations. In the Ethiopian situation, members of the 
board are non-executives who work on part-time basis. Directive No. SBB/49/2011 of 
the National Bank of Ethiopia strictly prohibits an executive or any employee of a 
bank from sitting on the board effective 15th January 2011. But a senior management 
group can participate in board meetings in regard to specific agenda items relating to 
the concerned bank but with no voting rights. In the Ethiopian situation there is no 
CEO duality because of Proclamation No. 592/2008 Art. 15 (4) that prohibits an 
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employee of a bank from serving, at same the time, as a chairperson of the board of 
directors or a board of directors of other bank. 
To ensure sound decisions by the board, members should attend board 
meetings and contribute through their expertise and judgments. While all board 
members are expected to attend board meeting regularly, it is understandable that 
some may be unable to attend some meetings due to unforeseen circumstances.  In 
the Ethiopian situation, no decision may be taken unless the majority of the board of 
directors is present i.e., a decision is made by an absolute majority (Commercial 
Code of Ethiopia Art. 358, 1960). No attendance, one way or another, could be 
deterrent to timely decision. Hence to enhance good governance, members should 
commit themselves to meet a minimum acceptable rate of attendance as set by the 
entire board. 
In reference to the above issues, the survey results show that 43 (41%) of 
respondent boards of the banks confirmed that they met every two weeks specially 
when the bank was in its early stage of establishment and 42 (40%) replied that they 
meet every month. In general, the board of directors meets at least twelve times a 
year. The board members‟ average attendance rate per year according to 66 (62%) 
and 34 (32%) of the respondents were 90-100% and 75-89%, respectively. Only 6 
(6%) respondents replied that their attendance rate was 60-74%. A recent study by 
Pamburai et al. (2015) on the relationship between the frequency of board meetings 
and firm performance in accounting terms shows negative and significant 
relationships. That is, boards that hold meetings less frequently are likely to perform 
better than those who hold meetings more frequently.  
The size of the board may also have some impact on the practice of corporate 
governance as large boards can be dysfunctional (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, 1998). 
The Commercial Code of Ethiopia Art. 347(2) (1960) fixes the minimum and 
maximum number of board members to be three and twelve, respectively. 
Respondents were asked whether the current size of the board of which they are a 
member is too large, too small or ideal and the significant majority of respondents 85 
(80%), replied that it is ideal. Only 14 (13%) and 7 (7%) consider it to be too large 
and too small, respectively. Those that felt it is too large 14 (13%) and too small 7 
(7%) were requested to propose the ideal size and 15 (14%) and 5 (5%) respectively 
proposed 9 and 7. From the annual reports of the banks, the smallest size is 7 board 
members and the largest size 12 with an average board size of 10. All the board 
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sizes comply with the requirement set by the Commercial Code of Ethiopia (Ethiopia, 
1960). 
The OECD (2004) emphasizes the importance of board committees as they 
are the means to strengthen the board and thereby improve its work. The presence 
of a board committee enables among other things, (1) to handle in a more efficient 
way various issues that require expert opinion and propose recommendations to the 
board; (2) enhance objectivity and independence of the board in key decision areas 
as remuneration, nomination, and control activities. However, when various board 
committees are established the OECD recommends that their mandate, composition 
and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. Among 
the board committees recommended by OECD are the audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees. Accordingly, respondents were asked about the existence 
of these committees in the banks that they direct and control and 96 (91%) and 86 
(81%), respectively mentioned nomination and remuneration committees do not exist 
in vast majority of the banks. But all the 106 respondents (100%) reported that they 
work with audit committee. (See Appendix 7.3).  
Roles that Characterize the Ethiopian Board of Directors  
Boards of directors, who are at the apex of the corporate form of organization, 
direct and control corporate affairs. As governing bodies, they are expected to 
execute the strategic, service and control tasks. Accordingly, boards may be 
characterized by the roles that they play more. In their strategic role, boards initiate 
and involve in different phases of strategic decision making. In playing their service 
role, boards mentor and support top management whereas monitoring financial 
performance, top management behavior, and the strategic decision making process 
are control roles of boards. In light of the above issues, respondents were requested 
to characterize the Ethiopian board of directors in terms of the roles they play. 85 
(80%), 67 (63%) and 41 (39%) of the respondents characterize the Ethiopian board 
of directors respectively as control, strategic and service oriented. This shows that 
the vast majority of the respondents believe that the Ethiopian board of directors are 
mainly control oriented followed by strategic and to a lesser extent service oriented 
(see Appendix 7.3). 
Approaches to Promote Good Corporate Governance Practices in Ethiopia 
The three generally accepted approaches to promote good corporate 
governance practice are the prescriptive, non-prescriptive, and mixed approaches 
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(Conyon, 2006). According to Conyon‟s (2006) study of corporate governance, the 
Singapore Corporate Governance Committee considered three of the above 
alternative approaches to promote good corporate governance and maximize 
shareholders‟ value. In greater detail, these approaches are: (1) a prescriptive 
approach which would require firms to adopt and adhere to specific corporate 
governance practices by regulation; (2) a non-prescriptive approach that allows firms 
to determine their own corporate governance practices; and (3) a mixed (balanced) 
approach that specifies basic corporate governance framework by regulation that 
allows firms to develop more detailed practices of their own but subject to 
appropriate disclosure. The balanced approach adopted in the UK and Canadian 
markets and tested in Singapore (Conyon, 2006) is found out to be the best 
approach for improving corporate governance. This approach is a mix of the other 
two approaches reflecting the characteristics of both. The mixed approach allows 
organizational flexibility in implementing good corporate governance within the 
general framework of corporate governance practices. . 
Currently there is no report about the approach that Ethiopia follows as the 
phenomenon is recent, and as there is no stock market, nor a code of best practices, 
nor an institution that is responsible for corporate governance practices. To address 
the absence of researched opinion on the subject, respondents were asked to select 
what they consider to be the best approach to promote good corporate governance 
in the Ethiopian banks. A summary of their views is presented in Appendix 7.3. 
The majority of the respondents (86, 81%) believe that the approach that 
would work better to promote good governance practices in the Ethiopian banks is 
the mixed approach. Fewer respondents i.e., 15 (14%) and (5, 5%) preferred the 
prescriptive and the non-prescriptive approaches, respectively. The preference of the 
respondents is believed to be based on the existing reality and future trends. There 
cannot be one approach that can apply universally to all situations. The best 
approach should take into account the social, economic, political and legal 
environments of a country as well as the particular organizational environment. 
 
7.3 Survey of Stakeholders’ (Sample-2) Perception of Corporate Governance 
practices 
Stakeholders are those parties who have different interests in a firm. These 
include: shareholders, creditors, suppliers, employees, regulatory agencies, 
161 
legislators, investors and labor unions (Davies, 1999). In Chapter Seven section 7.2 
which surveyed the perception of corporate governance practices of sample-1 
respondents, who are governing bodies of the banks, revealed that corporate 
governance practices in terms of the OECD principles appear to be generally good.  
However, apart from the practices in light of OECD principles, the analysis also 
shows the presence of ownership concentrations, controlling shareholders and lack 
of corporate governance codes.  This simply suggests that different stakeholder 
groups might have lack of confidence in the current corporate governance practices 
in the Ethiopian banks. This section, therefore, examines how the different 
stakeholders perceive the current corporate governance practices in light of the five 
pillars of the OECD framework and other issues. To the best of the researcher‟s 
knowledge little is known about local corporate governance practices and this is 
study might be the first attempt to empirically investigate the perception of the 
various stakeholders of the Ethiopian banks regarding issues related to the current 
corporate governance practices. The study examines the perceptions of both internal 
(shareholders and employees) and external (parliamentarians, supervisory and 
regulatory agencies) stakeholders who are expected to play an active role in 
enhancing corporate governance practices in the emerging Ethiopian economy 
context.  The results of this analysis are also compared and aggregated with the 
perceptions of the governing bodies (sample-1). Two separate analyses have been 
made with the intent of giving emphasis to the perceptions of the governing bodies 
and the stakeholders and empirically compare differences and address research 
questions five and six.    
First, characteristics of respondents are presented and examined; second, 
stakeholders‟ perceptions of current practices are presented and investigated in 
reference to the OECD framework , remunerations, characteristics of boards, 
approach to promote corporate governance, corporate performance, strategic 
issues, board independence, board duty and governance issues. Finally, comments, 
issues raised and recommendations made by stakeholders to improve corporate 
governance practices are examined and analyzed so as to identify any substantial 
concerns. As stated in Chapter Four section 4.5.2, 401 questionnaires were 
distributed to the stakeholders (sample-2) in person. Of these 311 questionnaires 
were properly filled and returned resulting in a significant 78% completion rate (see 
Table 4.3). Of the 311 questionnaires returned, 193 (62%) and 118 (38%) were from 
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the private and public sector domains respectively. The relatively small number of 
respondents in the public domain is due to the limited number of public banks, which 
are only three. The breakdown of sample-2 respondents is presented in Table 7.11 
below. 
 
Table 7.11: Ownership type and proportion of questionnaires returned by 
category of stakeholder respondents 
Ownership & 
Stakeholder type   
Category Count % Valid 
% 
Cumulative 
% 
 
Ownership type 
Private 193 62.1 62.1 62.1 
Public 118 37.9 37.9 100 
 Total 311 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
Stakeholder type   
-Shareholders 79 25.4 25.4 25.4 
-Member of       
Parliament 
51 16.4 16.4 41.8 
-Private bank 
employee 
114 36.7 36.7 78.5 
-Public bank 
employee 
59 19.0 19.0 97.5 
-Supervisory 
& regulatory 
agencies 
8 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 311 100.0 100.0  
 
The questionnaires were administered to five categories of stakeholders of 
the private and public bank domains. Shareholders and private bank employees are 
considered as stakeholders of the private banks while parliamentarians and public 
banks as stakeholders of public banks. The supervisory and regulatory agency 
serves as a stakeholder for both. Questions on shareholders right and equitable 
treatment of shareholders are not addressed to the public domain stakeholders as 
these questions are not relevant to them. The rest of the questions are common to 
all categories of respondents. Table 7.12 below presents biographical data 
encompassing gender, age, work experience, and level of education of stakeholder 
respondents. 
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Table 7.12: Profile of stakeholder respondents 
Demographic Variables Category Count % Valid 
% 
Cumulative 
% 
 
 
Gender 
Female 48 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Male 259 83.36 84.4 98.7 
Total 307  100.0  
Missing  4 1.3  100.0 
Total 311    
 
 
Age  
18-29 24 7.7 7.7 7.7 
30-39 105 33.8 41.5 41.5 
40-49 120 38.6 38.6 80.1 
50-59 45 14.5 14.5 94.5 
>60 17 5.5 5.5 100.0 
Total 311 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
Year as shareholder* 
     
1-2 7 2.3 8.9 8.9 
3-5 26 32.9 32.9 41.8 
4-6 25 31.6 31.6 73.4 
11-20 6 7.6 7.6 81.0 
Since 
establishment 
15 19.0 19.0 100.0 
Total* 79  100.0  
 
 
 
Work experience ** 
1-5 18 10.1 10.5 10.5 
6-10 32 18.0 18.6 29.1 
11-15 45 25.3 55.2 55.2 
16-20 32 18.0 73.8 73.8 
>20 45 25.3 26.2 100.0 
Total 172  100.0  
Missing 6 3.3   
Total** 178 100.0   
 
 
 
 
Level of education 
Certificate 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Diploma 13 4.2 4.2 4.6 
Bachelor's  
Degree 
147 47.3 48.0 52.6 
Master's 
Degree 
134 43.1 43.8 96.4 
Doctoral 
Degree 
11 3.5 3.6 100.0 
Total 306 99.1 100.0  
Missing 5 1.6   
Total 311 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
Position in the bank** 
Managerial 127 71.3 70.2 70.2 
Professional 35 19.7 12.8 83.0 
Administrative 1 0.6 4.3 87.3 
Other/ Vice 
CEO 
2 1.1 2.0 89.3 
Total 165 92.7 100.0  
Missing 13 7.3   
Total** 178 100.0   
* Applies only to shareholders; ** Applies only to bank employees 
 
Referring to the above table, the sample selected is not balanced in terms of 
gender with a disproportionately big percentage i.e. 84% male respondents. The 
sample is male dominated indicating that the perception results are not free from 
gender bias. In regard to age, 92% reported to be more than 29 years of age 
implying that the respondents are matured and are expected to feel responsible in 
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answering the questions. Of all the stakeholders, 78 (25%) of the respondents were 
shareholders and more than 90% of them were shareholders for more than three 
years indicating that they have a retrospective grasp of corporate governance issues 
in their respective banks. The work experience variable refers only to the private and 
public bank employees and from Table 7.12, it is noted that more than 89% of the 
employees have work experience of more than five years; 72% of them hold 
managerial positions and 13 % are professional workers. These figures indicate that 
the respondents have sufficient exposure and understanding to assess their 
corporate governance environment and express their perceptions accordingly. 
Of the 311 stakeholders who returned the questionnaires, the majority of them 
(72%) are involved, directly or indirectly, in decision making, policy development and 
implementation, and formulating and monitoring corporate governance practices. 
Thus, the educational attainment of the majority of the stakeholders is expected to 
be high i.e., at least a basic degree. 
As shown in Table 7.12 above, 95 % of the respondents possess at least a 
bachelor‟s degree and more than 47% have a minimum qualification of a master‟s 
degree, indicating that almost all respondents have the capacity to understand and 
make an independent judgment of corporate governance practices addressed in this 
study. Given this high educational level of the respondents, the study is expected to 
have a high quality data and credibility. In a nutshell, given the overall results of the 
demographic factors, the responses obtained from the different categories of 
respondents are expected to be representative of corporate governance issues that 
enable to answer specifically the stakeholders‟ perception of the practices of 
corporate governance (research question five). 
 Ownership and Control Structure of Private Banks 
As explained in Chapter Seven section 7.2, ownership and control structure 
are among the variables that affect corporate governance behavior. The agency 
problem or corporate misbehaving is more manifested in a dispersed ownership 
structure. On the other hand, when ownership is highly concentrated, there is a 
danger of asset expropriation by controlling shareholders. It is also logically clear 
that shareholding creates an interest in the firm‟s performance and corporate 
governance practices. In this regard, shareholders who are owners of the banks 
were asked to describe the ownership and control structure of the banks which they 
own. The frequency distribution shows that 66 (89%) of the respondents believe that 
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the largest shareholders (each with up to 5% of holdings) effectively control the bank 
with substantial voting rights, whereas 8 (11%) of them believe that ownership is 
fairly diffused with no controlling shareholders (see Appendix 7.1b).  Taking together 
samples one and two, it is interesting to note that 113 (72%) believe that the largest 
shareholders (each with up to 5% of holdings) effectively control the banks indicating 
the presence of controlling shareholders and ownership concentration, allowing 
controlling shareholders to have significant freedom and subsequently to influence 
decisions to their advantages (see Appendix 7.1c). 
The Rights and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 The principles of the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders address 
several issues as shown in Table 7.13 (for more details consult Chapter Seven 
section 7.2). Shareholders as stakeholders were asked to indicate the presence or 
absence of the below listed rights and freedom in practice. Table 7.13 gives a 
summary result of shareholders‟ perception of rights and equitable treatment.  
 Table 7.13: The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders 
Characteristics  Yes No 
# % # % 
Deviation  from one-share one-vote rule  8 10 71 90 
Voting by mail allowed 1 1 78 99 
Voting by proxy allowed 50 64 28 36 
Adequate time given for questions at shareholders meetings 53 71 22 29 
Shareholders' priority subscription rights protected 71 92 6 8 
Equitable treatment of shareholders practiced 41 55 34* 45 
Candidates disclosed before shareholders‟ meetings 9 12 67 88 
Large shareholders nominate candidates at the shareholders‟ 
meetings 
61 79 16 21 
*Not  fully 
 
Table 7.14: Shareholders rights and obligations 
Characteristics  Yes Majority 
know 
Only few know 
# %  % # % 
Shareholders know their rights and obligations  41 52 33 42 5 6 
 
Those who know their rights freely exercise them 
in AGM in matters such as voting and  profit 
sharing 
Yes No Sometimes 
# %  % # % 
33 60 3 5 21 37 
 
From the shareholders responses in the above tables, it is noted that, most of 
the features of rights and equitable treatment of shareholders are present and 
exercised. That is, there is no deviation from one-share one-vote system as reported 
by almost all respondents (71,90%); voting by proxy is allowed as revealed by 50 
(64%) of the respondents; shareholders' priority subscription rights are protected as 
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71 (92%) of the respondents disclosed; the practice of equitable treatment of 
shareholder exists as 41 (55%) of the respondents indicated; candidates are not 
disclosed before shareholders meetings according to 67 (88%) of the respondents; 
large shareholders nominate candidates as 61 (79%) of the respondents mentioned 
and all the shareholders and majority of them know their rights and obligations, 
according to 41 (52%) and 33 (42%) of shareholder respondents respectively. In 
terms of the degree of exercise of their rights, 60% of the respondents believe that 
those who know their rights do freely exercise them in AGM and other situations. 
The results obtained from the shareholders are consistent with sample one 
(governing bodies) findings as presented in section 7.2 Table 7.1, Table 7.2, and 
Appendix 7.4.   
Disclosure and Transparency 
Table 7.15: Disclosure and transparency of private and public banks 
Characteristics  Yes No 
# % # % 
Governance structures 256 85 47 15 
Explicit corporate governance rules 190 63 110 37 
Vision, missions, and values 293 95 14 5 
financial performances       284 93 21 7 
Audited annual reports 279 92 25 8 
Resume or background of directors 169 55 136 45 
Members of board sub committees 190 63 112 37 
 
With regard to disclosure and transparency of material facts, the survey 
shows that 85%, 95%, 93% and 92 % of the stakeholders respectively stated that 
their banks disclosed governance structure, vision, financial performances, and 
audited annual reports, respectively. Regarding the other disclosure and 
transparency variable, more than 55% of the respondents revealed that relevant 
issues are made transparent and disclosed accordingly. The results obtained from 
the stakeholders are very much consistent with the data obtained from the governing 
bodies (sample one). Taking together the views of samples one and two, the 
disclosure and transparency items were rated most highly implying that the practices 
are certainly present and in line with the OECD framework of corporate governance 
(see aggregate values in Appendix 7.5). Transparency is considered as one criterion 
of good corporate governance (Said et al., 2015; OECD, 2004). The study of 
Adegbite (2015) on good corporate governance in Nigeria shows that timely, 
comprehensive and transparent disclosure on important issues improves the quality 
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of corporate governance. Gupta and Sharma (2014) also suggest that transparency 
and openness as the outcome of corporate governance enable a firm to maximize its 
long term value. Relevantly Friedman and Friedman (2010) consider transparency, 
responsibility, accountability and ethics as important elements for a free market 
economy to function efficiently. 
Respondents were also asked to indicate the means of disclosing information 
and they reported that their banks employee a combination of annual reports 
(288,93%), reports to regulatory agencies (220,71%), meetings (210,68%), bank‟s 
web pages (205,66%), and brochures (138,44%) respectively in disseminating 
information. This result is consistent with the responses from sample one (governing 
bodies) respondents that the banks mainly use annual reports and reports to 
regulatory agencies as a major out let in disseminating information followed by 
meetings, bank‟s web pages, and brochures. 
Role of Stakeholders 
As has been stated in Chapter Seven section 7.2, sound corporate 
governance is the result of the combined efforts of various interest groups and 
stakeholders. Corporate governance has also received due attention over the last 
decades as being important in building confidence in various groups of stakeholders 
(Dalwai et al., 2015). For the purpose of understanding the perceptions of various 
stakeholders, respondents were requested to rank the relative importance of various 
stakeholders listed below in improving corporate governance in Ethiopia, in general, 
and the banking sector in particular. Table 7.16 summarizes the results of the 
analysis. 
Table 7.16: Summary of importance of stakeholder in improving corporate 
governance 
Stakeholders Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # 
Media 54 18 30 10 50 17 53 18 63 21 49 16 12 
Chamber of commerce 10 3 41 13 68 22 72 23 64 21 41 13 15 
Professional society 33 11 67 22 66 21 72 23 35 11 20 6 18 
Financial supervisory agencies 157 51 78 25 39 13 18 6 8 3 4 1 7 
The judiciary  28 10 39 13 52 18 47 16 69 24 58 20 18 
Non executive board of 
directors 
56 20 58 20 35 12 20 7 34 12 84 29 24 
Others, Bankers association 15 5 3 1       1   
 
From table 7.16, 235 (76%) of the respondents indicated that the financial 
supervisory agencies are the most important stakeholders (rated as level 1 & 2) 
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believed to improve corporate governance practices. The rest of the stakeholders 
i.e., chamber of commerce, professional society, the judiciary, and non-executive 
board of directors are rated as levels 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively. These results are 
consistent with the results of sample one (governing bodies) as 64% of the 
respondents believe that the financial supervisory agencies play a significant role in 
promoting good corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian banking industry. 
The aggregate of sample one and two analyses (see Appendix 7.6a) also shows the 
same result that financial supervisory agencies play a crucial role in improving 
corporate governance practices as perceived by 324 (80%) of the respondents 
followed by non-executive board of directors (107, 28%), professional society (100, 
26%) and  chamber of commerce (92, 24%). The studies made by Mullineux (2006), 
Arun and Turner (2004) show that good corporate governance of banks requires a 
good prudential regulation and a regulatory organ. Consistent with the above, Mande 
et al.‟s (2013) study which used structural equation modeling to relate enforcement 
and board performance in the Nigerian regulatory enforcement agencies, revealed 
that strengthening the regulatory framework and capacity of the regulatory agency 
reduces conflict of interest and contributes to effective corporate governance. 
To check for differences in opinion between the different groups of the 
respondents, a Kruskal-Wallis test at the 1% level was run. The test revealed no 
significant difference in the opinions in regard to the relative importance of the 
media, chamber of commerce, professional societies and the judiciary in improving 
corporate governance. However, statistically significant differences in opinions are 
observed, among the groups, in respect of two of the variables namely the financial 
supervisory agencies and the non executive board of directors (details are given in 
Appendices 7.6b, 7.6c, 7.6d & 7.6e). The Kruskal-Wallis Post Hoc Pairwise 
Comparison test shows that member of parliaments‟ opinion about the financial 
supervisory agency, as relatively most important stakeholder (level 1) in improving 
corporate governance, significantly differs from the opinions of private bank 
employees, public bank workers and the governing bodies at the 1% level. The 
majority of members of parliament did not rank the financial and supervisory 
agencies as relatively most important (level 1) stakeholders. With regard to the non-
executive board of directors in advancing corporate governance, a statistically 
significant difference is observed between the opinions of the shareholders and the 
opinions of the private and public bank employees. The majority of the shareholders 
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consider the non-executive board of directors as the least important stakeholders in 
improving corporate governance. 
The role of stakeholders in controlling the disproportionate power of largest 
shareholders cannot be discounted. In this regard, the group of respondents was 
asked to rank the relative importance of the different stakeholders in controlling the 
undue behavior of controlling owners in the Ethiopian banking context. A summary of 
the views is presented in Table 7.17 below.   
Table 7.17: Summary of relative importance of stakeholders in preventing the 
influence of controlling owners  
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # 
Minority shareholders  27 9 24 8 48 16 54 18 80 27 63 21 15 
Institutional investors 19 7 37 13 64 22 82 28 65 22 27 9 17 
Outside (non-executive) 
board of directors 
30 10 58 20 70 24 59 20 46 16 34 11 14 
Financial supervisory 
agencies 
154 51 80 26 30 10 23 8 8 3 8 3 8 
Labor unions or employees 13 5 27 9 42 15 41 14 39 14 125 44 24 
The legal system 81 27 88 29 56 19 21 7 38 13 17 6 10 
              
 
The table shows that 154 (51%) of the respondents are of the opinion that 
financial supervisory agencies have a major role in containing the influence of 
controlling owners. This view is in line with the opinions of sample one respondents 
that the financial supervisory agencies have bigger powers in controlling the 
improper behaviors of controlling owners as explained in section 7.2 of this chapter. 
The other controlling mechanisms such as the legal system, non-executive board of 
directors and institutional investors are also considered as important stakeholders in 
playing a key role in playing down the influence of controlling owners with scores of  
88% ( level 2), 24% (level 3) and 28% (level 4), respectively. Minority shareholders‟ 
and the labor unions‟ roles are indicated as least important by the respondents. The 
results are wholly consistent with the views of sample one respondents. Therefore, 
the combined results of sample one and two in this pattern as given in Appendix 7.7a 
are not at all surprising. 
 From Appendix 7.7a, It is observed that 205 (52%), 111(28%), 95 (24%) and 
110 (28%) of the respondent group ranked the financial supervisory agencies, the 
legal system, non-executive board of directors and institutional investors as levels 1, 
2, 3 and 4, respectively, in terms of their  importance in preventing the behaviors of 
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controlling owners. To find out whether there are significant differences in opinions of 
the different groups of respondents, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. The result 
shows no significant differences at the 1% level except for the minority shareholders, 
financial supervisory agency and labor unions variables as shown in Appendices 
7.7b and 7.7c. The Post Hoc test demonstrated that shareholders have statistically 
significant differences of opinion from members of parliament, public employees, and 
the supervisory and regulatory agencies on the role of the minority shareholders in 
controlling the influence of the largest shareholders. The majority of shareholders 
ranked this item as more important than the stakeholders‟ groups specified above. 
On the same issue, the governing bodies‟ opinion also differs from that of the public 
bank employees, that is, the governing bodies ranked them as more important than 
the public bank employees. With regard to the regulatory agency as the most 
important tool in controlling the undue powers of the largest shareholders, the Post 
Hoc test shows a statistically significant difference in the opinions of the members of 
parliament from the private bank employees and the governing bodies. Members‟ of 
parliament rating of the financial supervisory and regulatory agencies as relatively 
most important stakeholders in preventing the undue influence of the controlling 
owners is lower than the two stakeholders‟. There is also a statistically significant 
difference between the members of parliament on the one hand and shareholders 
and the governing bodies on the other in ranking the labour union as an important 
stakeholder.  
 The group of stakeholders was also asked to rate the relative effectiveness of 
tasks or strategies for improved corporate governance. The respondents identified 
internal corporate governance mechanisms 117 (39%); introducing codes 97 (33%); 
enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and disclosure 69 (23%); external 
corporate governance mechanisms 59 (20%) respectively as effective strategies that 
can bring about better practices (Table 7.18). Put according to their relative 
importance, it is not surprising to note that the aggregates of sample one and two 
have the same view that 162 (41%), 126 (32%), 86 (22%) and 74 (19%) of the 
respondents do believe that internal corporate governance mechanisms, introducing 
codes, enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and disclosure, and external 
corporate governance mechanisms respectively as effective tools to ensure better 
corporate governance practices (see Appendix 7.8a for details). The responses were 
checked for significant differences in opinion between the groups of respondents 
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using the Kruskal-Wallis test at the 1% level and the results show that no significant 
difference exists in relation to five of the seven task variables identified as effective 
strategies for better corporate governance. The two areas of significant differences in 
responses relate to the variables of enhancing the standards of accounting, audit 
and disclosure; and reducing ownership concentration as effective strategies (see 
Appendix 7.8b). These differences in opinion are between the members of 
parliament and three categories of stakeholders, the private bank employees, the 
governing bodies and the shareholders. The members‟ of parliament ranking of the 
former variable is higher than the latter variable compared with the ranking of the 
three stakeholders. 
Table 7.18: Summary of relative effectiveness of tasks for better corporate 
governance 
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # %  % # 
Internal CG 
mechanism for better 
CG 
117 39 65 22 42 14 32 11 23 8 6 2 13 4 13 
external CG 
mechanism for better 
CG  
39 13 59 20 59 20 59 20 40 14 30 10 10 3 15 
Enhancing the 
standards of 
accounting, audit and 
disclosure 
36 12 69 23 54 18 49 17 40 14 22 8 25 9 16 
Introducing code of 
corporate governance 
97 33 58 20 53 18 40 14 29 10 13 4 6 2 14 
Conducting and 
publicizing corporate 
governance ratings of 
banks 
21 7 39 13 39 13 57 19 66 22 33 11 39 13 17 
Tightly controlling 
some types of related-
party transactions 
13 5 26 9 23 8 26 9 44 15 99 34 58 20 22 
Reducing ownership 
concentration 
28 10 13 5 27 9 22 87 31 11 61 21 104 36 25 
 
 Appraisal of the boards in terms of individual and group experience, 
effectiveness and approach is important in order to know their current status so that 
appropriate action can be take in due time. In this regard, the group of stakeholders 
was asked how they perceive their boards individual and group experience, 
effectiveness and approach in running their respective banks. From Table 7.19, the 
respondents overall evaluation in general is positive with167 (59%) rating of at least 
good and 92 (31%) satisfactory. Comparing this with evaluation of sample one 
(governing bodies) with the vast majority 87 (83%) rating it as at least good, it is 
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observed that stakeholders evaluation is slightly lower implying that the issue 
deserves attention to uplift the confidence of the stakeholders. Combining sample 
one and sample two, the majority of the respondents (264, 66%) are of the opinion 
that boards are good enough in terms of experience, effectiveness and approach to 
run the banks (see Appendix 7.9). A Kruskal-Wallis test for the combined samples 
shows no significant difference in opinion among the different groups of respondents 
at the 1 % level (see Appendix 7.9c).  
Table 7. 19: Perception of stakeholders regarding board characteristics and 
approaches to corporate governance  
Characteristics  Very 
good 
Good Satisfactory Poor Very 
poor 
Mis. 
Evaluation of board in light of individual and 
group experience, effectiveness, approach to 
run the bank 
62(20%) 115(39%) 92(31%) 22(7%) 8 (3%) 12 
 
Board roles that  mainly 
characterize the Ethiopian board of 
directors* 
Control role Service role Strategic role  
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
248(81%) 60(19%) 83(27%) 224(73%) 139(45%) 169 (55%) 
Approach that would work better to 
promote good corporate 
governance practices in the 
Ethiopian banks 
Prescriptive Non-prescriptive Mixed 
# % # % # % 
51 17 21 7 230 76 
* More than one item chosen 
 
The role that boards are expected to play and approaches to corporate 
governance were outlined in section 7.2 of this chapter. In light of the normative 
desiderata, the groups of stakeholders were requested to reflect their views on the 
characteristics of the Ethiopian boards and approaches that would work better to 
promote corporate governance in the Ethiopian banking industry. Table 7.19 
indicates that 248 (81%), 83 (27%) and 139 (45%) of the respondents characterize 
the Ethiopian boards of directors respectively as control, strategic and service 
oriented. The vast majority of the respondents categorize the Ethiopian boards of 
directors as mainly control oriented and to a less degree strategic and to a much 
smaller extent service oriented. These perceptions are consistent with the views of 
sample one (governing bodies). Taking the overall views of both samples, it can be 
noted that 333 (80%), 124 (30%) and 206 (50%) of the respondents respectively of 
the categories characterize the boards in the same way as above (see Appendix 
7.9a).  
The group of stakeholders was also requested to name the preferred 
governance approach to help promote good practices, and a significantly large 
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number (230, 76%), suggested that the mixed approach is the ideal strategy to good 
corporate governance. While a few respondents 51(17%) and 21(7%) proposed the 
prescriptive and non-prescriptive approaches respectively as the preferred 
approaches. These views are consistent with those of sample one. The same is also 
true when sample one and two are analyzed together. Their aggregate data show 
the majority 316(78%) of the respondents considered the mixed (balanced) approach 
as the best tool in promoting good corporate governance followed by 66(16%) and 
26(6%) of the respondents who suggested prescriptive and non-prescriptive 
approaches, respectively ( see Appendix 7.9a). 
Regarding the remuneration of boards, the various groups of respondents 
were asked to comment on the payments made to members of boards of directors 
and senior management of the banks. The majority of the respondents 177(60%) 
believe that the current fixed rate is not  sufficient enough to draw, keep and 
stimulate board members while roughly the same number of respondents 182(61%) 
believe that the payment made to senior management group is enough. The 
respondents were also asked whether the payment for senior management is linked 
to their performance and the majority of the respondents 162 (55%) believe that it is 
not as shown in Table 7.20 below. These results are consistent with those of the 
findings from sample one. From Appendix 7.9b, it is also noted that 271(68%) from 
sample one and two believe that the remuneration for boards is not enough while 
251(62%) believe senior management groups are sufficiently compensated. From 
the same group of respondents, 217 (54%) are of the opinion that the remuneration 
made to senior management groups is not tied to their performances.  
Table 7. 20: Stakeholders’ perception of remuneration 
 Yes No Missing 
Remuneration sufficient enough to attract, 
retain, and motivate:   
# % # % # % 
Board members 116 40 177 60 17 5 
Qualified senior management 182 61 117 39 12 4 
Remuneration of senior management is 
linked to performance 
134 45 162 55 15 5 
 
Extending the above discussions, this part examines another seven 
components of corporate governance: general corporate governance practices, 
board-management relations, corporate performance, strategic issues, board 
independence, board duty and corporate governance issues. As stated in chapter 
four section 4.5.3, the study used questionnaire with a 5- point likert scale to collect 
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primary date from the group of stakeholders (Sample-2). The average scores of the 
items forming the constructs are taken together with percentages for each item in the 
analysis. For the purpose of analysis strongly disagree and disagree are combined 
and treated as disagree while strongly agree and agree are pooled and treated as 
agree. Two open ended questions were also asked regarding major corporate 
governance issues faced by the Ethiopian banks and recommendations that may 
improve corporate governance practices. Below are details of the findings from the 
analysis.  
To understand the overall importance of corporate governance practices in the 
Ethiopian banking industry, the groups of respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent of their agreement on the items designed to measure the benefits from 
improved practices. The summarized results are presented in Table 7.21 below. The 
general corporate governance practices have resulted in an overall average score of 
3.8 representing 76%. Some of the results imply that boards of directors play a 
crucial role in bringing about good governance by carrying out their pivotal roles of 
directing, governing and controlling the activities of the bank; boards of directors as 
corporate governance mechanism are important instruments to maximize 
shareholders wealth and current corporate governance practices in the banks are 
much better compared with those of the previous years with 81%, 88%, 56% of 
agreement, respectively. The percentage of disagreement is low for all the items 
ranging from as low as 2% to 18%. Thus respondents studied appreciate the 
implications of good corporate governance practice and believe that the current 
corporate governance practices are better than the practices in the previous years. 
Furthermore, the majority believe that improved corporate governance results in 
more benefits to the banks.  
Table 7. 21: Implications of corporate governance  
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean General corporate governance # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
Boards of directors play crucial role in bringing 
about good governance by carrying out their 
pivotal role of directing, governing and 
controlling activities of the bank (CGGpra_1). 
7 (2) 22(7) 30(10) 148(48) 103(33) 311 4.0 
Boards of directors as corporate governance 
mechanism are important instruments to 
maximize shareholders wealth (CGGpra_2). 
6(2) 12(4) 21(7) 158(51) 114(37) 311 4.2 
Better corporate governance increases market 
value of shares (CGGpra_3). 
4(1) 3(1) 17(6) 121(39) 165(53) 310 4.4 
Better corporate governance reduces political 
or regulatory intervention (CGGpra_4). 
11(4) 37(12) 52(17) 128(41) 82(27) 310 3.8 
Boards are true representative of shareholders 
who strive to defend their interests 
8(3) 48(15) 86(28) 125(40) 44(14) 311 3.5 
175 
(CGGpra_5). 
Current corporate governance practices in my 
bank are much better compared with those of 
the previous years (CGGpra_6). 
9(3) 20(6) 107(34) 132(42) 43(14) 311 3.6 
Corporate governance in my bank is much 
better compared with other banks in Ethiopia 
(CGGpra_7). 
11(4) 41(13) 143(46) 82(27) 33(11) 310 3.3 
Compared with other banks, our board 
members are competent, skillful, experienced, 
and educated with high level of integrity to 
discharge their duty (CGGpra_8). 
11(4) 44(14) 119(39) 104(34) 28(9) 306 3.3 
Overall mean 3.8 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
   Both Kruskal-Wallis and One-Way ANOVA tests, at the 1% level, showed no 
significant differences in opinions between the groups of stakeholders except for 
three of the items (CGGpra_2, CGGpra_4 and CGGpra_7) (see Appendix 7.10a).  
The Post Hoc analysis revealed differences of opinions in regard to item CGGpra_2 
between private bank employees and members of parliament; and items CGGpra_4 
and CGGpra_7 between the members of parliament and the two stakeholders, the 
private and public bank employees. The mean rank of members of parliament is 
lower than the identified stakeholders for the variables.  
As has been repeatedly stated corporate governance is a system of structures 
and processes for the purpose of directing and controlling corporate forms of 
organizations (OECD, 2004). One of the systems is to have a board of directors that 
direct and control corporate affairs. Boards work closely with management that 
accomplishes operations of firms. Boards of directors rely on the top management 
for reliable and timely information for strategic and policy initiative, controls and 
handling challenges. Top management also depends on the board of directors for 
wisdom and strategic direction. It is expected that boards and top management work 
as a team and cohesive group to achieve a common goal of maximizing shareholder 
value (Erakovic and Goel, 2004). To this end, the groups of stakeholders were asked 
to express the extent of their agreement in regard to whether or not boards and top 
management in their banks establish and maintain smooth and productive working 
relationships. A summary of the results is presented in Table 7.22 below.  
Table 7. 22: Stakeholders’ perceptions of board- management relationships  
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean Board – management relationship # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
I believe that, in my bank, there is a sound 
relationship between the board and top 
management (BrdMR1.1 ) 
5(2) 25(8) 54(17) 159(51) 67(22) 
310 3.8 
There is a smooth relationship between the board 
and the President of the bank (BrdMR1.2  ) 
2(1) 16(5) 61(20) 158(51) 71(23) 
308 3.9 
Overall mean 3.9 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
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The overall mean score of 3.9 or 78% indicates the vast majority of 
stakeholders perceive that there prevails a sound relationship between the board 
and top management as well as between the board and the presidents of the banks.  
Examining the levels of agreement, it is noted that 73% and 74% respectively 
believe that there is smooth relationships with the top management and specifically 
with the presidents. The levels of disagreements are so low representing 10% and 
6%, respectively. However, using both Kruskal-Wallis and One-Way ANOVA, a 
significant difference in opinion between the stakeholders is observed on the second 
item BrdMR1.2. The test shows that the opinions of members of parliament differ 
from the private and public bank employees at a 1% level (see Appendices 7.10a & 
7.10b). The parliamentarian gave slightly lower evaluation score than the two. 
The OECD (2004) advocates for board independence in order to foster 
objectivity in decision processes on a number of corporate issues. Board 
independence is directly linked with the composition and structure of the board. 
Board independence is ensured if a sufficient number of board members are 
independent of management and if the roles of the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
chairman of the board are separated (OCED, 2004; Cadbury, 1992). According to 
the OECD principles of corporate governance, the separation of the two posts is 
considered as good practice helping to achieve an appropriate balance of power and 
objectivity in decision processes. In the Ethiopian situation it is not possible for an 
employee of a bank to sit on the board of directors in line with Directive No. 
SBB/49/2011 of the National Bank of Ethiopia, which has entered into force as of 
January, 2011. Consequently there is no such structure as executive board of 
directors for the banking sector, be it private or public. Banking Business 
Proclamation No. 592/2008 of the Federal Government of Ethiopia also prohibits an 
employee of a bank from serving as a chairperson of the board of directors of that 
bank or a director of any other bank. According to this proclamation, there is no CEO 
duality phenomenon in the Ethiopian case. Given the above background, the various 
groups of stakeholders were requested to express their views on the independence 
of boards. A summary of the results of the analysis is given in Table 7.23. 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
Table 7. 23: Stakeholders’ perceptions of board independence 
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean Board Independence # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
The board of directors of  the bank   are independent 
from the President of the bank (BrdInd_1) 
8(3) 33(11) 73(23) 131(42) 64(21) 
309 3.7 
The board of directors of the bank  are independent 
from the board chair person (BrdInd_2) 
9(3) 63(20) 125(41) 89(29) 23(7) 
309 3.2 
The board of directors of  the bank  are independent 
from the controlling shareholders (BrdInd_3) 
10(4) 52(21) 104(33) 57(18) 23(7) 
246^ 3.1 
Overall mean 3.3 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
^ N smaller than others as this addresses only private banks 
The overall average score of board independence is 3.3 or 66%, which is well 
above the average of 2.5 or 50%. The examination of individual items demonstrates 
that 63% of the respondents at least agree that boards of directors are independent 
from the presidents of the respective banks.  However, independence of the board of 
directors from the chairperson has received an agreement rate of 36%, which is 
relatively low. A low level of agreement, 25%, is also observed in investigating 
whether the boards of directors are independent from the controlling shareholders. 
These results indicate that the boards are not free from the influence of the 
chairpersons as well as the controlling shareholders making their independence 
questionable. As regards their independence from the presidents (CEOs), their 
independence is maintained as the presidents in the Ethiopian case do not play a 
double role of being a chairperson of the board and president of a bank both at one 
time. Triangulating the information from governing bodies (Sample-1), it is noted that 
the board of directors is not free from the influence of the controlling shareholders as 
the latter has influence on the selection of boards. A significant difference of opinion 
exists on the two variables (BrdInd_1 and BrdInd_2) between the groups of 
respondents as exhibited in Appendix 7.10a. The Post hoc test for example shows a 
difference of opinion between shareholders and public bank employees and the 
governing bodies; between private bank employees with members of parliament; 
between public bank employees and governing bodies; between the governing 
bodies and all except the public bank employees in regard to BrdInd_1 item. In 
relation to item BrdInd_2, the difference in opinion is: between shareholders and 
public bank employees and the governing bodies; between private bank employees 
and members of parliament and the governing bodies; between members of 
parliament and private bank employees; and finally between, the governing bodies 
and all the five categories of stakeholders. In all cases, the governing bodies‟ 
evaluation of independence is the highest of all. Taking only the stakeholders‟ group, 
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the difference of opinions on the two variables is only between the members of 
parliament and the two stakeholders, the private and public bank employees.  
As stated in Chapter Two section 2.7.2, the roles of directors can be defined 
in terms of a set of duties that are charged to them, which include the fiduciary duty 
(duty of trust) and the duty of supervision. Regarding these functions, the group of 
stakeholder respondents is of the view that boards discharge their assigned duties 
adequately, as demonstrated in the overall average score of 3.6 or 72% 
achievement on the items measuring board duties. The summarized results of the 
analysis are given in Table 7.24. 
Table 7. 24: Stakeholders perception of board duty  
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean Board duty # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
The board of directors in my bank act 
honestly, carefully, and reasonably in 
executing their duties (BrdDty_1) 
9(3) 22(7) 88(28) 148(48) 44(14) 
311 3.6 
In my judgment, the board‟s 
involvement in the oversight and 
monitoring of a company‟s financial 
performance, its top management and 
its strategic processes and outcomes 
meet shareholders‟ expectations 
(BrdDty_2) 
2(1) 39(13) 82(27) 159(52) 26(8) 
308 3.6 
The board of directors in my bank is 
not perfunctory/ rubber stamp: the 
chairperson does not dominate the 
board meeting, and different views of 
directors are welcome (BrdDty_3) 
4(1) 35(11) 115(37) 127(41) 28(9) 
309 3.5 
The board of directors plays an 
important role in selecting, monitoring, 
and replacing the President of the 
bank (BrdDty_4) 
4(1) 34(11) 64(21) 150(49) 55(18) 
307 3.9 
The board of directors effectively 
oversees potential conflicts of interest 
including related-party transactions 
(BrdDty_5) 
5(2) 30(10) 141(46) 115(38) 16(5) 
307 3.3 
The board is active in ensuring proper 
disclosure and actively communicate 
with shareholders and stakeholders 
(BrdDty_6) 
2(2) 39(13) 106(35) 134(44) 22(7) 
307 3.4 
 In general, the board of directors is 
active in ensuring the effectiveness of 
various governance practices 
(BrdDty_7) 
5(2) 33(11) 82(27) 159(52) 28(9) 
307 3.6 
Overall mean 3.6 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
Stakeholders‟ views on board duties show that the majority believe that 
boards of directors: (1) act honestly, carefully, and reasonably; (2) involve in the 
oversight and monitoring of a company‟s financial performance, its top management 
and its strategic processes; (3) play an important role in selecting, monitoring, and 
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replacing the President of the banks; (4) ensure different views of directors are 
welcome in board meetings; (5) ensure proper disclosure and active communication 
with shareholders and stakeholders. Fewer (43%) believe that the board of directors 
effectively oversees potential conflicts of interest including related-party transactions. 
However, the level of disagreements regarding all the variables measuring board 
duty is relatively low ranging from 10% to 15%. The general assessment of the group 
of stakeholders in respect of the role of the boards in ensuring the effectiveness of 
various governance practices is positive as expressed by the majority (61%). 
Kruskal- Wallis and the One-Way ANOVA tests for significant differences of opinion 
show that a difference exists only in one of the variables, BrdDty_3, specifically 
between the shareholders and the private bank employees at the 5% level; however, 
at the 1% level, the Post hoc analysis shows no significant difference between the 
stakeholders.  
Boards of directors have a major role of setting the big picture. They establish 
the road map/direction and goals and monitor their progress towards achieving them 
on behalf of the share owners. They are strategic thinkers and do not involve in 
routine matters. The overall average score of 3.6 or 72%, which is well above 
average, shows respondents‟ opinions on the strategic issues are upbeat, indicating 
a general perception that boards are strategic oriented, involved in formulating 
strategies for achieving goals. Specifics are given in Table 7.25 and Appendix 7.10a. 
Table 7. 25: Stakeholders’ perceptions of strategic issues 
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean Strategic issue # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
The board is actively involved in 
formulating long-term strategies for 
attaining future goals and reviews it as 
deemed necessary (StrIss_1) 
2(1) 31(10) 59(19) 162(52) 56(18) 
310 3.8 
The board is more involved in strategic 
matters than routine matters (StrIss_2) 
5(2) 43(14) 74(24) 140(45) 48(16) 
310 3.6 
The board identifies actions to seize 
opportunities that will contribute to the 
bank‟s strategic priorities (StrIss_3) 
3(1) 35(11) 85(27) 155(50) 32(10) 
310 3.6 
The board identifies annual strategic 
direction within the framework of the long 
range planning (StrIss_4) 
4(1) 22(7) 78(25) 164(53) 43(13.8) 
311 3.7 
The board demonstrates awareness of 
emerging/ environmental  trends affecting 
the bank and reflect them in discussion 
and decision-making (StrIss_5) 
3(1) 38(12) 102(33) 136(44) 29(9) 
308 3.5 
Overall mean 3.6 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
The results of the analysis from Table 7.25 show that the majority of the 
respondents (53% to 70%) believe that boards are actively involved in formulating 
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strategies, do not involve in routines, identify actions to seize opportunities, and 
demonstrate awareness of emerging trends in discussions and decisions. The 
opposite view is expressed by a much smaller figure of 8% to 16% of the 
respondents. The Kruskal-Wallis or the One-Way ANOVA tests show a significant 
difference in opinion on only one of the variables, StrIss_2, between the members of 
parliament and private bank employees at the 5% level. Thus the assessment of the 
members of parliament is far more generous than the private bank employees‟. 
However, the Post Hoc test at 1% level shows no significant difference in opinion 
between the stakeholders. 
Stakeholders‟ perception of corporate performance as a function of corporate 
governance practices shows that the majority are satisfied with the performances of 
the banks (66%) and this is due to the perceived relentless group effort by the board, 
executives and employees (73%). The majority of the stakeholders (57%) believe 
that the profitability of the banks is due not only the efforts of the executive body and 
employees but also the boards. This view is consistent with the above in that the 
vast majority of the stakeholders (79%) have the conviction that banks, besides 
making profit for shareholders, have the goal of maximizing the well-being of various 
stakeholders, such as employees and customers. Detailed analysis of results is 
given in Table 7.26. 
Table 7. 26: Perception of stakeholders regarding corporate performance 
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean Corporate performance # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
I am satisfied with the performance of the 
bank and the amount of profit declared 
every year (CorPrf_1) 
11(4) 49(16) 44(14) 157(51) 46(15) 
307 3.6 
The bank is profitable every year due to 
persistent effort  by the board, executive 
body and employees (CorPrf_2) 
6(2) 24(8) 54(17) 164(53) 62(20) 
310 3.8 
The bank is profitable every year  due to 
persistent effort only by executive body 
and employees (CorPrf_3) 
17(6) 158(51) 55(20) 63(21) 15(5) 
308 2.7 
Many of the issues that the board deals 
with  add value to the shareholders 
(CorPrf_4) 
2(1) 28(9) 94(31) 159(52) 24(8) 
307 3.6 
I can sense the effectiveness of the 
boards and clearly see their wealth 
maximization efforts (CorPrf_5) 
5(2) 40(13) 114(37) 137(44) 13(4) 
309 3.4 
My bank, besides making profit for 
shareholders, has the goal of attaining the 
well-being of various stakeholders, such 
as employees and customers (CorPrf_6) 
7(2) 19(6) 40(13) 197(64) 46(15) 
309 3.8 
Overall mean 3.5 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
The above responses were tested for any significant differences between the 
opinions of the groups of stakeholders. As shown in Appendices 7.10a and 7.10b, a 
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significant difference between the members of parliament and other two 
stakeholders‟ groups, the private and public bank employees is noticed only in 
regard to one of the variables, CorPrf_2. The mean rank of the parliamentarians is 
lower implying their belief that the profitably of banks is due to the group effort is not 
as strong as the employees‟. Furthermore, regarding the same variable, a significant 
difference is observed between the supervisory and regulatory agencies and the 
public bank employees. The former‟s mean rank is smaller than the latter, which may 
suggest that public bank employees have stronger belief than the supervisory and 
regulatory agencies that the profitability of banks is due to persistent effort by the 
board, the executive body and employees. 
The groups of stakeholders were requested to identify major corporate 
governance issues prevailing in their respective banks. The perception of the 
majority of the stakeholders‟ shows that the identified issues such as: lack of integrity 
and ethics among board members and top management, and conflict of interest are 
identified as major corporate governance issues expressed in an agreement level of 
47% and 42%, respectively. Insider trading, lack of proper balance between the 
executive and non-executive boards, an ineffective connectivity between board and 
management are not major issues as shown in the smaller disagreement level of 
37%, 40% and 48%, respectively (see Table 7.27). The overall average score for 
corporate governance issues main construct is 3.0 or 60% which is above average.  
Table 7. 27: Perception of stakeholders about corporate governance issues 
Extent of agreement* 1 2 3 4 5  
N 
 
Mean Corporate governance issues # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) # (%) 
Lack of integrity and ethics among boards 
is a major issue (CGIssu_1) 
16(5) 61(20) 87(28) 102(33) 43(14) 
309 3.1 
Lack of integrity and ethics among top 
management  is a major issue (CGIssu_2) 
14(5) 63(21) 85(28) 100(32) 46(15) 
308 3.3 
Insider trading
6
 is a major issue 
(CGIssu_3) 
34(11) 78(26) 144(48) 36(12) 7(2) 
299 2.7 
Conflict of interest of board of directors is 
a major issue (CGIssu_4) 
24(8) 51(16) 100(33) 89(29) 41(13) 
305 3.0 
Lack of proper balance between executive 
and non executive members in the board 
is a major issue (CGIssu_5) 
35(12) 83(28) 106(36) 58(20) 14(9) 
296 2.8 
 Ineffective connectivity between board 
and management is a major issue 
(CGIssu_6) 
30(9) 102(39) 87(29) 65(22) 18(6) 
302 2.8 
Overall mean 3.0 
*  (1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral,  (4), Agree , and (5) Strongly agree 
  The above items were checked using both the Kruskal-Wallis and One-Way 
ANOVA to see if there were significant differences of opinions among the group of 
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stakeholders. The tests show a statistically significant difference, at the 1% level, 
among the groups of stakeholders. Based on the Post Hoc test of pair comparison, 
the opinion of members of parliament is significantly different from the opinions of the 
shareholders, and the private and public bank employees in regard to the first four 
items (CGIssu_1, CGIssu_2,  CGIssu_3, and CGIssu_4). The parliamentarians 
perceive the four corporate governance items as major concerns in the banks as 
shown in the highest mean ranks values of their responses. Regarding the fifth and 
sixth items (CGIssu_5 and CGIssu_6), there is a significant difference of opinion 
between the members of parliament and the private and public bank employees. The 
majority of the former consider the two issues as serious concerns; however, the 
majority of the private bank employees do not consider them as such. 
 
7.4 Key Corporate Governance Issues/Problems  
 In addition to the opinion survey questions administered to the governing 
bodies (Sample-1) and the stakeholders (Sample-2), the questionnaires also 
included two open ended questions. The two open ended questions focused on 
identifying major corporate governance issues and possible recommendations to 
improve corporate governance practices in the banking sector. The first question 
asked respondents to give opinion on major corporate governance problems facing 
the Ethiopian banks. A total of 241respondents (63 governing bodies and 178 
stakeholders) expressed their perceptions. In a related way the second question, 
requested respondents to forward comments and recommendations to improve 
corporate governance practices. A total of 106 respondents (26 governing bodies 
and 80 stakeholders) answered the question. The two questions were analyzed so 
as to identify dominant themes to the respondents. The analysis of the comments 
generated by the first question indicated the following key issues as important to the 
respondents. 
(1) Lack of relevant knowledge, limited experience, and insufficient understanding  
(awareness) of corporate governance characterize boards and key 
stakeholders, 
(2) Lack of integrity, conflict of interest and corruption of board members, 
(3) Limited capacity of the regulatory body (National Bank of Ethiopia) and undue 
intervention by the same, 
(4) Influence of large shareholders/ownership concentration, 
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(5) Lack of a proper national code of corporate governance practices or 
comprehensive regulation, 
(6)  Lack of transparency, 
(7) Lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities in board of directors, 
(8)  Interference of board of directors in managerial and operational activities 
undermining the autonomy of managers, 
(9) Poor remuneration scheme for boards that affected their commitment to play 
their role,  and  
(10) Lack of proper mechanism of nomination and selection of board of directors. 
The following are detailed analyses and comments made by the respondents on the 
identified themes. 
 Among the ten themes identified, lack of relevant knowledge, limited 
experience and understanding (awareness) of corporate governance by board of 
directors, regulatory agencies and other stakeholders is outlined as the most 
significant concern by 41% (98 of 241) of the respondents especially the 
stakeholders that included shareholders, parliamentarians, and employees of private 
and public banks. Some of the most emphasized issues were:  boards‟ inadequate 
knowledge of governance, lack of skilled and experienced board members as 
Ethiopia is new to corporate governance systems; board members‟ lack of sufficient 
awareness of roles and responsibilities; inadequate understanding of what corporate 
governance is all about and the benefits in the practice. Listed below are some of the 
remarkable comments made by the respondents on the specified theme.    
 Relationship based membership on the board with inadequate knowledge of the 
banking sector involving some board members who are unclear about their duties 
and responsibilities. 
 Lack of training of board members on basic principles of corporate governance 
and general banking systems; and lack of awareness of shareholders and boards 
regarding their responsibilities and duties. 
 Composition and balance of the board in terms of knowledge, qualification and 
commitment is poor and no regular meetings are held to ensure control. 
 Ethiopian banks are run by traditional bankers with insufficient exposure to the 
international best practices in the management system and sticking to their tools 
to maintain the status quo in older banks. 
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 Bottlenecks to corporate governance are diversified interests, capacity 
differences, lack of awareness of the essence of corporate governance among 
boards, and outdated technology. 
 Board members are co-opted from all walks of life without undergoing basic 
professional training for their roles. 
 Most influential shareholders are not aware of the sensitive nature of the banking 
industry and the contagious effect of its problems, lack of knowledgeable 
personnel both at board and senior management level, limited corporate culture 
and limited capacity at the regulatory level. 
 Lack of integrity, and conflict of interest and corruption are other concerns 
raised by 50(21%) of the respondents. In relation to these issues, the following are 
some of the problems particularly noted by the respondents: selfish motives, 
nepotism, lack of integrity, lack of commitment and good governance, unethical 
behavior, corrupt practices and disregard of rules and procedures, and favoritism 
dominate the institutions. The following are some of the expressed concerns worth 
noting. 
 Deteriorating integrity of the board of directors. 
 Nepotism in granting loans, in employment and renting offices for branches. 
 Interest of individuals dominating the board role and above all conflict of interest 
between boards and management. 
 Rent seeking behavior in both management and boards. 
 Board of directors and top management abuse their power to their own 
advantage and also favor their relatives. 
 Directors in some banks are engaged in maximizing the interests of the 
influential shareholders, demonstrating conflict of interest. 
 Capacity issues and interferences of the regulatory body (National Bank of 
Ethiopia) are marked as significant by 51(21%) of respondents. Too much 
interference from the National Bank of Ethiopia, stringent regulations by NBE, 
government interference and imposed policies for purchase of bonds, weak 
institutional capacity of NBE, unpredictable policy changes by the NBE, and unfair 
and discriminatory treatment against private banks by the NBE are among the 
problems greatly emphasized by the respondents.  Research (Kiyota et al., 2008) 
using the financial liberalization index shows that Ethiopia is the lowest in Sub-
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Saharan Africa (scoring 20 out of 100, 100 being the most liberalized) indicating that 
the sector is highly regulated by the government. The following are some of the 
important comments made by the respondents regarding the capacity issue and 
excessive interference of the NBE. 
 Unfair treatment by NBE over all banks other than Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
which is governmental bank. 
 Excessive control of the NBE on private banks. Though control by the NBE is 
desirable, the tight grip on private banks has rendered them unable to act 
according to their charter. 
 NBE has no enough capacity to regulate private banks and promote 
governance practices. 
 Change of NBE policies and guidelines which favor only public banks. 
 NBE does not study the volatile nature of the banking industry and revise the 
policies and directives in good time as per the changing market situation, but 
acts reactively. 
 Some policies of NBE such as fixing remunerations and excluding executive 
directors from board membership cause problems in some governance areas. 
 NBE fails to focus on building capacity on corporate governance but put in 
place stringent directives and demands more responsibility from boards and 
senior management. 
 Forty five (19%) respondents pointed out that, Influence of large 
shareholders/ownership concentration is a corporate governance problem in the 
Ethiopian banks. Major shareholders self-interestedly manipulate the board; major 
decisions are made by big shareholders, who also unduly intervene in bank 
operations. They also influence on the nomination of directors by major shareholders 
and exercise excessive power control. These were some of the prominent comments 
of the respondents. Respondents‟ other important views include the following. 
 The majority of shares are owned by party affiliated corporations resulting in 
minority shareholders‟ interests being sidelined. 
 Vested interests of large shareholders which affect the stability of the banks and 
result in inappropriate allocation of resources like loan dispersal. 
 Invisible hands of influence by major shareholders. 
 Involvement of major shareholders in the operations of the bank. 
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 Tendency of major shareholders to manipulate decisions to their own business 
advantage. 
 Ownership concentrated in few hands, hence major shareholder influence in self-
seeking nomination and selection. 
 Lack of a proper code of corporate governance practices or a comprehensive 
regulation was underlined as a significant issue by 33(14%) of the respondents. The 
most repeatedly made comments in line with this issue include: the absence of a 
workable legal corporate governance framework, lack of a code of corporate 
governance, lack of code of conduct, lack of corporate social responsibility and 
business ethics and failure to comply with regulatory issues. Apart from these, the 
following are some of the more specific comments of the respondents. 
 Lack of appropriate guidelines by the governing bodies and the banks 
themselves. 
 Rules and regulations set by government must be uniformly applicable to all 
banks to ensure fair competition. 
 Organic corporate governance policies/instruments from within the banks are not 
being introduced. This is the responsibility of the regulatory body (NBE). 
 Lack of comprehensive corporate governance regulations and failure to 
understand even the existing scant governance regulation. 
 Absence of good corporate citizenship, ethical behavior and sound corporate 
governance as well as weak and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms. 
 Lack of transparency has also been identified by 30(13%) respondents as a 
corporate governance problem in the Ethiopian banks. The most frequently 
mentioned issues include: lack of transparency and accountability, lack of open 
communication and participatory approach, unawareness of the importance of 
transparency and disclosure, and ownership concentration hampering the level of 
transparency. On this issue of transparency, some of the most prominent comments 
are listed below. 
 The management team is usually formed by a group of handpicked individuals 
and it is difficult to control their performance objectively as their cohesiveness 
hinders transparency of the management system. 
 Some important information such as strategic plan, AGM, board meetings 
minutes are not shared with shareholders. 
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 Lack of transparency of decisions is especially common whenever there is a 
shortage of critical resources like foreign currency permissions for customers. 
Lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities among members of the board 
of directors was identified as one of the significant concerns by 24(10%) 
respondents. No clear separation of roles between management and boards, lack of 
commitment, roles of boards not being clearly defined, lack of team spirit, lack of 
accountability, boards being not participatory, and board and management being not 
interactive are some of the recurring remarks made by respondents. Respondents‟ 
opinion on the problem is further reflected by the following specific comments. 
 No clear demarcation of boards and management tasks. 
 Members of boards of directors of public banks are government officials and do 
not have sufficient time to execute their roles as board. 
 Lack of strategic focus of boards, more focus on trivial and routine matters. 
 No adequate information of roles and responsibilities of boards. 
 Duties and responsibilities not clearly stated. Scope of board in management 
duties is fuzzy. 
 Lack of commitment by some directors and failure to deliberate sufficiently and 
timely on some critical matters that demand serious attention of the boards. 
 Some directors are not clear about their roles due to their poor background in 
leadership. 
 Just like some big share owners, interference of members of the board of 
directors in management duties and operations is as a significant problem in the 
Ethiopian banks as mentioned by 18(8%) of the respondents. Most of the comments 
on this issue come from the board of directors. Eroding management freedom, poor 
attention to strategic issues but undue focus on management concerns; unclear 
demarcation between top management and boards, and board interference in 
routine duties are the most emphasized issues. Some of the specific significant 
comments on the problem outlined include: 
 Influence of board of directors on decision practices especially on loan and 
foreign currency permits which is purely operational and the domain of 
management. 
 Boards in the Ethiopian banks apart from their strategic decision making role and 
oversight functions interfere in tasks that should have been left to management.  
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  Neglect of oversight roles and policy issues but much involvement in operation. 
 Failure to determine and focus on what constitutes corporate governance and as 
a result involve in undue operational matters. 
The inadequacy of remuneration of board of directors has been marked as 
one important problem of corporate governance in the Ethiopian banks. In this 
regard 17(7%) of the respondents mentioned poor compensation as significant 
problem. The most noteworthy comments on this issue include: 
  The boards of directors are not fully motivated to utilize their potential, 
knowledge and experience to address strategic issues because of low benefit 
arrangements. 
 The remuneration of boards is not enough and thus experienced and senior 
people are not motivated to become board members. 
 The remuneration problem has resulted in professional ethics being undermined 
and poor quality service and lack of transparency becoming serious issues. 
 The agency problem has emerged due to weak compensation to board of 
directors. 
The last corporate governance problem highlighted by 17(7%) of the 
respondents was the lack of a proper mechanism of nomination and selection of 
members of the board of directors. The following are some of the comments made 
by respondents on the issue. 
 Ganging up in both the nomination and selection of board members and not 
allowing new members to join them. 
 Board as well as management nomination are not based on merit but 
relationships of different forms such as tribal, religious and old school boy 
network. 
 Not giving much importance to education and leadership experience in selection. 
 In most of the banks, board membership is based on relationship to the 
controlling shareholders instead of competence and professionalism, leading 
boards to be at the service of the controlling shareholders. 
 Nomination and election of boards is just made randomly. There is no recognized 
nomination body to make nominations based on set criteria.  
In a nut shell, the stakeholders‟ perceptions as captured in the main themes 
specified above are considered to be the major corporate governance problems 
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faced by the Ethiopian banks. The identified themes and issues are systematic 
reflections of the views based on respondents‟ knowledge and experiences.  
 
7.5 Corporate Governance Practices in the Ethiopian Banks: the way 
forward 
The second open ended question asked respondents to suggest ways and 
means that they think will improve corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian 
banks. Recommendations from a total of 106 (26 governing bodies and 80 
stakeholders) were collected and analytically considered in terms of their worth and 
relevance. The following are the major recommendations that the respondents 
believe may help address one or more of the problems identified in the Ethiopian 
banking business corporate governance. 
(1) There should be national codes of best practices. 
(2) Regular capacity building systems for regulatory agencies and board 
members need to be in place. 
(3) Board nominations should be standardized. 
(4) More transparency and disclosure are needed. 
(5) Awareness of corporate governance in general and the boards‟ roles and 
responsibilities in particular should be created. 
(6) Performance related remuneration schemes for board members need to be 
introduced. 
(7) Board members and major shareholders must maintain the required distance 
form managerial and operational activities. 
Further analysis of the findings and the particularly important recommendations 
of the respondents on each theme is presented below. 
 Most of the respondents placed great emphasis on the need for instituting a 
framework for codes of best practices of corporate governance and code of ethics 
and an institution responsible for the set of reforms suggested. In particular, 31(29%) 
respondents suggested the formulation of codes of best practices applicable to the 
financial institutions. It seems that there is a consensus on the strong need for the 
codes among the different groups of stakeholders and the governing bodies as all 
have made similar recommendations on the issue. The following are some of the 
prominent recommendations made. 
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 Instituting strong codes of governance will improve corporate governance 
practices and draw in board members with appropriate skills, experience, and 
independent boards. 
 The old commercial law should be revised in line with the current socio-economic 
and political settings. The revised code has to clearly define the powers and 
responsibilities of boards, executives, and shareholders. 
 Corporate governance practices could improve if codes of governance and ethics 
are introduced, monitored and evaluated periodically. Governance practices 
should be linked to risk management and compliance activities. Periodic 
evaluation and communication with all parties could improve corporate 
governance practices. 
 There is no stock market to control the market and people buy shares without any 
legal protection. Government should interfere by setting rules and regulations to 
protect investors and increase their confidence. 
 A stock market must be introduced so as to create an institution that serves as an 
umbrella responsible for crafting the voluntary codes of corporate governance. 
 As corporate governance is new phenomenon, education and ethics can be 
powerful instruments to improve the practice. There is a need to build an 
institution for good governance at a national level. 
 In Ethiopia there is no one institution responsible for developing and overseeing 
corporate practices. The current law, which is in effect aimed to regulate 
corporate structure is, the 1960 Commercial Code that was intended to serve 
simple corporate entities of the time. Corporate governance is new to our country 
and some people consider it as corporate management. But it is much broader 
and includes fair, efficient and transparent administration. So the Commercial 
Code needs to be revised to accommodate the current developments and a 
specific corporate governance code has to be issued by responsible entity. 
 To add value to the banks, promote ethical and responsible decision making, and 
encourage professionalism; there should be a corporate governance committee 
to regularly assess the skills and experiences of the board. 
Developing the capacity of the regulatory body and the board of directors was 
suggested by 28(26%) respondents as a means to improve corporate governance in 
the Ethiopian banks. Strengthening the capacity of the regulatory body, making 
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available training for the boards of directors after their election and periodically; and 
minimizing excessive interference of the regulatory body were the strong 
recommendations made by both stakeholders and governing bodies. The importance 
of educating the members of the regulatory body and boards to help in promoting 
better corporate governance practices is indicated in the following specific 
recommendations made by the respondents. 
 NBE should train its employees in a better way so that they can understand what 
corporate governance is all about and what constitutes the modern banking 
system. 
 The Government should consider fundamental structural change of NBE with 
enhanced capacity in order to help it properly oversee the private banks. 
 The NBE is the apex of banks whose role is to control, regulate and stabilize the 
monetary system in the national interest, but this does not imply it should 
monopolize every activity of the banks. Freedom should be given to every bank 
so that they can exercise their duties freely. 
 The heavy handed regulations of the NBE need to be repealed and the bank 
should work on building its own institutional capacity and that of the board of 
directors. 
 Policy issues by the NBE should be based on a study and not imposed as this 
may result in owners‟ loss of confidence and violation of their rights causing 
undue frustration. 
 Building the institutional capacity of the regulatory organs such as the NBE, 
public financial supervisory agency, and the federal ethics body will contribute 
much to the enforcement of the existing corporate governance related laws and 
help introduce new laws pertinent to the current situation. 
 Both the board of directors and top management should be given training and 
experience sharing opportunities to widen their knowledge and abilities in 
decision making. The NBE should work out the minimum responsibilities of the 
boards. It should also give orientation and induction courses to newly appointed 
board members. 
 Standardizing board nomination in terms of professional qualification, 
competence and experience was another suggestion made by 24(23%) respondents 
as important means to help improve corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian 
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banks. It was also strongly recommended that: nomination be strictly on merit basis, 
NBE revise its directives on board membership eligibility, nominees have related 
qualification and exposure to the banking industry, clear criteria on nomination and 
selection of boards be set and the need for a nomination committee be addressed. 
The following are some of the suggestions that highlight the respondents‟ 
recommendations. 
 Individuals should have basic knowledge of the financial sector to be elected as 
board members and the criteria set by the NBE be revised in view of pertinent 
developments on the ground. 
 Banks should establish key board committees including those of audit, 
remuneration, and nomination in a transparent manner. The nomination 
committee is particularly important for a formal and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors. 
 The qualification and competence of the board of directors and executive 
management needs to be standardized. 
 The Commercial Code especially the section addressing the appointment of 
boards, and the criteria for appointment needs to be strengthened and made 
clear. 
 In practice, most of the board of directors and executive management are 
nominated and appointed with the influence of large shareholders. As a result, 
nepotism and vested interest are clear dangers to all banks in Ethiopia. All the 
time, minor shareholders are ceremonial in all AGMs. Elections need the blessing 
of major shareholder. Therefore the need for nomination committee to have a 
balanced board is abundantly clear. 
 There should be a nomination standing committee which will assess the 
candidates before AGM and present them for election. The current traditional 
system of board nomination greatly affects the banks negatively. 
To improve corporate governance in the Ethiopian banks, respondents have 
also emphasized on introducing more transparency and disclosure practices. Thus 
20(19%) of the respondents underlined the particular importance of the relevant 
reform. Among the more common recommendation are: the need for proper 
disclosure of information to shareholders, enhancing the level of transparency, the 
need for transparent and open communication between board and senior 
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management and employees. The other specific suggestions forwarded by the 
respondents are listed below. 
 Transparency and disclosure are of paramount importance to promote sound 
corporate governance and build trust. 
 Enhance transparency and accountability so as to build trust among stakeholders 
towards corporate organizations. 
 Effective reporting and disclosure of financial and operational performances are 
crucially important. 
 There has to be open and effective communication between boards and senior 
management and employees to foster goal congruence. 
Another recommendation made by 13(12%) respondents relates to the need 
for more awareness creation on corporate governance, roles and responsibilities of 
boards to improve corporate governance practices. Respondents felt that boards and 
the various stakeholders appreciate the importance of corporate governance in the 
modern world. Boards also need to internalize the roles that they play and the 
specific responsibilities that they are expected to accomplish. For all this to be 
possible through awareness creation, involving all concerned parties is imperative. 
The following are some of the relevant recommendations made by the respondents. 
These include the need for: 
 Internalizing the very essence of corporate governance and serving mentality on 
the part of directors. 
 Boards to develop their own policy and procedure manual that clearly stipulates 
their role and responsibilities. 
 Enhancing corporate behavior by creating awareness across the board. 
 Developing values and beliefs in the worker to improve corporate governance. 
 Board to think strategically and keep in mind that they are acting on behalf of the 
shareholders, which simply means change of attitude is necessary. 
 The concept of corporate governance needs more awareness creation among 
board members, and more training is necessary in this regard. 
 Setting clear roles and responsibilities for the board of directors and management 
ensuring no overlap occurs. 
An improved remuneration scheme as one mechanism to improve corporate 
governance was suggested by 12(11%) respondents. The respondents believe that 
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the current fixed payment set by the NBE fails to attract and maintain experienced 
and qualified persons to serve as board members. The following are highlight of the 
recommendations made. 
 Remuneration for the board of directors is not enough and experienced and 
senior people are not motivated to become board members. 
 There should be a strong legal framework, better remunerations, freedom from 
high government interference to attract honest and vigilant board members. 
 Remuneration needs to be aligned with performance so that competition is 
enhanced and responsibility and accountability instituted. 
 The last recommendation made to improve corporate governance is to 
prevent interference from major shareholders and board of directors outside their 
domain. This was suggested by 11(10%) respondents. This subject of freedom was 
identified in the previous section as one of the problems hampering good 
governance. On this issue, some of respondents made the following specific 
recommendations. 
 The shadow board (big shareholders) is governing the banks; therefore, fair 
representation of minority shareholders in the boards is essential; also limiting the 
number of seats of major shareholders on the board may help minimize the 
degree of influence. 
 Relationship with customers should be left to the staff and any interference by the 
board should be discouraged. 
 A person who is not economically independent can never be professionally 
independent and putting economically less secure person on the board will not 
help in improving corporate governance. Most members of boards of directors 
join in primarily for economic reasons and tend to listen when the influential 
shareholders come up with unreasonable requests. 
 There should be distinction of authority and responsibility between the board and 
management. The Board should not be allowed to interfere in management 
activities. 
 The board of directors should refrain from operational activities. More specifically 
the board must limit itself to setting policies, strategies, board goals and 
approving annual plan and critically monitoring performances of the management 
against agreed parameters. Only then can the board achieve a strong level of 
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independence to hold the management accountable if there is any failure or 
success. But if directors engage in operations, corporate governance will be 
compromised since directors may make mistakes due to their lack of experience 
or other reasons. In such cases, they cannot question management as this would 
make them accountable for their own mistakes. 
In summary, the respondents believe that the Ethiopian banking business 
corporate governance can be improved if the above recommendations are well 
addressed. The different groups of stakeholders and the governing bodies of the 
banks collectively agree that in order to improve corporate governance in the 
Ethiopian banks, there is no way other than adhering to good corporate governance 
practices. According to the respondents, good corporate governance practices 
include, to mention some, instituting a framework for codes of corporate governance, 
establishing an institution responsible for corporate governance, creating awareness 
of the importance of corporate governance among concerned parties, strengthening 
the capacity of the regulatory body, and reducing ownership concentration to 
minimize the influence of large shareholders. 
 
7.6 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
 As mentioned in Chapter Four, this study used the interview method to collect 
the primary data to gain an understanding of the practical aspect of corporate 
governance practices in the banking industry. The qualitative method was used in 
order to provide sufficient details about the study situation (Yin, 2003; Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2010). The interview method as a qualitative approach is important as it 
encourages interviewees to discuss issues important to them and enables to explore 
issues interactively with the researcher directing the discussion (Clark, 1998). The 
results obtained from the interview analysis are used to answer research questions 
not addressed by the quantitative analysis and to triangulate and validate the 
findings. 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with different groups of 
key informants that included board chairpersons/members, board secretaries, bank 
presidents/CEOs and shareholders of sampled banks. Different groups of interview 
participants were selected with the objective of obtaining a variety of views from a 
relatively small group of respondents, preventing heavy dependency on a single 
informant and triangulating the information from different sources so as to enhance 
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validity. The interviewees for this exploratory research were purposively selected to 
include those that have at least served two years in their capacity as board 
chairpersons/ member, secretaries and presidents/CEOs and shareholders.  
An interview guide questions was used (see Appendix 4.2d) when conducting 
the interview. It was not possible to audio tape the interviews as the participants did 
not feel comfortable and were unwilling to be quoted.  Therefore, relevant key 
issues, problems, strong comments, current issues and recommendations were 
noted down and care was taken not to lose the flow of the conversation in all the 
interviews. Interview questions were designed to focus respondents‟ reply to the 
researcher‟s specific areas of interest. But there were some concerns which were 
raised by the respondents themselves, unasked by the researcher.  These included:  
low remuneration, interference of board in operations, inadequate capacity of NBE, 
need for nomination committee, and loss of trust/confidence in boards. 
The interview questions mainly focused on obtaining information on boards‟ 
commitment to good corporate governance practices, their role in assurance of 
sound stewardship, and board structure and functioning of the board of directors. 
Ten interviews were conducted and each interview lasted for about 45 to 60 minutes. 
At the start of the interview, the aim of the research was fully explained to the 
participants and it was also confirmed that the interview was highly confidential. 
Below in Table 7.28 is presented the profile of the interviewees. 
Table 7. 28: Profile of interviewee 
Code  Ownership type  Respondent category 
1 Private bank Board secretary 
2 Private bank Board secretary 
3 Private bank Shareholder and employee 
4 Public bank Board secretary 
5 Public bank Board member 
6 Private bank Board  chairperson 
7 Private bank Board chairperson 
8 Private bank Board member 
9 Private bank President 
10 Public bank Former board member 
 
Upon completion of the interviews, each interview was given a code as shown 
in Table 7.28 above. The interviews were sorted, transcribed, categorized and 
analyzed accordingly. In the analysis, key issues were analyzes for patterns, 
common ideas and differences in opinions so as to make comparisons among the 
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interviews.  Based on the semi-structured interviews conducted, six basic themes or 
categories emerged as listed below.  
1. The issue of commitment to good corporate governance 
2. Board compensation  
3. Board composition and nomination 
4. Conflict of interest and malpractices 
5. Role of the regulatory agencies and code of best practices 
6. Other general concerns 
 
Commitment to Good Corporate Governance 
As has been emphasized in this study, corporate governance is important for 
corporate forms of organizations because it deals with establishing a system by 
which companies are directed and controlled (OCED, 2004). A system refers to the 
structures and processes on the basis of which decisions are made. It is a tool to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders and build investor confidence (Afolabi & 
Dare, 2015).  In short, good governance helps to realize shareholders‟ and 
stakeholders‟ right, equitable treatment of shareholders, transparency and discloser, 
and a responsible board (OECD, 2004). To reap the benefits of good governance, 
there has to be commitment to it by developing and implementing relevant codes 
and policies. In this respect, respondents were asked to express the extent of their 
commitment to promote good corporate governance by crafting a sound charter 
according to the country‟s legislation, with provisions on matters such as shareholder 
rights, transparency and disclosure, and role and distribution of power between 
board and management. All the interviewees were in agreement that in order to 
enhance the current weak status of corporate governance practices in the country, it 
is mandatory to have a memorandum and articles of association approved by the 
National Bank of Ethiopian, the regulatory body of the financial institutions. Having a 
memorandum and articles of association is a precondition for licensing in the 
banking business as proclaimed by the Banking Business Proclamation No. 
592/2008. The respondents mentioned that binding items such as business 
objectives, voting rights of shareholders, powers and roles of boards and 
management, appointment of directors, power of the general meetings of 
shareholders, and conflict of interest and transferability of share are covered in the 
documents. Some of the respondents believe that having a colorful document that 
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covers fundamental corporate governance issues is not a guarantee to good 
corporate governance; instead its proper implementation is what matters more. The 
majority agree that, since the last few years commitment to good governance has 
been eroded from time to time, especially in the private banks. 
One of the private bank respondents‟ noteworthy opinion in his words is that: 
“There has been a demonstrated lack of commitment and seriousness in the board 
of directors especially after the remuneration for the directors was fixed by the 
directives of National Bank of Ethiopia. Such lack of motivation in the boards is noted 
when documents and other materials are sent to them for review. It is a common 
phenomenon to see board members appear for a meeting or committee assignments 
without reading materials sent well ahead of meetings. This problem has been 
manifested since annual board membership remuneration was fixed to be no more 
than Birr 50, 000 on January 15, 2011. Earlier, the situation was totally different. 
Then you could see documents labeled with red marks almost by all and meetings 
were accompanied by hot discussions signifying that the materials were well 
reviewed. Furthermore, low attendance rates in board meetings, dissatisfaction and 
lack of a sense of belonging were observed subsequent to the coming into force of 
the bank‟s directive fixing the remuneration. These problems were not as such 
rampant before the year 2011 when remunerations were based up on banks‟ annual 
performance. Prior to this period, actually there was strong fight to have a sit on the 
board because the board fees were attractive enough.”   
The public bank respondents do not really accept the „lack of commitment‟ 
and frustration resulting from fixed annual remuneration. They argue that, sitting on 
the board in the public banks is an assignment and not a matter of being elected. 
Individuals are assigned to serve as board members in order to accomplish the 
objectives of the government, which are about developmental and commercial 
commitment. The respondents believe that the remuneration issue, which was fixed 
in 2011, is not a pleasant one and might demotivate members to some extent but 
cannot be echoed as a major issue because board membership in public banks is 
considered as a part of larger assignments or extension of official assignment.  
Board Compensation  
The issue of remuneration of board members was addressed in chapter 
seven sections 7.2 and 7.3 in the survey analysis of the governing bodies and 
stakeholders‟ perceptions. The results of both analyses showed that remuneration of 
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the board members is insufficient and does not reflect well enough the importance of 
the duties and responsibilities entrusted to them. Similar perceptions were reflected 
in the interview involving both the private and public bank respondents. All those 
interviewed have the conviction that board remuneration is inadequate and this has a 
negative repercussion on the boards‟ commitment to and performance of key roles. 
All believe that the level of remuneration should reflect the level of duties and 
responsibilities that boards shoulder.  
The following are some of the opinions of the interviewees: “Limiting 
remuneration is a source of frustration to board members because the service that 
we deliver and the burden of responsibilities are not reflected in the pay. This has 
also led to corruption involving some of the board members who have resorted to 
aligning themselves with the management in unlawfully arranging loans and foreign 
currency permits to customers. Lack of commitment has also been observed since 
the time the annual board remunerations were fixed.” Another interviewee from the 
private bank domain also supports the opinion given above by stating the following, 
“There is no question about the board payment fixed by the NBE in 2011 being 
insufficient; however, in spite of the small payment, there is still a fight to have a sit 
on the board. This may suggest that the suspicion that there might be indirect 
benefits linked to some malpractices like facilitation of loans in collaboration with 
management is credible.” 
Public bank respondents share the views expressed about the inadequacy of 
the incentive mechanisms but do not consider it a major issue given the purpose of 
the assignment as a board member. Put in his words: “Limiting board payment 
emanates from the government‟s ideology of developmental state or philosophy of 
protecting owners when malpractices, and fights for a sit on the board and 
misbehaving are observed in some of the private banks. This is not considered a big 
problem in the public banks because the assignment is considered as an extension 
of official responsibility.” 
Some of the respondents from both the private and public bank domains 
believe that if someone shows an interest to serve willingly as a board member, 
whether assigned or elected, the boards‟ role should not be affected by the level of 
compensation. However, since the banks are profit oriented and to attract 
professional members, board remuneration should be commensurate with the 
assigned roles and responsibilities. The interview results are consistent with the 
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survey results. A study conducted by Lee and Isa (2015) shows the determinant role 
of director‟s remunerations on performance. Their findings show positive association 
between a director‟s remuneration and performance in the banking sector in 
Malaysia. The findings clearly imply that high quality directors are attracted by 
reasonable remuneration, which in turn has a positive influence on performance. 
Board Composition and Nomination 
In corporate forms of organizations, the thousands of shareholders cannot 
direct and control the company that they own, thus, this role has to be delegated to 
another organ, the board of directors, who act on their behalf. The board of directors 
is, therefore, one of the alternative corporate governance control mechanisms that 
limit the agency problems between management and shareholders. The agency 
problem (theory) is based on the notion of separation of ownership and control that 
potentially leads to self serving behavior by those in control (managers) (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991; Dalton et al., 1998, Fama & Jensen, 1983). And one of the reasons 
why boards of directors are needed is to play a vital role of monitoring the self-
seeking behavior of management that benefits itself but not the company owners. 
The way boards are nominated has implication for board composition. Board 
composition, which refers to boards‟ demographic, human capital, and social capital 
composition (Johnson et al., 2013) is one of the important ingredients in the ability of 
the board to influence performance. In this respect, interviewees were asked to 
express their views on how the composition of the board is determined and whether 
the current structure of boards in terms of diversity, mix of skills and experience 
works well and in favor of sound board processes.  
  Most of the respondents acknowledged the role that the composition of the 
boards plays in the boardroom activity and in executing boards‟ strategic, service 
and control functions. They all believe in the importance of a nomination committee 
in bringing about the right blend of board members. The majority of the respondents 
do not have a problem with the educational qualification of the board members but 
the problem observed in most of the boards is lack of enough knowledge of the 
business and relevant experience. Further, at present professional and experienced 
people show less interest to serve as board members because they weigh their time 
allocation against the meager board remuneration. The following are some of the 
board composition issues described by the private bank respondents in their own 
words: “As I observe in most of the private banks, composition of board members is 
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based on the blessing of the influential shareholders and finally by popular election 
of the shareholders. To me, the composition of boards‟ members should be based 
more on knowledge to the business. I also observe domination by board chair, which 
might signal a potential danger to the interests of the shareholders.” 
 One of the private bank respondents describes the problem associated with 
board composition as follows:  “In the bank where I serve as a board member, most 
members are representatives of organizations and reside in a regional city which is 
far from the head office located in Addis. These people, most of the time, do not 
show up at board meetings and one person serves many committees. Some of the 
subcommittees are underrepresented. This has become a hurdle to the board to 
accomplish its tasks properly. The other thing worth mentioning is the capacity of the 
persons to serve as board members. Most of us do not have relevant knowledge 
about the sector and we are too reserved to speak our minds as the chairperson and 
some members are politicians. The bank should not be politically charged and its 
primary objective must be maximizing the wealth of shareholders though the major 
shareholders are institutional shareholders. There are groupings in the board and 
sometimes decisions are made by such groups.  We do not even collect the board 
fee as this has been decided to be waived by the board.” 
 The literature on board composition is fundamentally in favor of large 
proportions of outside directors, as grounded in the agency theory. The 
understanding is that the non-executive directors are true stewards that benefit the 
firms as a result of their independence from the firm‟s management (Dalton et al., 
1998; OECD, 2004; Andres, 2005). This does not discount the benefits of having 
inside directors, but the stronger argument is for a majority of outside directors. 
In the Ethiopian context, any employee of a bank is prohibited from sitting on 
the board of any bank (National Bank of Ethiopia, SBB/49/2011, 2011). However, the 
interviewees do not vividly see the problem of including a limited number of 
executives or employees, who are knowledgeable about the sector, to serve as 
board members so that boards can make informed decisions. The respondents 
acknowledge the importance of having a majority of non-executives on the board 
and do not consider including very limited executives to the board as a serious 
problem. A review of the relevant research by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) shows 
that, there are situations where outside directors do better in safeguarding the 
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interests of shareholders than insiders; and there are other board tasks better 
accomplished by inside directors than outsiders  (Andres, 2005).   
In line with the above argument, the following are opinions forwarded by one 
of the private bank respondents: “Another point worth mentioning is, the exclusion of 
an insider from board membership, which was not the case before the Banking 
Business Proclamation was enacted. In the Ethiopian banks, be it private or public, 
there are no executives or employees‟ representatives represented on the board.  I 
feel that exclusion is not right because executive directors can bring important input 
or information to the board which the non executives cannot secure easily. The only 
thing to fight the agency problem, in case it happens, is to balance between the non-
executive and executive board members and make executive boards non-voting and 
sometimes exclude them from some board meetings that concern them.” One of the 
public bank respondents also shares the above opinion: “There is no exception for 
the regulation issued by the NBE, which also applies to the public banks. There are 
no executive board members which, of course, would have been an added 
advantage if a limited number were included to serve the board as resource 
persons.”   
Interviewees from the private domain heavily stressed the problems 
associated with the nomination and selection of board members and question the 
manner in which it is practiced. They believe in the establishment and importance of 
a nomination committee to make a conscious decision in bringing about the right 
blend of board members. The current practice is that nomination and selection is 
done by the mass of shareholders during the annual general meetings. Some of the 
criticisms by the respondents are: “The way boards of directors are nominated is 
mostly orchestrated and influenced by large shareholders. It has been observed that 
those elected in this way are there to run the interests of a few individuals but not the 
mass of shareholders.” “The role of influential shareholders in board nomination and 
selection is significant. There is lobbying of the influential shareholders by the board 
in the nomination of new directors and removals of others before their terms expire.” 
 Respondents from the public domain do appreciate the nomination problems 
encountered by their private bank counter parts but they do not observe such 
problems in the public domain as nomination and selection are performed by the 
government. Rather they capitalize on the importance of assigning or appointing 
boards to the public banks by the government. One of the public bank respondents 
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said the following: “It has to be clear that assignment of boards to the public banks is 
based on considerations of experience and backgrounds from the various sectors 
that include agriculture, industry, finance, trade and the like so as to meet/ address 
the developmental agendas in these sectors. There is an advantage in the diversity 
of the board composition such as easy access to the government and high 
facilitation as members are representatives of the government. The board 
chairperson or president of the bank can easily access and discuss even with 
regional presidents in the country about loans and if loans are not returned as 
promised, their budget allocation by the government might be questioned. The 
chairpersons of the public banks have the strongest influence and play a big role in 
every aspect as they are big government officials. If the chairperson is strong or 
weak, the outcome depends on the attributes of the chairperson. Due to the nature 
of composition of the public banks, bank presidents do not challenge the board even 
if their territory is trespassed. There is also a tendency for some board members to 
serve as rubber-stamp of the chairperson.”   
In line with the above, another public bank respondent added the following: 
“Boards that are appointed by the government are resourceful and useful in 
networking as they bring skills and experience related to the organization or 
ministries that they lead. Decisions are almost unanimous as they have common 
interests, which are essentially developmental and commercial.”  
To recap the above responses, there is a consensus in regard to the need for 
a majority body of non-executives board of directors, in the boardroom, as inferred 
from both the private and public bank respondents. Respondents from both domains 
agreed that the non-executive directors are independent of the organization with 
independent viewpoints and can bring in outside experience and networking to the 
banks. The nonexecutive directors may lack knowledge and understanding of 
complexities of the business and may face difficulty in executing their strategic, 
service and control roles. Blending a limited number of executive directors with a 
majority of non-executive directors in the boardroom may help substantially resolve 
the problem. The executive directors are believed to be rich in inside experience. In 
this connection, a recent study made by Semenova and Savchenko (2015) who used 
the 2010 bank-level data from 112 countries show that combining CEO and chair of 
board of directors‟ positions and a high number of executive directors on the board 
would reduces banks‟ profitability. In considering the mix of the board of directors, 
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nomination and selection should be based on merit that includes relevant 
knowledge, experience, skill and networking. Whether private or public (election or 
appointment), a conscious choice that takes into account merits of the candidates be 
given prime importance and be done professionally by a nomination committee. The 
interview results are consistent with the survey findings (sections 7.4 and 7.5 of this 
chapter) and complement each other in the sense that there is lack of a proper 
mechanism of nomination and selection of board of directors. 
Conflict of Interest and Malpractices 
The comments on malpractices of board of directors followed the discussions 
of board remunerations and nomination process. Respondents believe that the 
problem is not as such rampant and out of control and they felt that it has very much 
to do with the remuneration and nomination of boards. One of the private bank 
respondents has described the status of malpractices in the following way. “Conflict 
of interest and fighting among board members are recent phenomenon observed in 
some private banks and most people believe that the enactment of the Banking 
Business Proclamation No. 592/2008 and the subsequent directives were responses 
to limit the conflict of interests and misbehaving of boards of directors.” 
Another respondent forwarded opinion linking it with board payments as 
stated under the board remuneration section of the interview analysis.  He said, “…in 
spite of the small payment, there is still a fight to have a sit on the board. This may 
suggest that the suspicion that there might be indirect benefits linked with some 
malpractices like facilitation of loans in collaboration with management is credible. 
The boardroom atmosphere is not noble as expected as some members have 
different motives, which may not include safeguarding the interests of shareholders” 
 The public board respondents are of the opinion that conflict of interest and 
corruption are not serious problems in the public banks because boards are 
assigned in order to advance primarily the developmental agenda of the state. One 
of the public bank respondents gave the following comments. “The primary purpose 
of appointment of the board members is to advance the goal of the government so 
conflict of interest is almost nonexistent, while may be prevalent in the private banks. 
Decisions are almost unanimous as board members have common interests, which 
are developmental and commercial.” 
 Another respondent from the same sector said the following: “Of course the 
remuneration amount compared to the previous times is not that big, which might 
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demotivate members. When it comes to the public banks no conflict of interest has 
been observed as a result of insufficient incentives. This is because board members 
are public officials and /or policy makers assigned to perform dual roles of 
developmental and commercial character. Board membership is considered a part of 
their assignment in their capacity as government officials. Board members are also 
assigned in order to align the banks‟ strategy with the overall strategy of the country 
pertaining to investment, manufacturing, trade and the like.” 
Role of the Regulatory Agencies and Code of Best Practices  
The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) is the central bank of the country which 
was initially established in 1963 and underwent several reforms until it was 
reorganized in 1994 under the market-based economic policy; it was entrusted with 
the responsibility of ensuring monetary stability, a sound financial system and such 
other credit and exchange conditions as are conducive for the balanced growth of 
the country‟s economy (www.nbe.gov.et).  To accomplish such important objectives 
of the NBE, it is essential that sound corporate governance practices are in place in 
the banking sector. Dermine (2013) in his study of bank corporate governance 
highlights the importance of bank supervision and concludes that bank governance 
should concern not only the board of directors but also the governance of banking 
supervision with clear accountability principles and with the objective of a sound 
banking system. It is, therefore, important that the regulatory organs ensure that 
banks have sound governance structures in place. 
To this end, NBE is vested with powers to licensing banking business; to set 
the criteria for eligibility for membership on a board of directors and  senior 
management, to approve the election of board of directors and  appointment of chief 
executive or senior executive officers; to remove the board of directors and chief 
executive or senior executive officers; to determine the maximum remuneration of 
members of board of directors; to regulate and protect the rights of shareholders and 
limit the acquisition of shares; to regulate transactions that could give rise to possible 
conflicts of interest; to ensure that banks disclose material information such as 
financial statements and other reports to the public; and to inspect any bank 
periodically or at any time so that banks comply with the regulations issued by the 
governing bank (www.nbe.gov.et). To date Ethiopia has no capital market and any 
institution responsible for crafting the voluntary code of best practices of corporate 
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governance. Shares have been sold freely to the public in the absence of a stock 
market and a strong regulatory framework.  
In reference to the role of the NBE to regulate and supervise the banking 
business and the importance of codes of best practices in fostering good corporate 
governance, respondents have the following opinions. One of the interviewees 
challenges the capacity and commitment of the NBE in ensuring good corporate 
governance. The respondent said: “I appreciate the importance of the regulatory 
body (the NBE) in the Ethiopian situation where there are no stock markets, where 
shares are freely sold to people without any control, where there is lack of codes of 
corporate governance.  I do not think the NBE has the institutional capacity to craft 
the codes of practices, if it had, it would have done it long ago when corporate forms 
of organizations come into picture. In my view, its capacity is to issue strong 
regulations that are not of much benefit to the private banks. I do not think the 
directives that it issues are based on a study. It did not even take the initiative to train 
the board of directors to assure good governance prevails.”    
Two respondents also commented on the NBE‟s effort in ensuring good 
corporate governance. The first respondent expressed the view that “NBE as a 
regulatory organ does not make strict control and provide training or create 
awareness on corporate governance. It should have been this organ that takes the 
initiative for the development of codes of corporate governance. It is really very 
unfortunate to observe that there are some board members who do not really know 
about or have very limited knowledge of corporate governance.”  The second 
respondent added the following comment, “NBE has failed to give trainings on basic 
corporate governance principles to the current and new board members.”  
Comments about board members regarding the interest they demonstrate to 
learn about corporate governance principles were not positive. One respondent said 
that, “The board members have clear lack of interest to know about sound corporate 
governance, the Commercial Code of Ethiopia, the banking business proclamation 
and the directives of the NBE.” Another respondent commented on the nomination 
process and the consequences for sound corporate governance as follows: “The 
corporate governance situation in Ethiopia is worrisome as it is new and most of us 
have limited knowledge and we do not really know its very essence. The way boards 
of directors are elected is on a lobby basis. It is not merit based and if some 
intervention is not made in good time the consequences can be disastrous with 
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shareholders losing confidence and trust in corporate forms of organizations. The 
NBE, the regulatory body, has to revise the current board nomination criteria and 
more clearly formulate a new set by consulting the experiences of other countries 
and based on local studies. I also propose that those elected must have a 
reasonable investment (shareholdings) so that they have a sense of belonging and 
feel like they are governing their individual business. That should be the way board 
members should be elected.” The interview findings are consistent with the survey 
results (sections 7.4 and 7.5) about the institutional capacity of the NBE and interest 
of boards in promoting good governance.  
Other General Concerns 
Respondents expressed concern regarding the low level of motivation of boards 
to understand the following issues: banking business, role and responsibilities of 
boards, principles of good governance and the rules and regulations issued by the 
NBE. They believe that knowing the basic things about the above issues is at least a 
good start in promoting good practices. One respondent mentioned the limited 
knowledge of board members on the industry as follows, “In some instances, the 
management controls the board as the board lacks basic knowledge of the banking 
industry. The board of directors becomes a board of management and the situation 
is just like „the tail wags the dog‟.” The importance of awareness creation and 
training to a board of directors was raised several times by the interviewees as 
important for boards to ably and diligently carry out their duties. Some aired the 
following views, 
 There is also lack of alignment between rights and duties of boards. A significant 
number of members hardly know their duties, which explains why boards 
interfere in operations which is totally out of their scope. 
 Boards intentionally appoint weak management in order to manipulate it easily 
and interfere in management duties. This has been observed in at least one of 
the private banks which I am working in. 
 The board room atmosphere is not as expected because members have different 
motives, and are not necessarily there to safeguard the interests of shareholders. 
This emanates largely from lack of awareness about board duties and 
commitment to good practices. Such problems can be resolved if periodic training 
is given to boards by the concerned bodies and banks take the initiative to 
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develop a code of best practices until a responsible organ is established for this 
purpose. 
  Interestingly enough one respondent from the private bank domain, who was 
an actor in the regulatory organ, commented on how board members are appointed 
in the public domain and the predictability of their tenure. The respondent said, “With 
regard to the tenure of board members in case of public banks, it is highly 
unpredictable as the members are appointees of the government and most of them 
have the rank of director or state minister or minister in their parent ministerial offices 
or are management members of the privatization and government developmental 
enterprises control agency. They stay on as board members as long as they hold 
their vital positions where they are employed. The moment they are removed from 
their former positions they will quit as board members. So my understanding is that 
there is a problem of predictability of public board terms which might have an impact 
on the performance and extent of commitment of the members.” 
7.7 Summary  
This chapter empirically examined the corporate governance practice 
perceptions of the governing bodies (Sample-1) and various stakeholder groups 
(Sample-2) from the banking sector in Ethiopia. The study employed questionnaire 
survey involving 106 governing bodies and 311 stakeholders. The aspects of 
corporate governance that were examined include: the principles of good corporate 
governance (OECD), strategies and approaches to promote good governance, 
characteristics of the Ethiopian boards, key corporate governance issues and related 
concerns in regard to the emerging Ethiopian market economy setting. The two 
groups of samples were analyzed separately and ultimately merged to enable overall 
evaluations. Separate analyses were made to understand the perceptions of the 
various stakeholder groups and answer research questions five and six. Moreover, 
major corporate governance problems and recommendations to improve corporate 
governance practices were analyzed. Finally, in order to enhance the results of the 
quantitative analysis and/ or help bi-directionally inform the two differing datasets, 
the qualitative in-depth interview was analyzed for patterns emerged forming five 
specific corporate governance themes. In this section a summary of the combined 
results of sample-1 and 2 is presented. 
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The results of the analysis show that ownership is relatively concentrated in 
the hands of the largest shareholders (each possessing up to 5% of holdings) 
effectively controlling the bank with substantial voting rights. This perception of 
concentration is shared between the respondents of the private bank governing 
bodies and the shareholders.  However, the examination of the exercise of the basic 
principles of the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders; transparency and 
disclosure appear to be in good status as presented in Appendices 7.4 and 7.5. The 
findings reveal that the financial supervisory agency is perceived to be the most 
important stakeholder with a key role in promoting and improving corporate 
governance, the other stakeholders including professional societies, the chamber of 
commerce, the judiciary and non-executive boards are considered to have little 
importance.  
The respondents‟ evaluations of the relative importance of stakeholders in 
abating the influence of controlling owners shows that the majority of the subjects 
believe the financial supervisory agencies is relatively the most important in 
controlling the undue influence of controlling owners followed by the legal system 
and non-executive boards of directors. However, the respondents‟ belief in 
institutional investors, labour unions and minority shareholders as important 
stakeholders in controlling the undue influence of large shareholders is relatively 
weak.  
The examination of the relative effectiveness of tasks or strategies that would 
bring good corporate governance reveals that the majority of the respondents are of 
the view that internal corporate governance mechanisms, introducing codes, 
enhancing the standards of accounting and auditing, and external corporate 
governance mechanisms are important tasks in this regard.  
The perception of the respondents regarding the boards‟ individual and group 
experience, effectiveness and approach in running their respective banks shows that 
the vast majority of the respondents rated them as at least good ( good and very 
good). It is also found that the vast majority of the respondents characterize the 
Ethiopian board of directors as control oriented 333 (80%), followed by strategic 206 
(50%) and service 124 (30%) oriented.   
With regard to the preferred governance approach to promote good corporate 
governance practices in Ethiopia, the vast majority of the respondents (78%) 
proposed a mixed approach. More than two-thirds of both the governing bodies and 
210 
stakeholder respondents believe that the remunerations for the board is not enough 
while 62%  have the conviction that the compensations for the senior management 
group are sufficient even though they are not linked to their performances.   
The governing bodies were given the chance to compare the corporate 
governance practices of their bank with the practices in other banks and with those 
of the previous years. The majority indicated that the practices in their banks was 
„much better‟ (36%) and „slightly better‟ (28%) than other banks. Similarly 54% and 
33% felt that corporate governance performance was „much better‟ and „better‟ 
respectively compared to earlier years. The group of stakeholders also agrees that 
current corporate governance practices are much better compared with those of the 
previous years.  All the board‟s respondents confirmed that they work with the audit 
committee but there are no nomination and remuneration committees to work with.   
Examining the relationship between the board and top management and more 
specifically with the president, the vast majority of stakeholders seem to feel that 
there is a smooth relationship between the board and top management as well as 
between the board and the presidents of the banks. The investigation of board 
independence from the chairperson and the larger shareholders shows that the 
board members are not free from the influence of both. 
 Regarding board duties, the majority of stakeholders believe that boards of 
directors discharge their duties adequately and are satisfied with the performances 
of the banks owing to the joint group effort by the board, executives and employees. 
They further indicated that their banks besides generating profit for shareholders 
have the goal of assuring the well-being of various stakeholders. 
Respondents also identified major corporate governance issues/ problems 
prevailing in their banks and these were categorized into ten themes which include: 
lack of relevant knowledge, limited experience, understanding (awareness) of 
corporate governance by boards and key stakeholders; lack of integrity, conflict of 
interest and corruption of board members; limited capacity of the regulatory body 
(National Bank of Ethiopia) and undue intervention by the same; influence of large 
shareholders/ownership concentration; lack of proper national code of corporate 
governance practices or comprehensive regulation; lack of transparency; boards‟ 
lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities;  interference of board of directors in 
managerial and operational activities that undermine the autonomy of managers; and 
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poor remuneration scheme for boards that affected their commitment to play their 
role; and lack of proper mechanism of nomination and selection of board of directors. 
Furthermore, respondents forwarded recommendations to address one or 
more of the issues identified above. The recommendations were synthesized to form 
the following set of themes:   
 a national codes of best practices has to be in place 
 regular capacity building systems for regulatory agencies and board members 
should be introduced; 
 board nominations should be standardized; 
 there should be more transparency and disclosure;  
 awareness on corporate governance in general and the board roles and 
responsibilities in particular needs to be created; 
 performance related remuneration schemes for board members should be 
introduced; and  
 follow up should be made to ensure board members and major shareholders 
keep the required distance form managerial and operational activities. 
  Finally, in order to capture corporate governance issues that were not covered 
by the quantitative analysis, semi-structured interview was employed. The findings of 
the interview were transcribed, categorized, summarized and presented in the above 
section. The results from the interview are integrated and triangulated with the 
quantitative results. The interview findings indicated a number of concerns and these 
were categorized under five main themes the included: the issue of commitment to 
good corporate governance; board compensation; board composition and 
nomination; conflict of interest and malpractices; and the role of the regulatory 
agencies and code of best practices. Of the above, lack of commitment 
demonstrated by the board of directors and the regulatory organ in advancing good 
corporate governance, the issue of insufficient compensation, the need for a 
nomination committee to have a proper blend of board composition, and  the 
capacity problem of the NBE were raised and emphasized as major concerns by the 
respondents.  
 In the following chapters, formal tests of hypothesis are performed and then 
the descriptive findings together with the interview results are triangulated and 
integrated for further analysis so as to make conclusions and research implications. 
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Chapter 8 Research Findings and Discussion  
8.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter, the intention is to make an evaluation of the structural model 
as well as present and discuss the major findings of the study in association with the 
hypotheses established in Chapter Three. The hypotheses are tested through the 
PLS structural model evaluation technique that examines relationships between the 
latent constructs. First, an overview of the inner model and PLS bootstrapping 
procedure will be briefly presented. Next, the bootstrapping process is used to 
measure the significance of the values of the outer model and inner model path 
coefficients (validity and quality of structural model). Then, the results of the 
structural model obtained through the bootstrapping process of the SmartPLS are 
analysed to answer the research questions. Finally, the results are revisited and 
discussed in light of the corporate governance theoretical perspectives and prior 
empirical evidence and also triangulated using qualitative results in order to give 
meanings to the findings. 
 
8.2 PLS Structural Model Evaluation and Hypothesis Testing 
 PLS-SEM is used when the goal is predicting and explaining variance of 
target constructs. PLS employs path models which are diagrams used to visually 
display the hypotheses and variable relationships. A PLS path model is composed of 
two elements: the structural model (also called the inner model) and the 
measurement mode (also referred to as the outer models). The structural model 
represents the constructs and also displays the relationships (paths) between the 
constructs. The measurement model displays the relationships between the 
constructs and the indicator variables. When latent variables (constructs) serve only 
as independent variables, they are called exogenous latent variables. These are the 
constructs that predict or explain other constructs in the model. When the constructs 
serve only as dependent variables in at least one casual relationship, they are called 
endogenous latent variables. These are the constructs that are being explained in 
the model (Hair et al., 2014a & b; Gotz et al., 2010). 
 Partial least squares analysis tool is used to obtain results for both the 
measurement (outer) model and structural (inner) models.  First the outer model has 
to be assessed for reliability and validity before the inner model is tested. That is, the 
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measurement model has to be tested to see how well the indicator variables of 
theoretical constructs relate to one another as well as how well their variances are 
captured by the latent variables. This is done by PLS-CFA tests that provide 
evidence of construct validity. According to Hair et al. (2014a: 641), “CFA alone is 
limited in its ability to examine the nature of relationships between constructs beyond 
simple correlations. Thus, a measurement theory is often a means to the end of 
examining relationships between constructs, not an end in itself”. It means, CFA 
ensures only the quality of measurement model in terms of validity but does not 
determine the nature and extent of relationships between latent variables; however, 
its outputs are used as inputs in performing the structural model evaluation. To this 
end, the inner (structural) model is considered to measure the nature and magnitude 
of relationships among the constructs. 
 The PLS method, which is a variance based approach, does not have an 
overall goodness of fit measure unlike the covariance based approach. This is due to 
the fact that PLS is based on the assumption of distribution-free variance. However, 
the quality (overall goodness) of the structural model can be determined using non-
parametrical tests such as the endogenous variables‟ determination coefficient (R2), 
and direction and significance of path coefficients (Hair et al., 2014a & b; Sanchez, 
2013; Gotz et al., 2010). The coefficient of determination (R2), a normalized term that 
can assume values between 0 and 1, is the level or share of the latent construct‟s 
explained variance. There is no generalizable value about the acceptable threshold 
values of R2, however, to achieve a higher level of variance explained by the 
exogenous variable, a larger R2 is recommended (Gotz et al., 2010). Hair et al. 
(2014b) and Wong (2013) consider the magnitude of the R2 as a criterion to 
determine the predictive relevance of an exogenous variable and  describe R2 values 
of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 as weak, moderate, and substantial explanatory powers, 
respectively.  
 In a PLS structural model, the path coefficient represents a directional 
relationship between constructs and the coefficients are similar to the standardized 
beta coefficients (values between -1 and +1) in a regression relationship (Hair et al., 
2104b; Gotz et al., 2010). A general rule of thumb is that, structural path coefficients 
with standardized values above 0.20 are significant and indicate the extent of 
influence of the independent variable up on the dependent variable and also 
determine the strength of predictability of the independent variable (Hair et al., 
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2014b). However, the significance (goodness) of the path coefficients estimated in 
the measurement model of the PLS has to be tested by the empirical t-values for 
their goodness. The standard error and t-values are obtained by means of the 
bootstrapping process of the PLS. Bootstrapping is a resampling iterative procedure 
used to generate the t-values. The number of bootstrap samples should be high to 
avoid bias and Hair et al. (2014b) recommend using 5000 bootstrap subsamples 
though this number requires more computer time to run. Path coefficients with 
empirical t-values greater than the critical t-value are statistically significant showing 
the hypothesized direction and support the proposed causal relationship. On the 
contrary, path coefficients with smaller t-values are statistically insignificant. 
Insignificant paths and/or those that show signs contrary to the hypothesized 
direction do not support a hypothesis (Gotz et al., 2010). 
 As has been indicated above, both the outer and inner models results can be 
obtained and presented simultaneously; however, in this study both are presented 
separately only for convenience purposes. That is, a measurement model was 
presented in Chapter Six followed by descriptive statistics of validated constructs 
and the bivariate correlation analysis as preliminary hypotheses test and support for 
the structural model.   
 The following procedure suggested by Hair et al. (2014b:169) is adopted in 
assessing the structural model. 
Step 1.  Assess structural model for collinearity issues. 
Step 2. Assess the significance and relevance of the structural model 
relationships. 
Step 3.  Assess the level of R2. 
Step 4 . Assess the effect sizes f2.  
Step 5. Assess the predictive relevance Q2 and the q2 effect sizes. 
 Before assessing the quality of the structural model in light of the key criteria 
set (significance of path coefficients, level of R2, effect size f2 and predictive 
relevance Q2), Hair et al. (2014b)  and Wong (2013), advise that the structural model 
be checked for collinearity problems. Therefore, one of the considerations in the 
PLS-SEM is multicollinearity assessment of the inner model and this is also a 
concern for this study as the first order model has seven exogenous variables. This 
test helps to check for potential collinearity problem so early decision can be made to 
eliminate, or merge variables into a single construct, or develop a higher order 
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construct (Hair et al., 2014b; Wong, 2013). To perform a collinearity test for this 
study, the latent variables score of the SmartPLS output was imported and used as 
input for SPSS version 20 to get the tolerance or Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
values. To avoid the collinearity problem, a tolerance level of higher than 0.20 or VIF 
of 5 or lower should be obtained in the test (Hair et al., 2014b). The hypotheses for 
this study are anchored (based) at a second order level, so collinearity problem may 
not be a serious concern. However, to support it statistically, collinearity 
assessments of the exogenous latent variables are performed both for the first and 
second order models. The following sets of exogenous variables (predictors) were 
assessed for collinearity in the first and second order models: SBInd, SComm, 
SComp, PrCog, PrBrA, PrCom, PrCon, BStruct and BProcess. Table 8.1 presents 
tolerance and VIF values of SPSS output. The full report of the collinearity 
diagnostics is given in Appendix 8.1. 
Table 8. 1: Collinearity Assessments (Tolerance and VIF values of SPSS 
output) 
First order 
exogenous latent  variables  
Collinearity Statistics Second order 
 exogenous constructs 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
SBInd (Board Independence) .634 1.576 BStruct (Board structure) .475 2.105 
SComm ( Board committee) .633 1.581 BProcess (Board Process) .475 2.105 
SComp ( Board composition) .654 1.529   
PrCog ( Cognitive conflict) .386 2.587 
PrBrA Boardroom activity) .389 2.567 
PrCom ( board commitment) .396 2.525 
PrCon ( process conflict) .813 1.230 
a. Dependent Variable: Serole or Controle 
 
 Looking at Table 8.1, it is noted that all of the first order and second order 
exogenous latent variables‟ tolerance values and VIFs are higher than 0.20 and 
lower than 5, respectively. Therefore, there is no collinearity problem among the 
predictor variables both at the first and second order structural model of this study. 
Thus, the study can continue by examining the significance of the path coefficients, 
the R2 of the endogenous latent variables and their associated effect sizes, the 
predictive relevance of exogenous variable together with their effect sizes in order to 
evaluate or determine the quality of the structural model. 
 In this section, the structural model outcomes for the first order and second 
order are presented. First, significance of values of the outer loadings is considered 
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before moving to the second order model. The figures below give a graphical 
representation of the full model on the basis of which the structural model results are 
reported.   
 
 
Figure 8.1:  Full PLS- PM with path coefficients 
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 Figure 8.2:  Full PLS- PM with bootstrap results  
A review of the t-statistics from the above diagram shows that all the reflective 
indicators loadings (outer model) are highly significant at the 5%. The t-statistic of 
the outer model, which is presented above in the diagram, is also given in a tabular 
form in Appendix 8.2. 
 From the above diagram it is also observed that all the path coefficients in the 
inner model are statistically highly significant at the 5% level. The path coefficients 
denote the direction as well as the strength of the relationships between the latent 
variables.  As this is the focus of this chapter, further details of the path coefficients 
in terms of their mean, standard deviations and t-values of the first and second order 
full model are presented in Table 8.2 below. 
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Table 8. 2: Path coefficients of the first and second order full model (Mean, 
STDEV, T-Values) 
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Control role -> BCont 0.926 0.926 0.017 0.017 53.73 
Control role -> OCont 0.878 0.880 0.028 0.028 31.88 
Control role -> SCont 0.884 0.883 0.024 0.024 36.14 
Process -> Control role 0.517 0.507 0.078 0.078 6.63 
Process -> Pr Cog 0.902 0.901 0.032 0.032 28.34 
Process -> PrBrA 0.870 0.871 0.027 0.027 32.38 
Process -> PrCom 0.881 0.883 0.022 0.022 40.03 
Process -> PrCon -0.463 -0.426 0.219 0.219 2.11 
Process -> Service role 0.531 0.521 0.098 0.098 5.42 
Service role -> SerAd 0.839 0.843 0.031 0.031 27.26 
Service role -> SerNwI 0.666 0.665 0.077 0.077 8.64 
Service role -> SerNwR 0.784 0.784 0.052 0.052 15.23 
Service role -> SerSp 0.943 0.943 0.009 0.009 101.08 
Structure -> Control role 0.381 0.388 0.074 0.074 5.13 
Structure -> Process 0.725 0.739 0.049 0.049 14.85 
Structure -> SBInd 0.761 0.768 0.045 0.045 16.95 
Structure -> SComm 0.781 0.785 0.080 0.080 9.82 
Structure -> SComp 0.784 0.791 0.060 0.060 13.07 
Structure -> Service role 0.301 0.309 0.087 0.087 3.46 
 
 So far the information needed to evaluate the PLS-SEM model that includes 
outer model loadings, construct reliability and validity, and significance of inner path 
coefficients were examined and the result is meaningful models. All R2 values are 
also higher than 0.52. This implies that the estimated model fits the survey data well 
with R2 values of 0.53, 0.61, and 0.70 for board process, board service role, and 
board control role, respectively. The results are very good (Chin, 1998) and support 
the validity of the structural model. Furthermore, these R2 values of the endogenous 
variables show good predictive power of the exogenous variables.  
 However, this good fit of model alone is not sufficient unless examination of 
the individual structural parameter estimates against the established hypotheses is 
carried out. This takes us to testing the research‟s hypothesis considering the PLS 
inner (structural) model results.  
 
8.3  Hypotheses Testing of Second Order Model Based on PLS Structural 
Results 
 The second order structural model which, addresses the research‟s major 
hypotheses, is considered in the hypotheses testing process. Table 8.3 is an 
extraction of second order inner model results from Table 8.2 above.  
219 
Table 8. 3: The second order (structural) model results (Mean, STDEV, T-
Values) 
Path 
From -> to  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P-value 
Structure ->Service role  0.301 0.309 0.087 0.087 3.46 0.0* 
Structure -> Control role 0.381 0.388 0.074 0.074 5.13 0.0* 
Structure -> Process 0.725 0.739 0.049 0.049 14.85 0.0* 
Process -> Control role 0.517 0.507 0.078 0.078 6.63 0.0* 
Process -> Service role 0.531 0.521 0.098 0.098 5.42 0.0* 
*Significant at p<0.01 (one-tailed). Values calculated using bootstrapping method with 5,000 bootstrap   
samples.  
 
 Table 8.3 reveals that all the five theorized structural paths and estimated 
coefficients are significant at 1% and also in the predicted directions, providing 
further support for the validity and acceptability of the structural model. Furthermore, 
as can be seen from Table 8.3 that hypotheses H1a to H3 are all strongly supported 
(p<0.01) by the empirical outputs (coefficients of the predictive paths) of the 
structural model. Earlier the study determined the predictive relevance of the model 
by looking only at the magnitude of the R-square and now the study will reconfirm 
the predictive relevance of the theoretical/structural path model by applying the 
blindfolding procedure of the SmartPLS technique. The blindfolding procedure 
calculates Q2 (predictive relevance), where Q2 > 0 indicates the model has predictive 
relevance and  Q2 < 0 represents lack of predictive relevance of the exogenous 
construct on the specified endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2014b; Chin, 2010). A 
relative measure of predictive relevance (Q2) values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 
respectively, indicate that an exogenous construct has a small, medium, or large 
predictive relevance for an endogenous latent variable (Hair et al., 2014b; Wong, 
2013; Chin, 2010). A cross-validated redundancy Q2 is recommended if prediction is 
made by latent variables that predict the endogenous constructs and a blindfolding 
procedure is performed for one reflective target construct at a time. Now getting back 
to this particular study, the analysis for the predictive relevance is done by running 
the blindfolding algorithm first with the board service role construct, followed by the 
board control role construct and finally with the board process construct. Table 8.4 
presents the summary of blindfolding results for the specified constructs; full results 
are provided in Appendix 8.3. From Appendix 8.3, it can be noted that the predictive 
relevance of most of the first order exogenous latent variables is high ranging from 
0.24 to 0.59 except for Prcon which is 0.13. 
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Table 8. 4: Summary of blindfolding (Cross-validated Redundancy, Q2) results 
for the second order endogenous constructs 
Endogenous Construct SSO SSE Q2 = 1-SSE/SSO 
Board Service role 2332.00 1685.95 0.28 
Board control role 1378.00 858.80 0.38 
Board process 1802.00 1380.73 0.23 
SSE= Sum of squared observations; SSE= Sum of squared prediction errors 
 
 All Q2 results, in the above table, are considerably high and above zero 
providing further evidence that the model has, in general, a good predictive 
relevance to the endogenous latent variables. However, it is necessary to assess the 
effect sizes of the predictive relevance of the exogenous variables on the 
endogenous latent variables. The Q2 effect sizes are calculated manually by 
applying the following formula:  
Effect size:  Q2= Q2included- Q
2
excluded/1- Q
2
included 
Where „Q2 included‟ represents the predictive relevance when the exogenous variable 
is included in the model, and „Q2 excluded‟ refers to the predictive relevance when the 
exogenous variable is excluded from the model. The following effect sizes: Q2 values 
are used for assessment to determine a constructs‟ relationship to an endogenous 
construct in the structural model: 0.02 to 0.15 small, 0.16 to 0.35 medium, or greater 
than 0.35 large effect sizes (Hair et al., 2014b; Wong, 2013; Chin, 2010). 
Table 8. 5: Determination of effect sizes 
Direct Path 
From exogenous   -> To endogenous 
Q
2
included 
(with 
exogenous) 
Q
2
excluded( 
without  
exogenous) 
Effect size (Q 
2
) 
Structure ->Service role  0.28 0.26 0.03 
Structure -> Control role 0.38 0.34 0.07 
Structure -> Process 0.23 0.45 0.29 
Process -> Control role 0.28 0.22 0.08 
Process -> Service role 0.38 0.31 0.11 
 
 The Q2 effect sizes range from 0.03 to 0.29 reflecting a relatively small impact 
on the endogenous variables. For example, the Q2 effect size of board structure on 
board service role is 0.03 which implies that the relationship between board structure 
and board service role is relatively small. The board process has the highest 
relevance in explaining both the board service and board control role constructs in 
the structural mode. In general, all the Q2s together with their effect sizes confirm 
that the model has achieved a good predictive relevance for the endogenous 
variables. With this general statement, the study precedes to the examination of 
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each of the hypothesis. The following diagram represents the second order 
constructs on the basis of which the hypothesis are established followed by Table 
8.6 which summarizes the models‟ results for the hypothesised relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Second order PLS structural model results extracted from Figures 8.1 
and 8.2 
 
Table 8. 6: Summary of hypotheses testing results  
Direct Path 
From  -> To 
Path 
coefficient 
T 
Statistics  
 
P-value 
Direction of 
hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
supported 
or not 
Structure ->Service role  0.301 3.46 0.0* H1a+ Supported 
Structure -> Control role 0.381 5.13 0.0* H1b+ Supported 
          Structure -> Process 0.725 14.85 0.0* H3+ Supported 
          Process -> Control role 0.517 6.63 0.0* H2a+ Supported 
          Process -> Service role 0.531 5.42 0.0* H2b+ Supported 
         Indirect path (Total Effects) 
         From  -> To 
Structure -> Service role  0.687 17.94 0.0* H4a+ Supported 
Structure -> Control role 0.756 12.6 0.0* H4b+ Supported 
* Significant at p<0.01 (one-tailed).  Significance levels computed with 5000 bootstrap samples. 
 
8.3.1 Hypotheses H1a to H3 
Hypothesis H1a examines if there is a positive and significant relationship 
between board structure construct and board service role construct. Table 8.6 of the 
PLS result reveals that H1a is supported. That is, a well structured board directly, 
significantly and positively influences board service performances. Thus, it can be 
concluded that board structure is a good predictor of board service performances.  
With regard to H1b which investigates whether board structure is directly and 
positively related to board control role, the PLS output shows that it directly and 
positively influences the board control role. This gives support to H1b confirming that 
H1b+, 0.38,  
P= 0.00* 
Board 
structure 
Board 
Process 
R
2
=0.53 
Board 
service role  
R
2
=0.61 
Board 
control role 
 R
2
=0.70 
H1a+, 0.30,  
P= 0.00* 
H2b+, 0.52,  
P= 0.00* 
H2a+, 0.53,  
P= 0.00* 
H3+, 0.73,  
P= 0.00* 
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board structure is a good predictor of board control performances. That is, the board 
structure significantly contributes to explaining the board control performances. 
Considering H3 hypothesizing a direct and positive relationships between 
board structure and board process, the PLS output in Table 8.6 reveals that there is 
a  direct, strong and positive relationship (with a predictive path coefficient of 0.725) 
between the two latent variables proving strong support to H3. This is in line with the 
literature which demonstrates that a properly structured board with the right blend 
will have positive impact on the board‟s decision making activities.  
H2a and H2b are concerned with the direct relationship between board 
process and board service role; and board process and board control role, 
respectively. Table 8.6 of the PLS results reveals that board process is directly and 
positively related to the board service performances. The same holds true for H2b 
that board process directly influences the board control performances. Thus, both 
H2a and H2b are supported by the PLS results. 
 
8.3.2 The Mediation Effect of the Board Process 
H4a and H4b test the mediation effect of board process on board service and 
control performances, respectively. Both test the indirect relationship of the board 
structure to board service and control roles mediated through the board process. 
Specifically, H4a theorizes that a properly structured board is indirectly positively 
related to the board service performance mediated through the board process; and 
H4b hypothesizes that a properly structured board is indirectly positively related to 
the board control performance mediated through the board process. Table 8.6 of the 
PLS output shows that board structure indirectly positively and significantly 
influences both the service and control roles. Hence, both H4a and H4b are strongly 
supported. That is, the mediating hypothesis involving the board process latent 
variable is supported. To further confirm the extent of influence (substantial or not) of 
the exogenous variable (board structure) up on the endogenous variables (board 
service and control roles), it is necessary to work out the change in the determination 
coefficient with and without the mediator variable as given in Table 8.7 below. Once 
the mediating effects are established, to determine whether a mediator latent 
variable has a substantial influence on the dependent latent variable, it is necessary 
to determine the „effect size, f2. This is calculated by estimating the structural model 
twice, once with and once without the independent latent variable. Then, the f2 
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values are used to determine the effect size (strength) of the mediating variable‟s 
weak, moderate or substantial influence on the particular latent endogenous 
variable. The following effect size categories, f2, values are used for assessment: 
0.02 to 0.15 weak, 0.16 to 0.35 moderate and greater than 0.35 strong (Cohen, 
1988; Chin, 1998; Gotz et al., 2010). 
Effect size:  f2= R2included- R
2
excluded/1- R
2
included 
Where „R2 included‟ represents the overall variance explained by the mediated model 
that includes the board process variable, and „R2 excluded‟ refers to the overall 
variance explained by the model without the board process variable. The R2s of the 
endogenous variables of board service and control roles of the mediated model are 
0.61 and 0.70 which are rather high.  Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the non-mediated 
models. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4:  Outer loadings and path coefficients for non mediated model (without 
board process construct) 
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Figure 8. 5: Bootstrap results of the non-mediated model (excluding board process) 
Table 8. 7: Path Coefficients of structural model without board process (Mean, 
STDEV, T-Values) 
  
Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Structure -> Service role 0.686591 0.690659 0.055810 0.055810 12.302300 
Structure -> Control role 0.755290 0.756738 0.046004 0.046004 16.417976 
 
From Figures 8.4 and 8.5 and Table 8.7, it can be observed that the outer 
model loadings and inner model path coefficients without mediation are all significant 
at p<0.01 (one-tailed). Specifically the direct effects of board structure on both 
service role and control role are significant when the board process (mediator) 
variable is excluded from the PLS path model. The inner path coefficients (total 
effect) are larger than the mediated path coefficients, which means that the mediator 
variable (board process) absorbs some of the total effect. Hence, the effect size 
(strength) of the mediator variable has to be determined by including it in the PLS 
path model, as shown below, and observe the changes in the path coefficients and 
the R2s.  
Table 8. 8: Relative explanatory power (effect size) of mediator for board 
service role 
Construct ( Mediator) R
2
included (with 
mediator) 
R
2
excluded( without  
mediator) 
Effect size (f 
2
) 
Board process  0,61 0.47 0.36 
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Table 8. 9: Relative explanatory power (effect size) of mediator for board 
control role 
Construct (Mediator) R
2
included R
2
excluded Effect size (f 
2
) 
Board process  0.70 0.57 0.43 
 
 Tables 8.8 and 8.9 reveal that the effect sizes (f2) of the board process on the 
two endogenous variables, board service role and board control role, are 0.36 and 
0.43, respectively. These values suggest that the board process latent variable 
serving as a mediator has a substantial (large) effect size (influence) in explaining 
both the board service role and board control role latent variables.  Thus, the board 
process‟s mediating role is strongly supported. Furthermore, the indirect effect (see 
Table 8.6 summary of hypotheses testing results above) coefficients are also 
significant implying that the mediator absorbs some of the direct effect. It is, 
therefore, crucial to determine the relative size of the mediating effects of the board 
process (mediator) in relation to the total effect (board structure latent variable) to 
determine the amount that the mediator absorbs and also decide whether the board 
process fully or partially mediates the situation. The VAF (Variance Accounted For) 
is used to determine the relative size of the mediating effect. According to Hair et al. 
(2014b), VAF determines the amount of the variance of target constructs that is 
explained by the indirect relationship through the mediator variable or the proportion 
of the variance of the dependent variable explained by the independent variable. The 
following criteria are set to determine mediation effects (Hair, 2014b): 
            VAF > 80%, Full mediation, 
 20% ≤ VAF≤ 80, Partial mediation, and  
             VAF < 20%, no mediation. 
 VAF = Indirect effect/ Total effect 
Table 8. 10: The relative size of the mediating effects of the board process  
 Indirect effect Total effect 
(Direct+Indirect) 
VAF 
Structure -> Service role 0.725*0.531= 0.385 0.302+0.385= 0.687 0.56 
Structure -> Control role 0.725*0.517= 0.375 0.381+0.375= 0.756 0.50 
 
The above table shows that the board process latent construct partially 
mediates the relationship between the board structure and the board service 
performance; and also between the board structure and the board control 
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performance with VAF values of 56% and 50%, respectively. Consequently, it can be 
inferred that 56% of the board structure‟s effect on the board service role is 
explained through the partial mediation of the board process latent variable. 
Likewise, 50% of the variation in the board control role construct is explained through 
the partial mediation of the board process latent variable. This also magnifies the 
relevance of the board structure‟s direct effects in explaining the endogenous 
variables. A summary of the structural model evaluation is provided in Table 8.11 
below for quick reference.  
Table 8. 11: Summary of structural model evaluation  
First order 
exogenous latent  variables  
Collinearity Statistics Second order 
 exogenous constructs 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
SBInd (Board Independence) .634 1.58 BStruct (Board structure) .475 2.11 
SComm ( Board committee) .633 1.58 BProcess (Board Process) .475 2.11 
SComp ( Board composition) .654 1.53  
PrCog ( Cognitive conflict) .386 2.59 
PrBrA Boardroom activity) .389 2.57 
PrCom ( board commitment) .396 2.53 
PrCon ( process conflict) .813 1.23 
 
 
 
Second order 
 endogenous constructs 
 
Mediator for board 
service role 
Implication  
     R
2
 
Explanatory 
power 
Mediator Effect 
size (f 
2
) 
 
Board Service role 
0.61 Moderate 
BProcess 0.36 Large effect,  VAF = 
56%, partial mediation 
Mediator for board 
control role 
 
Board Control role 0.70 Moderate Mediator  f 
2
  
Board process 
0.53 Moderate 
Bprocess 0.43 Large effect, VAF = 
50%, partial mediation 
Path 
From -> to  
Significance of path 
coefficients 
Predictive relevance 
Path 
Coefficients 
P-value Effect size (Q 
2
) Predictive relevance of 
exogenous  variables 
Structure ->Service role  0.301 0.0* 0.03 Small 
Structure -> Control role 0.381 0.0* 0.07 Small 
Structure -> Process 0.725 0.0* 0.29 Medium 
Process -> Control role 0.517 0.0* 0.08 Small 
Process -> Service role 0.531 0.0* 0.11 Closer to medium  
*Significant at p<0.01. 
The above summary of assessments confirms validity of the structural model. 
 
8.3.3 Moderation effects of ownership structure/ sub-sample analysis: H5a 
and H5b 
It has been hypothesized that the type of ownership (being private or public) 
has no significant bearing on the board service and control performances. In the 
hypothesis, ownership type (private or public) is designated as a moderator variable. 
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The nature of ownership has implication on the way boards are brought to 
representation. As stated in Chapter One section 1.4, the ways boards are brought 
to board membership differ in the private and public banks. That is, when the banks 
are owned privately by the shareholders, representation is by mere election by the 
shareholders while for the banks that are owned by the state, boards are appointed 
by the government. The assumption here is that the practice of election or 
appointment will have impact up on the strength of boards‟ service and control 
performances. The intention here is to see if the practice of election or appointment 
of boards affects the strength of the board performances. In this case, it was 
hypothesized that there is a categorical moderator variable, ownership type, that 
influences the relationships in the PLS path model. The aim, therefore, was to find 
out the strength of the effect of ownership type, moderator variable, by comparing 
PLS path models of the publicly owned and privately owned bank dataset to see 
whether different parameter estimates occur for each group (Hair et al., 2014b; 
Henseler et al., 2010).  
Henseler et al. (2010) consider the group comparison approach as a popular 
method of determining the effect of a categorical moderator variable up on the 
endogenous latent variable. To this end, the data is divided into two groups based up 
on moderator variable, the type of ownership, (Henseler et al., 2010), for analysis 
purposes. To see the effect of the moderator variable, it is necessary to determine its 
effect size by drawing separate PLS path models for private and public banks and 
observe differences in the path coefficients to find out the role of the moderator 
variable (see Appendix 8.4 for the path models). If no significant differences exist, 
the role of the moderator path coefficient variable is minimal. A moderator effect size 
is d = b1-b2; where b1 is private bank parameters and b2 public bank parameters. 
Table 8. 12: Structural path coefficients and moderator effect size 
Paths Path coefficient  
Effect size  
d = b1-b2 
From  to Global  
(full model) 
Private 
ownership (b1) 
Public 
ownership (b2) 
Board structure Board service role 0.302 0.225 0,365 -0.140 
Board structure Board control role 0.381 0.361 0.493 -0.132 
Board structure Board process 0.725 0.722 0.602 0,120 
Board process Board service role 0.531 0.586 0.115 0.471 
Board process Board control role 0.517 0.504 0.455 0.049 
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It is observed from Table 8.12 that there are considerable differences in the 
path coefficients between the two models. This implies that being private (board by 
election) or public (board by appointment), type of ownership, influences the 
relationships in terms of strength and/or direction between the exogenous variable 
and endogenous variables, that is (1) between board structure and board service 
and control roles, (2) between board structure and board process and (3) between 
board process and board service and control roles. 
Therefore for the current model, a moderator effect is present, which could 
mean that the board structure and board processes do not have a constant effect on 
board performances with changes in the type of ownership. Thus, ownership type 
matters. That is, ownership type moderates the relationship between board structure 
and board service and control performances; and between board structure and 
board process. On the basis of the results of the above analysis, hypotheses H5a 
and H5b are not supported 
To further confirm the above inference on the moderator‟s role, further analysis 
was conducted using SPSS to compare the equality of means of the endogenous 
second order latent variables of the structural model. To this end, the independent 
samples t- test was used to understand and determine if a difference exists between 
the means of: 
 board service task performances of private and public boards 
 board control task performances of private and public boards 
 board process performances of private and public boards 
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 PriPub N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
BStruct 
Private 85 3.9229 .52145 .05656 
Public 19 4.3041 .39691 .09106 
BProcess 
Private 84 3.6688 .49618 .05414 
Public 20 3.9588 .33662 .07527 
BServrole 
Private 80 3.6972 .56087 .06271 
Public 17 4.3182 .35646 .08646 
BControle 
Private 85 3.8324 .55553 .06026 
Public 20 4.4000 .33834 .07566 
 
Table 8. 14: Independent Samples T-Test: Comparison between private bank boards and public bank boards’ task 
performances 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df Sig.  
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Upper 
BStruct Equal variances assumed .766 .383 -2.994 102 .003 -.38122 .12732 -.63375 -.12868 
BProcess Equal variances assumed 1.681 .198 -2.477 102 .015 -.29006 .11708 -.52229 -.05782 
BServrole Equal variances assumed 1.237 .269 -4.371 95 .000 -.62102 .14207 -.90307 -.33898 
BControle Equal variances assumed 4.253 .051 -4.373 103 .000 -.56765 .12981 -.82509 -.31021 
 
Table 8. 13: Private and public bank board group descriptive statistics 
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Table 8.13 shows that the mean values for the four second order constructs 
(board structure, board process, board service task performance and board control 
task performances) are relatively higher for public banks than private banks. The 
independent samples t-test Table 8.14 also shows that there are significant 
differences in the means for each of the four latent variables, indicating that public 
banks‟ board average achievements are larger than those of private banks. When 
the finding is limited to the two endogenous target variables, board service and 
control task performances, the test indicates that public bank boards accomplish 
their role better than their private bank counterparts. Thus, one of the main reasons 
for such differences could be the way individuals are brought on board (i.e. through 
election or appointment). The difference observed in the mean board performances 
due to the difference in ownership structure is, thus, considered to be further 
evidence to the moderation effect, influencing both board service and control task 
performances. Thus hypotheses H5a and H5b are not supported.  
8.3.4 Ownership Structure and Overall Bank Performance 
The Ethiopian banking industry consists of both old and young banks, with 
years of service ranging from 2 to 106 years, with 32% being less than 5 years old 
(see Appendix 8.5). Table 8.15 displays a summary of the aggregate profitability 
levels of private and public sector banks. Though there is disparity in the profitability 
levels, all the sampled banks have positive return on their average assets. For the 
2013/14 financial year, the majority of the banks (8 banks, 62%) reported more than 
3% return on their assets. No bank reported less the 1.1% ROA, the highest being 
5% (see Appendix 8.6). The average ROA (profitability rate) of the private and public 
banks over the study period (2002/03-2013/14) is 2.56% and 2.06, respectively. The 
above figures serve as evidence that banks in the Ethiopian context are profitable 
regardless of their ownership structures.  
Thus, it was hypothesized (H6) in Chapter Three, section 3.3.4 that ownership 
structure (being private or public) has no significant bearing on the banks‟ overall 
performance measured in accounting terms. Banks‟ performance in financial terms is 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and this is in line with previous studies that 
examined bank profitability (La Porta et al., 2002; Kiyota et al., 2008; Ghosh, 2006; 
Grove et al., 2011; Kapur & Gualu, 2012; Bokpin, 2013; Nyamongo & Temesgen, 
2013; Rahman & Reja, 2015). ROA is a ratio of profit after tax divided by average 
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total assets and it measures the profit earned per dollar of assets and reflects how 
well the bank uses the banks‟ real investment resources to generate profits. To test 
the hypothesis, data was collected from the annual reports of banks. From the stand 
points of data availability, banks with more than 5 years of age were considered (see 
Appendix 8.7). The data set consists of 10 banks out of 16 owned by the private 
sector and all the 3 banks in the public sector. Data from financial statements of the 
banks for the years 2002/03-2013/14 (twelve years) were used to test the efficiency 
of banks in light of the difference in ownership structure.  
 
Table 8. 15: Summary of ROA, net profit and total assets of Ethiopian Banks 
Year 
 
ROA (%)* Net profit Total Assets 
Private 
banks 
Public 
Banks 
Private banks 
(Mn) 
Public 
Banks(Mn) 
Private 
banks (Mn) 
Public 
Banks(Mn) 
2002/03 1.12 0.73 57.4 530.50 6175 28224 
2003/04 2.17 0.7 150 413.20 9159 31725 
2004/05 2.19 1.47 290.9 642.30 12580 39551 
2005/06 2.43 1.87 432.81 868.00 16439 42582 
2006/07 2.26 1.93 599 956.00 22081 50837 
2007/08 2.48 2.67 737 1510.00 29170 58443 
2008/09 1.32 2.90 976.5 2048.00 39684 68412 
2009/10 3.25 2.23 1435 2097.00 50571 86612 
2010/11 3.58 2.40 2012 3147.00 63791 132996 
2011/12 3.48 3.10 2494 5897.00 75638 189175 
2012/13 3.18 2.77 2691 7009.00 93894 232160 
2013/14 3.26 2.00 3234 7883.00 110524 286341 
*Return on average asset 
Source: Researcher‟ computation from annual reports of individual banks 
 
In order to empirically establish whether ownership structure (private Vs public 
banks) has significant impact on financial performance measured in terms of 
profitability (ROA), the Independent samples t- test was used. The appropriateness 
of the parametric test was determined after the assumption of normality and equality 
of variances was met. The normality of the data was checked using the Kolmogorov 
Smirnov test as shown in Table 8.16 below and compare performance parameters of 
private and public sector banks. The results of the analysis are given below. 
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Table 8. 16 : Tests of Normality 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic df Sig. 
ROA .098 24 .200
*
 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. Test not significant 
as p>.05. 
 
The test indicates that the data are normally distributed with the test statistic of 0.098 which is smaller than the critical value of 
0.200 resulting in the acceptance of the null hypothesis of normality. 
Tables 8.17 and 8.18 present the outcomes of the data analysis on financial performance measures based on differences in the 
ownership structure of banks. 
         Table 8. 17: Group Statistics 
 
 
        
 
 
Table 8. 18: Independent Samples Test 
 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T Df Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
ROA 
Equal variances assumed .059 .810 1.518 22 .143 .49583 .32662 -.18153 1.17320 
Equal variances not assumed 
  
1.518 21.980 .143 .49583 .32662 -.18157 1.17323 
 
 
 ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ROA 
Private 12 2.5600 .81189 .23437 
public 12 2.0642 .78803 .22748 
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The Levene's Test for Equality of Variances demonstrates that the variability 
in the ROA of private and public sector banks is not significantly different as the 
significance level is greater than 0.05. Thus, t-value corresponding to equal 
variances assumed is considered for analysis. The group statistic table shows that 
on average private sector banks‟ return on average asset was 2.56% with a standard 
deviation of 0.81% and the relevant figure for public sector banks‟ was 2.06% with 
standard deviation of 0.79% over the 12 years observation period. It is noted that 
there is a difference in the ROAs but are the mean differences statistically 
(significantly) different? The t-test results show no significant difference as the p-
value (0.143) is larger than 0.05. Thus, it can be concluded that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the ROAs of the private and public sector 
banks. This indicates that, there is no significant difference in the efficient utilization 
of assets in generating profits, as measured by ROA, between the private and public 
sector banks over the 12 year study period. The mean difference (0.49583) between 
the ROAs may be due to other factors or chance but not due to the difference in 
ownership structure. Thus, hypothesis H6 stating that corporate performances (in 
accounting terms) of privately and publicly owned banks do not differ due to the 
difference in ownership structure is supported. 
 
8.4 Summary of Research Findings and Discussions  
 This section presents a summary of the research questions together with their 
associated hypotheses, findings and discussions in relation to the conceptual model, 
corporate governance theories that guide the study and prior empirical studies. The 
discussion focuses on the main study that examined (1) the  overall effect of the 
model on the boards‟ service and control performances; (2) the meditational role of 
the board process between the board structure and the board service and board 
control performances; (3) the moderational effect of the type of ownership on board 
service and board control performances; (4) whether the overall firm performances, 
in financial terms, differ due to the difference in ownership structure and (5) the 
antecedents of corporate governance factors that influence boards‟ services and 
control performance and over all firm performance. Throughout the discussion the 
descriptive results and interview conducted with boards, board secretaries and bank 
presidents are triangulated, as found appropriate, to explain the statistical results. 
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8.4.1 Summary of Research Questions, Hypothesis and Findings 
 This sub-section recaps the main research question, sub questions, 
subsequent hypotheses developed to answer the research questions, and the 
research findings. The main research question answered in the study and formulated 
in Chapter One section 1.5 was: How do corporate governance structure and 
process, in an emerging economy setting, affect performances of boards in the 
Ethiopian banks?  Six sub questions were set to address attendant issues related to 
the main question. The first four sub questions were answered by 10 testable 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter Three. The last two sub questions were answered 
using the stakeholders‟ survey results as presented in Chapter Seven. In testing the 
hypothesis of relationships, mediation and moderation roles, the Smart Partial Least 
Squares regression method is used. To test a difference in profitability due to the 
differences in ownership structure; the independent samples t-test was employed. 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation analysis were also used to explain and 
complement the results. Furthermore, to assess the stakeholders perception of the 
current corporate governance practices in Ethiopia, descriptive statistics was used. 
Finally, the results of the qualitative analysis were triangulated, as deemed 
necessary, to validate and give meaning to the findings.  
 The following table presents a summary of research questions, associated 
hypotheses and findings. 
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Table 8. 19: Summary of research questions, hypothesis and research findings 
RQ No. Research Question (RQ) Hypothesis Research 
findings 
1 What is the nature of the interplay 
between board governance structures, 
processes, and boards‟ service and  
control performances in  
banks? 
H1a: A board with proper structure is 
positively and significantly related to 
boards’ service task performances. 
Supported 
H1b: A board with proper structure is 
positively and significantly related to 
control task performances. 
Supported 
H2a: Board process has positive and 
significant relationship with board 
service task performances. 
Supported 
H2b: Board process has positive and 
significant relationship with board 
control task performances. 
Supported 
H3: A properly structured board has 
positive and significant relationship with 
board process. 
Supported 
2 How does the board process mediate 
the relationship between boards‟  
structure and boards‟ service and  
control performances? 
 
H4a: Board process mediates the 
relationship between board structure 
and boards service task performances. 
Supported 
H4b: Board process mediates the 
relationship between board structure 
and boards control performances. 
Supported 
3 What is the impact of ownership  
structure on boards‟ service and  
control performances?  
 
H5a: Type of ownership does not 
moderate board service task 
performances. 
Not 
supported 
H5b:  Type of ownership does not 
moderate board control task 
performances. 
Not 
supported 
4 Does the difference in ownership  
structure affect bank performances in 
accounting terms?  
 
H6: There is no significant difference in 
the return on average asset (ROA) 
between private and public banks due 
to the difference in ownership structure. 
 
  
Supported 
 5 What is the attitude of stakeholders 
 toward corporate governance practices 
 in the private and public banks? 
 See 
chapter 7 
6 What are the unique features of the  
Ethiopian banking industry corporate 
governance environment? 
 See 
chapter 9 
section 
9.2.1 
 
From the above table, it is noted that 80% of the hypotheses (8 out of 10) are 
statistically supported.  
 
8.4.2  Discussion of Findings  
The following section revisits and discusses the findings from the perspectives 
of the conceptual model, corporate governance theories and prior empirical findings.  
The key findings of the discussion are a synthesis of the analysis of the survey 
results and the semi-structured interviews. The discussion part of the stakeholders‟ 
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perceptions is not included in this section as detailed discussion is made in Chapter 
Seven sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6. 
In Chapter Three, a conceptual framework linking board structure and process 
with the board services and control task performances anchored on the agency, 
stewardship, stakeholders, resource dependency and social capital theories of 
corporate governance, was proposed. A survey sample of 106 respondents from the 
private and public bank domains was drawn to test the conceptual model.    
From the collected data, it is noted that 80%(85) of participants serve private 
banks and 20% (21) public banks. Of the 106 participants in the study, 10%(11) are 
board chairpersons, 64%(68) non-executive board members, 7%(7) former board 
members, 8%(8) board secretaries, and 11%(12) bank presidents. The demographic 
data of the sample group used to test the theoretical model provided the following 
basic facts that supported the study‟s reliability. From Table 6.17, 82% of the 
participants have served for at least 3 years as board members and about 96% have 
more than10 years of work experience other than board membership, and more than 
two-third of the participants (69%) hold either a master‟s or doctoral degree in areas 
such as business, economics, finance, law, accounting, agriculture and science 
related areas to mention at least few. These characteristics suggest that the 
respondents have the requisite background to competently examine issues from 
various perspectives and fill the questionnaire comfortably and properly, enabling the 
collection of valid data. Furthermore, the questionnaires that examine the role of 
boards were filled by those persons that directly or indirectly play active roles in 
corporate leadership. Of the 106 that properly filled the questionnaire, 93% (board 
members and presidents) are involved in making corporate decisions and, therefore, 
are expected to have sufficient understanding of corporate practices. Thus, the data 
from the respondents are believed to be representative of corporate governance 
picture, enabling to answer the research questions and thereby the research 
hypotheses. From the data (see table 6.17), it is observed that there are no 
executive boards. The National Bank of Ethiopia‟s Directive No. SBB/49/2011 strictly 
prohibits bank employees from board positions. The board is, therefore, exclusively 
composed of non-executive directors making it unique considering the state of affairs 
of relevance in other emerging economies like South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria or those 
countries that have unitary or one tier model. By the same directive, there is no issue 
of CEO duality as the CEO cannot be a member of the board of directors.  
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With regard to the exclusion of executives from the board membership, the 
qualitative interview shows that the respondents support the idea of the inclusion of a 
limited number of executives on the board, which was the case before the year 2011. 
They believe the inclusion of few insiders will not be a problem. On the contrary 
executive boards can serve as internal resource persons in facilitating decision 
making by providing important information to the board. The agency and stewardship 
theories and OCED (2004) do not discount the benefits of including insiders on the 
board but they argue for a significant majority of outsiders so that the boards‟ 
independence is largely maintained. This is in line with the research that Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991) have reviewed which highlights the importance of having both 
by illustrating situations where outside directors can do better in safeguarding the 
interests of shareholders than insiders; and there are other board jobs where inside 
directors are more preferable than outsiders.   
In terms of academic credentials, it can be noted that 98% of the respondents 
hold a minimum of a bachelor‟s degree in business and economics and related 
backgrounds (more than 70%). This that respondents‟ level of understanding of 
governance issues is adequate or high giving indication that they can easily 
comprehend questionnaire items. In consequence, data obtained from such groups 
is expected to be reliable and valid. Furthermore, the National Bank of Ethiopia‟s 
Directive No. SBB/54/2012 under the section „Requirements for Persons with 
Significant Influence in a Bank‟ stipulates the appropriate level of knowledge, 
experience and age for a place on the non-executive board of directors. According to 
the directive, at least seventy five percent of a bank‟s board members should hold a 
minimum of a basic degree or its equivalent and the remaining members should 
have completed general secondary school or its equivalent. Furthermore, board 
members are required to have adequate experience in business management or 
should take adequate training after holding a seat on the board and their age should 
also be at least 30 years (Directives No. SBB/54/2012). Hence, on the basis of the 
above analysis, all the board members surveyed comply with requirements set out 
by the NBE. 
Assessments of Measurement and Structural Model Fit 
The theoretical model developed in chapter three shows the relationships 
between the endogenous and exogenous variables and this has been extensively 
evaluated using the partial least squares method. This method was used to assess 
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both the measurement (outer) and structural (inner) models (Hair et al., 2014a & b; 
Gotz et al., 2010). 
First the measurement model that displayed the relationships between the 
constructs and the indicator variables was assessed for reliability and validity before 
testing the structural model. The tests of validity, PLS-CFA tests, provide evidence of 
construct validity. That is, the tests indicate how well the indicator variables of 
theoretical constructs relate to one another as well as how well their variances are 
captured by the latent variables (Hair et al., 2014a). As presented and discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six sections 6.2 and 6.3, the model has passed the tests of 
reliability at the first order factor model and tests of validity (CFA) both at the first and 
second order factor models. Once the quality of measurement model was 
determined through CFA, the next step followed was evaluating the quality of the 
structural model before conducting the tests of hypothesis (Hair et al., 2014a & b). 
The quality of (overall goodness) the structural model was determined using non-
parametrical tests such as the endogenous variables‟ determination coefficient (R2), 
and direction and significance of path coefficients (Hair et al., 2014a &b; Sanchez, 
2013; Gotz et al., 2010). In assessments of the quality of the structural model, Hair et 
al. (2014b) and Wong (2013) recommend that the structural model be examined for 
collinearity problems. Accordingly, as displayed in Table 8.1, there are no collinearity 
problems among the predictor variables both at the first and second order structural 
model of this study. 
Chapter Eight section 8.2, Figure 8.1 and Table 8.2 show that all the path 
coefficients in the inner model, which are above 0.20 are statistically highly 
significant at the 5% level (Hair et al., 2014b). All R2 values are also higher than 0.52 
implying that the estimated model fits the survey data well with R2 values of 0.53, 
0.61, and 0.70 for board process, board service role, and board control role, 
respectively. This means that the theoretical model explains 0.53, 0.61, and 0.70 of 
the variances in the board process, board service role, and board control role, 
respectively. The results are very good based on these parameters (Chin, 1998) and 
support the validity of the structural model with good predictive or explanatory power 
of the exogenous variables. The model satisfies the criteria set for a good model by 
Chin (1998) and Hair et al. (2014b). In the next section the results of each of the 
hypotheses presented in section 8.2 are discussed.  
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Board Structure, Board Service and Control Task Performances: H1a and H1b 
As extensively discussed in Chapter Three section 3.3.1, the agency theory 
views the board of directors as an important corporate governance mechanism with 
a key role in reducing the agency costs and maximizing shareholders‟ wealth (Millan, 
2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to the perspectives of the agency and 
stewardship theory, boards of directors provide important service and control 
functions. To ensure that boards provide important services and serve as a 
monitoring body, it is important for boards to have an appropriate board structure 
explained in terms of composition, independence and committee functioning (OCED, 
2004; Millan, 2010; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Arif & Syed, 2015). Against these 
desiderata, as put in Table 8.19, research question one is answered by testing five 
hypotheses. The research question examines the relationships between board 
governance structures, board processes, and boards‟ service and control 
performances of banks. Based on the agency and stewardship theories, direct and 
significant relationships are expected between: (1) the board structure and board 
service performances (H1a), (2) the board structure and board control performances 
(H1b), (3) the board structure and board processes (H3), (4) the board process and 
board service performances (H2a) and (5) the board process and control 
performances (H2b). The results of the hypotheses are in the expected direction. 
The PLS results give strong support to hypotheses H1a and H1b, that is, there is a 
positive and significant relationship between the board structure and the board 
service and control performances. The predictive path coefficients of 0.30 and 0.38 
between board structure and board service role; and between board structure and 
board control role, respectively, imply that the board structure is a good predictor of 
both the board service and control task performances. This suggests, the board 
structure has a significant contribution in explaining the variances in both the boards‟ 
service and control task performances. From the PLS outputs, the board structure 
has the potential to explain 61% and 70% of variability in the boards‟ service and 
control task performances, respectively. 
The results lend support to the agency, stewardship, resource dependency 
and social capital theories (see Chapter Three sections 3.2 and 3.3). The proponents 
of these theories believe in a properly structured board of directors as one internal 
corporate governance mechanism in order for boards to carry out their service and 
control roles. Wan and Ong (2005) believe that boards with different backgrounds, 
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composition, and independence are likely to have an influence on the boards‟ 
decision making process and on their ability to execute their service and control 
roles.  
Past empirical work focused largely on the relationship between board 
structures, defined in terms of CEO duality, proportion of insider/outsider directors, 
board size (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Daily & Dalton, 
1993; Klein, 1998; Coles et al., 2001; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Abdullah, 2004; 
Andres et al., 2005; Garg, 2007; Yi et al., 2008; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Lee et al., 
2013; Guillet et al., 2013), board demographics, board independence (Rosenstein & 
Wyatt, 1990; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Sarkar, 2009; Knyazeva et al., 2013; Arif & 
Syed, 2015), committee structure (Klein,1998), and company performance though 
the empirical evidence were not conclusive. Minichilli et al. (2009) and Wan and Ong 
(2005) have specifically examined the antecedents of board performances. Using 
regression analysis, Minichilli et al. (2009) tested the relationship between board 
structure (board size, CEO duality, outsider ratio) and board performances and found 
mixed results. With regard to the board tasks, they found that board size negatively 
impacts the advisory role, while positively influences both the output and behavioral 
control roles. The CEO duality has no influence on both the service and control roles. 
The outsider ratio, apart from negatively influencing the strategic participation role, 
has no influence on the service and control roles. Wan and Ong (2005) also 
examined the relationships between board structure (CEO duality and 
insider/outsider director), process and performances in public listed companies. They 
found no significant relationships between structural variables and the monitoring, 
service and strategic roles and concluded that board structure does not influence 
board performance.  
As presented above, the results of this study are quite different from the 
findings in prior empirical studies for two reasons. First, the board structure 
components used in previous studies centered on the CEO duality and 
insider/outsider ratio, which are not prevalent in Ethiopian context. Second, the 
methodologies used in testing the hypotheses differ.  
To recap the discussion, the results of this study suggest that a board 
composed of a workable number of members with the right blend of skills and 
experience functioning with appropriate board committees and who maintain their 
independence will effectually accomplish their service and control roles. To further 
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support the hypothesis test results, descriptive and bivariate correlation analyses are 
drawn and triangulated. The descriptive statistics show an overall average score of 
4.14 (83%) for the board structure, which is a high achievement rate for the items 
measuring the same, which in turn has resulted in the overall mean achievements of 
3.81(76%) and 3.98(78%) for board service and control performances, respectively. 
This high achievement, as Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) cited in Wan and Ong 
(2005) argue, reflects that a group‟s performance is as much a function of its 
structure and process. That is, properly structured boards are expected to 
accomplish service and control tasks more effectively. This is further strengthened 
by the results of the correlation analysis presented in Chapter Six section 6.5 and 
Tables 6.25 and 6.30.  
The bivariate correlation analyses also provide support for the significant and 
positive association between each of the structural latent variables (Scomp, SBInd 
and Scomm) and each of the service (SerAd, SerNwR, SerNwI and SerSp) and 
control role (BCont, OCont and SCont) latent variables (see Table 6.27). The 
significant and positive correlation implies that properly structured boards accomplish 
the service and control tasks effectively. The correlation coefficient relating to the 
second order constructs between the board structure and the board service role 
(0.679) and board structure and control role (0.737) demonstrates the existence of 
strong association. 
Given the strong association, the descriptive statistics show a higher 
achievement for control role than the service role as the predictive path coefficients 
between board structure and board service role (0.30); and between board structure 
and board control role (0.38) are higher for board control role. These results show 
that given the above relationships, the boards of directors are oriented more to 
control role than the service role. This is further supported by the stakeholder 
perception survey, which shows that 81% of the respondents characterize the 
Ethiopian board of directors as control oriented and to much lesser degrees strategic 
and service oriented. These orientations might be directly or indirectly associated 
with the backgrounds of the board members. The vast majority of the respondents in 
the stakeholder perception survey examining the boards‟ individual and group 
experience, effectiveness and approach in running their respective banks also shows 
that the boards are positively viewed (as being good or very good). This seems to 
explain the contribution of the board structure to board performance.    
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Board Structure and Board Process: H3 
Coming to H3 that hypothesizes the direct and positive relationships between 
board structure and board process, the PLS output result is in agreement with the 
expectation. That is, there is a direct, strong and positive relationship (with predictive 
path coefficient of 0.725) between the board structure and the board process. This 
value is high, denoting the strong predictive power of the board structure regarding 
the board process, showing the extent of its influence on the board process. From 
the analysis it is noted that, the board structure has the potential to explain 53% of 
the variance in the board process. The hypothesis is in line with the argument 
mentioned above that the board process is a function or reflection of the board 
structure. This is also in line with the resource dependency and social capital 
theories as the proponents argue that a board composed of independent outsiders 
with different backgrounds will bring in more knowledge, skill and experience that 
enable the board to make better decisions and maintain good board room 
atmosphere. Proponents of the agency theory also argue that outside boards are 
likely to be more objective in their discussions and willing to accommodate various 
ideas in decision making with higher level of cognitive (job related) conflict in the 
board room ( Wan & Ong, 2005).  
On this issue, Wan and Ong (2005) have examined the relationships between 
board structure (CEO duality and insider/ outsider director) and board process and 
found no relationship and concluded that board structure does not influence/affect 
the board process. This is not in agreement with this study‟s findings. The difference 
in the findings could be again due to the methodology employed and components of 
the structural variables considered. Despite Wan and Ong‟s findings, Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) found a positive and significant relationship of the proportion of 
outside directors with both effort norms (commitment) and cognitive conflict. This 
finding is consistent with this study‟s findings at the first order latent variables. 
The descriptive and correlation analysis serve as further evidence and 
support the findings of this study. As mentioned above, the overall achievement of 
the board structure and the board process are high suggesting that success in the 
board structure is also success in the board process or otherwise. From the bivariate 
correlation analysis presented in Chapter Six section 6.5 it is noted that, the board 
structure latent variable is significantly and positively correlated with the board 
process latent variable with a correlation coefficient of 0.679. The value gives 
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evidence of the relationship between the board structure latent variable and the 
board process dimension. The result is consistent with the hypothesis testing results 
showing that board structure affects board process. The results imply that, a properly 
structured board in terms of composition, independence, and active committee might 
also be active in the board process expressed in terms of commitment, critical 
debate, and maintaining good sprit in the boardroom. 
Board Process, Board Service and Control Task Performances: H2a and H2b 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b have examined the direct relationship between: (1) 
board process and board service role, (2) board process and board control role, 
respectively. The results of the PLS test show that the board process is directly and 
positively related to the board service task performances with the predictive path 
coefficient of 0.531. The same holds true for H2b that posited that the board process 
directly influences the board performance with a significant path coefficient of 0.517. 
The path coefficients indicate the extent of influence of the board process, as an 
exogenous variable, on the board service and control roles as endogenous 
variables. Thus, both H2a and H2b are in the expected directions. The descriptive 
statistics for the variables as indicated in the above paragraphs are all well above 
average denoting good achievements. The bivariate correlation analyses both at the 
first and second order variables also indicate significant and positive relationships 
across all the latent variables except for the process conflict first order variable. 
Specifically, the correlation at the second order (principal construct) level of the 
board process with the board service performance is 0.740 and with the board 
control performance is 0.746. These are additional evidence confirming the results 
obtained through the PLS hypothesis testing procedure. To this end, the statistical 
results do suggest that strong commitment coupled with a high level of cognitive 
conflict and conducive board room environment is likely to enhance the service and 
control tasks of the board of directors. This could mean, at least to mention few, high 
commitment enables board members to take initiatives in giving advice based on 
personal knowledge and to have significant influence on major management issues, 
to help in obtaining scarce resources. The test also implies high involvement in 
strategic issues, and the exercise of proper output, behavioral and strategic control 
roles. The cognitive conflict, which is based on important ideas, issues, principles 
and critical questions, enables boards to play their strategic role of making quality 
decisions and actively monitoring their implementation. Despite the above results, 
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the personal interview with members of the private bank board shows that there is 
lack of commitment and seriousness in the board of directors due probably to fixing 
of the relevant annual remunerations by the NBE. They believe that this has 
consequences for the service and control roles they are supposed to play. The effect 
on the boardroom is likely to be significant; a conducive board room environment 
with the board chair leading meetings with a clear focus and in a cohesive way would 
be very likely to contribute favorably to the board strategic role. But this assumes 
proper compensation. 
Minichilli et al. (2009) tested the positive relationship between two variables, 
board members‟ commitment and critical debate, of the board process construct and 
the board service and control task performances as the first order latent variables. 
Their findings suggest that board members‟ commitments are important predictors of 
the boards‟ service and control task performances. That is, boards‟ commitment as 
one component of the board process has a strong and positive impact on all the 
boards‟ service and control tasks; whereas, critical debate as one component of the 
board process is positively related only to the advisory and networking roles of the 
service tasks. The commitment variable as a predictor of both the boards‟ service 
and control tasks is consistent with the findings of this study.   
In this study, however, the process and the cognitive conflicts of the first order 
variables of the higher order board process construct are negatively related to all the 
services, but positively related to control roles. The results suggest that process 
conflict inhibits board performance since the disagreements relate largely to boards‟ 
working style (procedural matters) more than the decision making process, which is 
typically based on ideas, issues and principles (cognitive conflict). The cognitive 
conflict enhances the board performances. This result is different from Minichilli et al. 
(2009) when it comes to the critical debate variable. This is due to the fact that 
Minichilli et al. (2009) merged both the process and cognitive conflict variables into 
one to form the critical debate variable. As a result they came up with combined 
results as this study has done in testing the hypotheses at the second order by 
bringing together the first order variables. Another reason explaining the disparity in 
the results could be the methodological differences, that is, the authors measured 
the critical debate items by asking the CEOs only. In this study, originally, both the 
process conflict and cognitive conflict variables were set to be one variable under the 
name critical debate, but the scale assessment procedure of the principal component 
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analysis (EFA) factorized the critical debate variable as a two factor structure with 
the process conflict and cognitive conflict.  
The empirical evidence from Wan and Ong (2005) shows that board process 
is related to board performance. They considered general effort norms 
(commitment), cognitive conflict and process conflict as components of the board 
process and examined their relationships with monitoring, service, strategic function 
and resource dependence. On the basis of the examination of the individual 
variables, they found that effort norms (commitment) and cognitive conflicts are 
positively related to the boards‟ monitoring, service, strategic function and resource 
dependence roles whereas the process conflict is negatively related to the board 
roles. The results from Wan and Ong (2005) are fully in agreement with the findings 
of this study. Forbes and Milliken‟s (1999) prediction of both the effort norms and 
cognitive conflicts with the service and control roles are also consistent with the 
results of this study.   
The Mediation Effect of the Board Process: H4a and 4b 
H4a and H4b tested the mediation effect of board process on board service 
task and control task performances, respectively. Both tested the indirect relationship 
of board structure with board service and control performances mediated through the 
board process. To test and support the meditational role of the board process 
between the board structure and the board performances, the following condition 
should hold true in the theoretical model. That is, the board structure should be 
related to both the board process and the board performance; and in turn, the board 
process should be related to board performance together with the board structure 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986 in Wan & Ong, 2005). The theoretical model of this study is 
indeed in the desired setting so that the mediating effect of board process can be 
examined. 
 The test results of the PLS, on whether the board process mediates the 
relationship between the board structure and the board performances (service and 
control roles), confirm the meditational role of the board process. Hence, the board 
structure indirectly positively and significantly influence both the service and control 
roles (see section 8.3.2). To determine the extent of the influence of the exogenous 
variable (board structure) up on the endogenous variables (board service and control 
roles), the change in the coefficient of determination with and without the mediator 
variable is calculated and effect size determined. The effect sizes (f2) of the board 
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process on the two endogenous variables, board service role and board control role, 
are 0.36 and 0.43, respectively. These values of the effect size suggest that the 
board process latent variable serving as a mediator has a substantial (large) effect 
size (influence) in explaining both the board service role and board control role latent 
variables. Thus, the board process‟s mediating role is strongly supported. It is also 
important to determine the relative size of the mediating effect to see whether it 
partially or fully mediates the relationships. VAF (Variance Accounted For) was used 
to determine the relative size of the mediating effect. The VAF values between board 
structure and service role; and between board structure and control role are 56% 
and 50%, respectively. Thus, the board process partially mediates the relationships. 
These values have important implication for explaining the relevance of the board 
structure‟s direct effects in explaining the endogenous variables. The VAF values of 
56% and 50% indicate the board structure‟s effect on the board service and control 
roles explained through the partial mediation of the board process latent variable.  
The findings of the present study do not agree with those of Wan and Ong‟s 
(2005) who found that board process does not mediate the relationship between 
board structure and board performance. There are several reasons for the mixed 
results. Firstly, Wan and Ong‟s test fails to meet two of the conditions out of three for 
testing the meditational role of the board process. They found no relationship 
between structure and process and between structure and board performance. In 
their study, only one of the required conditions is met, i.e., board process is related 
to board performance. Secondly, it could be due to the differences in the 
components forming the structural latent variable and the statistical approaches used 
in the analysis (Hierarchical regression vs. partial least squares of structural equation 
modeling).  
Moderation Effects of Ownership Structure/ Sub-Sample Analysis: H5a and 
H5b 
  As mentioned in the hypothesis formation stage and analysis part, the 
practice of representation of boards depends on the type of ownership. For the 
private banks, representation is by mere election by the shareholders, while for the 
banks that are owned by the state, representation is by appointment by the 
government. The assumption underlying this practice is that, ownership type matters 
in affecting the strength of board service and control task performances of private 
and public banks. That is, ownership type moderates the performances of private 
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and public boards. Hence, H5a and H5b examined whether ownership type has 
significant bearing on board service and control task performances, respectively. 
Both the PLS path models (Hair et al., 2014b; Henseler et al., 2010) and the 
independent samples t-test were used. The PLS path models of the group 
comparison approach to determine the effect of a categorical moderator variable, 
ownership structure, up on the endogenous latent variable, showed that ownership 
matters implying that hypotheses H5a and H5b are not supported. Thus, ownership 
structure moderates the relationship between board structure and board service and 
control task performances; and between board structure and board process.  
As further evidence to the above, the Independent samples t-test was used. 
The test showed that there is a significant difference in the means for the four latent 
variables (board structure, board process, board service task performance and board 
control task performances) between the private and public bank boards. From the 
Independent samples t-test, public bank board‟s average achievement scores are 
larger than the values for private banks‟. In relation to the two endogenous target 
variables, board service and control task performances, the test indicated that public 
bank boards accomplish their roles better than their private bank counterparts. One 
of the main reasons for such differences could be the way broads are formed 
(through election or appointment). The Public bank boards appreciate the current 
practice of assignment or appointment of boards to the public banks by the 
government as many considerations such as professional experience, educational 
background and commitment are taken into account in the process of assignment. 
Serving as a board member is also seen as a part of the full time assignment in the 
government offices. This reason is supported by an interview made with one long 
serving public bank board member. The director argued in his words that, 
 “It has to be clear that assignment of board members to the public 
banks is based on considerations of experience and backgrounds in 
the various sectors that include agriculture, industry, finance, trade and 
the like so as to meet/ address the developmental agendas in these 
sectors. There are advantages in such a composition such as easy 
access to key government decision makers, access to national data 
and high facilitation as members are representatives of the 
government…”  
Another board member of a public bank added that:  
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“Boards that are appointed by the government are resourceful and 
useful in networking as they bring skills and experiences related to the 
organization or ministry that they lead. Decisions are almost 
unanimous as they have common interests which are developmental 
and commercial.”  
With all the support they get from the government, it is not surprising that the service 
and control task performances of public board members are relatively better than 
their private counter parts.  One of the private bank respondents said:  
“As I observe in most of the private banks, board membership is based 
on the blessing of the influential shareholders and the mass selection 
by the shareholders. To me, composition of board members should be 
based more on knowledge of the business…‟‟  
The argument at this junction is that, public bank board members are screened 
thoughtfully in their assignments and private bank board members are nominated 
and elected during the annual general meeting without going through thorough 
nomination process. The absence of nomination committee is highly echoed by 
stakeholders as one major problem. Another person from the private domain 
expressed his relevant worries and the need for a nomination committee to have the 
right blend of boards so that they can carry out their roles properly. He commented:  
“…[C]orporate governance situation in Ethiopia is worrisome as 
corporate governance is new and most of us do not really know its very 
essence. The way board of directors is selected is on lobby basis; it is 
not merit based and if no corrective measures are not taken on time 
the consequences can be disastrous, with shareholders losing 
confidence and trust in corporate forms of organizations. The NBE, the 
regulatory body, has to revise the current board nomination criteria and 
clearly set them by consulting the experiences of other countries and 
local studies…” 
Thus, the difference observed in the mean board performances due to the 
difference in ownership structure is considered as further evidence for the 
moderation effect, explaining why the public bank board excels in the average board 
service and control performances. 
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Ownership Structure and Overall Bank Performance 
The above discussion focused on the moderation effect of the ownership type 
on board performance while this part discusses whether ownership matters in the 
banks‟ performances expressed in monetary terms. Looking into the summary of the 
aggregate profitability levels of private and public sector banks displayed in Chapter 
Eight Table 8.15, regardless of the disparity in the profitability levels, all the sampled 
banks have positive return on their average assets. This confirms what was 
hypothesized (H6) in Chapter Three section 3.3.4 that ownership structure (being 
private or public) has no significant bearing on the banks overall performance 
measured in accounting terms. For example, for the 2013/14 financial year, the 
majority of the banks (8 banks, 62%) reported more than 3% return on their assets. 
No bank has reported less than the 1.1% ROA, the highest being 5% (see Appendix 
8.6). The average ROA (profitability rate) of the private and public banks over the 
study periods (2002/03-2013/14) was 2.56% and 2.06, respectively. These financial 
performances show that banks in the Ethiopian context are profitable regardless of 
their ownership structures. But, the question remains whether there is significant 
difference between the private and public banks in their average profitability rates. 
The banks performance was measured in terms of ROA. This  is a ratio of profit after 
tax divided by average total assets measuring the profit earned per dollar of assets 
and reflects how well the bank uses the banks‟ real investment resources to 
generate profits. ROA as a measure of efficiency was used in prior empirical studies 
by La Porta et al. (2002), Zeitun and Tian (2007), Kiyota et al. (2008), Ongore 
(2011), Kapur and Gualu (2012), Ongore and Kusa (2013), Mule and Mukras (2015), 
and Rahman and Reja (2015).  
 The hypothesis was tested using the Independent samples t- test first by 
verifying the appropriateness of the parametric test in terms of the assumptions of 
normality and equality of variances. The t-test result shows that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the ROAs of the private and public sector 
banks. In other words, there is no significant difference in the efficient utilization of 
assets in generating profits, as measured by ROA, between the private and public 
sector banks over the 12 year study period. The mean difference (0.49583) between 
the ROAs may be due to other factors or chance but not due to the difference in 
ownership structure. Thus, hypothesis H6 which states the corporate performances 
(in accounting terms) of privately and publicly owned banks do not differ due to the 
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difference in ownership structure is supported. This implies that ownership 
structure‟s moderating role in a banks‟ performance in accounting measures is 
insignificant. This finding is consistent with Ongore and Kusa (2013) that ownership 
type does not influence firm performance. 
The findings of this study differ from those of Rahman and Reja (2015), 
Iannota et al. (2007) and Micco et al. (2007) who concluded that government-owned 
banks have lower profitability than privately owned banks. The present study also 
disagrees with the research of Gursoy and Ayodogan (2002) and Bonin et al. (2005) 
who suggest that government ownership leads to a better performance. The present 
project is also different from those of Kapur and Gualu (2012), Kiyota et al. (2008) 
and La Porta et al. (2002) that specifically addressed the Ethiopian situation and 
inferred that private ownership leads to better performance in the Ethiopian context; 
that private banks show generally better performance in Ethiopia; and privately 
owned banks are more efficient than public banks in other countries, respectively. 
Also, Ongore (2011), Zeitun (2009) and Zeitun and Tian (2007) produced empirical 
evidence showing a negative significant relation between government ownership and 
a firm‟s accounting performances. The difference in the findings could be due to the 
reason that: (1) Kapur and Gualu (2012) used all 8 commercial banks (six private 
and two public banks) in operation over the years 2001-2008 (covering only eight 
years) when relatively there was no stiff competition due to the small number of 
banks compared to the post 2008 period which saw 10 more private banks emerging 
to share the profits, (2) methodological differences. Thus Kapur and Gualu (2012) 
used a nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test as opposed to the current study that 
used parametric tests. The same argument as above also applies to Kiyota et al.‟s 
(2008) findings from a regression study of 10 banks (7 private and all 3 public banks) 
over the time period 1998-2006. Interview results on the issue reveal that the 
possible reasons could be aggressive expansion and branching of the giant public 
bank, i.e., Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, enabling it to maintain the lion‟s market 
share, and the establishment of new banks that share the market resulting in a 
relatively lower profit for the majority of private banks, which may balance profitability 
between the private and public domain. 
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Stakeholders’ Perceptions on Corporate Governance Practices 
Extensive discussion of the perception survey results was made in Chapter 
Seven. This part will briefly revisit and discuss the major results. Research question 
five was answered by scanning corporate governance practices through 
stakeholders‟ perceptions. It primarily examined the attitudes of various groups of 
stakeholders to the current practices. The aspects of corporate governance practices 
that were examined include: the principles of good corporate governance (OECD, 
2004), strategies and approaches to promote good governance, characteristics of 
the Ethiopian boards, key corporate governance issues and recommendations to 
improve corporate governance. The comprehensive assessment indicates the status 
of corporate governance in Ethiopia as an emerging market economy. 
Understanding the relevant status is particularly important, in order to pay due 
attention to corporate governance as an important agenda as this is a relatively new 
phenomenon to Ethiopia. The assessment of stakeholders‟ perception also aims to 
contribute to the literature by addressing corporate governance practices and issues 
from the stand point of an emerging economy. 
 As mentioned in Chapter One sub section 1.1.2, the history of corporate 
governance in Ethiopia dates back to 1960. It was still in its infancy when a regime 
change in 1974 led to its demise. It was in 1992 with a major policy change to 
reopen a market economy that the interest in corporate governance emerged. Due to 
the absence of a capital market, a national code of best practices and an institution 
responsible for it, it is, relatively, at its earliest stage of development. Despite its 
current weak status, there have been some measures put in place to make strides 
like revising the 1960 Commercial Code of Ethiopia (work in progress), a joint move 
to standardize the accounting and auditing practices of corporate firms, modernizing 
the company register, strengthening the organizations of the business community at 
national and city levels to make important contributions to the institutional 
environment for supporting corporate governance. 
  The evaluation of the stakeholder perceptions showed that ownership is 
relatively concentrated with the largest shareholders effectively controlling the bank 
with substantial voting rights. This would allow the controlling shareholders to have 
more freedom and influence over decisions to their benefits. However, the 
concentration of ownership is limited by the Banking and Insurance Proclamation 
NO. 592/2008 of the Federal Government of Ethiopia.  
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The exercise of the basic principles of the rights and equitable treatment of 
shareholders; and the transparency and disclosure issues appear to be in good state 
as extensively discussed in Chapter Seven. In prompting and improving good 
corporate governance, the Financial Supervisory Agency is indicated to be the most 
important stakeholder followed by professional societies, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the judiciary and finally non-executive board. In the banking sector, the 
financial supervisory agencies are believed to be relatively most important 
stakeholders in controlling the undue influence of controlling owners, followed by the 
legal system and non- executive board of directors. Such results are to be expected 
because the regulatory body is vested with the legal power to oversee the activities 
of banks. Corporate governance is in its early years and this is the only enforcing 
institution that oversees how well it is practiced.  
Stakeholders believe that internal corporate governance mechanisms, codes, 
high standards of accounting and auditing, and external corporate governance 
mechanisms are important to ensure improved corporate governance practices. The 
effectiveness of the boards and their individual and group experience, in running 
their respective banks is rated by the stakeholders as at least good although the vast 
majority of the respondents characterize them as control oriented boards. The 
stakeholders proposed a balanced corporate governance approach that would work 
better in promoting good governance practices in the Ethiopian banks. This 
approach allows flexibility as it is a combination of the prescriptive and non-
prescriptive approaches. Respondents preferred this approach taking into account 
the existing reality and future trends of the social, economic, political and legal 
environment of the country as well as the organizational milieu. 
  The current remuneration package of boards, which the National Banks of 
Ethiopia fixed in 2011, was decried as being insufficient incommensurate with the 
level of responsibility and insufficient to attract, retain and motivate board members. 
Interviewees stated that board remuneration, being inadequate, can have a negative 
repercussion on the boards‟ commitment to their assigned key roles. Respondents 
believe that the level of remuneration should reflect the level of duties and 
responsibilities that boards shoulder and the decision of how much to pay should be 
left to the shareholders as owners. According to the respondents, the current 
corporate governance practices in the banks are much better compared with those of 
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the previous years. Though there are improvements in practice, they disclosed some 
major corporate governance issues prevailing in their banks that include:  
 Board members‟ lack of relevant knowledge, limited experience, 
understanding  of corporate governance by boards and key stakeholders;  
 lack of integrity, conflict of interest and corruption of board members; limited 
capacity of the regulatory body (National Bank of Ethiopia) and undue 
intrusion by the same; influence of large shareholders/ownership 
concentration; 
 lack of a proper national code of corporate governance practices or 
comprehensive regulation; lack of transparency; 
  lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities by the board of directors;  
interference of board of directors in managerial and operational activities that 
undermine the autonomy of managers; and 
  poor remuneration scheme for board members that affected their 
commitment to play their role; and lack of a proper mechanism of nomination 
and selection of a board of directors.  
They also forwarded the following recommendations to address one or more of 
the issues identified above. The recommendations include: 
 crafting national codes of best practices; 
  introducing regular capacity building systems for regulatory agencies and 
board members;  
 standardizing board nominations;  
 introducing more transparency and a disclosure system; creating and 
promoting awareness on corporate governance in general and  the boards‟  
roles and responsibilities in particular;  
 introducing performance related remuneration schemes for board members; 
and 
  ensuring that board members and major shareholders keep the required 
distance form managerial and operational activities.  
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8.5 Summary  
This chapter evaluated the structural model for its fitness, tested the 
hypothesis and discussed the major findings of both the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses. The hypotheses were tested mainly using the PLS structural model 
evaluation technique. Before the hypotheses were tested, the structural model was 
checked for collinearity problems and the tests verified that there was no collinearity 
problem among the predictor variables. The quality of the structural model was also 
determined by examining the significance of the path coefficients, the coefficient of 
determination (R2) of the endogenous variables and the predictive relevance of the 
exogenous variables. The tests verified the good fit of the structural model. These 
tests are prerequisites to testing the hypotheses of the research. To facilitate 
discussion of findings, the research questions, hypotheses and their findings were 
summarized. Finally, an extensive discussion was made on the findings of the 
hypotheses tests and the perception data of stakeholders. The following chapter 
presents conclusions, contributions and implications of findings. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions, Contributions and Implications of findings   
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Eight section 8.4, the findings of both the quantitative and 
qualitative data analyses were discussed. This chapter presents conclusions drawn 
from the findings of the analysis, addresses the contributions of the study and draws 
implications for future study. 
 
 9.2 Conclusions from Findings 
Recent empirical studies on corporate governance focused on board structure 
(size, CEO duality, outsider/ insider ratio) and firm performance leaving out the board 
process, which is thought to be an important missing link between board structure 
and firm performance. Most of the analyses of recent studies are based on 
secondary data and the results mixed and inconclusive. Most research is in the 
context of well developed economies and typically western oriented.  
 This study, which is based on primary data, examined the relationship 
between board structure, board process and board performances. This study is 
different in the sense that it investigated the relationships between the structural, 
process (the missing link) and board performance variables (not only company 
performance) using largely primary data from boards of directors. Additionally, unlike 
the vast majority of previous studies, this research addressed an emerging market 
economy context. 
  On the basis of the empirical results discussed in the previous chapter, it is 
concluded that there is:  
(1)  Positive and significant relationship between board structure and board 
service; 
(2) Positive and significant relationship between board structure and control 
task performance; 
(3)  Positive and significant relationship between board structure and board 
process; 
(4) Positive and significant relationship between board process and board 
service, and  
(5) Positive and significant relationship between board process and control 
task performance. 
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Furthermore, the study concludes that the relationships (1) between board 
structure and board service and (2) between board structure and control task 
performances are affected by board process. Interestingly, the results show that 
board service and control task performances are also affected by ownership type, 
whereas company performance in accounting terms is not affected by this variable. 
Another important conclusion to be drawn from the findings is that the 
indicator variables of the latent exogenous variables of the board structure construct 
(board composition, board independence and board committee); and the board 
process (commitment, process conflict, cognitive conflict and boardroom activity) are 
acceptable measures of the board structure and board process, respectively. 
Likewise, the proposed manifest variables forming the latent variables (advisory role, 
networking resource, networking image, strategic participation, behavioral control, 
output control and strategic control) are found out to be good measures of the 
constructs of board service and control performances.  
The study also investigated perceptions of corporate governance practice in 
Ethiopia‟s context as an emerging market economy where there is neither a national 
code of best practices nor an institution responsible for it. From the findings, it can be 
concluded that corporate governance is a relatively new phenomenon in the country. 
Ethiopia, like many emerging market economies, has  neither  fully developed the 
legal and regulatory systems, nor  a regulatory organ with sufficient enforcement 
capacities, nor a private sector that is required to support effective corporate 
governance. 
Given these limitations associated with the infancy of corporate governance in 
context, the achievements in terms of rights and equitable treatment of shareholders 
(fairness), disclosure and transparency, recognitions of roles of stakeholders and 
accountability of boards are not bad. However, to make strides in corporate 
governance, much has to been done in the enabling elements that lead to an 
effective corporate governance framework. These include: the basic stock exchange 
development with listing requirements, an institution responsible for crafting the 
principles of good corporate governance, strong laws and regulations, and well 
developed private sector institutions such as a strong accounting and auditing 
sector, professional associations, strong financial press and capable security 
analysts. As stated above, there is no stock market in the country as a result of 
which the role of capital market to institute corporate control is limited.  The NBE, the 
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regulatory organ, should take the lead in the development of capital markets in the 
country. Until such development is realized, the NBE should enhance its capacity to 
effectively regulate and promote sound corporate governance practices in the 
Ethiopian banks.  
Based on the roles that boards play and taking in to account the predictive 
path coefficients of the structural model, descriptive statistics of the service and 
control role constructs, and perception results of the governing bodies and 
stakeholders, the Ethiopian boards of directors are characterized as more control 
oriented than strategic or service oriented leaders. As regards the preferred 
approach to promote good governance, once an institution responsible for it is 
established, a mixed (balanced) approach (which is a mix of the prescriptive and the 
non-prescriptive approaches) is recommended. Furthermore, the nature of the 
Ethiopian banking corporate governance system is characterized as one tier system 
with non executive boards of directors and ownership concentration.  
 
9.2.1 Unique Features of the Ethiopian Banking Industry Corporate 
Governance Environment 
From the analysis, results, discussion, conclusions and policy recommendations, 
the following traits are identified that may make the Ethiopian banking industry 
corporate governance environment look different from those of developing 
economies like India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria. 
Distinctively, the Ethiopian banking industry corporate governance system operates 
in the following environment. 
(1) Absence of stock market as a fertile ground for voluntary codes (Shares are 
simply sold freely in the market). 
(2) Absence of national code of corporate governance. 
(3) Fixing of remuneration for board members by the regulatory body not the 
shareholders as owners after the year 2011. 
(4) Exclusion of insider directors from board membership by the regulatory organ 
after the year 2011. 
(5) No nomination and selection committee, mass nomination and selection made 
during the annual general meeting without prior nomination and screening 
process. 
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(6) Highly regulated and excessive interference by the regulatory organ, which is 
the National Bank of Ethiopia. 
(7) The closed nature of the banking sector to foreign investment isolating it from 
the impact of globalization. 
 
9.2.2 Policy Implications 
 The results of both the quantitative and qualitative perceptions suggest the following 
policy implications.  
(1) The need for a national code of corporate governance. 
(2) The need for a capital market. 
(3) The need for the establishment of nomination and selection committee 
supported by an appropriate legal framework. 
(4)  The need for the rational inclusion of insiders to the board. 
(5)  The need to review and raise the present meager fixed bank board 
compensation to a reasonable level. 
(6)   The need for well developed private sector institutions. 
 
9.3  Contributions of the Study 
Empirical studies on corporate governance until recently have focused only on 
the board structure and organizational performance. The empirical findings point to 
mixed or inconclusive relationships (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991; Daily & Dalton, 1993; Dalton et al., 1998; Klein, 1998; Dulewicz & 
Herbert, 2004; Andres et al., 2005; Garg, 2007; Pamburai et al., 2015).  As explained 
in Chapter Two, the literature on board processes is scant and scholars in the area 
consider the lack of sufficient studies as a lacuna standing in the way of a full 
understanding of performance. Researchers in the area believe that one of the 
reasons for the limited empirical studies on board processes could be inaccessibility 
of the board of directors (Minichilli et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005). Minichilli et al. 
(2009) for example assessed board performance by using the CEOs as key 
informants, while Wan and Ong (2005) largely depended on data of publicly listed 
companies as it was difficult for them to obtain data on private companies. The 
conceptual model of this study has incorporated the missing link, board process, in 
assessing board performance by targeting the boards themselves. Thus, it 
contributes both empirically and methodologically. 
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In examining the board structure, prior studies depended on secondary data 
with a focus on the CEO duality, board size, outsider/ insider director ratio and other 
demographic information (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
Daily & Dalton, 1993; Dalton et al., 1998; Klein, 1998; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; 
Andres et al., 2005; Garg, 2007, Pamburai et al., 2015), while this study collected 
primary data on board structure with a focus on board composition, board 
independence, and board committee functioning as determinants of the board 
process and board service and control roles. 
The results suggest that both board structure and board process directly play 
an important role in board performance. They also indicate that the board process 
plays a more important role than board structure in explaining board performance. 
The mediation effect of the board process is another important contribution to the 
existing literature. The results also suggest the important role that ownership 
structure plays in corporate governance systems in moderating board performance. 
That is, ownership type moderates the relationship between board structure and 
board service and control task performances; and between board structure and 
board process.  
In terms of theoretical development, these findings contribute to enriching the 
existing literature and corporate governance theories, i.e., agency, stewardship and 
resource dependence theories. Well structured boards as representatives of 
shareholders accomplish their service and control tasks (agency theory) and also 
play their stewardship and networking role to say the least. The validated 
comprehensive conceptual model with a second order construct that links board 
structure, board process and board performance can be considered as a contribution 
to the corporate governance literature and serve as a springboard for other studies. 
The study also offers reliable and valid research instruments than can be used by 
other researchers for similar purposes. 
The contribution of the present study to practice can be viewed from two 
angles. One, the different items used to measure structure, process and 
performance components and the various corporate governance issues identified, 
can create greater understanding of the corporate governance system that may help 
boards and stakeholders to promote good corporate governance and there by 
enhance their contributions. Second, the model developed and tested may help 
boards and other stakeholders, especially shareholders and the government as 
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owners of the banks to understand more clearly how the corporate structure and 
process influence the board service and control task performances and thereby the 
corporate performance at large.  Understanding of the issues may help them inject 
structure, process and role related interventions to enhance board effectiveness and 
shareholders‟ value. By way of substantially adding to the scant research on board 
process (Minichilli et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Lablanc & Gillies, 2003), this research has thoroughly investigated its mediation role 
potentially helping boards to appreciate how important the process is in affecting 
their roles. Furthermore, the outcomes of the study help to understand the role of 
ownership type on both board and company performances.  
The results from the stakeholder perception survey are of significant value to 
interested groups like policy makers, board of directors, regulatory and supervisory 
agencies that directly or indirectly are concerned with the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices. Finally, the study in general, is believed to be useful 
to all interested groups, including academia, in terms of enhancing their 
understanding of corporate governance in the context of emerging economies.  
 
9.4 Implications for Future Research 
The results of this study indicate avenues for future research. The meditational 
role of the board process (missing link) between the board structure, on the one 
hand, and board service and control roles, on the other hand, point to its importance 
by directly or indirectly affecting the board roles that deserve further research. Other 
future directions that deserve attention include: 
(1) The sample drawn was confined to governing bodies and stakeholders of 
private and public banks. This has to be extended to incorporate the non-
financial institutions in order to have a broader perspective on the boards‟ 
structural, process and performance variables and validate the results. 
Especially, the relationship between structural, process and performance 
variables have to be further tested as the CEO duality and insider directors do 
not apply to this study. The results of this study show that ownership type 
matters in board performance while it has no impact on company 
performance. The latter is a quite different result from those of previous 
studies, demanding further confirmation. 
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(2)  As the research focuses on an emerging economy context, more research is 
needed to further reconfirm the antecedents of board performances. 
(3) In line with the above, the study has provided vital data on the current 
corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian banks from the standpoints of 
key stakeholders. To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, no prior study 
has explored the perceptions of groups of stakeholders on corporate 
governance in Ethiopia, so this pioneering study may serve as a spring board 
for further studies in the future.  
Finally, together the theoretical model on board structure, board process and 
board roles and the perception results may provide a wider base for future 
researches in corporate governance. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1.  Main constructs, variables, and their operationalizing items 
before EFA and CFA (Sample -1) 
Main 
constructs 
Variables  Operationalizing items Source (Adapted 
from) 
Prior Alpha 
reliability 
 
 
 
Board 
Structure 
Board 
Composition  
11 measurement items on 
a 5 point Likert  
scale ranging from (1) 
strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
World bank ( 2011); 
King III; Board 
Evaluation 
questionnaire; 
Procl. 592/2008 
 
Board 
Committee 
five measurement items on 
a 5 point Likert  
scale ranging from (1) 
strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
World bank, 2011; 
OECD, 2004 
 
Board 
Independence 
Three measurement items 
on a 5 point Likert  
scale ranging from (1) 
strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
OECD, 2004; 
Procl. 592/2008; 
Nam & Nam, 2004 
 
 
 
Board 
process 
Commitment  Six  measurement items on 
a 5 point Likert scale 
ranging from (1) strongly 
agree…(5) strongly 
disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009)  
Forbes & Milliken 
(1999) 
0.87 
Critical 
debate  
Seven measurement items 
on a 5 point  
Likert scale ranging from 
(1) strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009) and Wan & 
Ong (2005) 
0.77 
Board room 
activity/  
atmosphere 
Nine measurement items 
on a 5 point  
Likert scale ranging from 
(1) strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
World bank( 2011); 
Board Evaluation 
questionnaire 
 
 
 
Service 
role/task 
Advisory role  Seven  measurement items 
on a 5 point  
Likert scale ranging from 
(1) strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009) and 
resource 
dependency 
thoery 
0.82 
Networking 
role 
Seven measurement items 
on a 5 point Likert 
 scale ranging from (1) 
strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009) and Wan & 
Ong (2005) 
0.83 
Strategic 
participation 
role 
Eight measurement items 
on a 5 point  
Likert scale ranging from 
(1) strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009) and Wan & 
Ong (2005) 
0.83 
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Control 
role/task 
Behavioral 
control role 
Seven measurement items 
on a 5 point  
Likert scale ranging from 
(1) strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009)  
 
0.62 
    
Output control 
role 
Six measurement items on 
a 5 point Likert  
scale ranging from (1) 
strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009) and Wan & 
Ong (2005) 
0.71 
Strategic 
control role 
Four measurement items 
on a 5 point 
 Likert scale ranging from 
(1) strongly agree…(5) 
strongly disagree 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009) and  theory 
 
   
Ownership and control structure One multiple choice 
question   
 Nam & Nam, 2004; 
OECD, 2004; 
Procl. 592/2008 
 
Shareholder Rights Six nominal type 
questions  
OECD, 2004; Nam 
& Nam, 2004 
 
Disclosure and transparency One nominal type 
questions 
OECD, 2004; 
Procl. 592/2008 
 
Role of Stakeholders Three ranking and one 
nominal questions   
OECD, 2004; Nam 
& Nam, 2004; 
Procl. 592/2008 
 
Upper echelon remuneration Three nominal type 
questions  
Procl. 592/2008  
Corporate governance practices Eleven likert scale, 
multiple  choice and 
nominal type 
questions 
OECD, 2004; Nam 
& Nam, 2004; 
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Appendix 4.2.  Survey Questionnaires 
Appendix 4.2a.  Survey Questionnaire for governing bodies 
 
 
University of South Africa 
Graduate School of Business Leadership 
 
Dear respondent, 
 
Thank you very much for your willingness to take time to respond to this research 
questionnaire. The research is being conducted by a staff member of Addis Ababa 
University who is a PhD candidate at Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of 
South Africa (UNISA). 
The survey is asking questions on the corporate governance systems and practices 
in the Ethiopian banks. As a distinguished and experienced board member, your accurate 
and frank response is imperative for the successful accomplishment of the study and in the 
future improvement of corporate governance practices in Ethiopia. Please be assured that 
your responses will be treated strictly confidential, your identity anonymous; and the results 
will be used only for the purpose of this research and be presented only in aggregate without 
being revealed by individual Banks. The survey questionnaire contains three parts: the first 
part is on personal profile, the second on corporate governance related issues, and the third 
on corporate governance structure, process, and roles. Kindly return the questionnaire 
appropriately filled by answering every item at your earliest convenience. 
Thank you again.  
 
Respectfully,  
 
Tsegabrhan Mekonen 
Doctoral candidate in Business Leadership 
Graduate School of Business Leadership  
University of South Africa 
 Tel. 0911403644 
 
 
Private/Public Banks 
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Please answer every item by putting a tick (√) mark as appropriate and feel free to 
make additional comments.  
 
SECTION ONE: PERSONAL PROFILE 
1. Indicate your position in the bank 
Chairman Non-executive 
board7 
Executive 
board8 
President Board 
secretary 
Other 
      
2.  Gender:   Male____ Female ____ 
3.  Age group 
18-29____ 30-39____  40-49____  40-59____  Over 60____  
4.  Years of service as a board member: ______________    
5.  Work experience other than serving as a board (years): 
    1-5____ 6-10____ 11-15____ 16-20____ 21 or more____ 
6.  Highest level of education   
Certificate____ Diploma____   Bachelor‟s Degree____    Master‟s 
Degree____  
Doctoral degree____    Other (Please specify): _________________________ 
7.  Major background (Field of study): ___________________________________________ 
 
SECTION TWO: Please put a tick (√) mark as appropriate (Does not apply to public 
banks) 
Ownership and control structure of Private Banks  
8.  Which one of the following describes the ownership and control structure of the Bank?  
(i) The largest shareholders (each up to 5% of holding) have a substantial voting right 
and effectively control the Bank_____   
(ii) The largest shareholder effectively controls the Bank even though the voting  right is 
far less than 5%____ 
(iii) Two or more large shareholders collectively control the Bank _____   
(iv) Ownership is fairly diffused with no controlling shareholder, and the management is 
not directly controlled by shareholders_____   
(v) Other (Please specify):__________________________ 
Shareholder Rights 
9.  Is there any deviation from the one-share one-vote rule in your bank?  
 Yes____    No____ 
10.  Indicate shareholders participation in voting and other issues at the shareholders‟ 
meetings.           
          Yes    No 
10.1 Is voting by mail allowed?       ____    ____ 
10.2 Can anybody serve as a proxy?       ____    ____ 
10.3 Are shareholders given adequate time for asking questions at the  
    shareholders‟ meeting?       ____     ____ 
10.4 Are shareholders‟ priority subscription rights in the issuance of 
 shares    well protected?        ____     ____ 
11.  Is the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders being practiced in your bank? 
  Yes ______  Not fully ______   Not at all ______  
 
12. Indicate the role of shareholders in nominating candidates and electing outside board of 
directors of your bank by the following sub questions.     
  
                                                          
7
 Board of director who is outsider/not part of Management 
8
 Board of director who is insider/ part of Management 
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  Yes No 
12.1 Are director candidates disclosed before the shareholders‟ meetings? ____ ____ 
12.2    Do large shareholders (holding up to 5% shares) nominate 
candidates at the shareholders‟ meetings?                
 
____              
 
____
    
13.  In your judgment, do the shareholders know their rights and obligations? 
       Yes ____   Majority know _______     Only few know _____Almost none knows_______ 
14. Do you think that those who know their rights freely exercise it in the annual general 
meeting   in matters such as voting and profit sharing? 
Yes ______   No ______   Sometimes ______ 
Disclosure and Transparency 
15. Does your bank disclose the following information? 
   Yes No 
(i) Governance structures ____ ____ 
(ii) Explicit corporate governance rules ____ ____ 
(iii) Vision, missions, and values ____ ____ 
(iv) financial performances       ____ ____ 
(v) Audited annual reports ____ ____ 
(vi) Resume or background of directors ____ ____ 
(vii) Members of board sub committees ____ ____ 
If yes, by what means? (More than one choice can be made) 
(i)  Bank‟s web page   _____ 
(ii) Annual report   _______ 
      (iii) Report to regulatory agencies _____  
(iv) Brochures ____ 
(v) Meetings ____ 
Role of Stakeholders 
16. How do you rank the relative importance of the following entities in improving corporate 
governance in Ethiopia in general and the banking sector in particular? 
 (Write 1, 2 ...6 starting from the most important) 
i. Media ___________ 
ii. Chamber of commerce ___________  
iii. Professional societies such as accounting and audit ___________  
iv.  Financial supervisory agencies ___________ 
v. The judiciary ___________ 
vi. Outside (non-executive) board of directors ___________  
17. How do you rank each of the following tasks in terms of their relative effectiveness 
(contribution) for better corporate governance in Ethiopia in general and the banking 
sector in particular?   (Write 1, 2 ...7 starting from the most effective) 
i. Making the internal corporate governance mechanisms (such as active shareholder 
participation and the role of the board) work better ___________ 
ii. Making the external governance mechanisms (such as outside board, monitoring, 
enact specific regulation) more effective ___________  
iii. Enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and disclosure ___________ 
iv. Introducing code of corporate governance___________ 
v. Conducting and publicizing corporate governance ratings of banks___________ 
vi. Prohibiting or tightly controlling some types of related-party transactions (like lending to 
directors or senior officers and cross-guarantees of repayment) ___________ 
vii.  Reducing ownership concentration (by tighter control of cross-shareholding9 or 
pyramid ownership structure10 etc.) ___________ 
viii. Other ( please specify)  __________________________________________________ 
                                                          
9 A situation in which stocks are held by two corporations in each other 
10 The control of a corporation through a chain of ownership structure of a group of firms 
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18.  How do you rank the relative importance of each of the following stakeholders in 
preventing the influence of controlling owners (largest shareholders) from abusing their 
power (to pursue their private interests)?  (Write 1, 2…6 starting from the most 
important) 
i. Minority (non-controlling) shareholders ___________ 
ii. Institutional investors (like companies and others) ________ 
iii. Outside (non-executive) board of directors ______________________  
iv. Financial supervisory agencies __________________________  
v.  Labor unions or employees ______________ 
vi. The legal system _____________ 
vii. Other (please specify)_________________________________________________ 
19. Are institutional shareholders in a stronger position to influence the board, than the other 
types of shareholders (minority and controlling shareholders), to act in the best interest 
of the owners? 
  Yes ______ No ______  
Power of Boards  
20. Of the following, who has the strongest influence in the selection and dismissal of non 
executive board of directors?  (You may choose more than one) 
i. Board  of directors__________ 
ii. Nomination committee (autonomously)__________ 
iii.  President/CEO __________ 
iv. Controlling owner, but the board puts some input __________ 
v. Others  (please specify)___________ 
21. Of the following, who has the strongest influence in removing a poorly performing 
President and selecting a new President of the bank? (You may choose more than 
one) 
i. Board of directors __________ 
ii. Nomination committee (autonomously) __________ 
iii. Controlling owner, but the board puts some input __________ 
iv. Other  ( specify)___________ 
Boards’ Access to Information 
22. The following questions refer to board of directors‟ access to information. 
22.1 Meeting/discussing with managers (who are not board members) and workers of 
the company        Often______   Sometimes______   Rarely_____   Never______ 
22.2 Access to business records and books of account 
No restriction at all _______    Somewhat limited______   Very limited_______ 
22.3 issuing information material in time to be digested before every board meeting 
Very much so__________    Not always _______    Rarely____________ 
Board and executive officers (senior management) remuneration 
23.  Do you think that the remuneration is sufficient enough to attract, retain, and motivate 
board members?   Yes _____   No ______  
24.  Do you think that the remuneration is sufficient enough to attract and retain qualified 
senior   management?   Yes _____   No ______  
25. Do you think that the remuneration of senior management is linked to performance?  
Yes____   No____ 
Corporate governance practices 
26. What is your view of corporate governance in your bank compared with other banks? 
Much better _____ Slightly better_______ About the same_____ Slightly 
worse______  Much worse______ 
27. How do you compare your bank‟s current corporate governance practices with those of 
the previous years? 
Much better ____  Slightly better_____ About the same_____ Slightly worse______ 
Much worse______ 
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28. Your overall evaluation of the board members in light of individual and group experience, 
effectiveness, and approach to run the bank is: 
     Very good _____ Good ______ Satisfactory ______ Poor ______ Very poor ______  
29.  Which of the following have you strictly observed or adhered to in the appointment of 
 boards?  (You may choose more than one) 
(i)   Relevant Commercial Code ________ 
(ii)  Requirements of the National Bank of Ethiopia (regulatory agency) ________ 
(iii)  Company Policy______ 
(iv)  Code of Corporate Governance ________________ 
(v)  Other, please specify___________ 
30.  How often does the board conduct meetings (frequency of meetings)? 
Every two weeks _________    Every month_________    Every three months______   
If different, please specify __________ 
31.  What was your average attendance rate for board meetings per year? 
  90-100% ____     75-89% _____   60-74% ____     50-59%_____    Below 50%_____ 
32.  Does your board have the following committees? Yes No 
(i) Audit Committee     ____ ____ 
(ii) Nomination Committee    ____ ____ 
(iii) Remuneration Committee    ____ ____ 
33.  What do you think of the current size of your board (governing bodies)? 
  Too large_______      Too small _________    Ideal _________ 
34.  If too large or too small, what do you think should be the ideal size of your board?      
________________ 
35.  In your view, which of the roles mainly characterize the Ethiopian board of directors?  
  (You may choose more than one) 
(i) Control Role11  ______ 
(ii) Service role12  _______ 
(iii) Strategic role13 _______ 
36. In your view, which of the following approaches would work better to promote good 
corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian banks? (Please choose one option) 
(i) Prescriptive approach14_____ 
(ii) Non-prescriptive approach15_____ 
(iii) Mixed approach16______ 
 
In your opinion, what are the major corporate governance problems or issues faced by the 
Ethiopian banks?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Monitoring financial performance, top management behavior, and strategic decision making 
12
 Mentoring and supporting top management 
13
 Initiation and involvement in the different phase of strategic decision making process 
14
 Prescription of specific corporate governance rules and practices by regulations 
15
 Allowing firms to determine their own corporate governance practices 
16
 Prescription only the basic framework by regulations and allowing firms to develop more detailed 
practices 
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SECTION THREE: Structure, process and roles of boards 
This section requires your observation regarding the structure, process, roles of boards etc…in 
your bank. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements by putting a 
tick (√) mark on one of the following: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral (or no opinion), 
Agree, or Strongly agree. Kindly answer every item 
 
37 Composition  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
37.1 There is a transparent and clear 
structure that defines roles, 
responsibilities, functions, and 
relationships between the board 
members, the President,  and executive 
directors 
     
37.2 The board consists of a workable 
number of board members to function 
effectively and efficiently as a group. 
     
37.3 The board includes enough employee 
representatives as members. 
     
37.4 Inclusion of executive directors in a 
board is essential as they have sufficient 
information and are knowledgeable 
about the bank. 
     
37.5 Non executive board members bring with 
them important resources (expertise, link 
to the market, know-how, technology…) 
and serve as a link with the external 
environment. 
     
37.6 Prospective board members are 
identified by a nominating committee or 
through other means of succession 
planning process 
     
37.7 Board members are required to disclose 
possible conflicts of interest before their 
appointment 
     
37.8 Induction and development programs are 
provided to board members 
     
37.9 Outside (non executive) board members 
actively play their stewardship/ control 
role compared to inside  board members 
     
37.10 Working as a team, the board has the 
right blend of skills, experience, and 
appropriate degree of diversity relevant 
to the boards tasks and  bank‟s 
operation 
     
37.11 The quality, experience and 
independence of a board member 
directly affect board performance 
     
38 Committee/board appointment  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
38.1 This board  has standing and ad hoc 
committees that include board members 
and management 
     
38.2 Working with committees is useful as this 
would allow maximum use of board‟s 
expertise and knowledge 
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38.3 Committee assignments reflect  the 
interests, experience, and skills of 
individual board members 
     
38.4 Standing and ad hoc committees report 
regularly to the full board 
     
38.5 Committees are reviewed annually with 
regard to composition, goals, 
responsibilities and performance.  
     
Board process 
39 Commitment  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
39.1 Board members regularly attend board 
meetings and make informed decisions. 
     
39.2 Board members come to the meeting 
well prepared for the agenda and are 
actively involved in discussions. 
     
39.3 Board members are very active in finding 
their own information in addition to 
reports  supplied by the President or top 
management team 
     
39.4 Board members devote sufficient time 
needed and are available to fulfill board 
activities.  
     
39.5 Board members effectively use their 
knowledge, skill, and experience and 
contribute meaningfully to board 
discussions. 
     
39.6 The board follows up and monitors its 
decisions and receives sufficient status 
reports on the implementation. 
     
40 Critical debate  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
40.1 There are conflicts and disagreements 
on the decisions to be taken during 
meetings 
     
40.2 There are conflicts and disagreements  
on the board working style 
     
40.3 Differences of opinion in board decisions 
are more often settled by vote than by 
more discussions 
     
40.4 The Board exerts efforts to build 
consensus and managing conflict 
constructively 
     
40.5 Board members ask critical questions to 
proposals initiated by the management 
team. 
     
40.6 Board members critically assess 
information presented by the 
management team 
     
40.7 Board members raise critical points 
during meetings and do not serve as 
rubber stamp 
     
41 Board room activity/ processes  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
41.1 Board members receive clear agendas      
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and background material with sufficient 
time to review prior to board and 
committee meetings 
41.2 The board focuses much of its attention 
on long-term strategy and policy issues 
rather than on short-term administrative 
concerns 
     
41.3 The board chair leads meetings well with 
a clear focus on the big issues facing the 
bank and allows full and open discussion 
before major decisions are made. 
     
41.4 The board refrains from making 
decisions related to operations and the 
implementation of policy that fall in the 
domain of the President/CEO and 
management team. 
     
41.5 The board conducts its deliberations in a 
thoughtful, objective manner, and 
considers viewpoints of different 
members before making decisions. 
     
41.6 Each board member has equal and 
adequate opportunities to discuss 
issues and ask questions 
     
41.7 The length of board meetings is 
adequate to thoroughly examine all items 
on the board‟s agendas 
     
41.8 Board members accept and support a 
decision that has been made, regardless 
of the way they voted on the issue. 
     
41.9 There is always a very good internal 
atmosphere at board meetings 
     
Service role 
42  Advisory role  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
42.1 Board members take initiatives to  give 
advice based on personal knowledge, 
ideas, and points of view  
     
42.2 The board provides support and counsel 
to senior executive body up on request 
     
42.3 The board has significant influence on 
major management issues (such as 
bank‟s structure, strategy…) 
     
42.4 The board contributes to technical issues 
(new technology, new product…) 
     
42.5 The board contributes to market issues  
(new market or consumer behavior) and 
legal issues affecting the bank 
     
42.6 The board gives proper advice and 
directions on how to achieve goals by 
setting policies 
     
42.7 Non executive directors provide 
alternative viewpoints 
     
43 Networking  role  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
43.1 The board creates linkages with 
important external stakeholders 
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(customers, government, non 
government agencies…) 
43.2 The board assists the bank in obtaining 
scarce resources 
     
43.3 The board provides the bank with 
external legitimacy and reputation 
     
43.4 The board effectively represents the 
bank in the political, economic, and 
social arena influencing the decision-
making process. 
     
43.5 Board members are chosen on their 
merit and  influence in community  
     
43.6 The board seeks information and advice 
from leaders of similar organization 
     
43.7 The board invites former members to 
special events designed to convey the 
bank‟s history and values to new 
members and also share their 
experience 
     
44 Strategic participation role   Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
44.1 The board understands the 
organization‟s operational and 
environmental contexts 
     
44.2 The board is actively involved in long-
term strategic planning process and 
goals to align with changes in the 
external environment 
     
44.3 The board identifies actions to seize 
opportunities that will contribute to the 
bank‟s strategic priorities 
     
44.4 The board applies a strategic approach 
to decision making , i.e., considers facts, 
perspectives, objectives and criteria in 
discussions 
     
44.5  The board demonstrates awareness of 
emerging/ environmental  trends 
affecting the bank and reflect them in 
discussion and decision-making 
     
44.6 The board benchmarks strategic plan 
with best performing banking industry 
data 
     
44.7 The board identifies annual strategic 
direction within the framework of the long 
range planning 
     
44.8 The board receives plan for strategy 
implementation from the President 
     
Control role 
45 Behavioral control role  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
45.1 The board is actively involved in 
monitoring that all internal behaviors are 
adequately controlled 
     
45.2 The board is actively involved in defining 
behavioral guidelines for itself and top 
level managers 
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45.3 The board is actively involved in 
controlling/preventing occurrence of 
conflicts of interest among itself 
     
45.4 The board is actively involved in 
supervising and evaluating the 
performance of  the President 
     
45.5 The board actively oversees the 
activities of its standing committees 
     
45.6 The board is formally evaluated by its 
members  
     
45.7 The board is formally evaluated by its 
shareholders 
     
46 Output control role Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
46.1 The board controls that the activities are 
well organized  
     
46.2 The board evaluates performance 
according to plans and budgets 
     
46.3 The board has internal mechanisms to 
effectively monitor key performance 
areas  yearly 
     
46.4 The board is regularly kept informed on 
the financial position of the bank 
     
46.5 Management regularly reports to the 
board on key outcomes and targets that 
flow directly from the strategy. 
     
46.6 As member of this board, I have been 
regularly assessed and received 
feedback on my performance 
     
47 Strategic control role Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
47.1 The board actively monitors and 
evaluates implementation of strategic 
decisions and main goals 
     
47.2 The board critically reviews performance 
against strategic plan 
     
47.3 The board monitors top management in 
decision-making 
     
47.4 Management regularly reports to the 
board on key outcomes and targets that 
flow directly from the strategy 
     
48 Board responsibilities  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
48.1 As a member of  the board of directors, I 
am adequately informed and 
knowledgeable about my functions and 
responsibilities  
     
48.2 As a member of the board of directors, I 
feel responsible  and devote sufficient 
time to carry out my responsibilities 
     
48.3 As a member of the board of directors, I 
consider fiduciary and  stewardship 
responsibilities in discussions and 
decision-making 
     
48.4 As a member of the board of directors, I      
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am responsible and  take into account 
stakeholder interests in decisions and 
actions  
48.5 As a member of the board, I am willing to 
be accountable and responsible for 
situations that may cost me to the extent 
of relinquishing my position. 
     
49 Board independence Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
49.1 The  board of directors of  the bank  are 
independent from the President of the 
bank 
     
49.2 The board of directors of the bank  are 
independent from the board chairperson 
because the chairperson  will not 
influence the extension or termination of 
the directorship 
     
49.3 The board of directors of  the bank  are 
independent from the controlling (large) 
shareholders 
     
Any comments and recommendations that you think will improve corporate governance 
practices. ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
....……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………. 
End of questionnaire 
I highly appreciate your time and effort in filling the questionnaire 
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Appendix 4.2b. Survey Questionnaire for shareholders and MPs 
 
University of South Africa 
Graduate School of Business Leadership 
 
Dear Shareholder/ Honorable Member of Parliament,  
 
Thank you very much for your willingness to take time to respond to this research 
questionnaire. The study is being conducted by a staff member of Addis Ababa University 
who is a PhD candidate at Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of South 
Africa. 
The survey is asking questions on the corporate governance systems and practices 
in the Ethiopian banks. As a shareholder, your accurate and frank response is imperative for 
the successful accomplishment of the study program and in the future improvement of 
corporate governance practices in Ethiopia. Please be assured that your responses will be 
treated strictly confidential, your identity anonymous, and the results will be used only for the 
purpose of this research and be presented only in aggregate without being revealed by 
individual Banks. The survey questionnaire contains three parts: The first part is on personal 
profile; the second and the third are on corporate governance related issues. Kindly return 
the questionnaire appropriately filled by answering every item at your earliest convenience. 
Thank you again.  
 
Respectfully,  
 
Tsegabrhan Mekonen 
Doctoral candidate in Business Leadership 
Graduate School of Business Leadership  
University of South Africa 
Mobile: 0911403644
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Please answer every item by putting a tick (√) mark as appropriate and feel free to 
make additional comments 
SECTION ONE: PERSONAL PROFILE 
1. Gender   Male____     Female_______________ 
2. Age group   18-29____ 30-39____ 40-49____ 50-59____ Over 60____  
3. Years as shareholder (Applies to shareholders) 
      1-2____    3-5___    6-10_____   11-20 _____    Since establishment______  
4. Highest level of education   Certificate____ Diploma____   Bachelor‟s Degree____    
Master‟s Degree____  Doctoral degree____    Other (Please specify): ____________ 
5. Number of shares owned (Applies to shareholders) ________ 
TWO: Please put a tick (√) mark as appropriate 
Ownership and control structure of Private Banks (Applies to shareholders) 
 6. Which one of the following describes the ownership and control structure of the Bank?  
(i) The largest shareholders (each up to 5% of holding) have a substantial voting right 
and effectively control the bank _____  
(ii) The largest shareholder effectively controls the Bank even though the voting  right is 
far less than 5% _____ 
(iii) Two or more large shareholders collectively control the Bank _____ 
(iv) Ownership is fairly diffused with no controlling shareholder, and the management is 
not directly controlled by shareholders  _____ 
(v) Other (Please specify):__________________________ 
Shareholder Rights (Applies to shareholders) 
7.  Is there any deviation from the one-share one-vote rule in your bank?  
Yes_____ No________ 
8. Indicate shareholders participation in voting and other issues at the shareholders‟ 
meetings.           
          Yes    No 
8.1 Is voting by mail allowed?       ____    ____ 
8.2 Can anybody serve as a proxy?       ____    ____ 
8.3 Are shareholders given adequate time for asking questions at the  
shareholders‟ meeting?       ____     ____ 
8.4 Are shareholders‟ priority subscription rights in the issuance of  
shares well protected?         ____     ____ 
9.  Is the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders being practiced in your bank? 
  Yes ______  Not fully ______   Not at all ______ 
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10.  Indicate the role of shareholders in nominating candidates and electing outside board 
directors of your bank by the following sub questions. 
  Yes No 
10.1 Are director candidates disclosed before the shareholders‟ meeting? ____ ____ 
10.2    Do large shareholders (holding up to 5% shares) nominate 
candidates at the shareholders‟ meeting?                
 
____              
 
____
10.3    Can the existence of large shareholders be a built-in corporate  
governance mechanism as this would reduce the problem of the  
 separation of ownership and management?                                                       
 
 
____
 
 
____ 
11.  As a shareholder, do you know your rights and obligations? 
          Yes ____     Partly I know _______      No _____  
12. If your answer to the above is yes, do you freely exercise your rights in the annual 
general meeting in matters pertaining to voting, profit sharing and other issues? 
    Yes ______ No ______ Sometimes ______ 
 
Disclosure and Transparency 
13. Does your bank disclose the following information? 
  Yes No 
(i) Governance structures ____ ____ 
(ii) Explicit corporate governance rules ____ ____ 
(iii) Vision, missions, and values ____ ____ 
(iv) financial performances     ____ ____ 
(v) Audited annual reports ____ ____ 
(vi) Resume or background of directors ____ ____ 
(vii) Members of board sub committees ____ ____ 
If yes, by what means?  (More than one choice can be made) 
(i) Bank‟s web page ____ 
(ii) Annual report_______ 
(iii) Report to regulatory agencies_____ 
(iv) Brochures ____ 
(v) Meetings____ 
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Role of Stakeholders 
14. How do you rank the relative importance of the following entities in improving corporate 
governance in Ethiopia in general and the banking sector in particular? 
    (Write 1, 2 ...6 starting from the most important) 
i. Media ___________ 
ii. Chamber of commerce ___________  
iii. Professional societies such as accounting and audit ___________  
iv.  Financial supervisory agencies ___________ 
v. The judiciary ___________ 
vi. Outside (non-executive) board  of directors17 ___________  
vii. Other ( please specify)  ________________________________________________ 
15. How do you rank each of the following tasks in terms of their relative effectiveness 
(contribution) for better corporate governance in Ethiopia in general and the banking 
sector in particular?        (Write 1, 2 ...7 starting from the most effective) 
i. Making the internal corporate governance mechanisms (such as active shareholder 
participation and the role of the board) work better ___________  
ii. Making the external governance mechanisms (such as outside board, monitoring, 
enact specific regulation) more effective ___________ 
iii. Enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and disclosure ___________ 
iv. Introducing code of corporate governance___________ 
v. Conducting and publicizing corporate governance ratings of banks___________ 
vi. Prohibiting or tightly controlling some types of related-party transactions (like lending 
to directors or senior officers and cross-guarantees of repayment) ___________ 
vii. Reducing ownership concentration (by tighter control of cross-shareholding18 or 
pyramid ownership structure19, etc) ___________ 
viii. Other( please specify)  _________________________________________________ 
16. How do you rank the relative importance of each of the following stakeholders in 
preventing  the influence of controlling owners (largest shareholders) from abusing their 
power (to pursue their private interests)?  (Write 1, 2…6 starting from the most 
important) 
i. Minority (non-controlling) shareholders ___________ 
ii. Institutional investors (like companies and others) ________ 
iii. Outside (non-executive) board of directors ______________________  
iv. Financial supervisory agencies __________________________  
                                                          
17
 Board of director who is outsider/not part of Management 
18
 A situation in which stocks are held by two corporations in each other 
19 The control of a corporation through a chain of ownership structure of a group of firms 
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v. Labor unions or employees ______________ 
vi. The legal system ________________ 
vii. Other please specify)_____________________________________________ 
17. Your overall evaluation of the board members in light of individual and group experience,   
     effectiveness, and approach to run the bank is: 
        Very good ______ Good ______ Satisfactory ______ Poor ______ Very poor ______   
18. In your view, which of the roles mainly characterize the Ethiopian board of directors?  
(You may choose more than one) 
(i) Control Role20 _____    (ii) Service role21 _____   (iii) Strategic role22 ______ 
19. In your view, which of the following approaches would work better to promote good    
corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian banks? (Please choose one option) 
(i) Prescriptive approach23___  (ii) Non-prescriptive approach24___ (iii) Mixed 
approach25____ 
Board and executive officers (senior management) remuneration 
a. Do you think that the remuneration is sufficient enough to attract, retain, and motivate 
board members?    Yes _____ No ______  
b. Do you think that the remuneration is sufficient enough to attract and retain senior 
management?     Yes _____ No ______  
22. Do you think that the remuneration of senior management is linked to performance?  
Yes____   No____ 
In your opinion, what are the major corporate governance problems or issues faced by the 
Ethiopian banks?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Monitoring financial performance, top management behavior, and strategic decision making 
21
 Mentoring and supporting top management 
22
 Initiation and involvement in the different phase of strategic decision making process 
23
 Prescription of specific corporate governance rules and practices by regulations 
24
 Allowing firms to determine their own corporate governance practices 
25
 Prescription only the basic framework by regulations and allowing firms to develop more detailed 
practices 
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SECTION THREE:  
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements by putting a tick (√) 
mark on one of the following: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral (or no opinion), Agree, or 
Strongly agree. Kindly answer every item 
23 General corporate governance  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
23.1 
 
Board of directors play crucial role 
in bringing about good governance 
by carrying out their pivotal role of 
directing, governing, and controlling 
activities of the bank. 
     
23.2 Boards of directors as corporate 
governance mechanism are 
important instruments to maximize 
shareholders wealth. 
     
23.3 Better corporate governance 
increases market value of shares 
     
23.4 Better corporate governance 
reduces political or regulatory 
intervention 
     
23.5 Boards are true representatives of 
shareholders who strive to defend 
my interest  
     
23.6 Current corporate governance 
practices in my  bank are much 
better compared with those of the 
previous years 
     
23.7 Corporate governance in my  bank 
is much better compared with other 
banks in Ethiopia 
     
23.8 Compared with other banks, our 
board members are competent, 
skillful, experienced, and educated 
with high level of integrity to 
discharge their duty 
     
24 Board- management Relations Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  
agree 
24.1 I believe that, in my bank, there is a 
sound relationship between the 
board and top management. 
     
24.2 There is a smooth relationship 
between the board and the 
President of the bank 
     
25 Corporate performance  
26.1 As a shareholder, I am satisfied 
with the performance of the bank 
and the share dividend declared 
every year 
     
25.2 The bank is profitable every year 
due to persistent effort  by the 
board, executive body and 
employees 
     
25.3 The bank is profitable every year 
due to persistent effort  only by the 
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executive body and employees 
25.4 Many of the issues that the board 
deals with add value to the 
shareholders 
     
25.5 I can sense the effectiveness of the 
boards and clearly see their wealth 
maximization efforts 
     
25.6 My bank, besides making profit for 
shareholders, has the goal of 
attaining the well-being of various 
stakeholders, such as employees 
and customers 
     
26 Strategic issue  
26.1 My board is actively involved in 
formulating long-term strategies for 
attaining future goals and reviews it 
as deemed necessary 
     
26.2 My board is more involved in 
strategic matters than routine 
matters  
     
26.3 The board identifies actions to seize 
opportunities that will contribute to 
the bank‟s strategic priorities 
     
26.4 The board identifies annual 
strategic direction within the 
framework of the long range 
planning 
     
26.5 The board demonstrates 
awareness of emerging/ 
environmental  trends affecting the 
bank and reflect them in discussion 
and decision-making 
     
27 Board independence Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  
agree 
27.1 The  board of directors of  the bank  
are independent from the President 
of the bank 
     
27.2 The board of directors of the bank  
are independent from the board 
chairperson 
     
27.3 The board of directors of  the bank  
are independent from the 
controlling (large) shareholders 
     
27.4 Non executive  board of directors
26
 
are fully independent from the 
board chairperson, because the 
chairperson  will not influence the 
extension or termination of the 
directorship 
     
28 Board duty  
28.1 The board of directors in my bank 
act honestly, carefully, and 
reasonably in executing their duties 
     
                                                          
26
 Board of director who are outsiders/not part of Management 
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28.2 In my judgment, the board‟s 
involvement in the oversight and 
monitoring of a company‟s financial 
performance, its top management 
and its strategic processes and 
outcomes meet shareholders‟ 
expectations 
     
28.3 My board is not perfunctory/ rubber 
stamp: the chairperson does not 
dominate the board meeting, and 
different views of directors are 
welcome 
     
28.4 My board plays an important role in 
selecting, monitoring, and replacing 
the President of the bank 
     
28.5 My board effectively oversees 
potential conflicts of interest 
including related-party transactions  
     
28.6 My board is active in ensuring 
proper disclosure and actively 
communicate with shareholders 
and stakeholders 
     
28.7  In general, my board is active in 
ensuring the effectiveness of 
various governance practices 
     
29 Corporate governance issues  
29.1 Lack of integrity and ethics among 
boards is a major issue  
     
29.2 Lack of integrity and ethics among 
top management  is a major issue 
     
29.3 Insider trading
27
 is a major issue      
29.4 Conflict of interest of board of 
directors is a major issue 
     
29.5 Lack of proper balance between 
executive
28
 and non executive 
members in the board is a major 
issue 
     
29.6  Ineffective connectivity between 
board and management is a major 
issue 
     
Any comments and recommendations that you think will improve corporate governance 
practices:  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
End of questionnaire 
I highly appreciate your time and effort in filling the questionnaire 
 
                                                          
27
 When share prices are artificially controlled for personal gain  
28
 Board of director who is insider/ part of Management 
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Appendix 4.2c. Survey Questionnaire for bank employees, NBE and 
PFEA 
  
University of South Africa 
Graduate School of Business Leadership 
 
 
Dear respondent, 
Thank you very much for your willingness to take time to respond to this research 
questionnaire. The study is being conducted by a staff member of Addis Ababa University 
who is a PhD candidate at Graduate School of Business Leadership, University of South 
Africa. 
The survey is asking questions on the corporate governance systems and practices 
in the Ethiopian banks. Your accurate and frank response is imperative for the successful 
accomplishment of the study and in the future improvement of corporate governance 
practices in Ethiopia. Please be assured that your responses will be treated strictly 
confidential, your identity anonymous, and the results will be used only for the purpose of 
this research and be presented only in aggregate without being revealed by individual 
Banks. The survey questionnaire contains three parts: The first part is on personal profile; 
the second and the third are on corporate governance related issues.  Kindly return the 
questionnaire appropriately filled by answering every item at your earliest convenience. 
Thank you again. 
 
Respectfully,  
 
 
Tsegabrhan Mekonen 
Doctoral candidate in Business Leadership 
Graduate School of Business Leadership  
University of South Africa 
Mobile: 0911403644
Private/ Public Bank employees, NBE and PFEA 
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Please answer every item putting a tick (√) mark as appropriate and feel free to make 
additional comments 
SECTION ONE: PERSONAL PROFILE 
1. Indicate your position in the bank 
Managerial Professional Technical Administrative Other 
     
2. Gender:   Male____     Female_______________ 
3. Age group 
18-29____ 30-39____ 40-49____ 50-59____ Over 60____  
4. Work experience in the same business, related or others 
1-5____ 6-10____ 11-15____ 16-20____ 21 or more____ 
5. Highest level of education   
Certificate____ Diploma____   Bachelor‟s Degree____    Master‟s 
Degree____ Doctoral degree____    Other (Please specify): ________________________ 
SECTION TWO: Please put a tick (√) mark as appropriate 
Disclosure and Transparency 
6.  Does your bank disclose the following information?  
  Yes No 
(i) Governance structures ____ ____ 
(ii) Explicit corporate governance rules ____ ____ 
(iii) Vision, missions, and values ____ ____ 
(iv) financial performances        ____ ____ 
(v) Audited annual reports ____ ____ 
(vi) Resume or background of directors ____ ____ 
(vii) Members of board sub committees ____ ____ 
If yes, by what means? (More than one choice can be made) 
(i)  Bank‟s web page   _____ 
(ii) Annual report   _______ 
      (iii) Report to regulatory agencies _____  
(iv) Brochures ____ 
(vi) Meetings ____ 
(vi) Other (please specify):_________________ 
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Role of Stakeholders 
7. How do you rank the relative importance of the following entities in improving corporate 
governance in Ethiopia in general and the banking sector in particular?  
(Write 1, 2...6 starting from the most important) 
i. Media ___________ 
ii. Chamber of commerce  and sectoral associations___________  
iii. Professional societies such as accounting and audit ___________  
iv.  Financial supervisory agencies ___________ 
v. The judiciary ___________ 
vi. Outside (non-executive) board  of directors29 ___________  
vii. Others (please specify)  _____________________________________________ 
8. How do you rank each of the following tasks in terms of their relative effectiveness 
(contribution) for better corporate governance in Ethiopia in general and the banking 
sector in particular?  (Write 1, 2 ...7 starting from the most effective) 
i. Making the internal corporate governance mechanisms (such as active shareholder 
participation and the role of the board) work better ___________ 
ii. Making the external governance mechanisms (such as outside board monitoring, enact 
specific regulation) more effective ___________ 
iii. Enhancing the standards of accounting, audit and disclosure ___________ 
iv. Introducing code of corporate governance ___________ 
v.Conducting and publicizing corporate governance ratings  of banks___________ 
vi. Prohibiting or tightly controlling some types of related-party transactions (like lending to 
directors or senior officers and cross-guarantees of repayment) ___________ 
vii. Reducing ownership concentration (by tighter control of cross-shareholding30 or pyramid 
ownership structure31, etc.) ___________ 
viii. Other ( please specify)  __________________________________________________ 
9. How do you rank the relative importance of each of the following stakeholders in 
preventing the influence of major shareholders (controlling owners) from abusing their 
power (to pursue their private interests)? (Write 1, 2 … 6 starting from the most 
important) 
 i. Minority (non-controlling) shareholders ___________ 
ii. Institutional investors (like companies and others) ________ 
iii. Outside (non-executive) board of directors ______________________  
                                                          
29
 Board of director who are outsiders/not part of Management 
30 A situation in which stocks are held by two corporations in each other 
31 The control of a corporation through a chain of ownership structure of a group of firms 
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iv. Financial supervisory agencies __________________________  
v.  Labor unions or employees ______________  
vi. The legal system ___________ 
vii. Others ( please specify)________________________________________________ 
10. My overall evaluation of the board members in light of individual and group experience,         
effectiveness, and approach to run the bank is: 
        Very good ______ Good ______  Satisfactory ______  Poor ______ Very poor ______   
11. In your view, which of the roles mainly characterize the Ethiopian board of directors?  
(You may choose more than one) 
(i) Control Role32 _____  (ii) Service role33 _____  (iii) Strategic role34 ______ 
12. In your view, which of the following approaches would work better to promote good 
corporate governance practices in the Ethiopian banks? (Please choose one option) 
(i) Prescriptive approach35___ (ii) Non-prescriptive approach36___ (iii) Mixed 
approach37___ 
Board and executive officers (senior management) remuneration 
13. Do you think that the remuneration is sufficient enough to attract, retain, and motivate 
board members?        Yes _____ No ______  
14. Do you think that the remuneration is sufficient enough to attract and retain senior 
management?    Yes _____ No ______  
15. Do you think that the remuneration of senior management is linked to performance?  
Yes____   No____ 
16. In your opinion, what are the major corporate governance problems or issues faced by 
the Ethiopian banks? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Monitoring financial performance, top management behavior, and strategic decision making 
33
 Mentoring and supporting top management 
34
 Initiation and involvement in the different phase of strategic decision making process 
35
 Prescription of specific corporate governance rules and practices by regulations 
36
 Allowing firms to determine their own corporate governance practices 
37
 Prescription only the basic framework by regulations and allowing firms to develop more detailed 
practices 
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SECTION THREE:  
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements by putting a tick 
(√) mark on one of the following: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral (or no opinion), 
Agree, or Strongly agree. Kindly answer every item 
17 General corporate governance Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
17.1 Board of directors play crucial role 
in bringing about good governance 
by carrying out their pivotal role of 
directing, governing and controlling 
activities of the bank. 
     
17.2 Boards of directors as corporate 
governance mechanism are 
important instruments to maximize 
shareholders wealth. 
     
17.3 Better corporate governance 
increases market value of shares 
     
17.4 Better corporate governance 
reduces political or regulatory 
intervention 
     
17.5 Boards are true representative of 
shareholders who strive to defend 
their interests  
     
17.6 Current corporate governance 
practices in my  bank are much 
better compared with those of the 
previous years 
     
17.7 Corporate governance in my  bank 
is much better compared with other 
banks in Ethiopia 
     
17.8 Compared with other banks, our 
board members are competent, 
skillful, experienced, and educated 
with high level of integrity to 
discharge their duty 
     
18 Shareholders’ rights Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
18.1 Institutional shareholders38  
influence the board  better than the 
other types of shareholders 
(minority and controlling 
shareholders) to act in the best 
interest of the owners 
     
18.2 During annual general meeting,  the 
board gives its shareholders 
enough room for questions and 
discussions 
     
                                                          
38
  Like companies and others 
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18.3 Corporate governance system in 
my  bank ensures the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders 
     
19 Board– management relationship  
19.1 I believe that, in my bank, there is a 
sound relationship between the 
board and top management  
     
19.2 There is a smooth relationship 
between the board and the 
President of the bank 
     
20 Corporate performance - specific  
20.1 As an employee, I am satisfied with 
the performance of the bank and 
the amount of profit declared every 
year 
     
20.2 The bank is profitable every year 
due to persistent effort  by the 
board, executive body and 
employees  
     
17.3 The bank is profitable every year  
due to persistent effort only by 
executive body and employees 
     
20.4 Many of the issues that the board 
deals with  add value to the 
shareholders 
     
20.5 I can sense the effectiveness of the 
boards and clearly see their wealth 
maximization efforts 
     
20.6 My bank, besides making profit for 
shareholders, has the goal of 
attaining the well-being of various 
stakeholders, such as employees 
and customers 
     
21 Strategic issue  
21.1 The board is actively involved in 
formulating long-term strategies for 
attaining future goals and reviews it 
as deemed necessary 
     
21.2 The board is more involved in 
strategic matters than routine 
matters  
     
21.3 The board identifies actions to seize 
opportunities that will contribute to 
the bank‟s strategic priorities 
     
21.4 The board identifies annual 
strategic direction within the 
framework of the long range 
planning 
     
21.5 The board demonstrates awareness 
of emerging/ environmental  trends 
affecting the bank and reflect them 
in discussion and decision-making 
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22 Board Independence Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
22.1 The board of directors of  the bank  
are independent from the President 
of the bank 
     
22.2 The board of directors of the bank  
are independent from the board 
chair person 
     
22.3 The board of directors of  the bank  
are independent from the controlling 
shareholders 
     
22.4 Non executive board of directors39 
are fully independent from the 
board chairperson, because the 
chairperson  will not influence the 
extension or termination of the 
directorship 
     
23 Board duty  
23.1 The board of directors in my bank 
act honestly, carefully, and 
reasonably in executing their duties  
     
23.2 In my judgment, the board‟s 
involvement in the oversight and 
monitoring of a company‟s financial 
performance, its top management 
and its strategic processes and 
outcomes meet shareholders‟ 
expectations 
     
23.3 The board of directors in my bank is 
not perfunctory/rubber stamp: the 
chairperson does not dominate the 
board meeting, and different views 
of directors are welcome 
     
23.4 The board of directors plays an 
important role in selecting, 
monitoring, and replacing the 
President of the bank 
     
23.5 The board of directors effectively 
oversees potential conflicts of 
interest including related-party 
transactions  
     
23.6 The board is active in ensuring 
proper disclosure and actively 
communicate with shareholders and 
stakeholders 
     
23.7  In general, the board of directors is 
active in ensuring the effectiveness 
of various governance practices 
     
24 Corporate governance issues  
24.1 Lack of integrity and ethics among 
boards is a major issue  
     
                                                          
39
 Board of director who are outsiders/not part of Management 
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24.2 Lack of integrity and ethics among 
top management  is a major issue 
     
24.3 Insider trading
40
 is a major issue      
24.4 Conflict of interest of board of 
directors is a major issue 
     
24.5 Lack of proper balance between 
executive and non executive 
members in the board is a major 
issue 
     
24.6  Ineffective connectivity between 
board and management is a major 
issue 
     
Any comments and recommendations that you think will improve corporate governance 
practices: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
                                                          
40
 When share prices are artificially controlled for personal gain 
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Appendix 4.2d.  Interview guide questions for the Board/Secretary/President 
CG attribute Questions to ask 
Commitment to 
corporate 
governance 
 Does your Bank have a charter or articles of incorporation according to 
country legislation, with provisions on: (i) the protection of shareholder rights 
and the equitable treatment of shareholders; (ii) distribution of authority 
between the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, the Board of Directors 
and executive bodies, and (iii) information disclosure and transparency of the 
Bank's activities? 
Implementation 
of corporate 
governance 
policies and 
practices 
 Does your Bank have a code of best practices of corporate governance 
and/or policies?  
i. If yes, what is its general content and benefit or contribution to any 
improvement in operational and organizational efficiency? 
ii. If yes, does your bank‟s corporate governance practices conform to 
some  established standards, then to which ones  
iii. If no, are you convinced of its importance and do you intend to craft it? 
 How do you evaluate your Board? Is it policy, service provider or functional? 
 How do you evaluate the National Bank of Ethiopia in playing its regulatory 
and supervisory role? 
Structure  How is the composition of the Board of Directors determined? 
 Do you think that the current structure of boards (characteristics, 
composition, diversity, mix of skills/experience …) works well (serve the 
bank‟s interests) and is in favor of sound board processes?  
 If not what do you think should be the right skill mix to make the best of 
boards? If no what is missing? 
 Do you believe it is important to have both executive and non-executive 
directors on the board? 
 Does the Bank have board nomination committee? How does it work?  
 Do influential shareholders influence nomination and selection of board 
members?  
Functioning of 
the Board of 
Directors 
 Are board meetings considered as simply a formality or taken seriously by 
members? 
 How do you describe the board room environment? How important are the 
board dynamics around the board room table? 
 Strategy formulation is often considered to be the function of the board. 
What do you think is the involvement of the board in management 
operations? 
 Are conflict of interest and malpractices serious problems?  
Board 
compensation 
and Performance 
 
 If there are as such nonexecutive and executive directors in the board, how 
do you explain the impact of executive and non-executive directors, as a 
requirement, on performance? 
 Does the current level of remuneration of boards‟ impact on directors‟ 
performance?  
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Appendix 4.3. Sample Letter of Support 
Appendix 4.3a. Sample Letter of Support 
 
311 
 
Appendix 4.3b Sample Letter of Support 
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Appendix 4.3c. Sample Letter of Support 
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Appendix 4.4. Summary of returned questionnaires (cases) together with 
their identification numbers. 
 
Banks 
Respondents Category 
BOD and President MP/Shareholders Employees Remark 
Returned Ques. No Returned  Ques. 
No 
Returned Ques. 
No 
 
CBE 8 83-88, 
93,102 
 
51 
 
80-123 
305-311 
16 132-147  
CBB 6 89,90,96,
98,99,103 
22 148-167  
DBE 7 91,92,94,
95,101,10
4,106 
22 168-190  
Awash 9 1-7,81,99 8 1-8 7 191-197  
Dashen 5 8-12 7 9-15 8 198-205  
Abyssinia 8 13-20 9 16-24 5 206-210  
Wegagen 8 21-28 16 25-40 15* 211-224, 
312* 
 
United 8 29-36 12 41-53 8 225-232  
NIB 7 37-42,100 11 54-63, 
80* 
14 233-246  
CBO 4 43-46   6 247-252  
LIB 10 47-56 16 64-79 14 253-266  
Zemen  7 57-
61,65,82 
  6 267-272   
OIB 6 62-68   5 273-276  
Bunna  3 69-71   8 277-284  
Berhane  2 80,105   5 285-289  
Abay  3 72-74   6 290-295  
Addis  5 75-79   9 296-304  
NBE     5 124-128  
PFEA     3 129-131  
Total 106 (69%)  130**  183   
Grand 
Total  
Distributed 556 Stakeholders  
( Shareholders, 
MPs, 
employees, 
NBE, PFEA) 
Distributed 402 
Returned 419 (75%) Returned 313 (78%) 
* Not properly filled;    130** = 79 shareholders and 51 MPs 
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Appendix 4.5. Ethical Clearance 
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Appendix 5.1. Summary of number of missing data by Variable 
Variables Missing data Variables 
 
Missing data Variables 
 
Missing data 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
SComp_1 0 .0 PrCd_3 0 .0 SerNw_7 2 1.9 
SComp_2 0 .0 PrCd_4 1 .9 SerSp_1 0 .0 
SComp_3 3 2.8 PrCd_5 0 .0 SerSp_2 0 .0 
SComp_4 2 1.9 PrCd_6 0 .0 SerSp_3 1 .9 
SComp_5 0 .0 PrCd_7 0 .0 SerSp_4 0 .0 
SComp_6 1 .9 PrBrm_1 0 .0 SerSp_5 1 .9 
SComp_7 0 .0 PrBrm_2 0 .0 SerSp_6 0 .0 
SComp_8 0 .0 PrBrm_3 0 .0 SerSp_7 0 .0 
SComp_9 4 3.8 PrBrm_4 0 .0 SerSp_8 2 1.9 
SComp_10 2 1.9 PrBrm_5 0 .0 BCont_1 1 .9 
SComp_11 0 .0 PrBrm_6 0 .0 BCont_2 1 .9 
SBInd_1 1 .9 PrBrm_7 0 .0 BCont_3 0 .0 
SBInd_2 1 .9 PrBrm_8 0 .0 BCont_4 0 .0 
SBInd_3 2 1.9 PrBrm_9 0 .0 BCont_5 0 .0 
SComm_1 0 .0 SerAd_1 0 .0 BCont_6 0 .0 
SComm_2 1 .9 SerAd_2 1 .9 BCont_7 2 1.9 
SComm_3 0 .0 SerAd_3 0 .0 OCont_1 1 .9 
SComm_4 0 .0 SerAd_4 0 .0 OCont_2 0 .0 
SComm_5 0 .0 SerAd_5 0 .0 OCont_3 0 .0 
PrC_1 0 .0 SerAd_6 1 .9 OCont_4 0 .0 
PrC_2 0 .0 SerAd_7 5 4.7 OCont_5 0 .0 
PrC_3 0 .0 SerNw_1 0 .0 OCont_6 5 4.7 
PrC_4 0 .0 SerNw_2 0 .0 SCont_1 0 .0 
PrC_5 0 .0 SerNw_3 2 1.9 SCont_2 0 .0 
PrC_6 0 .0 SerNw_4 2 1.9 SCont_3 0 .0 
PrCd_1 1 .9 SerNw_5 1 .9 SCont_4 0 .0 
PrCd_2 0 .0 SerNw_6 0 .0    
There are no variables with 5% or more missing values. 
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Appendix 5.2. Summary of number of missing data by cases 
Cases Missing data Cases  Missing data Cases 
 
Missing data Cases 
 
Missing data 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Perce
nt 
1 0 .0 28 0 .0 55 1 1.3 82 4 5.0 
2 0 .0 29 0 .0 56 0 .0 83 1 1.3 
3 0 .0 30 0 .0 57 0 .0 84 2 2.5 
4 0 .0 31 0 .0 58 0 .0 85 1 1.3 
5 0 .0 32 0 .0 59 0 .0 86 1 1.3 
6 0 .0 33 0 .0 60 0 .0 87 0 .0 
7 0 .0 34 0 .0 61 1 1.3 88 4 5.0 
8 0 .0 35 0 .0 62 0 .0 89 0 .0 
9 0 .0 36 0 .0 63 0 .0 90 0 .0 
10 0 .0 37 0 .0 64 0 .0 91 1 1.3 
11 0 .0 38 0 .0 65 2 2.5 92 0 .0 
12 1 1.3 39 0 .0 66 1 1.3 93 1 1.3 
13 0 .0 40 0 .0 67 0 .0 94 0 .0 
14 0 .0 41 0 .0 68 1 1.3 95 0 .0 
15 0 .0 42 0 .0 69 0 .0 96 5 6.3 
16 0 .0 43 0 .0 70 0 .0 97 7 8.8 
17 0 .0 44 0 .0 71 0 .0 98 1 1.3 
18 0 .0 45 0 .0 72 0 .0 99 0 .0 
19 0 .0 46 0 .0 73 1 1.3 100 0 .0 
20 0 .0 47 0 .0 74 0 .0 101 1 1.3 
21 0 .0 48 0 .0 75 1 1.3 102 1 1.3 
22 0 .0 49 1 1.3 76 1 1.3 103 0 .0 
23 0 .0 50 0 .0 77 1 1.3 104 0 .0 
24 0 .0 51 0 .0 78 0 .0 105 0 .0 
25 0 .0 52 0 .0 79 0 .0 106 1 1.3 
26 0 .0 53 0 .0 80 0 .0    
27 0 .0 54 0 .0 81 0 .0    
There are no cases with 10% or more missing values. 
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Appendix 5.3. Mahalanobis D2 Distance Multivariate Outlier Test Results        
(df = 80) 
Case   
D
2
  
 
D
2
/df  
  
 
Case  
 
D
2
  
 
D
2
/df  
  
 
Case  
 
D
2 
 
 
D
2
/df  
  
 
Case  
 
D
2
  
 
D
2
/df   
36 96 1 15 86 1 91 80 0 8 74 0 
66 94 1 99 86 1 50 79 0 54 74 0 
16 94 1 53 86 1 27 79 0 25 74 0 
19 93 1 62 86 1 73 79 0 104 73 0 
82 92 1 85 85 1 30 79 0 106 73 0 
90 91 1 11 85 1 2 79 0 26 73 0 
29 91 1 51 85 1 101 79 0 94 72 0 
69 90 1 20 85 1 46 79 0 13 71 0 
72 90 1 35 85 1 31 78 0 83 71 0 
59 90 1 75 84 1 6 78 0 17 70 0 
71 90 1 10 84 1 1 78 0 87 69 0 
52 90 1 74 84 1 38 78 0 60 69 0 
34 90 1 102 83 1 5 77 0 84 69 0 
37 90 1 22 83 1 43 77 0 100 68 0 
79 90 1 76 83 1 80 77 0 33 66 0 
78 90 1 42 82 1 105 76 0 32 66 0 
68 89 1 58 82 1 7 76 0 65 65 0 
14 89 1 49 82 1 24 76 0 40 61 0 
98 88 1 28 82 1 41 76 0 56 60 0 
21 88 1 70 81 1 55 75 0 95 60 0 
97 88 1 93 81 1 44 75 0 45 59 0 
63 88 1 39 81 1 103 75 0 86 57 0 
67 88 1 12 81 1 88 75 0 4 56 0 
3 88 1 9 81 1 77 75 0 89 52 0 
23 87 1 96 80 1 64 75 0 57 51 0 
48 87 1 18 80 1 92 75 0    
47 86 1 61 80 0 81 74 0    
df (degree of freedom) = 80 
Appendix 5.4. Independent sample t-test for non-response bias (First order 
latent variables) 
First order latent variables t-test for Equality of Means 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Composite Index (mean of 
LV) 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Early Late Mean 
Difference 
SComp  (Board composition) -0.398 56 0.692 3.58 3.63 -0.05 0.13 
SBInd  (Board Independence) 1.291 61 0.202 4.10 3.85 -0.05 0.13 
Committee function (SComm) -0.176 62 0.860 3.99 4.02 -0.03 0.14 
Board Process – Commitment (PrCom) 2.221 63 0.030 3.95 3.62 0.33 0.15 
Board Process – Critical debate ( PrCd) 0.284 62 0.777 3.48 3.44 0.04 0.13 
Process- Boardroom atmosphere ( PrBrA) 0.681 63 0.499 4.06 3.95 0.11 0.16 
Board Service role- Advising (SerAd) -0.663 57 0.510 3.86 3.96 -0.10 0.15 
Board Service role- Networking (SerNw) -0.955 61 0.343 3.38 3.55 -0.17 0.18 
Board Service role- Strategic participation 
(SerSp) 0.222 62 0.825 4.06 4.02 0.04 0.17 
Board control role (BCont) 0.121 62 0.904 3.44 3.42 0.02 0.15 
Output control role (OCont) 0.573 56 0.569 3.86 3.80 0.07 0.12 
Strategic control role (SCont) 0.188 63 0.851 4.02 3.99 0.03 0.16 
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Appendix 7. Ownership and control structure 
Appendix 7.1a. Ownership and control structure of private banks by Sample 
one 
Characteristics Frequency  Valid % Cumulative % 
largest shareholders control bank with substantial voting 
right 
34 41 41 
largest shareholders control with voting right <5% 5 6 47 
at least two large shareholders control bank 8 9 55 
Ownership diffused 37 44 100 
 Missing 1   
Total 85   
 
Appendix 7.1b. Ownership and control structure of private banks evaluated by 
Sample two 
Characteristics Frequency  Valid  
% 
Cumulative % 
largest shareholders control bank with substantial voting 
right 
38 51.4 51.4 
largest shareholders control with voting right <5% 14 18.9 70.3 
at least two large shareholders control bank 14 18.9 89.2 
Ownership diffused 8 10.8 100 
 Missing 5   
Total 79   
 
Appendix 7.1c. Ownership and control structure of private banks (Sample one 
and two) 
Characteristics Frequency  Valid % Cumulative % 
largest shareholders control bank with substantial voting 
right 
72 45.6 45.6 
largest shareholders control with voting right <5% 19 12 57.6 
at least two large shareholders control bank 22 13.9 71.5 
Ownership diffused 45 28.5 100 
 Missing 6   
Total 164   
 
Appendix 7.2. Boards’ power, access to information, and remunerations 
Characteristics  Yes No Missing 
Who has the strongest influence in the 
selection and dismissal of non executive 
board of directors?* 
# %  % # % 
Board of directors 57 54 46 43 3 3 
Nomination committee 10 9 92 87 4 4 
President/CEO 12 11 91 86 3 3 
Controlling owner with input from board 56 53 47 44 3 3 
Others as NBE, AGM 22 21 79 75 5 5 
       
 
Who influences removal and appointment a 
president/CEO* 
Yes No Missing 
# % # % # % 
Board of directors 96 91 10 9   
Nomination committee 3 3 103 97   
Controlling owner with input from board 28 26 77 73 1 1 
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Others as NBE 7 7 98 93   
 
Boards’ access to information Often Sometimes Rarely Never Missing 
Boards‟ access to information made through 
meetings with managers and workers 
39 (37%) 49 (46%) 18 (17%) - - 
 No 
restriction  
Somewhat 
limited 
 Very 
limited 
Missing 
Boards‟ access to business records and books 
of account 
82 (77%) 16 (15%) 8 (8%) - 
 Very much 
so 
Not always Rarely Missing 
Issuing information in time  before every board 
meeting 
79 (75%) 21 (20%) 5 (5%) 1 (1%) 
 
 Yes No Missing 
Remuneration sufficient enough to attract, 
retain, and motivate:   
# % # % # % 
Board members 11 10 94 89 1 1 
Qualified senior management 69 65 36 43 1 1 
Remuneration of senior management is 
linked to performance 
50 47 55 52 1 1 
* More than one chosen 
Appendix 7.3. General corporate governance practices 
Characteristics Much 
better 
Slightly 
better 
Same  Slightly 
worse 
Much 
worse 
Misi
ng 
 Status of corporate governance in your bank 
compared with other banks 
38(36%) 30(28%) 32(30%) 3(3%) 1 (1%) 2 
Bank‟s current corporate governance practices 
compared with those of the previous years 
50(54%) 35(33%) 17(16%) 2(2%) 1 (1%) 2 
 
 Very 
good 
Good Satisfa
ctory 
Poor Very 
poor 
Mis. 
Evaluation of board in light of individual and 
group experience, effectiveness, approach to 
run the bank 
26(25%) 61(58%) 14(13%) 2(2%) 2 (2%) 1 
 
 Every 2 
weeks 
Every 
month 
Every 3 
months 
Every 
week 
Missing  
Frequency of board meetings 43(41%) 42(40%) 6(6%) 1(1%) 1 (1%)  
 
 
Average attendance rate per year 
90-100% 75-89% 60-74% 50-59% Below50% Mis
. 
66(62%) 34(32%) 3(3%) - 1 (1%) 2 
 
 
Size of board 
Too large  To small Ideal 7 9  
14(13%) 7(7%) 85(80%) 5(5%) 15 (14%)  
       
 
Document adhered to in the 
appointment of boards* 
Yes No Missing 
# % # % # % 
Commercial code  55 52 47 449 4 4 
NBE requirements  103 97 2 2 1 1 
Company policy 26 25 79 75 1 1 
Code of corporate governance 17 16 84 79 4 4 
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 Yes No Missing 
Presence of Board committee # % # % # % 
Audit committee 106 100 - - - - 
Nomination committee 10 9 96 91 - - 
Remuneration committee 19 18 86 81 1 1 
       
 
Board roles that  mainly 
characterizes the Ethiopian board of 
directors* 
Control role Service role Strategic role  
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
85 (80%) 21 (20%) 41(39%) 65 (61%) 67(63%) 39 (37%) 
Approach that would work better to 
promote good corporate governance 
practices in the Ethiopian banks 
Prescriptive Non-prescriptive Mixed 
# % # % # % 
15 14 5 5 86 81 
* More than one item chosen 
Appendix 7.4. The rights, equitable treatment and obligations of shareholders 
Appendix 7.4a. Aggregates of sample one and shareholders’ perceptions on 
the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders 
Characteristics  Yes No 
# % # % 
Deviation  from one-share one-vote rule  10 6 154 94 
Voting by mail allowed 2 1 162 99 
Voting by proxy allowed 120 74 43 26 
Adequate time given for questions at shareholders meetings 126 79 34 21 
Shareholders' priority subscription rights protected 153 95 8 5 
Equitable treatment of shareholders practiced 107 77 53* 33 
Candidates disclosed before shareholders‟ meetings 22 14 137 86 
Large shareholders nominate candidates at the shareholders‟ 
meetings 
115 72 45 28 
*Not  fully 
Appendix 7.4b. Aggregates of samples one and shareholders 
perceptions’ on the rights and obligations  
Characteristics  Yes Majority 
know 
Only few 
know 
# %  % # % 
Shareholder know their rights and obligations  55 34 78 48 30 18 
 
Those who know their rights freely exercise it in 
AGM in matters such as voting and  profit 
sharing 
Yes No Sometimes 
# % # % # % 
104 73 6 4 32 23 
Appendix 7.5. Aggregates of samples one and two on disclosure and 
transparency of private and public banks 
Characteristics  Yes No 
# % # % 
Governance structures 354 87 55 13 
Explicit corporate governance rules 268 66 137 34 
Vision, missions, and values 398 96 15 4 
financial performances       390 95 21 5 
Audited annual reports 385 94 25 6 
Resume or background of directors 237 58 172 42 
Members of board sub committees 256 63 152 37 
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Appendix 7.6. Relative importance of stakeholders in improving corporate 
governance 
Appendix 7.6a. Aggregates of samples one & two respondents on the relative 
importance of stakeholder in improving corporate governance 
Stakeholders Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # 
Media 63 16 40 10 61 16 71 18 85 22 71 18 26 
Chamber of commerce 12 3 49 13 81 21 92 24 90 23 65 17 28 
Professional society 40 10 83 21 100 26 91 23 46 12 31 8 26 
Financial supervisory 
agencies 
224 55 100 25 48 12 18 4 9 2 7 2 11 
The judiciary 35 9 54 14 69 18 61 16 79 20 89 23 30 
Non executive board of 
directors 
74 19 81 21 44 12 30 8 45 12 107 28 36 
Appendix 7.6b. Kruskal-Wallis test of perceptions in regard to the 
relative importance of stakeholders in improving corporate governance 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Media_1 Chamber_2 ProfSoc_3 SupAg_4 Judi_5 NEboard_6 
Chi-Square 10.617 13.897 13.252 31.105 10.978 15.874 
df 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Asymp. Sig. .060 .016 .021 .000 .052 .007 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
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Appendix 7.6c. Sample of pairwise comparison for the financial supervisory 
and regulatory agencies as stakeholder in improving corporate governance 
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Appendix 7.6d. Sample of pairwise comparison for the non-executive boards 
as stakeholder in improving corporate governance 
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Appendix 7.6e. Ranks of respondents on the relative importance of 
stakeholders in improving corporate governance 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
Media_1 
shareholder 74 196.26 
Private bank employee 111 195.62 
Member of Parliament 47 155.13 
Public bank employee 59 203.02 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 156.00 
Governing bodies 92 216.11 
Total 391  
Chamber_2 
shareholder 72 193.31 
Private bank employee 110 189.75 
Member of Parliament 47 160.47 
Public bank employee 59 181.08 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 222.63 
Governing bodies 93 226.42 
Total 389  
ProfSoc_3 
shareholder 71 167.30 
Private bank employee 110 213.50 
Member of Parliament 47 166.29 
Public bank employee 57 201.07 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 246.25 
Governing bodies 98 204.34 
Total 391  
SupAg_4 
shareholder 76 208.91 
Private bank employee 112 192.27 
Member of Parliament 49 276.31 
Public bank employee 59 203.77 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 202.75 
Governing bodies 102 176.72 
Total 406  
Judi_5 
shareholder 72 157.04 
Private bank employee 110 203.67 
Member of Parliament 47 211.59 
Public bank employee 56 198.92 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 172.50 
Governing bodies 94 201.10 
Total 387  
NEboard_6 
shareholder 69 230.23 
Private bank employee 107 172.59 
Member of Parliament 48 205.07 
Public bank employee 56 171.93 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 7 225.64 
Governing bodies 94 184.76 
Total 381  
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Appendix 7.7. Preventing the influence of controlling owners  
Appendix 7.7a. Aggregates of samples one and two perceptions in preventing 
influence of controlling owners  
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # 
minority shareholders  34 9 34 9 67 17 76 20 105 27 71 18 30 
Institutional investors 30 8 48 12 83 21 110 28 81 21 35 9 30 
Outside (non-executive) 
board of directors 
42 11 76 19 95 24 77 20 60 15 42 11 25 
Financial supervisory 
agencies 
205 52 111 28 37 9 25 6 9 2 12 3 17 
Labor unions or 
employees 
15 4 27 7 51 14 46 12 58 16 177 48 42 
The legal system 106 27 111 28 69 17 36 9 49 12 25 6 21 
 
Appendix 7.7b. Kruskal-Wallis test of perceptions in preventing the influence 
of controlling owners 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 MnrtySH_1 InstInves_2 OutsBOD_3 FSagen_4 Unions_5 LegalS_6 
Chi-Square 32.037 3.324 9.501 18.945 32.929 10.469 
df 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .650 .091 .002 .000 .063 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
 
 
Appendix 7.7c. Ranks of  perceptions in preventing the influence of controlling 
owners  
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
MnrtySH_1 
shareholder 74 154.60 
Private bank employee 110 194.15 
Member of Parliament 48 232.58 
Public bank employee 56 230.99 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 296.69 
Governing bodies 91 173.72 
Total 387  
InstInves_1 
shareholder 75 196.70 
Private bank employee 107 190.00 
Member of Parliament 48 212.09 
Public bank employee 56 194.59 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 231.81 
Governing bodies 93 183.48 
Total 387  
OutsBOD_3 
shareholder 73 220.79 
Private bank employee 110 195.37 
Member of Parliament 48 216.49 
Public bank employee 58 172.62 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 154.75 
Governing bodies 95 187.14 
Total 392  
FSagen_4 
shareholder 76 199.39 
Private bank employee 113 181.51 
Member of Parliament 48 258.43 
Public bank employee 58 207.14 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 195.88 
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Governing bodies 97 191.24 
Total 400  
Unions_5 
shareholder 74 206.86 
Private bank employee 102 182.87 
Member of Parliament 48 132.04 
Public bank employee 55 175.17 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 113.56 
Governing bodies 88 223.40 
Total 375  
LegalS_6 
shareholder 75 210.11 
Private bank employee 112 201.50 
Member of Parliament 48 162.00 
Public bank employee 58 202.11 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 123.25 
Governing bodies 95 208.38 
Total 396  
 
Appendix 7.8. Relative effectiveness of tasks for better corporate governance 
Appendix 7.8a. Aggregate of samples one & two perceptions on relative 
effectiveness of tasks for better corporate governance 
Characteristics Levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missing 
# % # % # % # % # % # %  % # 
Internal CG 
mechanism for better 
CG 
162 41 82 21 57 14 37 9 29 7 9 2 20 5 21 
external CG 
mechanism for better 
CG  
55 14 78 20 74 19 80 20 51 13 38 10 16 4 25 
Enhancing the 
standards of 
accounting, audit and 
disclosure 
46 12 86 22 74 19 71 18 52 13 27 7 35 9 26 
Introducing code of 
corporate governance 
126 32 82 21 77 20 48 12 36 9 18 5 7 2 23 
Conducting and 
publicizing corporate 
governance ratings of 
banks 
26 7 47 12 49 13 70 18 90 23 49 13 58 15 28 
Tightly controlling 
some types of related-
party transactions 
15 4 36 9 34 9 34 9 65 17 127 33 71 19 35 
Reducing ownership 
concentration 
36 10 24 6 31 8 32 9 49 13 79 21 126 34 40 
 
Appendix 7.8b. Kruskal-Wallis Test of perceptions of effectiveness of 
tasks for better corporate governance 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 IntCG_1 ExtCG_2 Stds_3 CCG_4 CGrating_5 RPT_6 Ownconc_7 
Chi-Square 2.780 6.184 22.765 6.187 11.684 14.629 34.164 
df 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Asymp. Sig. .734 .289 .000 .288 .039 .012 .000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
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Appendix 7.8c. Ranks of perceptions of effectiveness of tasks for better 
corporate governance 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
IntCG_1 
shareholder 74 212.32 
Private bank employee 110 199.59 
Member of Parliament 47 186.61 
Public bank employee 59 196.22 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 228.81 
Governing bodies 98 191.44 
Total 396  
ExtCG_2 
shareholder 74 219.43 
Private bank employee 109 188.89 
Member of Parliament 46 207.95 
Public bank employee 59 182.92 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 154.25 
Governing bodies 96 193.84 
Total 392  
Stds_3 
shareholder 73 186.48 
Private bank employee 110 221.39 
Member of Parliament 46 132.77 
Public bank employee 58 202.52 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 156.13 
Governing bodies 96 203.83 
Total 391  
CCG_4 
shareholder 72 222.32 
Private bank employee 112 181.65 
Member of Parliament 46 200.03 
Public bank employee 59 201.54 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 205.13 
Governing bodies 97 193.09 
Total 394  
CGrating_5 
shareholder 73 202.10 
Private bank employee 109 178.26 
Member of Parliament 45 197.16 
Public bank employee 59 183.83 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 124.63 
Governing bodies 95 220.59 
Total 389  
RPT_6 
shareholder 72 171.53 
Private bank employee 108 184.87 
Member of Parliament 45 233.99 
Public bank employee 57 217.39 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 7 192.14 
Governing bodies 93 178.19 
Total 382  
Ownconc_7 
shareholder 72 173.60 
Private bank employee 105 167.90 
Member of Parliament 45 257.81 
Public bank employee 57 214.82 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 7 261.50 
Governing bodies 91 169.76 
Total 377  
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Appendix 7.9  Aggregate of sample one and sample two results 
Appendix 7.9a. Aggregate of sample one and sample two results of board 
evaluation, and corporate governance approaches 
 Very good Good Satisfact
ory 
Poor Very 
poor 
Mis. 
Evaluation of board in light of individual 
and group experience, effectiveness, 
approach to run the bank 
 
88(22%) 
 
176(44%) 
 
106(26%) 
 
24(6%) 
 
10 (3%) 
 
13 
 
 
Board roles that  mainly 
characterizes the Ethiopian board 
of directors* 
Control role Service role Strategic role  
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
333(80%) 81(20%) 124(30%) 289(70%) 206(50%) 208 
(50%) 
Approach that would work better 
to promote good corporate 
governance practices in the 
Ethiopian banks 
Prescriptive Non-prescriptive Mixed 
# % # % # % 
66 16 26 6 316 78 
 
Appendix 7.9b. Aggregate of samples one and sample two results regarding 
remuneration 
 Yes No Missing 
Remuneration sufficient enough to attract, 
retain, and motivate:   
# % # % # % 
Board members 128 32 271 68 18 4 
Qualified senior management 251 62 153 37 13 3 
Remuneration of senior management is 
linked to performance 
184 46 217 54 16 4 
 
Appendix 7.9c. Kruskal-Wallis test for board evaluation (BrdMR1.2) of samples 
one & two combined 
 Test Statisticsa,b  Ranks 
 Evalua  
 
 
 
Evalua 
Stkhol N Mean Rank 
Chi-Square 19.042 Shareholder 77 201.76 
df 5 Private bank employee 108 196.97 
Asymp. Sig. .002 Member of Parliament 48 181.71 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
Public bank employee 58 188.12 
Supervisory & Regulatory 
agencies 
8 97.00 
Governing bodies 105 234.21 
Total 404  
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Appendix 7.10. Sample-2 Tests of the general corporate practices, board–
management relationships, corporate performance, strategic issues, board independence, 
board duty, and major governance issues of stakeholders‟ perceptions  
 
Appendix 7.10a. Kruskal- Wallis Tests  (Sample-2) 
Test Statistics
a,b
 - General corporate governance 
  GCGpra_1 GCGpra _2 GCGpra _3 GCGpra _4 GCGpra _5 GCGpra _6 
Chi-Square 6.314 16.379 12.140 25.885 9.844 7.019 
df 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .177 .003 .016 .000 .043 .135 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
 
  Test Statistics
a,b
 – Board-management relations 
  BrdMR1.1 BrdMR1.2 
Chi-Square 5.410 34.284 
df 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .248 .000 
 
Test Statistics
a,b
 - Corporate performance 
  CorPrf_1 CorPrf_2 CorPrf_3 CorPrf_4 CorPrf_5 CorPrf_6 
Chi-Square 11.311 26.389 .565 8.442 2.414 11.142 
df 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .023 .000 .967 .077 .660 .025 
c. Kruskal Wallis Test 
d. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
 
Test Statistics
a,b
: Strategic issue 
  StrIss_1 StrIss_2 StrIss_3 StrIss_4 StrIss_5 
Chi-Square 8.923 18.968 12.362 13.244 5.432 
df 4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .063 .001 .015 .010 .246 
e. Kruskal Wallis Test 
f. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
 
Test Statistics
a,b
 :  Board Independence 
  BrdInd_1 BrdInd_2 BrdInd_3 
Chi-Square 59.863 87.452 3.663 
df 5 5 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .160 
g. Kruskal Wallis Test 
h. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
 
Test Statistics
a,b
: Board duty 
  BrdDty_1 BrdDty_2 BrdDty_3 BrdDty_4 BrdDty_5 BrdDty_6 BrdDty_7 
Chi-Square 7.438 2.439 14.693 22.734 3.356 12.559 2.596 
df 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .114 .656 .005 .021 .500 .014 .627 
i. Kruskal Wallis Test 
j. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
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Test Statistics
a,b
: Corporate governance issues 
  CGIssu_1 CGIssu_2 CGIssu_3 CGIssu_4 CGIssu_5 CGIssu_6 
Chi-Square 31.915 30.320 35.533 37.743 30.564 33.738 
df 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
k. Kruskal Wallis Test 
l. Grouping Variable: Stkhol 
          
Appendix 7.10b.  Ranks                     
 General corporate governance ranks 
       Stkhol N Mean Rank 
GCGpra_1 
shareholder 78 164.20 
Private bank employee 114 163.74 
Member of Parliament 51 133.02 
Public bank employee 59 149.64 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 139.88 
Total 310  
GCGpra_2 
shareholder 79 167.32 
Private bank employee 114 168.67 
Member of Parliament 51 118.48 
Public bank employee 59 153.01 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 124.88 
Total 311  
GCGpra_3 
shareholder 79 143.71 
Private bank employee 113 171.01 
Member of Parliament 51 130.06 
Public bank employee 59 164.84 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 146.19 
Total 310  
GCGpra_4 
shareholder 79 141.36 
Private bank employee 114 172.21 
Member of Parliament 51 112.52 
Public bank employee 58 182.64 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 134.31 
Total 310  
GCGpra_5 
shareholder 79 147.72 
Private bank employee 114 170.11 
Member of Parliament 51 137.35 
Public bank employee 59 163.25 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 102.06 
Total 311  
GCGpra_6 
shareholder 79 144.07 
Private bank employee 114 162.89 
Member of Parliament 51 145.75 
Public bank employee 59 172.68 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 118.06 
Total 311  
GCGpra_7 
shareholder 78 139.22 
Private bank employee 114 168.79 
Member of Parliament 51 132.45 
Public bank employee 59 176.41 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 117.63 
Total 310  
GCGpra_8 
shareholder 79 149.73 
Private bank employee 114 165.79 
Member of Parliament 47 131.70 
Public bank employee 58 159.71 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 98.69 
Total 306  
Total 246  
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Board- management relations ranks 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
BrdMR1.1 
shareholder 79 148.42 
Private bank employee 114 157.50 
Member of Parliament 51 147.11 
Public bank employee 58 173.50 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 119.94 
Total 310  
BrdMR1.2 
shareholder 79 152.38 
Private bank employee 113 169.63 
Member of Parliament 50 102.09 
Public bank employee 58 180.91 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 97.81 
Total 308  
 
Corporate performance ranks 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
CorPrf_1 
shareholder 79 157.62 
Private bank employee 113 163.31 
Member of Parliament 50 118.62 
Public bank employee 57 160.59 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 160.88 
Total 307  
CorPrf_2 
shareholder 79 158.18 
Private bank employee 114 162.16 
Member of Parliament 51 118.52 
Public bank employee 58 183.05 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 70.13 
Total 310  
CorPrf_3 
shareholder 79 159.38 
Private bank employee 113 154.13 
Member of Parliament 51 153.68 
Public bank employee 57 148.84 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 157.13 
Total 308  
CorPrf_4 
shareholder 79 142.44 
Private bank employee 114 154.07 
Member of Parliament 49 141.60 
Public bank employee 57 175.21 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 192.00 
Total 307  
CorPrf_5 
shareholder 79 163.24 
Private bank employee 113 153.63 
Member of Parliament 51 141.61 
Public bank employee 58 159.49 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 145.75 
Total 309  
CorPrf_6 
shareholder 79 140.04 
Private bank employee 114 166.23 
Member of Parliament 51 135.24 
Public bank employee 57 170.19 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 160.44 
Total 309  
 
                                        Strategic issue ranks 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
StrIss_1 
shareholder 79 145.88 
Private bank employee 114 151.61 
Member of Parliament 51 182.21 
Public bank employee 58 158.63 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 112.94 
Total 310  
StrIss_2 
shareholder 79 145.41 
Private bank employee 114 141.05 
Member of Parliament 50 187.78 
Public bank employee 59 177.02 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 100.69 
Total 310  
StrIss_3 
shareholder 78 147.76 
Private bank employee 114 149.44 
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Member of Parliament 51 184.32 
Public bank employee 59 161.04 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 92.69 
Total 310  
StrIss_4 
shareholder 79 154.85 
Private bank employee 114 143.42 
Member of Parliament 51 180.85 
Public bank employee 59 168.70 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 94.56 
Total 311  
StrIss_5 
shareholder 78 154.78 
Private bank employee 114 144.54 
Member of Parliament 51 174.29 
Public bank employee 57 159.76 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 129.94 
Total 308  
 
Board independence ranks 
 Stakeholder type N Mean Rank 
BrdInd_1 
 
shareholder 78 179.12 
Private bank employee 114 192.89 
Member of Parliament 51 138.62 
Public bank employee 58 244.13 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 135.44 
Governing bodies 105 263.16 
Total 414  
BrdInd_2 
 
shareholder 79 163.49 
Private bank employee 114 199.14 
Member of Parliament 51 127.99 
Public bank employee 57 219.48 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 157.75 
Governing bodies 105 285.60 
Total 414  
BrdInd_3 
shareholder 77 145.90 
Private bank employee 114 161.14 
Public bank employee 55 175.85 
Governing bodies 104 212.97 
Total 350  
 
`Board duty ranks 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
BrdDty_1 
shareholder 79 146.47 
Private bank employee 114 160.50 
Member of Parliament 51 141.71 
Public bank employee 59 176.53 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 125.69 
Total 311  
BrdDty_2 
shareholder 77 153.45 
Private bank employee 114 155.88 
Member of Parliament 51 140.73 
Public bank employee 58 164.84 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 157.75 
Total 308  
BrdDty_3 
shareholder 77 135.50 
Private bank employee 114 173.47 
Member of Parliament 51 139.57 
Public bank employee 59 164.40 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 108.50 
Total 309  
BrdDty_4 
shareholder 77 142.76 
Private bank employee 114 179.52 
Member of Parliament 51 119.03 
Public bank employee 57 154.15 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 120.38 
Total 307  
BrdDty_5 
shareholder 77 141.53 
Private bank employee 114 162.04 
Member of Parliament 50 149.71 
Public bank employee 58 159.50 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 146.44 
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Total 307  
BrdDty_6 
shareholder 79 142.93 
Private bank employee 113 171.78 
Member of Parliament 51 136.49 
Public bank employee 56 157.61 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 98.50 
Total 307  
BrdDty_7 
shareholder 79 148.41 
Private bank employee 112 158.88 
Member of Parliament 51 155.70 
Public bank employee 57 156.00 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 115.81 
Total 307  
 
Corporate governance issues ranks 
 Stkhol N Mean Rank 
CGIssu_1 
shareholder 79 166.45 
Private bank employee 112 133.69 
Member of Parliament 51 207.71 
Public bank employee 59 131.95 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 174.31 
Total 309  
CGIssu_2 
shareholder 79 163.83 
Private bank employee 112 132.11 
Member of Parliament 51 208.08 
Public bank employee 58 138.58 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 149.69 
Total 308  
CGIssu_3 
shareholder 79 145.98 
Private bank employee 109 131.06 
Member of Parliament 50 210.15 
Public bank employee 53 137.16 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 156.81 
Total 299  
CGIssu_4 
shareholder 78 162.72 
Private bank employee 111 131.41 
Member of Parliament 50 211.76 
Public bank employee 58 127.47 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 175.69 
Total 305  
CGIssu_5 
shareholder 76 156.83 
Private bank employee 107 126.71 
Member of Parliament 51 199.25 
Public bank employee 54 138.11 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 107.44 
Total 296  
CGIssu_6 
Shareholder 77 166.01 
Private bank employee 110 129.90 
Member of Parliament 51 203.45 
Public bank employee 56 127.21 
Supervisory & Regulatory agencies 8 147.75 
Total 302  
 
334 
Appendix 8.1. Collinearity diagnostic and model summary 
 
A- First order model 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .814
a
 .663 .639 .60384 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PrCon, SComm, SBInd, SComp, PrCom, PrBrA, PrCog 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 70.267 7 10.038 27.530 .000
b
 
Residual 35.733 98 .365  
Total 106.000 105   
a. Dependent Variable: Serole ( Board control role) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PrCon, SComm, SBInd, SComp, PrCom, PrBrA, PrCog 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 1 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 
SBInd 
SComm 
SComp 
PrCog 
PrBrA 
PrCom 
PrCon 
2.576E-006 .059 .000 1.000  
.062 .074 .062 .849 .398 .634 1.576 
.039 .074 .039 .528 .599 .633 1.581 
.243 .073 .243 3.352 .001 .654 1.529 
.165 .094 .165 1.744 .084 .386 2.587 
.422 .094 .422 4.489 .000 .389 2.567 
.120 .093 .120 1.283 .202 .396 2.525 
.135 .065 .135 2.079 .040 .813 1.230 
a. Dependent Variable: Serole (Board service role) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
2 .846
a
 .716 .695 .55448 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PrCon, SComm, SBInd, SComp, PrCom, PrBrA, PrCog 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
2 
Regression 75.871 7 10.839 35.254 .000
b
 
Residual 30.130 98 .307  
Total 106.000 105   
a. Dependent Variable: Controle  ( Board control role) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PrCon, SComm, SBInd, SComp, PrCom, PrBrA, PrCog 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model  2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant
) 
SBInd 
SComm 
SComp 
PrCog 
PrBrA 
PrCom 
PrCon 
4.001E-006 .054 .000 1.000  
.199 .068 .199 2.942 .004 .634 1.576 
.074 .068 .074 1.097 .276 .633 1.581 
.198 .067 .198 2.970 .004 .654 1.529 
.074 .087 .074 .852 .396 .386 2.587 
.303 .086 .303 3.506 .001 .389 2.567 
.223 .086 .223 2.606 .011 .396 2.525 
-.004 .060 -.004 -.065 .949 .813 1.230 
a. Dependent Variable: Controle ( Board control role) 
 
B- Second order model 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .778
a
 .605 .598 .63735 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Process, Structure 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 64.161 2 32.080 78.974 .000
b
 
Residual 41.840 103 .406  
Total 106.000 105   
a. Dependent Variable: Serole 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Process, Structure 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model1 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
Structure 
Process 
-4.940E-006 .062 .000 1.000  
.302 .090 .302 3.359 .001 .475 2.105 
.531 .090 .531 5.912 .000 .475 2.105 
a. Dependent Variable: Serole 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
2 .836
a
 .698 .692 .55725 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Process, Structure 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
2 
Regression 74.015 2 37.008 119.175 .000
b
 
Residual 31.985 103 .311  
Total 106.000 105   
a. Dependent Variable: Controle 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Process, Structure 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 2 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
Structure 
Process 
-5.411E-006 .054 .000 1.000  
.381 .079 .381 4.850 .000 .475 2.105 
.517 .079 .517 6.587 .000 .475 2.105 
a. Dependent Variable: Controle 
 
Appendix 8.2. Total Effects (Mean, STDEV, T-Values) of the first and second 
order full model 
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Control role -> BCont 0.925623 0.924016 0.017874 0.017874 51.787424 
Control role -> OCont 0.878005 0.879687 0.027537 0.027537 31.884235 
Control role -> SCont 0.883611 0.883492 0.022810 0.022810 38.737280 
Process -> BCont 0.478875 0.473013 0.070916 0.070916 6.752703 
Process -> Control role 0.517355 0.511726 0.074824 0.074824 6.914270 
Process -> OCont 0.454240 0.450535 0.069823 0.069823 6.505587 
Process -> Pr Cog 0.901720 0.899495 0.029776 0.029776 30.283002 
Process -> PrBrA 0.869944 0.868461 0.027045 0.027045 32.165986 
Process -> PrCom 0.880629 0.881240 0.021358 0.021358 41.232535 
Process -> PrCon -0.462525 -0.425156 0.223440 0.223440 2.070020 
Process -> SCont 0.457140 0.452579 0.070326 0.070326 6.500327 
Process -> SerAd 0.445306 0.440487 0.080090 0.080090 5.560069 
Process -> SerNwI 0.353651 0.344684 0.077047 0.077047 4.590087 
Process -> SerNwR 0.416141 0.407559 0.079153 0.079153 5.257440 
Process -> SerSp 0.500873 0.493587 0.091835 0.091835 5.454054 
Process -> Service role 0.531061 0.523310 0.095300 0.095300 5.572538 
Service role -> SerAd 0.838521 0.842431 0.030105 0.030105 27.852909 
Service role -> SerNwI 0.665933 0.657934 0.078784 0.078784 8.452622 
Service role -> SerNwR 0.783603 0.778836 0.052547 0.052547 14.912468 
Service role -> SerSp 0.943157 0.942492 0.009313 0.009313 101.272786 
Structure -> BCont 0.699522 0.699260 0.045257 0.045257 15.456496 
Structure -> Control role 0.755731 0.756490 0.042137 0.042137 17.935276 
Structure -> OCont 0.663535 0.665847 0.047815 0.047815 13.877246 
Structure -> Pr Cog 0.653379 0.660789 0.055519 0.055519 11.768597 
Structure -> PrBrA 0.630354 0.638176 0.054871 0.054871 11.487851 
Structure -> PrCom 0.638096 0.647125 0.049090 0.049090 12.998573 
Structure -> PrCon -0.335142 -0.314025 0.166737 0.166737 2.009997 
Structure -> Process 0.724591 0.734035 0.048579 0.048579 14.915879 
Structure -> SBInd 0.760535 0.767554 0.045452 0.045452 16.732722 
Structure -> SComm 0.780705 0.779423 0.083173 0.083173 9.386511 
Structure -> SComp 0.783527 0.786599 0.060278 0.060278 12.998567 
Structure -> SCont 0.667773 0.668762 0.047155 0.047155 14.161150 
Structure -> SerAd 0.575676 0.577850 0.047478 0.047478 12.125000 
Structure -> SerNwI 0.457188 0.452993 0.074164 0.074164 6.164548 
Structure -> SerNwR 0.537973 0.535361 0.063661 0.063661 8.450588 
Structure -> SerSp 0.647513 0.647001 0.054499 0.054499 11.881110 
Structure -> Service role 0.686538 0.686210 0.054231 0.054231 12.659441 
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Appendix 8.3. Predictive relevance (Q2) 
Board service role Construct Cross-validated Redundancy (Q2) 
Total SSO SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
BCont 530.000000 252.066400 0.524403 
Control role 1378.000000 856.622656 0.378358 
OCont 424.000000 226.469009 0.465875 
Pr Cog 530.000000 229.093954 0.567747 
PrBrA 424.000000 210.952331 0.502471 
PrCom 530.000000 280.866833 0.470063 
PrCon 318.000000 274.190192 0.137767 
Process 1802.000000 1379.054705 0.234709 
SBInd 318.000000 202.398261 0.363527 
SComm 318.000000 187.445309 0.410549 
SComp 318.000000 204.442261 0.357100 
SCont 318.000000 109.960882 0.654211 
SerAd 530.000000 326.668256 0.383645 
SerNwI 318.000000 228.700614 0.280816 
SerNwR 530.000000 323.452236 0.389713 
SerSp 954.000000 405.616983 0.574825 
Service role 2332.000000 1685.948464 0.277038 
 
Board control role Construct Cross-validated Redundancy(Q2) 
Total SSO SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
BCont 530.000000 256.326497 0.516365 
Control role 1378.000000 858.803687 0.376775 
OCont 424.000000 235.521985 0.444524 
Pr Cog 530.000000 229.087798 0.567759 
PrBrA 424.000000 210.955610 0.502463 
PrCom 530.000000 280.881278 0.470035 
PrCon 318.000000 274.194862 0.137752 
Process 1802.000000 1379.092436 0.234688 
SBInd 318.000000 202.440435 0.363395 
SComm 318.000000 187.358328 0.410823 
SComp 318.000000 204.422333 0.357162 
SCont 318.000000 116.486510 0.633690 
SerAd 530.000000 319.932301 0.396354 
SerNwI 318.000000 225.276124 0.291585 
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SerNwR 530.000000 324.056708 0.388572 
SerSp 954.000000 393.391854 0.587640 
Service role 2332.000000 1682.373364 0.278571 
 
 
Board process Construct Cross-validated Redundancy(Q2) 
Total SSO SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
BCont 530.000000 252.070744 0.524395 
Control role 1378.000000 855.312413 0.379309 
OCont 424.000000 226.476234 0.465858 
Pr Cog 530.000000 229.009065 0.567907 
PrBrA 424.000000 212.819401 0.498067 
PrCom 530.000000 285.775739 0.460800 
PrCon 318.000000 277.442943 0.127538 
Process 1802.000000 1380.730773 0.233779 
SBInd 318.000000 202.461304 0.363329 
SComm 318.000000 187.294226 0.411024 
SComp 318.000000 204.448663 0.357080 
SCont 318.000000 109.962204 0.654207 
SerAd 530.000000 319.941764 0.396336 
SerNwI 318.000000 225.278024 0.291579 
SerNwR 530.000000 324.034729 0.388614 
SerSp 954.000000 393.430993 0.587599 
Service role 2332.000000 1684.968154 0.277458 
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Appendix 8.4. Private-public bank path models 
Appendix 8.4a Private bank path model  
 
       
 
Appendix 8.4b. Public bank path model 
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Appendix 8.5. List of Banks in Ethiopia 
Public Banks   Year of 
Est.  
(G.C) 
Private Banks Year of Est. (G.C) 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) 1970 Awash International Bank 2001 
Construction and Business Bank (CBB) 1982 Dashen bank 2002 
Development Bank of Ethiopia(DBE) 1909 Bank of Abysinnia  2003 
  Wegagen Bank 2004 
  United Bank 2005 
  NIB International Bank 2006 
  Cooperative Bank of Oromia 2004 
  Lion International Bank (LIB) 2006 
  Zemen Bank 2008 
  Oromia  International Bank 2008 
  Bunna International Bank 2009 
  Berhan International Bank 2009 
  Abay Bank S.C 2010 
  Addis International Bank 2011 
  Debub Global Bank S.C 2012 
  Enat Bank 2012 
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Appendix 8.6. ROA of Ethiopian Banks 
Source: Annual reports of individual banks 
 
 
 
 
Year   
Financial indicators 
Private banks & year of establishment (E.C.)  
 
Public banks & year of 
establishment (E.C.) 
Awash 
(1994) 
Dashen 
(1995) 
Abyssinia 
(1996) 
Wegagen 
(1997) 
United 
(1998) 
NIB 
(1999) 
CBO 
(2004) 
LIB 
(2006) 
Zemen 
(2008) 
OIB 
(2008) 
CBE 
(1963) 
CBB 
(1975) 
DBE 
(1901) 
2002/03 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 0.7 1.5  0.4  1.4 1.2  1.5*      2.3  0.5  -0.6 
2003/04 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 1  2.4 2.5  3.2  1.2  2.7*      1.6  0.7  -0.2 
2004/05 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 0.8  2.3  3.0  3.5 3.5  3.1 -0.9     1.9  1.2  1.3 
2005/06 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
1.7 3.4  3.5  4.0  3.3  3.1  -2.0     2.3  2.8  0.5 
2006/07 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 2.9  3.6  2.2  4.0  3.4  3.3  0.6 -1.9    2.2  3.0  0.6 
2007/08 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 3  3.4 0.4  4.0  3.4 3.6  2.2  -0.2   2.9  3.9  1.2 
2008/09 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 3.6 2.9 2.1  4.0  2.4  3.6  0.2  0.5 -2 -4.1  3.5 4.3  0.9 
2009/10 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 3.1  2.9  2.4  4.1  3.3  3.7  1.8  3.5 5.5 2.2  3.0  3.2  0.5 
2010/11 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 3.6  3.3  2.6 4.7  3.4  3.8  2.3  2.8 6.4 2.9  3.0  2.6  1.6 
2011/12 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
 3.3  4.1  2.8  4.1  3.6  3.7  3.3  3.5 4.3 2.1  4.0  3.5  1.8 
2012/13 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
2.8 3.3 2.9 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.3 2.3 3.6 2.9 1.8 
2013/14 Return on Average Assets 
(ROA) % 
3.1 3.4 2.5 2.9 2.5 3.2 5.0 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.3 1.1 1.6 
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Appendix 8.7. Net profit after Tax and Total Assets of Private and Public Banks (2003-2013/14) 
Year   
Financial 
indicators 
Private banks & year of establishment (G.C.) 
 
Public banks year & 
establishment (G.C.) 
Awash 
(2001) 
Dashen 
(2002) 
Abyssinia 
(2003) 
Wegagen 
(2004) 
United 
(2005) 
NIB  
(2006) 
CBO 
(2004) 
LIB 
(2006) 
Zemen 
(2008) 
OIB 
(2008) 
CBE 
(1970) 
CBB 
(1982) 
DBE 
(1908) 
2002/03 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
9 27 5.4 11 5 n.a. n.a. n.a.   541 4.5 -15 
Total Assets 1403  1991  1422  889 470  n.a. n.a. n.a.   24630 950 2644 
2003/04 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
17 56 38 32 7 n.a. n.a. n.a.   412  7.2 -6 
Total Assets 1770  2677  1651  1140  674 1247 n.a. n.a.   27870 1093 2762 
2004/05 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
35 71 61 48 31 46 -1.1 n.a.   579 17.3 46 
Total Assets  2379  3420 2231 1616 1073 1732 129 n.a.   33172 1833 4546 
2005/06 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
45 134 85 71 44 58 -4.19 n.a.   793 50 25 
Total Assets  2990  4546  2834 2259 1559 2027 224 n.a.   35827 1797 4958 
2006/07 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
95 188 67 112 64 76 2 -5   867 56 33 
Total Assets  3683  6041  3396 3480 2183 2607 424 267   43393 1885 5559 
2007/08 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
127 239 17 139 91 113 12 -1   1360 84 66 
Total Assets  4783  7840 4270 4125 3250 3650  678 574   50344 2394 5705 
2008/09 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
214 250 100 181 94 154 2 4 -9.1 -13.4 1921 106 53 
Total Assets  7133  9733 5477  5118 4652 4807 1023 952 463 326 59412 2588 6408 
2009/10 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
248 324 141 223 175 201 25 40 42 16 1968 92 37 
Total Assets 9023 12353 6280 5742 5896 5971 1768 1364  1055 1119 74187 3162 9263 
2010/11 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million)  
361 451 178 323 232 246 48 44 85` 44 2863 86 198 
Total Assets  11089 14660  7278 8061 7725 7112 2483 1808 1613 1962 114265  3504 15227 
2011/12 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
394 652 216 336 298 286 102 75 86 49 5419 116 362 
Total Assets 13125 17520  8240 8347  8787 8276 3700 2463 2394 2787 158114 5947 25024 
2012/13 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
439 607 264 340 282 286 190 111 94 78 6318 200 491 
Total Assets 17784 19747 10200 10393 9986 9145 6538 2942 3248 3911 194488 7925 29747 
2013/14 Net Profit After 
Tax ( Million) 
618 713 265 318 278 314 344 96 128 154 7265 90 528 
Total Assets 22100 21962 11270 11529 11876 10747 7350 3613 3925 6152 242726 7898 35717 
  
Source: Annual reports of individual banks   
 
